A Look to the North: Canadian Regional Experience

SUBSTATE
REGIONALISM
AND THE
FEDERAL
SYSTEM
Volume V

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As Professor Birkhead points out in the introduction to this volume, "Americans interested in local government reform have remarked enviously about Canadian success in reorganizing government in metropolitan areas."

The Canadian experience has included a variety of approaches and, generally speaking, it has been much more widespread than that of the United States. The Dominion's approach has focused much more heavily on the reorganization and amalgamation of local governments themselves than on overlaying existing governments with a variety of areawide districts. Moreover, Canada's provincial governments have assumed a vigorous role in reorganizing local governments, while its local governments exhibit less of the home rule tradition and citizen participation activity so characteristic in the United States.

The reader undoubtedly will see many similarities, as well as basic differences, when comparing the case studies in this volume with experiences in the States. Professor Birkhead's warning about the danger of importing lessons across national boundaries, however, should be underscored.

The Commission is publishing this volume out of a realization that few Americans are well acquainted with Canada's record of local government reorganization. The Commission believes that despite the diffculties in applying lessons from abroad, the literature on substate regionalism in America would be seriously deficient without recognizing the record of our neighbor to the north. The Commission hopes that this fifth volume in its series on substate regionalism will fill that void.

The seven case studies presented here were carried out under the direction of Professor Stewart Fyfe of Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. All of the authors are Canadian and have been intimately acquainted with the areas they write about. Professor Guthrie Birkhead of Syracuse University in Syracuse, New York, edited the entire volume for the American audience and wrote the introductory chapter to put the case studies in perspective for our readers.

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INTRODUCTION

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
Americans interested in local government reform have remarked enviously about Canadian success in reorganizing government in metropolitan areas. Several generations of political science and urban studies graduates in this country have dissected the story of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. Since the late sixties the experiences of New Brunswick and Winnipeg also have raised questions south of the border, the most prominent being, why is it easier to get metropolitan structural reform in Canada than in the United States? Time and again publicists have reminded us of the proximity of Canada and of the at least surface similarity of its culture and institutions to those of the United States. Time and again comes the rejoinder that the study of comparative government is still in its infancy, and the literature is replete with warnings of the danger that lies in importing "lessons" across national boundaries, much less state and local boundaries within the United States.

The studies in this volume were conceived and organized by Professor Stewart Fyfe of Queen's University, and they suggest answers to the questions Americans have been asking. More importantly, the studies fill some of the wide gaps in the knowledge about Canada's regional and metropolitan governments on the part of both Americans and Canadians. These Canadian authors describe decisions and events that have produced structural change at the sub-provincial level in the most populated provinces.[1] In Toronto and Winnipeg single metropolitan areas were reformed, while Quebec and Ontario have undergone province-wide efforts to reorganize all major population centers. The British Columbia and New Brunswick studies examine attempts to reshape entire sub-provincial governmental structure and even to create local government in isolated areas where it has never existed. The length of the individual cases herein is no measure of the intrinsic importance of the reforms they describe. At this time, for example, the New Brunswick changes of the mid-1960's seem more thorough and fundamental than those in British Columbia. All the cases include meaningful analysis of the political and administrative processes of change. There is little description or analysis of outcomes, however, with one or two exceptions. Indeed, most of these reorganizations are too recent for analysis to be possible.

Few Canadian scholars have taken the time to study local government. Best known in the United States have been the works of K. G. Crawford, Donald C. Rowat, and Thomas J. Plunkett. Excellent source materials exist in the provincial, particularly special commission, reports. With some effort, a substantial amount of description can be gleaned from journals and from other government sources, but ordinarily it has been fugitive from Americans and, one suspects, from most Canadians. Textbooks on Canadian government rarely discuss local, metropolitan, or regional government.[2]

Further, the relatively few studies of Canadian experience in this field have concentrated on organizational structure or finances and have been only suggestive of the elements underlying the changes or the perceived differences in the records of Canada and the United States. Among well-known works published in the United States or by Americans, Frank Smallwood's goes beyond description to look at Toronto's record during the first decade,[3] while Harold Kaplan's book is a useful attempt to analyze early Metropolitan Toronto in structural-functional terms.[4] The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has provided an excellent analysis of the intergovernmental fiscal situation in Canada and has compared it with the United States.[5] Nevertheless, urban political processes, even those associated with the principal instances of metropolitan reform, remain relatively untouched by scholarship. A welcome exception is the volume on Metropolitan Toronto recently published by Albert Rose.[6]

The focus of these studies is upon the adjustments Canadians have made in sub-provincial government organization to deal with growing difficulties in both rural and urban, but primarily metropolitan, areas. The 1971 Census defined 22 "census metropolitan areas" in the following manner:

> ... A CMA is the main labour market area of a continuous built-up area having 100,000 or more population. CMA's are created by Statistics Canada and are usually known by the name of the largest city. They contain whole municipalities (or subdivisions).
>
> The main labour market area corresponds to a commuting field or a zone where a significant number of people are able to travel on a daily basis to workplaces in the main built-up area. Therefore, a CMA comprises (1) municipalities completely or partly inside the continuous built-up area, and (2) municipalities lying within a 20-mile radius of the limits of the continuous built-up area, if (a) the percentage of labour force in primary activities is smaller than the national average, and (b) the percentage of population increase for 1956-66 is larger than the average for the 1966 CMA. When only (a) or (b) is met, municipalities are included if they are accessed by a provincial or federal highway.[7]

These CMA's are similar in concept to the SMSA's of recent U.S. censuses, but their boundaries are more finely drawn—in most cases along the lines of municipalities (as in New England) instead of county lines. The 22 CMA's in 1971 encompassed 11,874,748 inhabitants, or 55 percent of the total population of 21,568,311 (See Table I-1). In 1970, the 243 SMSA's in the United States included 69 percent of the total population.

CMA boundaries often differ from metropolitan or regional government boundaries, as do SMSA boundaries in the U.S. Further, in 1971 the Canadian CMA's contained 347 of the 4,579 municipalities in the

country, or 7.6 percent.[8] Montreal leads this list with 103 municipalities, while Quebec has 36, and other metropolitan areas even less. Critics have frequently expressed concern over this jurisdictional complexity, and new suburban incorporations seem to have stopped some time ago in most provinces. Calgary and Saskatoon have only one municipality each, and 12 of 15 localities in Winnipeg were amalgamated into one in 1972. The "too many governments" syndrome of the United States thus has a parallel in Canada. Deciding which country has the more severe condition is chiefly a matter of choosing which U.S. metropolitan areas to compare with which Canadian complexes, and what indicators to emphasize. Generally, however, Canada's situation seems much less complex.

Most of Canada, of course, is uninhabited. These papers do not deal with the wilderness, except as some stretches of it are covered by new regional arrangements in New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia. In area, Canada is larger than the U.S. and second only to the USSR. The rugged climate and the Canadian Shield have limited urban settlement to a narrow corridor 100 to 200 miles wide along the southern border, with heaviest concentration in a strip extending from Quebec west along the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes to Windsor and London, Ontario. The two major metropolitan areas, Montreal and Toronto, are in this slender strip, along with eight lesser metropolitan areas. These combine for a total of 8,161,418 people, or 69 percent of the metropolitan population and 39 percent of the total population. This might be called Canada's mini-megalopolis, and it is closely associated with the

Table I-1

Canadian Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA's)
1971 Population, Percentage Increase in Population,
1966-1971, and Number of Municipalities, 1971

Census Metropolitan Area	1971 Population	Percent Population Increase 1966-71	Total Municipalities 1971
Calgary, Alta.	403,319	22.0	1
Chicoutimi-Jonquière, Que.	133,703	0.6	13
Edmonton, Alta.	495,702	16.5	9
Halifax, N.S.	222,637	6.1	3
Hamilton, Ont.	498,523	9.0	12
Kitchener, Ont.	226,846	18.0	9
London, Ont.	286,011	12.7	9
Montreal, Que.	2,743,208	6.7	103
Ottawa, Ont.-Hull, Que.	602,510	13.9	26
Quebec, Que.	480,502	10.0	36
Regina, Sask.	140,734	6.3	2
St. Catharines-Niagara, Ont.	303,429	6.3	9
St. John's, Nfld.	131,814	12.1	6
Saint John, N.B.	106,744	2.4	10
Saskatoon, Sask.	126,449	9.1	1
Sudbury, Ont.	155,424	13.7	11
Thunder Bay, Ont.	112,093	3.8	3
Toronto, Ont.	2,628,043	14.8	31
Vancouver, B.C.	1,082,352	16.0	19
Victoria, B.C.	195,800	11.7	7
Windsor, Ont.	258,643	8.5	12
Winnipeg, Man.	540,262	6.2	15
Totals	**11,874,748**	**11.1**	**347**

Note: Municipalities were reduced in 1972 to eight in Sudbury and six in Kitchener.

Source: Statistics Canada, Census Division, 1971 Census of Canada, "Final Counts of CMA by Municipality (1971 area)." (Ottawa: Geography Section, May 1972). Statistics Canada, 1972 *Canada Year Book* (Ottawa, 1972), Table 35, p. 134, reports different totals of municipalities for some CMA's. The above totals of municipalities do not include regions in British Columbia or counties.

great concentration of population in the northeastern and north central United States. Further west and north, metropolitan areas are isolated by vast expanses of farms and wilderness, until British Columbia which includes an urban cluster, again near the U.S. border on the south.

Among the provinces, only Prince Edward Island and the Territories have no metropolitan areas. Eight are in Ontario, three in Quebec, while Ottawa-Hull (Outaouais) is on the boundary between those two provinces. Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia have a pair each, while Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Manitoba each have one.

SUCCESS IN REFORM

The record of reforms delineated in the following pages denotes far more success since World War II in formal reorganization of metropolitan areas and local governments on a province-wide basis than has occurred in the United States. A few reform moves have failed, but in Toronto, Winnipeg, and elsewhere longstanding organizational obstacles to change, including local boundaries, have been swept away. New institutions have been created, in form and criteria remarkably like the recipes for change long touted for American localities. New Brunswick has gone even further with functional reorganization and the revamping of the revenue and expenditure system of the province and local governments. It is almost as if reform ideas had been pent up for decades and suddenly loosened in provincial capitals. Those ideas have been melded with English practices and indigenous concepts in uniquely Canadian ways.

Whether this has added up to better delivery of services or more responsive or democratic local government for the Canadians affected—or in contrast with the United States—are points yet to be determined. In the past few years, empirical studies of discrete policy areas have begun to reconvince scholars of the efficacy of structural reorganization in changing outputs and citizen satisfaction as well as organizational behavior. At a minimum, this proposition now can be tested in Canadian metropolitan areas and regions.

Here we can postulate some answers to the question, why has there been so much action toward an achievement of formal reorganization in Canadian metropolitan areas and in provincial-local relations? These answers fall under three headings: a crisis in service delivery, certain elements of Canadian political culture, and the constitutional and legal setting of Canadian local government and provincial-local relations. In speculating on these subjects, contrasts with the United States are often readily apparent.

SERVICE DELIVERY CRISIS

Local, provincial, and federal governments participate in the delivery of services, and a complicated set of functional and fiscal relationships emphasizes the provincial role. Arrangements for direct sharing of income tax proceeds between Ottawa and the provinces resulted in 1970 in the provinces receiving 28.9 percent of the total, as compared with the American States receiving only 9.4 percent of income tax proceeds in that year. There also is a system of special aid to the poorer provinces to equalize revenue-raising capacity. In addition, the federal government matches provincial welfare costs.[9]

Welfare, then, is a federal-provincial activity; the center bears about 80 percent of total costs, provincial governments 18 percent, and municipal governments less than two percent.[10] Of public expenditures on health, the provinces pay two-thirds and municipalities under three percent.[11] In both welfare and health, federal and local shares have been declining for at least a decade, while the provinces have been paying proportionately more. For elementary and secondary education, the provinces pick up slightly over half the total cost; local school boards pay the rest with the exception of 6 percent financed by the federal government via miscellaneous small programs.[12] Federal conditional grants and loans to provincial governments are also provided in highways and transport, urban renewal and housing, regional economic development, and other fields. A small amount of aid is paid directly by the federal government to local governments, primarily for payments in lieu of taxes, housing, and transport. Much greater provincial assistance to local governments goes for education, highways, aid to unemployed, and a handful of other programs.[13]

A feeling of crisis has been articulated by many Canadians about the quantity and quality of service delivery by local and provincial governments,[14] including a rising consciousness of the plight of the urban poor. This feeling extends to a concern about the entire role of local governments in their federal system. Traditionally, municipal governments were conceived as non-partisan administrators of limited services such as police, fire, water, and sewage disposal, and there was great emphasis on efficiency and keeping property taxes low. In 1973, property taxes remain the chief source of local revenues. Increasing population, however, has meant rising demands for more and better services of the traditional kind. Moreover, new services are sought by urban people in transportation, health, and housing, even though the locality may have no legal power or funds to perform them. As one authority explains:

> ... Urban citizens look increasingly to city hall for leadership in developing a consensus in support of urban-oriented policies and programmes. Moreover, there is a growing desire on the part of urban residents to develop the means of being able to influence the quality of urban life, to preserve customary life-styles or to give expression to emerging life-styles.

... [There has been a] shift in the decision-making role of municipal governments from one that previously emphasized administrative decision to one that now requires the reconciliation of community conflict and controversy. But the existing structure is still geared to the former role and is not readily adaptable to the genuinely political nature of the latter.

Equally if not more important, is the fact that the financial structure of Canadian municipalities barely enables them to meet the requirements of their traditional role let alone provide even a token response to new needs.[15]

There have been serious objections to the strain these expenses place on the property tax.[16] As a result, property assessment and property taxation in several instances have been taken over by the provincial governments.

Demands for improved services have occasionally been accompanied by a cry for further public participation in governmental decision making as part of the drive against poverty. Also, there have been initiatives by provincial governments to encourage neighborhood organizations. Toronto has experienced this movement.[17] Tom Axworthy describes in Chapter VI the community committees that have been built into the new Winnipeg Unicity to encourage citizen involvement. As described by David Barnes in Chapter VII, one purpose of the regional districts in British Columbia is to gain more voice and interest in public affairs by rural residents. Again, the interesting *"animation sociale"* movement, begun in rural Quebec by the Bureau d'Aménagement de l'est du Quebec in 1963 and later extended to Montreal and other areas, aimed at popular participation through "the idea of each person participating as much as possible in his individual and collective growth."[18] Jean Godin notes *animation sociale* briefly in these pages. From afar, these experiments appear to resemble OEO and other attempts in the same period to activate U.S. citizens, but the Canadian experience apparently has attracted less attention by scholars than has that in this country.

Service demands and occasional unrest in large cities have also reflected ethnic frictions. In Chapter IV, Godin briefly examines this quandary in Montreal, where it has become reflected roughly by central city-suburban animosity. Since World War II immigrants from Commonwealth countries, the United States, Italy, and other non-English-speaking countries have settled in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and other urban centers. The pieces by Axworthy, Rose, and Fyfe mention these new arrivals. There is as yet no summary treatment of the role of these newer immigrants in sub-provincial governmental affairs.

Most of this will have an exceedingly familiar ring to American ears, as will specific instances of urban problems in the cases which follow. There is little mention of non-whites in this context in Canada, if only because they are such a small minority.[19] Otherwise, a close parallel exists between this description of Canadian local governmental problems and those in the United States. Yet unlike the typical American urban situation, these perceptions have supplied the motivation for changes in formal governmental organization that are examined in these case studies.

Do Canadian scholars arrive independently at conclusions about institutional situations that are very much like those in the neighbor to the south? Or do they share in a pattern of social and political criticism that blankets both countries? Are the problems of Canada's urban areas only apparently like those in the U.S. because the tools and theories are alike in both instances? Or are the problems really the same? Whatever the answers may be, perceptions of Canada's urban difficulties closely resemble those of America's, *mutatis mutandis*. It frequently has been asserted that Canada is a decade behind the United States, but within the same cycle. Since "problems" of cities have developed more recently, perceptions of need and thus motivations for change have crystallized later. "When I visit southern Ontario, it is as though I were back in the fifties in New York State," says one observer. This dubious observation adds to our puzzlement. Is the difference only in time? Why should similar perceptions have produced rather different results? All this leads to examination of differences in the contexts or environments within which contrasting responses have emerged.

POLITICAL CULTURE

Values and beliefs, components of culture, are if anything less susceptible of identification and analysis than are socio-economic conditions that may induce change. The culture of Canada, including its political component, however, has been subjected to longer and more leisurely examination than have urban problems. S. M. Lipset has summarized the empirical and other research with special attention to contrasts between Canada and the United States in his book, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures.*[20] "The great mass of literature on these two North American democracies suggests the United States is more achievement-oriented, universalistic, egalitarian, and self-oriented than Canada."[21] Lipset stresses that these value orientations of the two neighbors are not greatly different, perhaps because social and economic development has been similar in each. He holds, nonetheless, that Canada's counterrevolutionary origins differ from American revolutionary origins and have had a lasting impact on Canadian values. These original differences have been institutionalized in religious systems, family structures, class relations, and educational systems.

Retention of monarchical institutions and the dominant Anglican and Roman Catholic religious traditions have contributed to giving Canada a more conservative cast. Lipset deals at length with evidence that Canadians are more elitist in outlook, tend to respect leaders as well as government institutions more, and depend more upon ascribed characteristics than do Americans. Even the trite metaphor of the mountie as the symbol of the Canadian frontier and the cowboy as the symbol of the U.S. frontier contains just enough historical accuracy to point up the difference in values.

Lipset largely fails to include French-Canadian values in his analysis,[22] but his findings are provocative when related to recent governmental reorganization in the Anglo-Canadian provinces. In British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick reorganization was initiated and engineered by provincial governmental authorities. Respect for legitimate governmental authority does seem to predominate more than in most American cases, where extra-governmental personalities, communications media, labor unions, and business organizations are frequently active. Canadian respect for authority may encourage provincial ministers and bureaucrats to act with greater decision and speed than do American state officials. Recent instances of American metropolitan reform by the Minnesota and Indiana state legislatures may be used either to affirm or negate the contrast between the United States and Canada in this regard.

Counter to the Lipset interpretations is an article by Tom Truman, a Canadian.[23] Reviewing some of the same evidence as did Lipset, and adding further sources of his own, Truman finds that Canada, with Britain and Australia, is more egalitarian than the United States. As evidence, he cites the social democratic parties in those three countries and finds that they are "more advanced . . . along the road to the welfare state . . . ."[24] By a few of the measures Lipset employed, Truman finds that Canada today is probably neither counter-revolutionary nor elitist. Canada, he says, is not embracing Britain and its institutions to escape the U.S. any more than any small country in the world today is trying to evade the U.S. and Russian (or Chinese) cultures. Both Truman and Lipset consider the Trudeau Liberal regime as perhaps marking a leftward drift in Canada's political and other values, by which Lipset seems to mean that Canada is becoming more like the U.S. and Truman appears to mean Canada is leaving the U.S. behind. How either scholar would relate these judgments to the Trudeau government's setback at the polls in December 1972 is unclear.[25]

This debate over values is troublesome from the standpoint of the central questions here under discussion. Lipset would help us to understand why there has been relatively more metropolitan reorganization in Canada, but Truman would deprive us of an explanation related to values, save perhaps the most general one that

leftist political thinking usually depends more on government as a central force in society than does rightist. With reference to the subject here, one notes that the provincial governments' carrying out metropolitan and regional reforms could scarcely be termed leftist. The role of the state as conceived by British and European socialists, however, has caught the imagination of many Canadians.

Given the present state of social science research, it is most discouraging to look for a direct connection between values and action by provincial or local governments. Examining individual cases adds to the quandary. In metropolitan area X, Canadian or American, whose values are at issue in understanding a reform move—the public, segments of the public, the decision makers, or all three? There is evidence in Canada that more initiative rests with provincial cabinets and with leading bureaucrats in provincial departments of municipal affairs. Studies of the beliefs and value orientations of these leadership elements would be worthwhile.

Across most of the continent the U.S.-Canada boundary in cultural terms is perhaps as close to no boundary as exists between two nations. In an age of instant and partly shared communications, Canada can scarcely find cultural sovereignty in the face of its giant neighbor.[26] The shades of value differences between the two countries, however, will continue to help explain varying collective behavior and institutional reactions. Thus, one hopes to see more precise comparisons of neighboring states and provinces, New York-Ontario or Washington-British Columbia, neighboring metropolitan areas such as Toronto-Rochester or Detroit-Windsor, as well as comparisons of parallel political processes or services.[27] These minor distinctions will be useful in the continuing attempt to understand urban problems and may turn out to tell more about the "evils of nationalism" than stronger contrasts, which probably do not exist, would tell.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SETTING

In history, theory, and fact, provincial-local relations and local governments in English Canada resemble those in the United States. The differences, many of them marginal, may go far in helping us understand the relative success of the Canadian metropolitan and regional reorganization movement. In the cases that follow, institutional details receive more attention than do group and individual behavior. In this connection, one is reminded that comprehension of the effects of organization structure on outputs is at least as rudimentary as understanding of the translation of individual values into demands and supports. We are, therefore, on as uncertain ground here as in the preceding section.

In the Canadian version of federalism, the provincial legislatures have limited, explicit powers, while Parlia-

ment has general and residual powers. This reversal of the United States constitutional formula has been the subject of continual debate which concerns the studies here very little. Much more important is the provincial-local relationship, which in constitutional terms is very much like its U.S. counterpart. Our Constitution does not mention substate governments, but the British North American Act of 1867, Canada's Constitution, in section 92-8, gives the provinces complete authority over municipal institutions.

> 92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subject next here-in-after enumerated; that is to say—
> ****
> s.8 Municipal Institutions in the Province.[28]

There is, thus, explicit recognition that English parliamentary sovereignty over municipal institutions was passed directly to provincial legislatures. This was precisely what occurred in the United States through usage, law, and court decision, but without expression in the Constitution. As Donald Tansley expressed it, in Canada "Local government . . . is whatever the provincial government says it is."[29]

The original provincial-local relationship in Canada has endured more than a century. In most provinces the practice was formerly that of allowing municipalities wide latitude to deal with their affairs, but since World War II provincial governments have paid more attention to local problems. The provinces, of course, do not have written constitutions. In the United States, however, through nearly two centuries state constitutions have been filled with protective devices for local governments, primarily protection against the state legislatures—prohibitions against special laws, home rule, requirements that changing local forms of government be accomplished by statewide or local referenda, and much more. American legislatures have gone further to legislate protection for local governments and indeed to pass far more laws concerning local affairs than has been the Canadian practice. Each province has a general act for local governments supplemented by acts dealing with specific functions such as education or highways. Occasionally special acts are passed, as was done for the Toronto and other regional governments. Referenda have rarely been used in recent years.

On the administrative side, each province has a department of municipal affairs and in some cases a municipal board to handle local government matters and provincial-local relations. Much that is provided by law in the usual American state is covered by custom and usage in the Canadian province. The department of municipal affairs is headed by a minister, a member of the provincial cabinet, who is directly responsible to the legislative assembly and the cabinet for all his actions. Matters of policy often originate with career officials in

these departments. Municipal boards are quasi-judicial bodies for adjudicating intermunicipal affairs, boundary changes, and various financial matters. Finally, in 1970, the federal government established a Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, charged with considering national urban policy. The Ministry has only a small staff and no operating responsibilities.

This Canadian system, it is safe to say, results in a greater sense of responsibility for local affairs in provincial (as compared with state) authorities, beginning with the premiers. Perhaps better expressed, it has meant a greater willingness on the part of the provincial leadership to act on matters that would be deemed local in American states. Canadian officials depend more upon informal reading of local opinion about change, where American governors and legislators commonly do not act without assurance they have at least majority support in areas to be affected. The other side of this coin is that Canadian local governments are weaker in constitutional, legal, and administrative terms than are American. Canadians are more accustomed to having provincial legislatures or bureaucrats make decisions about local borrowing, expressways, sewage systems, forms of government, boundaries, and the like than are Americans. Having metropolitan or regional governments legislated without referendum in affected localities, or having provincial leaders allocate functions among the tiers of new metropolitan government, are less traumatic there than here.[30]

Reform of the municipal level, therefore, has been easier in these formal terms in Canada than in the United States. Constitutional obstacles have been nil, and legal obstacles few. These cases illustrate numerous political obstacles, but the system provides the machinery for change when the leaders of the majority party in the legislature are ready to change. Preparation takes time, and each of the reforms reported in these pages has resulted from several years of analysis, formulation, and discussion of proposals at the provincial level. New laws often are necessary. The incursion of the council-manager plan from the United States required new legislation, and recently several provinces (Ontario, Manitoba, Quebec) have passed special laws with regard to new metropolitan governments. Amalgamating municipalities has usually been carried out by law, as have other kinds of fairly drastic reform.

Virtually all of these structural features are documented in the following case studies. One is particularly impressed with the firmness of decision of provincial governments, with crucial decisions often made without the detailed and protracted inputs from local parties, officials, and interest groups that characterizes similar attempts at decision by American state officials—as in Miami, Nashville, Jacksonville, or even Minneapolis-St. Paul and Indianapolis-Marion County. Reforms in New Brunswick and Ontario have come slowly, as Chapters V

and II illustrate. Frequently, however, the delays have occurred within the provincial government.

In Canadian metropolitan areas, there apparently has not been the amount and degree of interest-group activity that exists in American localities of comparable size. The literature seems to indicate this has been the case, and the studies here affirm it in most cases. As seen in Ontario, however, municipalities may submit briefs to provincial authorities, and advice may be solicited by the province from associations of local officials. Investigating commissions may be set up on specific problems. When there are strong local feelings, they can become salient, as Fyfe relates they have in the Hamilton-Wentworth and the Peel-Halton delays. The atmosphere may be changing. Nevertheless, until recently provincial decisions about local matters have involved primarily the cabinet or the majority party in the legislature, but seemed scarcely to demand protracted negotiations with the local wing of the majority party.

If the latter impression is correct, perhaps it results from the parliamentary form of government in each province and the party (some would say cabinet) responsibility thus implied. Competition between the parties is a fixture of Canadian government at the provincial and national levels. When a party is in the majority in a provincial legislature, only agreement among legislative members is required for it to act *vis-a-vis* local governmental matters. It is reported that the original Metro Toronto was worked out in the Toronto and York caucus, which comprised all government members of the Ontario legislature from Toronto and its suburbs. When majority party, cabinet, and especially premier are strong, the process may be fast. None of the governments that have set up regional or metropolitan governments seems to have suffered at the polls as a result of these actions. In fact, opposition parties have sometimes complained that reform is too slow.

National party competition, however, does not exist at the local or metropolitan level, and national party labels are not employed in local elections.[31] Where civic parties exist in larger cities, they may have informal ties with national parties, as in the United States. Until recently, such civic parties have been inactive between elections. One exception is the Civic Action Party, the Montreal party of Mayor Jean Drapeau, which has effectively dominated that city council. Usually there has been no clearly recognized party responsibility in municipal government. That local affairs are so openly exposed to provincial decision makers helps to explain this condition. It is, however, also related to the kinds of formal structures that have been created for local governments.

The formal structure of local governments, including the new metropolitan governments, does not provide for highly concentrated decision making authority. Mayors and reeves (the equivalent of mayor in certain small units) do not have the powers of elected chief executives on the U.S. side of the border. Direct election of mayors has been adopted in this century, but the strong-mayor concept, the political scientist's favorite among the devices of the municipal reform movement, has had little visible impact in Canada. Committees of the local council are frequently active, but there is always heavy dependence on the career employees in functional departments. Further, local governments look to the province to approve planning and zoning schemes, borrowing, and the like, so that local councils relatively less often consider matters that would be termed "policy" in American cities. Finally, beyond charter and legal arrangements, the absence of party attention to local affairs has meant that a close equivalent of cabinet government has not developed locally.

Several variations on the idea of a corporate executive have been employed. Formerly, Ontario cities had powerful boards of control, which they seem to have borrowed from several New York State cities and their experimentation in the early days of the municipal reform movement. The Canadian boards are rapidly disappearing, as did the American. A board of control comprised the mayor and (usually four) controllers, elected at large and devoting more time to their tasks than aldermen, who are elected from districts. Executive committees, typical in larger Quebec municipalities, are less powerful than were boards of control. An executive committee is chosen by the council from among its ranks to serve with the mayor. It reportedly does not act with much decision or clarity, perhaps because of its intimate ties with the council.[32]

Elsewhere, a city council may have a small number of standing committees vested with operating responsibilities; then the appointed commissioner of a given department (public works, recreation) reports directly to the relevant committee. Ordinarily there is also an executive committee of the council. The new Winnipeg metropolitan administrative and legislative organization is of this nature, and its commissioners meet with the mayor as a board with administrative responsibilities. The Manitoba government found precedents for this structure in neighboring provinces, not in the U.S. local commission form of government. Thus, the format as conceived is basically English, not American.

Councils seem to operate by consensus. Of course, exceptional personalities emerge as strong leaders under any of these arrangements, as has happened in the United States in weak-mayor cities. Formal means of encouraging such leadership has often been discussed in Canadian localities. The first chairman of the Metropolitan Toronto Council, Frederick G. Gardiner, was appointed by the provincial government, while Manitoba law provided for the first Mayor of the Winnipeg Unicity to be elected, and Stephen Juba won that race. Political necessity demanded both of these conditions, and both charters provided for a permanent switch in the second

term to the more familiar system of having the metropolitan council elect the chairman. Gardiner, who turned out to be a strong chairman, served eight distinguished years in that capacity. Juba has a unique style and an exceedingly strong political base, yet it remains to be seen if the Winnipeg council will elect him for a second term.

Canadian commentators have long called attention to the lack of clear leadership and party government at the local level. Writing in the 1950's, Donald C. Rowat speculated that the cabinet system had not developed locally because: (1) Canadian cities have tended to copy U.S. forms of government; (2) Canadian municipal elections have been non-partisan; (3) there are technical obstacles; and

> (4) ... if the system were used in the largest city in a province, the Cabinet of the city government, supported by a majority of elected representatives in the city Council, might become so powerful as to rival the provincial Cabinet itself. A more important objection is that a difficult situation might arise where a city government represented a political party different from that in power in its province.[33]

In the light of this early warning that urban coalitions might become aligned against provincial majorities, it is interesting to observe that the provinces have still run that risk and created new metropolitan entities. There remains the possibility that provincial-metro conflict will come about. In 1971, at the urging of local interest groups, the Ontario government vetoed a major expressway planned by Metropolitan Toronto. Something like party competition has been reported as emerging in that municipality's Council after the 1972 local elections. In Quebec Province, one may interpret recent events as the beginnings of a Province-Montreal conflict. The format of the new Winnipeg government also seems well suited for parties to begin to organize the council and operate in cabinet style.

A NOTE ON QUEBEC

Since the vast majority of Canadians are either English- or French-speaking, the co-existence of these two cultures (languages, religions) has obviously had some effects in local government terms. Friction between the two, however, has probably had considerably less effect on sub-provincial governments than has the black-white friction in the U.S., if only because the bulk of French Canadians live in the Province of Quebec while black Americans are scattered widely through the states.[34]

Outside Quebec, accommodations by local governments with locally sizable French-Canadian minorities have been needed in the cases of St. Boniface in Winnipeg City, or Cornwall, Ontario, where it was agreed

in the spring of 1973 to build a separate school for French-speaking children. On this subject of the impact of the French-English duality on local governments, however, we are confined to case studies and await the development of further knowledge and hypotheses to generate research.

In the aggregate, Francophone Canadians were an under-privileged minority of 5,793,650 in 1971, or 26.9 percent of the total population.[35] The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1969 reported that its

> ... studies show that, socially and economically, Francophone are in a far weaker position than Anglophones in the work world. They are decidedly and consistently lower in average income levels, in schooling levels, in occupational scales, and in the ownership of industry.[36]

The Commission found the causes of these conditions somewhat intractable to research. It is tempting for Americans to compare such conditions with those of blacks in this country, but that is a hazardous occupation, to be sure.

One admires the forthrightness with which Canadians have tackled the problem of English-French duality,[37] by the federal government in line with the recommendations of the Commission and also by the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. It remains a serious problem. In Quebec rising political self-consciousness has been accompanied by a rush of rural Québécois to the cities, making it the second most urban province, after Ontario.

In addition to this urbanization, the 1960's saw a major increase in services by the provincial government, particularly in fields like social welfare, education, health, and municipal affairs.[38] In the eventful period 1960-63, there was a "nationalization" (provincialization) of electricity, a reform of education, and the beginning of health insurance. These years have been referred to as those of the *révolution tranquille* or "quiet revolution," and some critics hold that the great advances made then by Quebec have not been adequately continued since that time.[39] One gains some sense of the meaning of those years in reading Chapter IV by Jean Godin, although the literature on subprovincial government in Quebec is remarkably sparse. It seems clear that the 1970's will see big changes in Quebec local government, and what has happened to date is surely a guide to those changes.

SUMMARY

Growing demands on local and metropolitan governments in the immediate future are surely going to be the most compelling pressure for reorganization, for identification of strong leaders, and for the articulation of clearer policies. Changes in urban social and economic structure are generating more politics on urban govern-

ments in the sense of authoritative conflict settlement and the provision of more services. The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities recently stated this viewpoint:

> From playing a relatively passive role in the Canadian political system, local government must acquire the resources and the authority to take the prime initiative in planning and administering the community-building and rebuilding process. It must be structured and staffed to perform this role; it must receive the necessary substantial assistance needed from federal and provincial governments today and access to adequate resources under its own authority tomorrow; it must have access to that as yet nonexistent forum that will provide a realistic means of its claim to a greater share of the nation's resources.[40]

Precisely such rumblings have brought about three tri-level conferences on local government and the federal system since 1971. In May 1973 discussions on their common problems and their relationships with the provinces and Ottawa were held by mayors of the six largest cities, including (to the amazement of many people) the mayors of Montreal and Toronto, who had previously tried not to be seen together!

Canada no doubt is on the threshhold of a period when a reordering of policies and priorities among the levels of government may take place. A few critics are asking the federal government to establish direct relations with major municipalities, and there is even a suggestion that Toronto and Montreal ought to be made separate provinces. The parallel with the United States in the sixties is again salient. If we may judge from the Canadian record of local reorganization since World War II, however, more firm action to strengthen local governments may be at hand. The case studies in this volume are, therefore, timely indeed.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Yukon and Northwest Territories are not examined here. A valuable series of about seven studies of regional and local problems in Alberta began to appear in 1971 from the work of the Task Force on Urbanization and the Future. This Task Force was created in 1971 by the Province and the ten cities of Alberta "to examine, over a three year period, aspects of urbanization which were of concern to the people of this province." There were extensive proposals for reform of Saskatchewan local government in the early sixties, but they were not implemented.

[2] K. G. Crawford, *Canadian Municipal Government* (Toronto, 1954); Donald C. Rowat, *Your Local Government* (Toronto, 1955); and *The Canadian Municipal System* (Toronto and Montreal, 1969); Thomas J. Plunkett, *Urban Canada and Its Government* (Toronto, 1978); and *The Financial Structure and the Decision-Making Process of Canadian Municipal Government* (Ottawa, 1972). Bibliographies are included in all but the last volume; see also Mary Powell and Alison Black, "Municipal Government and Finance: An Annotated Bibliography" (Ottawa, 1972). An excellent collection of readings is L. D. Feidman and M. D. Goldrick, *Politics and Government of Urban Canada*, 2d. ed. (Toronto, 1972).

[3] "Metro Toronto: A Decade Later" (Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research, 1962).

[4] *Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metropolitan Toronto* (New York, 1967).

[5] *In Search of Balance—Canada's Intergovernmental Experience*, M-68 (Washington, 1971).

[6] *Governing Metropolitan Toronto: A Social and Political Analysis, 1953-1971* (Berkeley, 1972).

[7] F. Ricour-Singh, "Census Metropolitan Areas: Revision of the Concept, Criteria and Delineations for the 1971 Census." (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Census Division, July 1972), p. 13.

[8] A comparable indicator for the U.S. is that in 1967 25.5 percent of local governments were in SMSA's. The Canadian total, however, does not include special districts in the U.S. meaning. Employing criteria roughly similar to those of the U.S. *1967 Census of Governments*, D. DelGuidice and S. M. Zacks

found 101 governments in Metro Toronto, of which 94 were "special bodies." "The 101 Governments of Metro Toronto." *Civic Affairs* (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, October 1968).

[9] *ACIR, In Search of Balance*, pp. 5-7.

[10] ACIR, *In Search of Balance*, p. 29.

[11] ACIR, *In Search of Balance*, p. 42-44.

[12] ACIR, *In Search of Balance*, p. 50-53.

[13] *1972 Canada Year Book*, pp. 1138-1170. Federal-provincial grants are detailed on pp. 1156-1158, and provincial-local grants on p. 1164. Total transfers from federal to provincial governments in fiscal year 1970 were $2,179,899,000 and to local governments, $97,302,000, out of total non-defense expenditures of $10,077,582,497. Total provincial transfers to local governments in fiscal year 1971 were $2,285,760,000. In 1969, the latest year for which data are available, gross general expenditure for all provinces was $10,331,039,000.

[14] On the "urban crisis" see Economic Council of Canada, "The Challenge of Rapid Urban Growth," *Fourth Annual Review: The Canadian Economy from the 1960's to the 1970's* (Ottawa, 1967); and N. H. Lithwick, *Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects* (Ottawa, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, and Goldrick, *Politics and Government of Urban Canada.*

[15] Plunkett, *The Financial Structure and the Decision-Making Process of Canadian Municipal Government*, pp. 16-19.

[16] Thorough studies of provincial-local relations and the property tax are included in Province of Manitoba, Royal Commission on Local Government Reorganization and Finance, *Report*, 1964; Province of New Brunswick, Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation, *Report*, 1963; and Province of Ontario, The Ontario Committee on Taxation, *Report*, I-III, 1967.

[17] See Jo Levy Sack and Jeffrey Sack, "Citizens' Advocates and Poverty Lawyers," pp. 36-39, and Nadine Nowlan and David Nowlan, "The Politics of Neighborhood: Toronto 1972," pp. 45-47, *The Canadian Forum* (May 1972).

[18] Marc A. Moreney, "Animation Sociale: The Experience of the BAEQ," reprinted in John Harp and J. R. Hofley, *Poverty in Canada* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 299. See also M. Blondin, "Animation Sociale as Developed and Practised by the

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Conseil des Oeuvres de Montreal." Reprinted in translation in Feldman and Goldrick, *Politics and Government of Urban Canada*.

[19] _ here were a quarter of a million Indians in Canada in 1969, living primarily in the provinces from Quebec west to British Columbia. See *1972 Canada Year Book*, p. 206.

[20] Revised ed. (Garden City, 1970), particularly Chap. 2.

[21] Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, pp. 38-39.

[22] The study by Jean Godin in this collection indicates some of the conservatism on local government matters that exists in Quebec. There is no study, however, of the extent to which French-Canadian values may be reflected in local government in that province or in New Brunswick.

[23] "A Critique of Seymour M. Lipset's Article, 'Value Differences, Absolute or Relative: The English-Speaking Democracies'" (*The Canadian Journal of Political Science*, IV, 4). This Lipset article was an earlier version of ideas expressed in *Revolution and Counterrevolution*.

[24] Truman, "A Critique of Seymour M. Lipset's Article," p. 523.

[25] In reading this in draft, one Canadian asked, "Can we not be conservative, deferential, and on the left—for example, Sweden and Holland?"

[26] Defining what is Canadian has received a good bit of attention. See, for example, William L. Morton, *The Canadian Identity* (Madison and Toronto: 1961); and Blair Fraser, *The Search for Identity: Canada 1945-1967* (Garden City and Toronto, 1967).

[27] The International Joint Commission and its boards of control, in their efforts to stem water and air pollution and other problems, are becoming involved in urban activities in both countries. Here is an unusual chance for comparative study.

[28] BNA Act, 1867, as amended. 30 and 31 Victoria, c. 3. There is a lengthy bibliography on Canadian federalism in J. P. Meekison, ed., *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1971).

[29] "Aspects of Municipal Administration: A Symposium," *Canadian Public Administration*, IX (June 1967), p. 30.

[30] In a brief study of Canadian local referenda, Harlan Hahn suggests that a big referendum turnout may not mean a large "no" vote, somewhat counter to U.S. finding. "Voting in Canadian Communities: A Taxonomy of Referendum Issues," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, I (December 1968), p. 4.

[31] Parties were identified on the ballots for members of Parliament in the 1972 national elections.

[32] See Rowat, *Your Local Government*, Chapter 2; Plunkett, *Urban Canada and Its Government*, Chapters 3-7.

[33] Rowat, *Your Local Government*, pp. 35-37.

[34] On this comparison, see U.S., Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *In Search of Balance*, pp. 2-3.

[35] Thirteen percent have mother tongues other than French or English. Quebec in 1971 was the residence of 4,867,250 of the total Francophone population, and this represented 80.7 percent of the Quebec population in that year. The next highest proportion was in New Brunswick, where 34 percent of the 634,557 total were Francophone. Next came Prince Edward Island with 6.6 percent, followed by Ontario with 6.3 percent. The provinces with the highest proportions of mother tongues other than English and French are Northwest Territories, 49.8 percent, Manitoba, 26.8 percent, and Saskatchewan, 22.5 percent. *1972 Canada Yearbook*, p. 1370.

[36] *Final Report*, vol. 3A (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), p. 5.

[37] *Cf.*, John Porter, "Canadian Character in the Twentieth Century," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 370 (March, 1967). Porter says, "It would be in keeping with the prevailing attitudes about Canadian dualism to treat the French and English groups separately and to show how each—as separate nations, as the French have recently been insisting that they are—have their own peculiar character. Yet, two large groups cannot have lived together in a system of ordered relationships for two hundred years without affecting each other's way of life in some respects. . . . Perhaps both groups have a deeply rooted conservatism. . . . " p. 50.

[38] Daniel Latouche, "Violence, Politique et Crise dans la Société Québécoise" in L. LaPierre, *et al.*, eds., *Essays on the Left: Essays in Honour of T. C. Douglas* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971). Table IX, p. 190, reprinted from *Annuaire du Quebec, 1970*. During the 1960's ordinary expenditures of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs rose from $2,975,600 to $33,448,700.

[39] Daniel Latouche feels that in those years the capacity of the Quebec system was greater than the needs expressed by the people: "C'est précisément cette sur-capacité du système québécois qui aurait donn´ ce ton enivrant à la révolution tranquille. Durant trois ou quatre années, tout apparaît comme possible aux Québécois. . . . " By 1970, he says, the gap had reversed and collective aspiration exceeded collective capacity. "Violence, Politique and Crise dans la Société Québécoise," pp. 193-194.

Other writers refer to activities during the *decade* of the sixties as the "quiet revolution."

[40] Brief to the Government of Canada, April 26, 1971, p. 3. Quoted in Plunkett, *The Financial Structure and the Decision-Making Process of Canadian Municipal Government*, p. 71.

Chapter II

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

REFORM IN ONTARIO

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
Local government reform in Ontario has been an evolutionary process; only recently has a coherent set of policies been articulated. The sheer size and diversity of the province have made the development of policies for local government reform even more difficult than in other provinces. On the other hand, the local government system has never been frozen. A number of adaptive mechanisms have been used, so there have not been major crises in the provision of public services. Indeed, the present reform program is only possible because the idea of change has become widely accepted.

Most of the province's population now lives in reorganized municipalities. To date 131 local municipalities and five counties have been consolidated into 65 local, six regional, and one metropolitan municipalities. Four more regional governments came into effect on January 1, 1974. Government policy is to extend this pattern of reorganization over the whole province. Integral parts of the reform are redistribution of functions, reform of local government finance and real property taxation, reductions in the variety and status of special purpose bodies, and changes in the organization and functioning of large parts of the provincial government.

The regional government program is occurring because the rate and scale of change in Ontario have outmoded traditional devices.

Formerly successful adaptive processes such as limited annexation or special purpose agencies are not adequate because they are directed towards the problems of a specific area or function. The increasing complexities of regional and functional interrelationships required regional solutions that take these interrelationships into account more systematically.

ONTARIO AND ITS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A large and prosperous province, Ontario accounts for 35 percent of Canada's population, 37 percent of its labor force, and 40 percent of its gross national product. A basic difficulty in devising a local government system for Ontario, and keeping it up to date, has been the great diversity of the province. The population of 7,703,000 is distributed unevenly over 344,000 square miles, and population density ranges from 2,500 persons per square mile in York County to 0.35 in the northern Kenora district. The urban centers vary in population from Metropolitan Toronto, with over 2,200,000, to tiny hamlets. The population is concentrated in southern Ontario—a strip some 400 miles long averaging 100 miles wide; and most of it is in a strip 25 miles wide along the shore of Lake Ontario. This area of continuous settlement contains the major cities and practically all the agricultural land. The rest of the province is heavily wooded, and people live in scattered settlements, with large intervening areas that are uninhabitable.

Ontario is the economic heartland of Canada and share disproportionately in the prosperity after World

War II. Recent population increase has been the largest in absolute numbers of all the provinces; the rate of increase is exceeded only by British Columbia (see Table II-1). In addition, there has been a major redistribution of population within the province. From being 59.7 percent rural in 1901, it has changed to 82.4 percent urban in 1971—6,334,000 out of 7,703,000.[1] Larger places have tended to have faster growth rates. Indeed, this polarization increased the importance of Metropolitan Toronto, where the population exceeded 1,000,000 in 1941 and reached 2,628,000 in 1971.

This urbanization is part of the transformation from an economy based on primary production to that of an industrial or post-industrial society. Currently, only about 10 percent of the Canadian labor force is engaged in primary industries.[2] Accelerated urbanization was paralleled by related changes in rural areas. Rural population began to show a decline after 1961 and dropped 46,000 in five years, but rural farm population dropped much more rapidly.[3] The total area under cultivation decreased from 22,400,000 acres to 17,825,000 acres, between 1941 and 1966. The scenic qualities of many remote places have attracted the tourist and summer cottager. Thus urbanization is bringing the problems of growth and demands for urban services into the most rural of areas.

In Ontario local government is more deeply rooted than in other provinces. Starting in the frontier period, a system of township officers, local school boards, and large districts was devised from British and New England precedents. The township was established as the basic unit of rural government, and with the villages and towns constitutes the county. The original four districts were subdivided as settlement spread, until they finally formed 38 counties. In most cases these were the hinterland of the main urban center in the county. It is said that in drawing the boundaries the school section was based on the distance children could walk, the townships on the longest distance a man could ride to the township hall and back conveniently in one day, and the county on a day's ride one way.

The township provided local services and collected taxes. The county council was responsible for the courthouse, jail, land registry office, county home for the aged, and certain minor functions. Almost from the beginning the larger urban centers have wanted the status of cities and separation from the county for municipal purposes. In northern Ontario, the responsibilities counties would have elsewhere were divided between the municipalities and the provincial government. In the large areas without municipal organization, local services were provided by local special purpose bodies or by provincial departments directly.

Local counties of 5-15 members are elected by non-partisan ballot. In the urban centers there may be extensive use of committees, and in the larger cities a form of executive committee with special powers has

Year	Canada	Percent Increase	Ontario	Percent Increase
1921	8,788	21.9	2,944	16.1
1931	16,377	18.1	3,432	17.0
1941	11,507	10.9	3,788	10.4
1951	14,009	21.8	4,598	21.4
1956	16,081	14.8	5,405	17.6
1961	18,238	12.4	6,236	15.4
1966	20,014	9.7	6,961	11.6
1971	21,568	7.8	7,703	10.7

Source: Information Canada, *Canada Year-Book,* 1970-71 (Ottawa), p. 213.

developed. Essentially it is a weak-mayor system. The head of the council is separately elected and has few powers of his own. His leadership depends on his abilities, the conventions of the office, and any claim he may have to a political mandate. By convention, municipal employees have long enjoyed reasonably secure tenure. Problems come from a lack of any central coordinating officer, although the position of chief administrative officer has been established in a few municipalities.

Developed for a rural, largely self-sufficient society, this system proved surprisingly adaptable. In 1968, its last full year, there were 964 municipalities, 33 cities, 156 towns, 155 villages, 580 townships, 38 counties, and Metropolitan Toronto.[4] Since that date, the number of municipalities has steadily decreased. In 1972 there were 882, and recent changes have brought a further decrease of 18.

TRADITIONAL CHANGE MECHANISMS

Constitutionally, municipal institutions are the responsibility of, and derive their powers from, provincial governments. The Municipal Act sets out the legal status, composition, powers, and procedures in varying detail for all municipalities. The Municipal Act is supplemented by specific laws, such as the Planning Act and the Public Health Act. Where a municipality is considered sufficiently unique, special laws may be passed, as in the cases of Metropolitan Toronto and the new regional municipalities. Localities may also ask the legislative assembly for a private act on any subject. These applications are heard by the private bills committee, and they are sent to the Ministry of Treasury, Economics, and Intergovernmental Affairs and other affected agencies for comment. The comments are usually decisive, although the result depends on how strongly the government feels about the bill.

Until recently, Ontario has looked to a series of traditional means for readjusting its subprovincial governmental system. Among the devices that have been employed are annexation, incorporation, the county, special purpose bodies, and direct action by the provincial government, especially in the fields of finance and planning.

Annexation and Incorporation

Each annexation, incorporation, or change in status used to be accomplished by a specific law. This procedure began to take up too much time in the legislative assembly and brought before it essentially local issues. Thus, general legislation was passed, vesting limited power in the cabinet[5] to decide these questions. Soon, however, its workload became too great.

In 1906, the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board was created, principally to supervise municipal and other railways under provincial jurisdiction. Later renamed the Ontario Municipal Board, it exercises wide control over local government, ranging from assessment appeals to approval of zoning bylaws, annexations, incorporations, and changes in status. Concerning the last groups of activities, it acts in a quasi-judicial manner, receiving applications, hearing evidence and making legally binding decisions. Applications are initiated by municipalities, the minister with the approval of the cabinet (this is rarely if ever done), or petition of local residents. An appeal may be made to the courts on a point of law and to the cabinet on the substance of a decision, but appeals are almost unknown. The minister may require that a decision be approved by the electors (property owners) of the municipality who are entitled to vote on money bylaws, but this power has been a dead letter for 20 years.

When an application is before it, the board (now the ministry) has almost complete discretion. Hearings are informal and vary greatly in elaborateness depending on the complexity of the case and the strengths of opinions. Any interested party may appear and testify without notice. The members of the board may ask questions and order further evidence. If an annexation is granted, the board has wide discretion, and the boundaries set may vary from those applied for. The board's order may include other matters, such as the composition of the municipal council, changes in ward boundaries, transfer of assets and liabilities, setting differential tax rates for a transitional period, and in general "all matters necessary or incidental to the carrying out of the annexation." Finally, a later, supplementary hearing may settle matters of detail, such as the exact boundaries and questions of implementation.

Over the years, board members developed considerable expertise on local government matters. If the problem is simple and there is no disagreement, the board can act quickly and flexibly to reach a solution.

On major applications the process may stretch over several years.

For example, the most important annexation application resulted in the creation of Metropolitan Toronto. The formal proceedings started with an application by the City of Toronto for amalgamation with 12 suburban municipalities in February 1950. The decision, given in January 1953, described the proceedings as follows:

> ... The hearing became in effect an exhaustive review of the history, development and the present administrative organization and operations of each of the 13 municipalities and when it was concluded some 85 witnesses had given oral testimony running to about three million words and more than three hundred exhibits were filed, including a large number of voluminous reports, a great mass of statistical material and elaborate financial surveys prepared by expert accountants for the purpose of the hearing.[6]

Implementation of the decision in this case was taken up by the provincial government, under the personal supervision of then Premier Leslie Frost.

The statutes provide no criteria on annexations, but the board in effect developed a set of working principles. Nevertheless, its policies are not always clear. Government attempts to influence decisions are rare (the creation of Metropolitan Toronto is a special case), and board decisions are rarely upset on appeal to the cabinet.

Most applications have resulted from the pressures of urban growth and the changing relationship of the urban center to its immediate hinterland. Motivations behind annexation applications vary considerably, however. In one case, the City of London annexed an area to bring its population up to the minimum prescribed for the operation of street cars on Sundays, and a golf club requested annexation to the Village of Portsmouth because it wished to open a bar.

The general attitude of the board was stated in a 1963 decision:

> ... the aim and object of any procedure instituted to determine the boundaries of municipal government must be guided and controlled by basic considerations of the greatest common good ...

> It is true that the board does adhere to the adversary system in conducting these hearings. This is because such a procedure has been found most effective in bringing out all the facts and ascertaining the truth in the case of conflicting evidence ...

> ... the basic principle involved is one of good government and the result to be desired is such alteration of municipal

boundaries as will ensure and protect the best interests of the ratepayers and other inhabitants concerned.[7]

In the Toronto decision the board stated its purpose to be the preparation of:

> ... a plan which will satisfy the most immediate needs of the Toronto metropolitan municipalities, and at the same time will avoid the most serious objections to continued independence or outright consolidation. The board has also attempted to prepare a plan which may be considered acceptable and practicable and not too far in advance of the existing general level of public opinion and information in the whole metropolitan area.[8]

In general, if an urban municipality can show a shortage of land for residential or industrial development, or that an area is in the normal path of development, the application will be granted. Increasingly, arguments based on consideration of town planning and the control of development have been asked. Rural municipalities have been told that ". . . if they fail to use this (planning) power they must expect urban areas to be allowed to continuously expand in order to control growth taking place."[9]

As seen in Tables II-2 and II-3, the frequency and extent of annexations have been considerable. Since 1948 every city except Vanier (which is surrounded by Ottawa) has had at least one annexation. Some cities have had many. For example, between 1948 and 1971, Galt, Kitchener, and Waterloo had 16, 13, and nine annexations respectively.[10] The aggregate effect has been substantial. In addition, major annexations and amalgamations have been part of all but one of the new regional government schemes. The effect of these changes was to accommodate a large part of urban development by boundary adjustments.

Individual annexations have been difficult, but cases have not been fought in principle or as skirmishes in an urban-rural split. Although the majority of the legislature has until recently been rurally oriented, the implicit policy of easing the path of urban development through annexation has not been the subject of significant public debate since at least 1949.

The lack of controversy probably stems from a number of factors. Inquiry by an experienced and independent commission has kept the temperature down and minimized the effect of red herrings. Further, the incorporation of new suburban communities effectively stopped in the 1930's, and rural municipalities were often glad to be rid of the burgeoning suburban areas with their demands for services and disruption of rural life and politics. The tax differentials between suburbs and cities tended to narrow, and maintenance of a favorable tax position was not an argument persuasive

Table II-2

Ontario Annexation Totals
1950 - 1971

Annexations by	1950-54	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1971
Cities	43	38	21	22	4
Towns	47	60	45	47	6
Villages	12	20	5	28	1
Townships*	8	4	6	13	1
Other	2	–	–	1	–
Total	112	122	77	111	12

* Many of the annexations by townships are in northern Ontario where frequently the township is an urban unit.

Source: Ontario Municipal Board Decisions and Orders, and Ontario Municipal Directories.

either to the municipal board or to the government. More important, population mobility is increasing and community identity decreasing, so the case for seeing problems in a wider context is more readily apparent.

Recently the application of the procedures, but not the principle, has been questioned on at least two occasions. In the examination of local government in Waterloo County, where between 1944 and 1970 there were 59 annexations affecting 15 municipalities, the following comment was made:

> A basic problem is the element of agreement involved. The annexing municipality must take an initiative, and is only likely to apply for the addition of those areas which will bring it a measurable benefit. The municipality from which land is being annexed will oppose the application unless it sees advantages in being relieved of certain burdens. The resultant threat of expensive and long-drawn-out proceedings often results in an annexation by agreement with the consequent peculiar boundaries and a high frequency of changes.[11]

The Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Municipal Law recommended in 1965:

> The committee is of the opinion that the Minister of Municipal Affairs is responsible for the effective functioning of the municipal system which should be sufficiently flexible to adjust to rapidly changing times and conditions. The committee is of the opinion that the power of the Ontario Municipal Board with respect to making decisions regarding changes in municipal

boundaries should be transferred to the Minister of Municipal Affairs.[12]

The Municipal Act was amended in 1966[13] to require the approval of the Minister of Municipal Affairs before the Municipal Board can act on applications for annexation, incorporation, or change in status. To date, this authority has been exercised only in a handful of cases where it was thought that the change might prejudice a local government review in progress.

The regional government program was started in part because urbanization around major urban centers is such that annexation of the area of urban influence would include large tracts which are rural in most respects. For isolated, but distinct communities, annexation and consolidation may be perfectly satisfactory solutions. For instance, in the Lakehead Review,[14] the two-tier solution was rejected, and two adjoining cities and parts of three suburbs were amalgamated into one city. Similarily, the mining center of Timmins was enlarged by the addition of three adjoining townships and extensive unorganized territory. This was occasioned by a major mining development which promised to transform the area and was carried through by the Department of Municipal Affairs. In the government's proposals for the Hamilton area, an alternative to a two-tier government was a single-tier government to be created by annexing to the City of Hamilton two towns, three townships, and parts of three more—an addition of 76,000 people and 210 square miles. Hamilton currently has a population of 306,000 and an area of 48 square miles.[15]

To handle the regional government program, the government established a parallel process for boundary adjustments and formed a municipal organization branch in the Department of Municipal Affairs. Starting with a

small research group compiling background information for the regional government reviews and one or two civil servants with ideas on reform, the branch has linked research, policy, administration, and planning and development. Changes in structure and boundaries now can be brought more within the normal processes of the provincial government.

Procedures similar to those for annexation take place before the Municipal Board with regard to incorporation and changes of status, but these proceedings tend to be less elaborate. If the council applies for a change and meets the criteria of the municipal act, approval is automatic.

Counties

The two-tier county structure has had difficulties in accommodating change. Traditionally the county was the institutional expression of the larger local community, linking urban and rural. It provided a vehicle for services demanding a larger administrative area, larger financial and technical resources, and economies of scale. Within counties there is a well established pattern of shifting responsibilities upward. They gradually have become the unit for such activities as secondary schools, assessment, secondary roads, area parks, welfare, planning, libraries, and public health. In many cases, however, the service was provided by a special purpose body or jointly with a nearby city and/or county.

This upward shift has accelerated since 1950, and since 1960 the counties have been the most rapidly changing part of the local government system. A basic problem, however, is that counties have never been seen as a very active level of government. They are confederations, and the composition of their councils was determined in earlier days when there was not much difference between municipalities in size. As the distribution of population changed, voting and even more political power on the councils remained heavily biased in favor of the rural municipalities. For example, in 1970, in Waterloo County the four urbanized municipalities had a majority of the population (32,000 out of 63,000) and paid 48 percent of the county tax levy, but had only seven out of 21 council members.[16]

Urban municipalities generally feel that rural people are not interested in their problems, are slow to respond to new needs, and do not contribute adequately to county finances. Townships tend to feel that urban areas are disrupting a long-established system, have expensive ideas about services, and want to move too fast. The reaction of the larger, established centers is to seek city status and separation from the county as soon as they reach the 15,000 minimum population. This separation, however, has not happened in counties where the growth was suburban and exurban overspill. A further difficulty with counties is that, while many boundaries are still appropriate, the number of cases where they no longer approximate the area of urban influence is increasing. Nevertheless, most regional governments are in effect large counties established by amalgamating old units or by broadening their functions.

Special Purpose Bodies

Special interests often want to be autonomous. Also, established structures may seem to lack the will, the means, or the geographic jurisdiction necessary to perform a particular function. At least 86 varieties of special purpose bodies are authorized by general legis-

Table II-3

**Enlargement of Ontario Cities Other
Than Toronto by Acreage
1945 - 1966**

Municipality	Total Acreage		Percentage Increase
	1945	1966	
Barrie	2,150	4,781	122
Belleville	1,800	7,655	325
Brantford	3,292	11,335	244
Brockville	1,374	6,024	388
Chatham	1,900	5,350	182
Cornwall	825	19,200	2,227
Eastview	660	660	No Change
Fort William	9,355	23,199	148
Galt	1,922	8,298	332
Guelph	3,014	16,031	432
Hamilton	10,316	31,725	208
Kingston	2,965	15,691	429
Kitchener	3,477	11,410	228
London	6,873	42,550	519
Niagara Falls	1,934	24,083	1,145
North Bay	2,100	2,260	8
Oshawa	3,660	14,000	283
Ottawa	6,009	30,482	407
Owen Sound	2,909	3,018	4
Peterborough	3,568	10,326	189
Port Arthur	15,632	15,632	No Change
Port Colborne	1,308	5,984	347
St. Catherines	2,400	17,000	608
St. Thomas	1,898	4,540	139
Sarnia	1,479	11,672	689
Sault Ste. Marie	6,188	60,016	870
Stratford	2,835	3,263	15
Sudbury	2,713	32,711	1,106
Waterloo	2,921	5,293	81
Welland	1,100	8,358	660
Windsor	8,251	31,584	283
Woodstock	1,525	3,456	121

Source: The Ontario Committee on Taxation, *Report,* II (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 498.

lation, in addition to many unique to one municipality. They include education units, health units, suburban road commissions, conservation authorities, planning boards, housing authorities, and airport commissions. The variations in autonomy, composition, finance, and jurisdiction are great. This has resulted from legislation drafted in most cases by agencies, departments, and local enthusiasts preoccupied with a particular problem: there has been little coordination within government. The legislative draftsmen have played only a technical role in drafting. The Department of Municipal Affairs had general responsibility, but it was for a long time a minor department with a weak voice even when it sought to exercise it.

Particularly in the post-war period there has been a trend toward intermunicipal boards with duties ranging from conservation to education to libraries. The result has been to reinforce the emphasis on vertical integration of activities and to fragment further the decision-making process.

> The councillors up at Pitlochry
> Believed in the creed of Ad Hocery
> They farmed all decisions
> To boards and commissions
> And so made their council a mockery.[17]

The wholesale use of special purpose bodies is now being questioned from two directions. In some cases, specialists, notably town planners, are concerned that the narrow focus of these agencies is inhibiting coordination with related functions and limiting performance by restricting access to the central organs of political power. At the same time, there is a growing concern about fragmentation of government in general on the part of the provincial government and municipal spokesmen. All the regional reviews have criticized the proliferation of boards and commissions. The Association of Counties and Regions produced a policy document on the problem, and the Minister of Municipal Affairs has stated that, as a matter of policy, the number should be reduced.

The Role of the Provincial Government

Up to this point discussion has concentrated on adaptation within the local government system. Another thrust for reform has come from within the provincial government. Apart from its responsibilities in maintaining a viable system of local governments, the province has become more involved with local government because fewer and fewer activities are of purely local concern.

The province is the only government short of Ottawa with the geographic jurisdiction and taxing powers to meet the public needs of a complex and changing society. Thus, the great expansion of the scope of provincial government activities is inevitable. The main

weight of the expansion of welfare, health, education, and environmental services has fallen within provincial jurisdiction. The federal government is also active in these areas, but many of its programs are conducted jointly with the provinces, and there is a convention that it does not bypass the provinces in dealing with local government.[18]

As a result, more and more the relationship between the province and local government is best described as interdependent. Municipal autonomy is no longer a meaningful term (if it ever was), although this does not say that the province has a free hand with local government. Local government is deeply ingrained in the province's politics and administration.

The change in relationships, however, is more than just an upward transfer of functions. It is also a change in style of government arising from economies of scale, growth in population and income, and urbanization. There is also an admixture of "empire-building," to which a rapidly expanding bureaucracy is vulnerable when faced with considerable influence over legislation and access to buoyant revenues.

Municipal Finance. The changing nature of provincial-local relations is characterized by shifting financial relationships. There have long been provincial grants to local governments, but until recently the basic relationship was established by allocating to localities specific sources of revenue, essentially the real property tax. As the pressure for more services has grown, the adequacy and equity of local tax resources has been questioned more and more. Meanwhile the functional interrelationships of local and provincial governments have increased. Pressures to ensure minimum standards and to encourage provision of services desired by the province have resulted in a complex system of grants and shared services. Traditionally the main grant programs were for roads and education, with sliding-scale formulas and complex standards to assist and influence local activities, particularly in rural areas. More recently there has been a concern for the high cost of services in urban centers, and even there the property tax is increasingly inequitable if not inadequate. The province has developed unconditional grant formulas which recognize need by per capita payments that increase with greater population. It also pays a larger share of urban road costs; has created new grants such as those for recreation, housing, transportation, and sewage to meet predominantly urban problems; and contributes a greater share of education and welfare costs. This is partly a reflection of urban voting power, but also of the growing gap between local responsibilities and locally controlled financial resources as clearly shown in Table II-4. The increase in grants to urban municipalities, not including school boards and other special purpose bodies, is more striking (see Table II-5).

With exceptions, the grants have evolved in response to pressures related to specific activities. The result is a

bewildering patchwork. J. S. Dupré lists 89 grants (other than those for education) as available in 1963, with payments for services ranging from municipal drainage ($1,253) to local roads ($76,203,662).[19] He comments:

> Time and again grants rather than other policy tools were chosen not only because they fit a situation in which more than one level of government exists but also because they constituted an alternative to an inter-governmental reallocation of functions. One of the principal textbook reasons for making a grant is that a halfway house in the division of governmental power is thereby achieved.[20]

There may be a pattern in some grants, but others are obscure. Dupré says:

> In a setting where any overall provincial policy toward grants has been conspicuous by its absence, statistical findings that reveal little of real significance have the value of confirming the expected.[21]

The proliferation of specific grants has gone so far that the built-in financial constraints on changing local government are becoming a serious issue. Not only is it impossible to determine the effectiveness of the grants in total, but realistic assessment of need is impossible. The capacity of local government to respond is inhibited by the extensive network of externally determined priorities.

The transfer of functions upward to the province has also been a gradual and complex process. In some cases, such as administration of justice (i.e., court facilities, county jails, and land registry offices) and the assessment of real property, transfer has been relatively simple. In most instances, however, it has been an evolutionary process, reflecting the strength and outlook of particular departments, the state of provincial finances, and political pressures. For example, in education school boards are responsible for primary and secondary education, but the provincial Department of Education exercises a pervasive and growing control through grant regulations, budget restrictions, specification of curricula and textbooks, certification of teachers, building approvals, and inspectors, supplemented by innumerable circulars and interactions between local and provincial educational bureaucracies. Local boards in many respects are merely administrative agencies.

Massive provincial and federal social programs have assumed most welfare activities. Local governments are now residual bodies for welfare cases not covered by the broad-gauged provincial programs, and are administrative agents for some of the less tidy social service activities.

Planning. The way planning has evolved also illustrates how provincial-local interdependence is increasing. Although town planning legislation existed for years,

Table II-4

Ontario Local Revenues by Selected Years

($000,000)

Year	Municipal Taxation	Provincial Grants to Local Authorities (Including School Boards)	Provincial Grants to Local Authorities (Excluding School Boards)
1944	$ 111	$ 24	$ 10.7
1957	431	233	66.5
1970	1,459	1,417	537.0

Sources: Department of Municipal Affairs, *Annual Report of Municipal Financial Statistics*, 1944, 1957; *Summary of Financial Reports of Municipalities*, 1970, p. xii.

Table II-5

Provincial Grants to Ontario Municipalities by Selected Years

($000,000)

	1944	1957	1970
Metropolitan Toronto Area	$ —	$20.5	$116.3
Ottawa-Carleton Regional Area	—	—	28.9
Niagara Regional Area	—	—	20.4
Cities	4.3	13.6	88.9
Towns	0.9	6.5	44.0
Villages	0.2	1.4	6.4
Townships	5.3	23.8	77.8
Counties	—	—	46.1
Total	**10.7**	**66.5**	**494.1**

Sources: Department of Municipal Affairs, *Annual Report of Municipal Financial Statistics*, 1944, 1957; *Summary of Financial Reports of Municipalities*, 1970, p. xii.

only in the post-war period did it begin to become effective. It was given impetus by post-war reconstruction, urbanization, and the strengthening of the municipal bureaucracies. A Department of Planning and Development was created to encompass industrial promotion, town planning, public housing, statistics, and conservation. Eventually, the community planning branch became part of the Department of Municipal Affairs, concentrating on the formal aspects of local planning such as zoning bylaws, official plans, approval of subdivisions, and the organization of local planning boards. The development and statistics branches eventually went to the provincial Treasurer's Department, as did industrial development (matured into a strong regional development branch). By performing elemen-

tary statistical compilation and economic analysis and attempting to give special attention to regions which felt they were not sharing in the general prosperity, the branch became the center of "macro-planning," while "micro-planning" was left to the town planners in Municipal Affairs. Between 1967 and 1971, the staff of this regional development branch increased from 10 to 125.[22]

Concern with the regional aspects of policies and administration became more explicit as provincial activities escalated. Moreover, a Conservative government, rooted in rural Ontario and the more prosperous suburbs, was sensitive about administrative centralization and regional inequalities. Provincial agencies and branches of departments found themselves replacing old structures with complex programs of explicit analysis, planning, and integration of provincial and local activities.

The Department of Highways was drawn more deeply into urban areas to plan local roads, examine highways and land use, and study other modes of transportation. Its survey of the provincial road system and localized highway studies progressed to urban transportation and regional traffic studies. This culminated in the Metropolitan Toronto and Regional Transportation Study (MTARTS), in which the provincial Departments of Economics and Development, Highways, Municipal Affairs, and Transport, Metropolitan Toronto, The Toronto Transportation Commission, and the two railways participated. The study, commissioned in 1962 and released in 1968, covered an area of 3,200 square miles, extending 100 miles from Bowmanville east of Toronto to Guelph in the west, and from Lake Ontario north to Lake Simcoe.

The MTARTS group reported that it could not advise on regional transportation needs:

> ... without a knowledge of the emerging development patterns within Metropolitan Toronto and the surrounding area.
>
> Current trends of growth were investigated, a number of goals were established and finally five developed concepts emerged as possibilities for the shape of the MTARTS region in the future.
>
> This investigation is an essential first step in development of specific plans and policies to guide public and private decisions and investments in the area.[23]

Parallel studies were conducted by the Ontario Water Resources Commission, the Ontario Hospital Services Commission, and the Department of Lands and Forests.

Much of this thinking on regional lines was brought together in 1966 in a statement of government policy which became known as "Design for Development: Phase One." This first statement was rudimentary, and in 1968 it was carried several steps further in "Phase Two." This statement brought the regional planners to center stage and embodied a much more comprehensive program:

> The first stage will emphasize solutions to problems of an economic and social nature. The second stage will deal with the improved use of our natural environment. From these plans will come targets for broad use of our land, the character and amount of economic activity in each region and recommendations for the most effective implementation of regional programs by both provincial and local departments.[24]

The most important and elaborate of the Phase Two regional development plans is the one for the Toronto Centered Region, released in May 1970.[25] In it, the MTARTS area is extended from 3,200 to 15,000 square miles to include all or part of five of the ten economic regions in Ontario (these were reduced to five in 1972). It proposes a land-use pattern for the region and a plan for development including transportation and other facilities. The rationale of the plan and the means of implementation are not clear, but the government declared that it embodies the policies which it intends to pursue in the Toronto area.

What led a Conservative government to assume responsibility for shaping urban growth in regional terms is not clear. It was alarmed at the prospect of uncontrolled urban sprawl, as seemed to be happening in major American cities. Premier Frost took the first step back in 1950, when he decided that service deficiencies in the Toronto area impaired the social and economic well-being of the province and necessitated intervention to reorganize local government. By the 1960's the implications of growth were being felt in all departments, not least in the Treasury. Pending development proposals would commit the government to very large capital expenditures, and the magnitude of the costs of urban development was becoming evident. The Toronto section of Montreal-to-Detroit Highway 401 needed widening from four to 12 lanes. An $88 million sewer and water system was planned by the Ontario Water Resources Commission to serve a population of 560,000 in the Brampton area northwest of Toronto, although MTARTS forecast population by the year 2000 of only 100,000 to 200,000.[26] On such decisions the province needed more information and more effective means of determining and implementing public policy.

It was apparent that the existing machinery was inadequate. Metropolitan Toronto had been successful within its boundaries, but its powers were ineffective over the further 380 square miles in which it had only planning jurisdiction. The planners in the Department of Municipal Affairs had substantial powers in theory but were unable or unwilling to impose policies on local councils or other provincial departments. Staff resources were inadequate and the planning machinery was essentially regulatory in nature. These questions and

doubts about local government machinery were dramatized in the Toronto area, and comparable problems were arising across the province.

STEPS TOWARD REFORM

By the 1960's opinion in Ontario was receptive to far-reaching changes in local government. The rapid rate of development was obvious. The success of Metropolitan Toronto and the prestige and publicity of "North America's first metropolitan government" impressed the government. It was probably equally impressed by the absence of any political backlash. The standing of the government was enhanced because it was willing and able to attack an intractable problem.

In addition, the program of consolidating school units proceeded with remarkably few political repercussions. By 1964, the 4,136 local school boards were reduced to 3,267. In 1967 the township was set as the minimum area, and in 1969 the county became the basic unit (excluding the five largest cities). There are now 125 major school boards (both public and separate, *i.e.*, Roman Catholic), plus 112 small boards to accommodate unique circumstances such as military bases.[27]

Another part of the foundation for local government reform was the 1965 report of the Legislative Assembly's Select Committee on the Municipal Act and Related Acts.[28] The chairman, Hollis Beckett, had a long interest in establishing metropolitan government in the Toronto area and had been solicitor for the suburban township of Scarborough. The committee's final report ranged widely in suggesting changes in local government. Most publicized was the recommendation that larger units were necessary "in dealing with regional problems and boundary adjustments of urban municipalities,"[29] and that these units should be based on the existing counties, including the cities. The report was pigeonholed by the government, but it had considerable influence in local government circles. For the first time, the term "regional government" appeared with a set of specific proposals for report in a public document.

Two years later the report of the Ontario Committee on Taxation (Smith Committee) dealt extensively with regional government. It was appointed in 1963, when there was a fashion for tax studies (the Byrne Commission in New Brunswick[30] was another):

> ...to inquire into and report upon the taxation and revenue system of our Province of Ontario and its municipalities and school boards in relation to their expenditures, the tax and revenue sources available to them....[31]

The Smith Committee drew attention to the degree to which provincial and local finance were intertwined and concluded that major reforms in finance could not be made at either level without drastic changes in local

government structure. Interpreting its terms of reference generously, it proceeded to outline a system of 22 metropolitan, urban, and county regions. The proposals were not implemented, but the report was highly publicized. Its extensive analysis of local financial aspects and coherent reform proposals gave a focus to the movement for local government reform. The extent and nature of provincial-local interrelationships were forcefully analyzed, and it was made clear that taxation and expenditures could not be considered in isolation from the institutions of local government.

Discussion of local government reform was no longer restricted to a few individuals, but had moved into wider circles. Municipal associations, professional bodies, and individuals urged regional or larger units of government in representations to the provincial government and to committees of inquiry. Most important was the policy document adopted by the Association of Counties in 1967, titled "A Blueprint for Local Government Reorganization," but as early as 1962 the larger Ontario Municipal Association urged an examination of procedures for boundary changes and of the relationship of urban units to the county.[32]

Local Government Reviews

Local government reviews were another major step in the evolution of local government reform. They started as a series of experiments in areas with highly visible problems. The device was the well-tried commission of inquiry, appointed by the province with the power to obtain information and the responsibility to recommend comprehensive solutions. The reasons for using this device were straightforward: to investigate, gain time, devise solutions, and educate. It had worked in Metropolitan Toronto[33] and was similar to the time-tested annexation process of the Ontario Municipal Board.

The first study was for the Ottawa area. In 1964 the Minister of Municipal Affairs announced a review of the local government system in the area, and M. V. Jones was appointed commissioner. Probably Ottawa's case was taken up because there was talk of establishing a federal district there, as in Washington and Canberra. A strengthened municipal system would weaken the case for a stronger federal voice in planning and development in the Ottawa region. A study was initiated locally in the Niagara area in 1964: in 1965 this was converted into a provincial review.

At about this time the Minister of Municipal Affairs almost tripled the number of studies because he was under fire from the opposition for going too slowly on regional government. In March 1965, while introducing his budget estimates, the Minister announced there would be nine regional studies.[34] Thus a different fire brigade was used for each hot spot rather than an overall approach. The Department of Municipal Affairs, however, was not staffed to undertake a major program of

local government reform even if such had been well-deliberated government policy. By various methods, 14 reviews have since been undertaken; the most expensive cost only $157,000.[35] The province covered all costs. The scope and variety of the ensuing reviews are best conveyed by the summary of all reviews in Table II-6. In October 1973, when legislation was passed to implement the 14th review, it was announced by the province that it would not impose any additional regional governments. If individual counties wished to initiate restructuring, the province would assist, provided that the result would be a substantial change in local boundaries and functions.

Procedures. The procedure used in the reviews and follow-up action has been rather elaborate, reflecting the complexity of the problems. The hearings ranged more widely than those of the Municipal Board, but were less formal and did not have the weight of a royal commission. The main elements are described below.

1. Request was made for a study by resolution of the municipalities in the area, after consultation with the staff of the Department of Municipal Affairs.

2. Terms of reference were agreed to, and one or two special commissioners were appointed. All the commissioners, in the nine reviews where they were used, had municipal experience: five as consultants; three as lawyers; two, academics; one, accountant; and one chairman of the Municipal Board. The terms of reference were almost identical. In the Waterloo Review they were:

> To inquire and report upon—
> (a) the structure, organization, financing and methods of operation of all the municipalities and their local boards in the County of Waterloo including the Cities of Kitchener, Waterloo and Galt;
>
> (b) all aspects of the functions and responsibilities of the existing local government institutions within the said area and, in particular, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, inter-municipal relations and problems which concern or may concern any two or more of the municipal corporations or local boards having jurisdiction within the said area;
>
> (c) the anticipated future development of the area or other changes therein which may require reorganization or revision of the existing system of local government in the Area;
>
> (d) the effect of present and anticipated future projects and operations of the national and provincial governments upon the responsibilities and resources of local government therein;

> (e) any other related matters, including an examination of boundaries, affecting the local government structure within the area.[36]

3. A staff was appointed, usually only one or two people with secretarial help. There was a limited use of consultants, but the research staff of the then Department of Municipal Affairs collected statistical data and prepared maps. Some of the research staff served more than one review.

4. There was consultation with local municipalities, organizations, and individuals to collect information and views on the functioning of local government in the area.

5. A data book was prepared and published. This compilation of information was intended to avoid duplication of effort, provide a common set of facts, and give a focus to the proceedings.

6. Briefs were requested from interested parties, particularly the local municipalities. These varied from one to several hundred pages.

7. Consultation went on with government departments and agencies, and possible recommendations were tested on them. The departments were not represented at the hearings and did not present formal briefs.

8. Public hearings were held. In the case of the Waterloo review they ran to 25 days and there were 104 briefs.

9. A report describing the problems and recommended solutions was submitted to the Minister and released by him at a public meeting in the area.

10. Local reaction to the report and its recommendations were submitted to the Minister.

11. The views of all government departments were collected by the Department of Municipal Affairs; it also made its own analysis of the report.

12. Government proposals were announced.

13. Local reactions to the government proposals then, of course, occurred. Discussions between the municipalities and the Department of Municipal Affairs were often extensive and the Minister himself took an important part. The local member of the legislature was involved if he was a government supporter.

14. Legislation was introduced.

15. Local reactions to proposed legislation then occurred.,

16. Further adjustments were made. Then, hopefully, legislation passed and arrangements were made for implementation.

As Table II-6 shows, not all of the reorganizations have used the review procedure. In fact there have been significant variations in procedures. Local opposition, or other evidence that local consensus would not occur in Brant-Brantford and Oshawa caused the procedures to terminate before any public hearings were held. On the other hand, York County worked up its own proposals. In the heavily urbanized area west of Toronto, there was so much controversy that the Peel-Halton and

Table II-6

Local Government Reorganizations in Ontario

Review and Year Study Instituted and Report Received	Basic Study Area (1971 municipal population)
1. (a) Metropolitan Toronto (1950-53) Implemented 1954	2,045,000 population; 240 square miles; 13 municipalities plus Metro
(b) Revision 1963-65 Implemented 1967	6 municipalities plus Metro
2. Ottawa-Carleton (1963-1965) Implemented 1969	460,000 population; 1,100 square miles; 16 municipalities
3. Niagara (1964-66) Implemented 1970	338,000 population; 720 square miles; 26 municipalities reduced to 12
4. Peel-Halton (1965-66) Implemented 1973 as two separate regions	463,000 population; 989 square miles; Peel—10 municipalities reduced to 3; Halton—7 municipalities reduced to 4
5. Lakehead (1965-68) Partial implementation 1971	106,000 population; 120 square miles; 20 municipalities of which 2 cities and parts of 3 suburbs were amalgamated
6. Brant-Brantford (1966) Only the data book has been completed. Reinstituted 1972	87,000 population; 347 square miles; 7 municipalities
7. Waterloo Area (1966-70) Implemented 1973	250,000 population; 506 square miles; 15 municipalities reduced to 7
8. Muskoka District (1967-69) Implemented 1970	30,000 population, 1,688 square miles; 25 municipalities reduced to 6
9. Hamilton-Wentworth (1967-69) Implemented 1973	393,000 population; 523 square miles; 11 municipalities reduced to 6
10. Sudbury (1968-70) Implemented 1973	158,000 population; 1,090 square miles; 15 municipalities reduced to 7
11. York—Study by county (1967-69) Implemented 1970	161,000 population; 645 square miles; 14 municipalities reduced to 9
12. Timmins (1972)—Internal government study Implemented 1973	42,000 population; 1,225 square miles; 4 municipalities plus unorganized territory reduced to 1
13. Oshawa Area (1969—discontinued) Government proposals 1972 Implemented as Region of Durham 1973	237,000 population; 1,168 square miles; 21 municipalities reduced to 8
14. Haldimand-Norfolk Implemented 1974	84,000 population; 1,122 square miles; 28 municipalities reduced to 6

Note: In all cases of implementation except Lakehead and Timmins a regional municipality was formed in addition to those enumerated.

Hamilton-Wentworth proposals were not actively pursued until late in 1972. Part of the delay came from the Conservative leadership convention in 1970 and the provincial election in 1971. The last two studies also differed substantially from the others. Because of great development pressures on areas of limited population, the studies tried to link future land-use patterns, location of major services, and local government structure. Other counties have instituted their own studies. Formal investigations by outside consultants were used in Leeds and Grenville, Oxford and Wellington, while there were studies by committees of county council in Lennox and Addington, Middlesex, Hastings, and Prince Edward.

The government does not propose to start any more reviews as of mid-1973. Those implemented or with proposals outstanding cover the whole urbanized area at the western end of Lake Ontario (see Map II-1). Of the three major cities other than Toronto, Ottawa has a regional government, while Windsor and London have elbow room resulting from large annexations, so their problems are not urgent. In any case, future regional reforms will probably use a simpler procedure since a pattern has now been evolved, expertise developed, and greater acceptance granted by the municipalities and the public.

Proposals. The review reports were circulated widely in the affected area and outside. Each contained extensive descriptions of existing local governments. Although each had its own emphasis, all dwelt on the problems of decision making in political and administrative terms. Finance apparently was not a major factor in framing recommendations. Several reports discussed the growing involvement of provincial agencies with local government and problems arising from defective co-ordination at the provincial level. The main concern was with inequalities in services and limited local capacity to meet problems of growth. Analysis of the evidence showed the impossibility of agreement by local initiative, and alternative solutions were examined before making recommendations.

With local variations, the governments are based on county lines, following the precedent of Metropolitan Toronto. Their main elements are as follows:

1. An upper-tier unit is created for the large urban center and its hinterland. The old county boundaries have been used commonly but not universally.

2. A reduction in the number of local municipalities, mainly by consolidation, is joined with large annexations to give the urban center more control over its immediate hinterland.

3. The council is composed of members of local councils, chosen on an *ex officio* basis, and

roughly in accordance with population. The chairman is appointed by the province for the first term, following the Toronto precedent. Thereafter he is to be chosen by the council, following the county model and that of Toronto also.

4. The regional municipality is responsible for public health, police, regional planning, arterial roads, sewage disposal, bulk water-supply treatment, garbage disposal, capital borrowing, welfare, and regional parks. Education is already the exclusive responsibility of a county board.

5. Local municipalities are responsible for local planning, roads, parks, local sewers, water distribution, garbage collection, fire protection, street lighting, and tax collection.

6. The regional municipality is financed by a requisition on the local municipalities in proportion to their individual shares of the total assessment. In addition, there is a special regional grant from the province of $8 per capita. This is above the regular unconditional grants, in recognition of the additional costs of up-grading services and the assumption from the province of policing rural areas. The province has also borne some of the initial organizing costs.

The trend in the later proposals has been to increase upper-tier powers at the expense of local units. Thus planning is a regional responsibility in Sudbury, and the new regions east and west of Toronto will be responsible for all aspects of water and sewer services. On the other hand, in the Ottawa-Carleton Region there have been difficulties in consolidating the small municipalities in the proposed lower tier.[37] As a result, representation on the upper-tier council has not been resolved. These are immediate problems; the more deeply rooted questions of the appropriateness of the regional boundaries and of the dominance of the City of Ottawa have been skirted.

There is no formal provision for public participation in creating these new governments except through briefs and public hearings. Some councils have held referenda, with no legal standing, and petitions and local meetings have been organized. The results of such participation have been mixed. People in the City of Waterloo voted 84 percent against amalgamation with Kitchener on a poll with a response rate of 60 percent. On the proposal that the Port Hope-Cobourg area not be part of the new region east of Metropolitan Toronto, large turnouts at public meetings appear to have influenced the result.[38] To the west of Toronto, the vociferously expressed views of the council of the Village of Streetsville (population 7,000) that it should not disappear may have delayed the decision but did not change it. Streetsville is in Premier Davis' constituency, and other Ministers' ridings were affected by the delayed Hamilton-Wentworth and Oshawa studies.

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MAP II-1

ONTARIO
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
REFORM 1973

LEGEND

Regional Municipalities

Legislation 1973

Provincial Studies

DISTRICTS IN NORTHERN ONTARIO

All of this has been part of the political process. In no case were recommendations accepted by the province for implementation without major changes. Many trade-offs have been made to produce locally acceptable packages. Still the basic pattern has been the county and the precedent of Metropolitan Toronto. The cities were given additional elbow room and the prospect of a more logical pattern of local services. Rural areas and small towns were given access to greater urban financial resources and the prospect of better services. Their identity was to some extent protected by insuring that no one municipality dominated the new council. The special grants for the new governments have been an incentive, but it is doubtful that they cover all the additional costs.

Department Role. In the local government reviews, the Department of Municipal Affairs began to take the initiative in local reform. Municipal Affairs became a separate department in 1935 to deal with the depression difficulties of municipalities. Over time, other respon-sibilities were added but it was considered a minor department. Its style was to watch weak local govern-ments, to accent detailed administration and regulation, and to act as the voice of the municipalities within the provincial government.

In the 1960's it became actively concerned with policy matters and upgrading its staff as a response to the pressure of external forces and because of an unusually hard-working, able, and ambitious young minister, W. Darcy McKeough. The government reorgani-zation program owes much to his desire for achievement and to the fact that he also enjoyed the confidence of the municipalities. Under his leadership the department became more visible and prestigious.

The department began to develop reform ideas, but it was immersed in administrative minutiae in dealing with over 900 municipalities. Most of the ideas generated were along the lines of the functional responsibilities of its various branches. Given time and the quality of its new staff, it might have developed a coherent policy, but it was overtaken by events in the localities and in other provincial departments.

Regional Government Program

The piecemeal local government reviews were con-centrated mostly in the period 1965-68. Out of them emerged a regional government program for the prov-ince. In the Norfolk-Haldimand, Oshawa area, and Toronto Centered Region studies, the province was increasingly involved in regional land-use planning. As mentioned above, many departments took up previously local functions: major urban roads; design, construction and operation of water and sewage facilities; regional parks; and public housing. In drafting regional develop-ment plans for the ten economic regions, an important technique was the designation of growth points,

whereby growth of selected urban centers would be encouraged by government policy. It was implicit in the concept that the benefits of this growth would accrue to the surrounding area only if the whole were structurally connected through common political institutions. The commitment to a regional development approach drew the province more deeply into an examination of the means to implement such policies, including the im-provement of local government.[39]

The 1968 "Design for Development: Phase Two" explicitly linked regional development and local govern-ment in a program of regionalization. The term "regional government" has never been clearly defined, partly because of the complexity of the problem and partly, one suspects, because it is still an evolving concept. Drawing on the regional reviews and the Smith Commit-tee Report, the government adopted the latter's five criteria in designing regional governments:

> 1. A region should exhibit a sense of com-munity identity based on sociological characteristics, economics, geography and history;

> 2. A region should have a balance of in-terests so that no one group can completely dominate the region;

> 3. There must be a financial base adequate to carry out regional programs at a satis-factory level;

> 4. The region should be large enough so that local responsibilities can be performed ef-ficiently by taking advantage of economies of scale; and

> 5. Regional boundaries should facilitate maximum inter-regional co-operation.[40]

Three further criteria were added:

> 6. ... community participation, and, where possible community acceptability. This does not mean any municipality will have a veto over regional government proposals in its area. What we do want is participation by all communities in an area in the discussions leading to the formation of a regional government.

> 7. ... the new regional government bound-aries should be usable by other institutions in the regional administration of their pro-grams. We have two types of institutions in mind. The first includes provincial depart-ments and agencies; the second includes local boards of education.

> 8. ... in cases where there are to be two tiers of government within a region, both tiers should be designed with the same criteria.[41]

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"Regional government" was to have other dimensions than geographic restructuring. Concern about the large total and high proportion of small municipalities (90 percent had less than 8,000 population and 270 less than 1,000) led to objectives of a minimum of 150,000 to 200,000 population for regional municipalities and 8,000 to 10,000 for local municipalities. On the basis of consultation with provincial officials, these were taken as the minimum for effective provision of services. It was quickly recognized, however, that in thinly populated areas they were not realistic. Effectiveness was seen as a function of size and "access," defined as "the most widespread participation possible on the part of all, or virtually all, individual citizens . . . in terms of capacity to influence public policy decisions and to enforce responsive and responsible administration."[42]

The discussion of regional units stressed the merits of bringing urban and rural together. It was argued that these differences are decreasing, and that the urban-rural community of interest is not only economic but also attitudinal and social, and rests in a common sharing of public service.[43] "Design for Development: Phase Two" was not committed to a two-tier system only but the analysis was written in terms of a two-tier (remodeled county) model. Each local solution was to depend on size, distribution of population and financial resources, and geographic and social considerations. Representation on the new councils was to be based on population. "Municipal councils will be strengthened by removing the powers from many special purpose bodies and turning these powers over to regional or local municipal councils."[44]

Implementation of the reforms was to be gradual; priority would go to "those areas where local government institutions are not responding to existing or anticipated change . . . for reasons beyond the influence of any one municipality acting alone." The symptoms of this stage may be ". . . increasing fiscal difficulty, a retardation of necessary growth, or a decline in the level of municipal services".[45] Other grounds for proceeding selectively were the shortage of experienced staff and the need for local opinion to form and express itself so there could be real participation.

Up to this point the main emphasis in local government reform had been on changes in boundaries and the redistribution of responsibilities, *i.e.*, structural changes. This was perhaps inevitable because those interested in reform were either within local government or in departments with functions immediately affected by the inadequacies of the existing structure.

Financial Reform Program

The regional government program was associated with reforms in public finance and management by the province. The Conservative government had been in office since 1943 and had never been really challenged by a strong opposition. Change had been evolutionary with a good deal of extemporizing and untidiness and little application of dogma. For systematic thinking about changes in government to arise in the context of finance is not surprising.

In the 1960's provincial revenues rose rapidly. A new sales tax and changes in financial arrangements with the federal government gave increased access to revenue directly related to the cash flows of an expanding economy. The extent of the financial commitments in new and expanded programs, particularly in education, health, and social services, was not at first apparent. The expansion and change in character of provincial activities, however, required not only more money but also a much enlarged public service and changes in procedure and outlook which the government's traditional approach did not lead it to anticipate (see Table II-7).

Central to the 1969 budget were proposals to modernize Ontario's public finance system. This was to be a two-part plan: the containment of expenditures and the reform of provincial-municipal taxation and finance. Not much was said about containment at that time, but in later years the government said that grants were to reduce taxes, not increase expenditures. Restraints were placed on education expenditures, over which local governments continually complained that they had no control and that education was not an appropriate charge on the property tax.

A detailed statement of finance proposals drawn from the Smith Committee brought local government reform onto a wider stage in the 1969 budget. Provincial-local interdependence had grown until the success of a whole series of provincial and federal programs was affected by the adequacy of the local government system. Commit-

Table II-7

Ontario Provincial Expenditures

($000,000)

Year ending March 31	Net General Expenditure	% Education	% Highways
1936	$ 95	—	—
1945	116	—	—
1955	434	—	—
1960	864	25	31
1965	1,377	33	24
1967	1,956	37	22
1969	2,928	40	16
1971	4,182	40	13
1973	5,052	39	12

Source: Budget Papers, 1969, 1971, 1972. Figures for 1973 are budget estimates.

ments to the subordinate level placed clear constraints on the province. In company with the local government reforms, therefore, the financial reforms were . . . "to provide a more equitable and viable financial basis for the development of provincial and municipal operations . . ."[46] by integrating their tax systems and ". . . a more measured and systematic control of the level and distribution of tax burdens."[47]

The financial reforms cover three areas: taxation, grants, and financial administration. The major concern was to reduce the weight of taxation on real property since that tax bears more heavily on lower incomes and does not respond easily to changes in economic conditions. It is an inappropriate revenue base for many services and is inadequate for supporting local services. To meet this situation, a system of provincial rebates on property taxes, aimed at integrating personal income tax payments and the real property tax, was devised. Transfer to the province of the costs of administration of justice and real property assessment, plus an increase in the provincial share of education costs from 45 to 60 percent over three years, were intended to reduce the real burden of property taxes. It was also decided to make the property tax more equitable by improving assessment administration, to broaden the base by reducing exemptions (notably by increased payments on provincial and other public property), and to achieve a more neutral business tax. Improving the quality of assessment was essential for equitable sharing of expenditures within the regional municipalities, and also to relate provincial grants to local needs and resources. It was hoped that if the property tax were fairer, it would be politically more acceptable and its productivity improved.

New and improved grants were the second part of the reforms. It was decided to increase the provincial share of local expenditure generally, in addition to the special case of education. In the process the grant structure was to be simplified, reducing the number of grant schemes and increasing the unconditional grant component as part of a "rationalized overall support policy," taking into account both local needs and resources.

The third element was improvement in local financial administration. This included more flexible provisions for capital borrowing, better financial information, and simplified legislation on procedural matters.

The creation of regional governments was conceived as part of the financial reforms insofar as the redistribution of income inherent in some services was regionally financed. This would reduce the need for redistribution through the provincial government, and a reduction in the number of municipalities would make it easier to devise an equitable grant formula.[48] The provincial treasurer estimated that the additional value to local governments of increases in provincial grants and subsidies rose from $131 million in 1968-69 to $585 million in 1972-73.[49]

The Local Government Reform Program

The importance, complexity, and long-term nature of the local government reforms made more public discussion desirable. In an attempt to improve acceptance by the municipalities and to generate public interest, a large provincial-municipal conference was held in 1970. Led by the Premier and several cabinet members, the talks made much of the province's desire to strengthen local government. Local government would be able to act more responsibly because its jurisdiction would correspond better to the social and economic community, it was argued. Local government power would be enhanced by reduction in the number of special purpose bodies, by greater municipal control over those retained, by simplification of the provincial grant structure, and possibly by a transfer of some functions from the province to reorganized local governments. None of this was really new, but it served to focus attention for an influential if somewhat skeptical audience.

What was billed as the first of an annual series was never repeated, however, nor was the final version of the proceedings published. The conference nevertheless created a public commitment, and it strengthened the new provincial-municipal liaison machinery. This ultimately may have more effect on reform than any grand gestures. McKeough, who had emerged as the key figure in provincial-local relations, said; "If we were to do it again I think we would place much greater emphasis on the other two aspects of the reform triangle" (i.e., consolidation and decision making rather than regional government).[50]

Since the conference, government statements have been couched more in terms of "local government reform" than "regional government." Officials speak of:
. . . a triangle of inter-related policies:
1. provicial-regional social and economic planning policy;
2. local government reform policy; and
3. provincial-municipal fiscal reform policy.[51]

It is indicative of the extent of local-provincial interdependence that in the 1972 restructuring of the provincial government to improve the quality of decision making, most of the Department of Municipal Affairs was absorbed into the new super-Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs.[52]

CONCLUSIONS

Local government reform in Ontario now is a relatively coherent program, not the collection of departmental programs it once was. It pertains primarily to service delivery. The program may not be so integrated nor implementation so rapid as to justify the term radical, but six regional municipalities have been created, four more went into effect on January 1, 1974,

and other important changes set in motion. If current proposals are carried forward, local government in the heavily urbanized strip around the western end of Lake Ontario will all be reorganized. Further, a start will be made on reorganization in the summer cottage areas, northern Ontario, and the national capital area.

The local government program has evolved rather slowly and has not resulted from any deep crises, ideologies, or change in government. The province of Ontario has always accepted responsibility for the viability of local structure and the municipalities have always been strong enough to influence provincial policies. Provincial recognition of those responsibilities and methods of influencing local government have also undergone an evolutionary process.[53] The most important events occasioning change were municipal financial difficulties in the 1930's and the recent expansion of the provincial bureaucracy.

Local boundaries have not been a serious problem until recently. Provincial boundaries divide only one significant urban community (Ottawa-Hull) and even there the activities of the federal National Capital Planning Commission keep many problems manageable.[54] The method by which county boundaries were originally determined has meant that some counties still constitute a recognizable community of interest, appropriate for services requiring larger area. The county is a unit on which further changes often can be based. In only a few areas, including Toronto, will the regional governments not be based on counties (with some readjustments and consolidations). In addition, the annexation process and the decreasing attractiveness of incorporating suburbs has made local adjustments possible and delayed the fragmentation of local government in metropolitan areas.

There has also been considerable flexibility in changing responsibility for functions. Through the years, this has been done by creating new functions, by shifting responsbility for established services, and by a variety of devices used at one level to influence the other, such as joint and advisory committees, professional associations and interest groups, grants, and improved communications.

That Ontario is a wealthy and dynamic province has also facilitated change. Many of the undesirable effects of change have been absorbed in the general prosperity. Rising revenues have made it possible for the province to shape its activities and grants to ensure a satisfactory minimum level of local services and to ensure that there would not be gross inequalities in local services or levels of taxation. Evidence on this cannot be conclusive. Neither the review reports nor the Smith Committee, however, have unearthed glaring cases of inequalities. Rather, the great variations in levels of assessment, the quality of administration, and complex functional and financial interrelationships make it impossible to determine if financial burdens and benefits are distributed

equitably or if resources are used efficiently. The financial arguments for reform are directed at good government and not at crises. Where there have been specific problems provincial tactics have frequently been to adjust the grant formulas, as in the use of special grants, to make major reorganization palatable.

Implementation

Implementation has not always conformed with the stated program. It has taken ten years to establish ten regional municipalities and two major urban consolidations. There is, however, no way to judge how long it will take to form the approximately 20 more governments that apparently are envisaged. The principle of the urban region has not been closely followed. Most conspicuously in the Toronto Centered Region, provincial logic, even as qualified in the various policy statements, would make the objective a very large extension of Metropolitan Toronto. It is doubtful that this was ever seriously contemplated, however, if only for fear of the political consequences of the concentration of power in one large municipality. The Toronto Centered Region originally envisaged extension of Metro's boundaries, but these have been progressively reduced to a minor adjustment of the eastern boundary.

The unspoken policy in that region appears to be one large Toronto metropolitan municipality, four smaller regional municipalities, and the province itself as the overall body for planning and major services. By contrast, there is some feeling that the Ottawa-Carleton region includes too large a rural area. Applying the regional concept in southern Ontario, where there are great variations in needs and resources compounded by severe communication problems, is even more difficult. Finally, in areas with no major urban center, achieving the minimum populations of 150,000 for the upper tier and 8,000 for lower-tier units is not practical. In these cases, also, looking for interrelationships as a key to designing local government structures is of limited value.

In general, therefore, the strategy in regional reform is to act where growth is imposing severe strains on the structure. The rural areas are being left to work out their own solutions for the present, although this is not the tactic that the regional development and growth-point strategies would call for. In applying the concept of the urban-centered region, the conflict with other policies is resulting in a rather procrustean version of what is a region.

On the financial side progress has been made, mainly in activities where the province has increased its expenditures. Little has yet been done to reduce the number of grants or to devise a program to simplify grant conditions. A final judgment is possible only when assessment reform is carried further, and thus a recasting of the grant structure is possible. It should be noted, however, that the emphasis has been on sharing of costs, not on sharing sources of revenue.

The impetus for functional reforms has come from town planning. Planning comprehends problems of development and it is deeply involved with spatial interrelationships. As with finance, the large number of policy issues inherent in effective planning draws attention to the relationships between functions and to deficiencies in existing service patterns. Provincial intervention in regional planning and economic development, however, is still carried out through the functional departments and the political process. Planning has prcvided an intellectual framework for bringing together various elements of provincial policy, except in the special case of the Toronto Centered Region, but regional planning has not otherwise been a major force in shaping the reforms.

In large part, the nature of the reform program reflects the interplay of power within the Ontario government. Inevitably the push for reform is rooted in each department's particular responsibilities and point of view. Concern for local government as a whole was left to one of the less important departments with its own functional preoccupations. This did not matter too much when the contact between local and provincial governments was limited and the rate of change moderate. Local government reform replaced "enlightened ad hocery" as an explicit government policy when provincial-local interdependence reached major proportions. The problems in society which gave rise to changes in local government also became major provincial concerns touching on central policy issues.

Political Considerations

The underlying goal of the Smith Committee and the "Design for Development" statements is efficiency. This efficiency is seen in functional terms, reflected in the central idea of designing a unit to maximize the use of resources, measured in terms of individual functions. The basic concerns are with economies of scale and functional communities of interest. Questions of improving effectiveness by means other than hierarchical and large-sale (*i.e.,* vertical) integration are not given much weight, nor are problems of identifying and accommodating diverse interests. This emphasis is not surprising, since the Smith Committee was primarily concerned with taxation and costs, not with service effectiveness or the orientation of local and provincial

government along functional lines. Examining the geographic distribution of power was left largely to town planners and geographers, who look at functional relationships and do not measure diversity. Participation, access to government, and the importance of political considerations have often been mentioned, but one is left with a feeling that for some of the proponents this is only a ritual. Perhaps the last thing they want is participation and genuine dissent. If there is a conflict between functional advantage and the broader issues of responsive government, there is no contest. Evidence to support this can be found in the development of the program details. There have been changes in planning administration, but little has been done to decrease the regulation of local government or to simplify the grant conditions. Such changes would require a change in the style of government and more pervasive measures than the redrawing of a boundary.

Politically the local government reforms have been successful. While regional government has not been listed prominently in the government's election literature, the opposition has not attacked it strongly either. It is much the kind of program one would expect from a government long in office, concerned with issues of "good government" and with the expanding role of the province. It is an evolutionary and pragmatic program, articulated by leaders not overly impressed with theoretical arguments and yet well aware of the diversity of the problems.

Local participation and acceptance are difficult to judge. On the whole, where regional government has been implemented, it has been accepted without serious objections or great enthusiasm. The rural areas seem to be unsure. In both the Niagara and Ottawa regions, the large cities feel they should have more say if they are to foot the bill. Some of their reluctance stems from an awareness gained through experience with school consolidations that the main purpose of the reforms is to improve the quality of public services, which inevitably means higher expenditures. Local people may agree services should be improved but they perceive no crisis. The abolition of special boards and conditional grants, and the possibly enhanced powers that are promised, are elusive. If the province is to accelerate the regional program, it must use more incentives; increase its rather low-key pressure, with the attendant political risks; or modify the program to improve its acceptability.

FOOTNOTES

[1] 1971 Census of Canada. Urban is defined as a place of 1,000 population or more whether incorporated as a city, town, or village or not, together with the fringe areas of places over 10,000 population. Census data is not available for all 1971 series as yet.

[2] For a detailed discussion see N. H. Lithwick, *Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects* (Ottawa: Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1970) and L. O. Stone, *Urban Development* (D.B.S. 1961 Census Monograph, 1967).

[3] A farm is defined as a holding of one acre or more and production of $50 or more a year.

[4] For Metropolitan Toronto, the City of Toronto has been counted as a city and the five boroughs as towns for the purposes here, although their status and power in law are equal for all practical purposes.

[5] Legally the expression is the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, or Executive Council, but it is the fact the cabinet which acts by Order-in-Council.

[6]Decision: Procedure Files C-2976 and B-6071, Ontario Municipal Board, Toronto, p. 9.

[7]*Re City of Woodstock*, P.F.N.-3275-62, Decision, pp. 2-4.

[8]Toronto Decision, p. 89.

[9]Stratford Decision, P.F.N.-7721-64.

[10]See *Waterloo Area Local Government Review, Report,* (Toronto: Department of Municipal Affairs, 1970), p. 29, and the 1970, 1971, and 1972 Municipal Directories.

[11]Waterloo Area Local Government Review, *Report,* p. 175.

[12]*Fourth and Final Report,* pp. 126-127.

[13]The Municipal Act, Section 25a (1966) C. 93.

[14] Lakehead Local Government Review, *Report and Recommendations* (Toronto: Department of Municipal Affairs, 1968).

[15]*Proposal for Local Government Reform in the Area West of Metropolitan Toronto* (Toronto: Ministry of Treasury, Economic and Intergovernmental Affairs, 1973), p. 44.

[16]For details see Waterloo Area Local Government Review, *Report,* pp. 161-162, 167.

[17]Niagara Local Government Review, *Report* (Toronto: Department of Municipal Affairs, 1966), p. 67.

[18]A good review of federal-provincial relations can be found in *In Search of Balance—Canada's Intergovernmental Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971).

[19]J. S. Dupré, *Intergovernmental Finance in Ontario: A Provincial-Local Prospective* (Toronto: Queen's Printer and Publisher, 1968), pp. 42-44 and 48-54.

[20]Dupré, p. 33.

[21]Dupré, p. 83.

[22]R. S. Thoman, *Design for Development in Ontario* (Toronto: 1971), p. 48.

[23]Letter of Transmittal, in *Metropolitan Toronto and Region Transportation Study: Choices for a Growing Region* (Toronto, Department of Municipal Affairs, 1967).

[24]"Design for Development: Phase Two." Statement by Premier Roberts, November, 1968, p. 5.

[25]*Design for Development: The Toronto Centered Region* (Toronto, Queen's Printer, 1970).

[26]Lithwick, p. 174.

[27]Department of Education, *Annual Reports.*

[28]While the committee was appointed in 1961 and had made earlier reports, these were concerned with specific clauses in the legislation. Its Fourth and Final Report is significant and became known as the Beckett Report.

[29]*Fourth and Final report,* p. 167.

[30]*Report of the Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation in New Brunswick* (Fredricton, 1963).

[31]The Ontario Committee on Taxation, *Report* (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1967), I, p. ix.

[32]*1962 Submission to the Executive Council of the Province of Ontario,* p. 12.

[33]*Report of the Royal Commission on the Government of Metropolitan Toronto* (Goldenberg Commission) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965).

[34]Legislature of Ontario, *Debates,* March 25, 1965, pp. 1604-5.

[35]*Public Accounts of Ontario 1969-70* (Toronto: Queen's Printer and Publisher).

[36]Waterloo Area Local Government Review, *Report,* pp. 6-7.

[37]"A Discussion Paper: Some Possible Adjustments in Ottawa-Carleton" (Department of Municipal Affairs, 1972), p. 1.

[38]*The Globe and Mail,* Toronto, April 26, 1973.

[39]This was most clearly put in the 1966 statement which became known as "Design for Development: Phase One."

[40]"Design for Development: Phase Two." Statement by McKeough. p. 1.

[41]"Design for Development: Phase Two," pp. 2-3.

[42]*Report,* The Ontario Committee on Taxation, p. 503.

[43]"Design for Development: Phase Two," p. 4.

[44]"Design for Development: Phase Two," p. 9.

[45]"Design for Development: Phase Two," p. 9.

[46]*Budget Statement 1969,* p. 7.

[47]*Budget Statement 1969,* p. 7.

[48]For more detailed statements and supporting financial information see the Budget Papers presented with the 1969, 1971 and 1972 Budgets.

[49]*1972 Ontario Budget,* p. 15.

[50]*Local Government Reform: Where We Stand,* A Statement by Hon. W. Darcy McKeough, to the Ontario Provincial-Municipal Conference, April 24, 1970, p. 2.

[51]"Design for Development: Phase Three." Statement by Hon. W. Darcy McKeough, Toronto, 1972, p. 2.

[52]The intergovernmental side initially had been concerned with federal-provincial relations, which included federal programs affecting local government.

[53]See K. G. Crawford, "The Independence of Municipal Councils in Ontario," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* 1940, pp. 543-554, for some of the earlier examples.

[54]On the Ontario side of the national capital area is the Ottawa-Carleton regional municipality, while on the Quebec side is the Outaouais regional community.

Chapter III

TWO DECADES OF METROPOLITAN GOVERMENT IN TORONTO: 1953-1973

Albert Rose
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The twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto occurred April 15, 1973, without fuss or fanfare. The newspapers reported that the Prime Minister of Ontario held a small reception in the legislature to which he invited the first two chairmen of the Metropolitan Council, a number of unspecified dignitaries, and elected and appointed officials. There were no stories of praise or glorification, no tributes to the achievements of Metro, but rather a widespread apathy and, even more, strong expressions of hostility in the newspapers. These were particularly evident during the few months preceding the anniversary.

When the provincial government passed Bill 80, an Act to Provide for the Federation of the Municipalities in the Toronto Metropolitan Area for Certain Financial and Other Purposes, on April 2, 1953, the population of Metro Toronto was not more than half what it is in 1973, about 2,300,000. The first chairman, appointed by the provincial Prime Minister, took office within two weeks. He began immediately to organize the administration of the first major federated metropolitan municipality in North America, with the stipulation that all should be ready by January 1, 1954.

In the intervening 20 years the achievements of Metro Toronto were extensive, particularly in the physical provision of services, which were necessary to a doubling population. In fact, when the investigations of the problems of greater Toronto began in 1948-49 the population within the present metropolitan boundaries was 937,000. About 675,000 lived within the central city of Toronto, incorporated in 1834.

The 1973 expressions of hostility, antagonism, and criticism towards the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, aired sharply in the press, were not necessarily surprising, except with respect to timing. These outbursts strongly predicted that the federation was breaking up, that the government of Ontario was likely to create new forms of regional government, perhaps through a bifurcation of Metro Toronto or in other ways. In truth, the major metropolitan newspapers had always expressed disapproval of the provincial government's creation of a federated metropolitan municipality, had fought the concept as strongly as they could throughout the intervening years, and had found fault with all the changes and reorganizations which occurred over two decades.[1]

A RECAPITULATION OF METROPOLITAN REORGANIZATION

At the commencement of the post-war period in 1946 there were 13 municipalities within greater Toronto. Their population of less than one million was approximately 22 percent of Ontario's population of 4.5 million. The governments, boards, and commissions of Toronto and its 12 adjacent municipalities were relatively few in number by comparison with the situation in such metropolitan areas as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Detroit. The central city housed about 62 percent of the total population of the recognized metropolitan area and maintained a relatively sound financial position by virtue of a substantial assessed valuation, which also comprised slightly more than 60 percent of the total for the entire area.

Although some of the municipalities in greater Toronto were large rural townships created when municipal boundaries were first determined in the mid-nineteenth century, some of the 12 suburban municipalities dated back only to World War I. There were five townships, four towns, and three villages. Technically, a village within the Province of Ontario was usually defined as having a population of less than 2,000. Similarly, towns were so described if they had populations ranging from approximately 3,000 to 10,000. Townships were usually very large rural areas which, in the early post-War period, began to expand rapidly in population if they were adjacent to relatively large urban areas. The City of Toronto occupied 35 square miles within a total metropolitan area of 240 square miles. The three largest townships were each larger in area than the long-established city itself.

Canada embarked upon a strong and forthright immigration policy immediately after World War II. Approximately 40 percent of all newcomers to the Nation during the ensuing 25 years settled in the Province of Ontario; about 75 percent or more of these newcomers sought employment and housing within the greater Toronto region. With vast numbers of returning servicemen, the population of the region began to expand rapidly. By 1952 it had exceeded 1.1 million, and the familiar statistical patterns throughout North America were clearly in process of replication.

The population of the central city remained fairly stable, moving only slightly up or down from year to year. On the other hand, the population of the suburban areas rose very rapidly. This was not the case in the villages (which ranged from 8,000 to 15,000 in population at the time), nor in the towns (which had 10,000 to 15,000 people at that time), but particularly in the huge townships across the northern segment of the semicircle, with its base along the shore of Lake Ontario, which makes up Metro Toronto. The municipalities of Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough had fewer than 25,000 persons each in 1945,[2] but by the beginning of the 1950's North York had reached 100,000 persons, and the others were not far behind. In 1973 the populations of these three municipalities were estimated at 275,000, 525,000, and 350,000 respectively. These figures alone provide a substantial rational for dissatisfaction with the metropolitan political organization

The problems of the years 1946 to 1951 are familiar from previous writings and need no further exposition. It is sufficient to indicate that all the attributes

described in the literature of that period as "metro-politanitis," "suburbanitis," "metropolitan sprawl," and the like were duplicated within greater Toronto.[3] A crisis in the provision of civic services emerged sharply in the latter 1940's: supplies of pure water, facilities for sewage disposal, educational facilities, and most of the essential requirements of modern urban existence were insufficient. There were no plans for an orderly expansion of services to meet the requirements of the growing population; there was growing antipathy between the municipalities; the capacity of the City of Toronto to extend its services beyond its boundaries to supply the deficiencies of other jurisdictions appeared to have reached the limit; and a real breakdown appeared possible within a year or two.[4] Several municipalities stopped or sharply restricted the issuance of building permits for residential development.

In 1950 the City of Toronto, which concluded its last annexation of land beyond its traditional boundaries at the end of World War I, applied to the Ontario Municipal Board for an order amalgamating the 13 municipalities within greater Toronto into one large city of Toronto. The board was a quasi-judicial body created by the government of Ontario to supervise the financial affairs, including the capital borrowing, of municipalities within the province, and to rule on such matters as annexation and changes in municipal status. Hearings on the application began within a few months and continued for almost two years. The city was supported by only one of the other 12 municipalities; opposition to the application was strong. The foremost municipal lawyers of the day were engaged on practically a full-time basis for a substantial period of time. The hearings were concluded in the late summer of 1952, and in mid-January of 1953 the Ontario Municipal Board submitted its report to the government of Ontario, rejecting Toronto's application for an "amalgamation," as it came to be known, of the 13 municipalities.[5]

The board went further, however. While it admitted that it had not been asked formally for its opinion on the future organization of Metropolitan Toronto, it presented its views. These views, which occupied the major part of the report, called for a metropolitan federation and went even further in suggesting the respective duties of local governments, which it proposed should be continued, and a new metropolitan level of government. The government of Ontario moved swiftly between February and April, 1953,[6] introducing a bill and carrying it through the required three readings to create the federation which has existed to the present time.

In the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act of 1953, the government of Ontario set up the basic metropolitan structure which was to consist of a new metropolitan council made up of 25 representatives: 12 from the City of Toronto, 12 from the suburban governments (who were the senior elected representa-

tives of each municipality), and a provincially appointed chairman who would serve until the close of 1954. In its first meeting of 1955 the Metropolitan Council would elect a successor chairman, who could be chosen from outside the metropolitan council or from among the members.

The council, therefore, was to be composed of persons already elected to office in the 13 "area municipalities," as they were described in the act, and they would thus serve both in their local governments and in the metropolitan government. There would be additional remuneration for these indirectly elected metropolitan councillors. The basic situation, as described, has existed to the present day. The number of municipalities has been sharply reduced, but the fundamental framework continues.

The functions of the Metropolitan Council were laid down in Bill 80 and constituted the regional responsibilities (the wholesaling functions); the local municipalities would continue to exist and were assigned many of the traditional community responsibilities of a non-regional nature (the retailing functions). Metro was assigned the following responsibilities:

Water Supply. Construction and maintenance of pumping stations, treatment plants, trunk mains, and reservoirs for the wholesale distribution of water to the 13 area municipalities.

Sewage Disposal. Construction and maintenance of trunk sewer mains and sewage treatment plants to provide a metropolitan sewage disposal system capable of accepting sewage on a wholesale basis from the area municipalities.

Roads. The designation of highways as metropolitan roads, and the establishment of an arterial system of highways. Financing to be split evenly with the province.

Transportation. The former Toronto Transportation Commission became the Toronto Transit Commission, with responsibility for public transportation throughout the metropolitan area.

Education. The Metropolitan School Board was given responsibility for coordinating educational facilities in the metropolitan area, and charged with paying a grant to each of the 13 local school boards (the latter continued in existence) for primary, secondary, and vocational school pupils.

Health and Welfare. The Metropolitan Council was given responsibility for the provision of homes for the aged, the maintenance of wards of childrens' aid societies, post-sanatorium care for tuberculosis

patients, and the hospitalization of indigent patients.

Justice. The Metropolitan Council must provide and maintain a courthouse and jail.

Housing. The Metropolitan Council was given all of the powers of a municipality in the fields of housing and redevelopment.

Planning. The metropolitan planning board was created, with authority extending beyond the metropolitan area, encompassing all adjoining townships. It was charged with preparing an official plan for this larger metropolitan planning area.

Parks. The Metropolitan Council was empowered to establish metropolitan parks.

Finance and Taxation. The Metropolitan Council was made responsible for the uniform assessment of all lands and buildings in the 13 municipalities. On the basis of the total assessment, the requirements of the metropolitan government are levied against each area municipality at a uniform mill rate. The local government than collects the metropolitan tax requirement, as well as its own requirement, from its taxpayers. All responsibility for debenture financing was given to Metro to exercise both for itself and on behalf of any local government in the area. Moreover, the metropolitan corporation was required to assume the school debenture debts of each municipality, and acquired all assets of the local municipalities needed for metropolitan services.[7]

The local governments were assigned the following responsibilities:

Water Supply. Local distribution systems and retail sale of water to consumers.

Sewage Disposal. Local sewage collection.

Garbage Collection. Left entirely with the Area Municipalities.

Roads. The construction and maintenance of local streets and sidewalks.

Police. Left entirely with the area municipalities.

Fire. Left entirely with the area municipalities.

Education. The local board of education would continue, and must finance the cost of any standard of educational service above the level of metropolitan grants, if it desired to go beyond the basic standard.

Health and Welfare Services. Public health in the municipal or health unit, unemployment relief, maintenance of non-wards, social services.

Housing. The local councils retained all their powers with respect to housing and redevelopment.

Planning. Local planning boards could be continued or created, and expected to plan in conformity with the overall metropolitan plan.

Parks and Recreation. Creation and maintenance of local parks.

Finance and Taxation. On the basis of the uniform assessment the local council would collect the revenues required to provide local services.[8]

The case of water supply is an apt illustration of the wholesaling-retailing concept. It was the responsibility of the Metro Council to create and maintain capital facilities and to ensure that a sufficient supply of pure water was made available for the metropolitan area. Metro thus sold supplies to the local governments, which provided the local capital installations directing the water to residents and places of work; water rates were then charged to local customers. In turn, the local governments remitted the wholesale charges as a portion of their payments to finance the activities of the Metro Council.

In the fields of elementary and secondary education a somewhat similar pattern was created, but there were only 11 school boards in existence rather than 13. A metropolitan school board was established with 50 percent representation from the City of Toronto and 50 percent from the other municipalities; the local boards of education continued to operate. The metropolitan board of education received grants from the provincial Department of Education and set the minimum standards for educational services and capital installations that governed the way in which provincial funds were distributed throughout the metropolitan area. The local boards did the hiring, established their own curricula within provincial regulations, and carried on local educational activities. If they chose to go beyond the basic acceptable levels of education set by the provincial department, they could levy additional taxes upon their constituents.

There emerged by 1954 a four-part tax responsibility for all the residents of Metropolitan Toronto. The Metropolitan Council first determined its operating and capital budgets for the calendar year. Then it established a mill rate against the total assessed valuation of Metropolitan Toronto as distributed within the 13 municipalities. The metropolitan levies were distributed in proportion to taxable assessment throughout the area. In addition, the metropolitan board of education developed its budget and requested the Metropolitan Council

to collect the required funds from its constituent municipalities.

The third and fourth parts of the annual tax bill were the responsibility of the local government or area municipality, which determined its budget for general municipal purposes and received the budgetary request from the local board of education. Under long-standing provincial legislation, a local government may not refuse to levy upon its residents the necessary taxation to provide its board of education with its financial requirements. The local government may argue, it may delay, it may seek to obstruct, and it may send back the budget for further examination; but it may not refuse ultimately to raise the budget requested by its local board of education.

Thus, from January 1, 1954, onward, each property owner within Metro, whether residential, commercial, or industrial, received a four-part tax bill from his local municipal treasurer covering metropolitan general purposes, metropolitan educational services, local general purposes, and local educational services. Most municipalities sent out an explanatory booklet or brochure with the tax bill to explain the method used to determine the mill rate and the way in which funds had been distributed throughout the four areas of revenue sources and the expenditure areas.

GROWTH OF METROPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES: 1957-1965

Although it was well recognized by students of the subject and well publicized by the first chairman of the Metropolitan Council, Frederick G. Gardiner, Q.C., that the new Metropolitan Council was making substantial progress, the 12 suburban municipalities and the press continued to oppose the new governmental organization. In 1957, two years ahead of the five-year review promised by Ontario Prime Minister Leslie M. Frost, a formal review of progress, responsibilities, and recommended changes was commissioned. The Metropolitan Toronto Commission of Inquiry was chaired by Lorne Cumming, chairman of the Ontario Municipal Board and in a real sense the political father of the Metropolitan Council. As would be expected, therefore, the report of the Commission of Inquiry was most favorable.[9]

The issues which led the Prime Minister to initiate a formal review so early were a series of dissatisfactions centered on such questions as (1) the appropriate representation of the constituent area municipalities on the Metropolitan Council; (2) the expansion of metropolitan functions to the detriment of local municipal autonomy; and (3) areawide election of the chairman of the Metropolitan Council, despite the legislation, which called for appointment by the Metropolitan Council on an annual basis.[10] A partial explanation of the hostility towards the metropolitan federation in the 1970's is the fact that these major issues, of vital concern from the beginning of Metro's existence, remain unresolved as far as the constituent municipalities are concerned.

In 1957, however, Metro received from the Commission of Inquiry a proverbial "clean bill of health"; the commission made few recommendations that were not simply matters of minor technical importance. It recommended that the chairman of the Metro Council continue to be appointed by the council; it recommended that council members still be indirectly elected from within the 13 area municipalities; and, above all, it recommended no change in the numerical representation created by the original legislation.[11]

Expansion of Functions

The report of the Metropolitan Toronto Commission of Inquiry, issued March 14, 1958, paved the way for the first significant expansion of the functions of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto vis-a-vis its 13 constituent local governments. In 1953 it had been a source of some surprise to those who had studied the political, social, and economic problems within greater Toronto that the government of Ontario did not assign the policing function to the upper tier of the new metropolitan federation. The 13 police forces continued as before, and yet dissatisfaction with their capacity to meet their responsibilities in a rapidly expanding urban environment mounted, as allegations became more frequent that the situation was productive of increased criminal activity.

In 1955-56 consolidation of the police departments within Metro Toronto was studied by an ad hoc committee. In 1956 the provincial government amended the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act to create a Board of Police Commissioners on January 1, 1957, to supervise a Metropolitan Toronto Police Department.[12] The new regional department was assigned responsibility for the entire area, and the 13 individual departments were to disappear as soon as the new administration could be developed. In fact, this operation was carried out with such tact, judgment and administrative skill that few criticisms were heard. Most of the staff members of the constituent police departments retained positions, but many were reassigned. Within two or three years a new regional reorganization had been accomplished, with district police stations often headed by former chiefs of police of relatively small local governments.

On January 1, 1957, the responsibility for licensing all businesses and enterprises which required such supervision, for example, taxicabs, was assigned to the Metropolitan Council.[13] A Metropolitan Licensing Commission was created, headed by a magistrate and with several appointed members. This new responsibility, not unrelated to the consolidation of the policing function in the large urbanized area, was an important reallocation of responsibility from local governments to the Metropolitan Council.

It had become quite clear by 1960, however, that

Metropolitan Toronto was changing rapidly and that its basic components in terms of population and assessed valuation were not what they were in the early 1950's. Moreover, the area municipalities became aware of the fact that the so-called "amalgamation" of the municipalities within Metropolitan Toronto could be accomplished in more than one way. The City of Toronto had continued its posture of advocating a "one-big-city approach." The other municipalities, with few exceptions, continued to be strongly opposed to this view as expressed by the powerful politicians who represented the city on the Metro Council. The suburbs saw that their future was no longer to be ensured by mere opposition to the city's continued demand for amalgamation.

The expansion of Metropolitan Toronto in terms of urban growth and development, as well as the expansion of the responsibilities of Metro Council by virtue of both legislation and the requirements laid upon Metro's administrative departments, appeared to be more threatening than the position taken by the city. By 1960 a great many debates had occurred in the Metro Council concerning a variety of approaches to governmental reorganization, and the area municipalities more frequently than before expressed their fear that they would disappear simply through attrition. Metro was becoming stronger, and local responsibilities appeared less important with each passing year. If they were not simply to vanish in this process, the suburbs would have to influence the provincial government to change Metro's organization in a fundamental manner.

Organizational Review

In his eighth inaugural address, in January 1961, Chairman Gardiner announced his resignation, to take effect at the close of the year. He also announced the formation of a metropolitan committee of the whole to investigate the future organizational and political system for Metropolitan Toronto.[14] Throughout the balance of the year, a series of major reports was commissioned and received, some emanating from within the well-developed departments of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto itself, some requested and completed within the Ontario Department of Economics,[15] and some stitched together by a series of internal papers developed by Chairman Gardiner and his senior department commissioners. No outside consultants were engaged, nor did the government commission the Ontario Municipal Board or any other organization to undertake a fundamental review of Metro.

Chairman Gardiner was succeeded by William R. Allen, Q.C., in January 1962, following a hard-fought election within the Metropolitan Council.[16] The reorganization debate quieted for a time, but by 1963 the pressures had developed to the point where the provincial government finally gave way. Late in 1963 it commissioned Carl H. Goldenberg, Q.C., a distinguished

specialist in Canadian local government organization and a noted labor relations negotiator (now a senator in the upper house of the government of Canada), to undertake a review. In formal terms, the Prime Minister of Ontario created a Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto and named Goldenberg as the sole commissioner.[17]

The facts which prompted this second but comprehensive review of the organization of Metropolitan Toronto were basically those of urbanization and population growth since 1953. After 10 or 11 years of metropolitan government, the proportion of population resident in the City of Toronto and the proportion of assessed valuation within the city had dropped to little more than 50 percent of the total for Metropolitan Toronto. The large townships in the northern reaches were each approaching or in excess of 200,000 persons, and together approached the population of the central city. Yet each of the 12 suburban municipalities had only one representative on the Metro Council, whereas the City of Toronto had 12 representatives. Moreover, on the powerful executive committee, which gradually evolved after 1954 (no provision was made for this committee in the original legislation) and was ultimately recognized in an amendment to the act, the city had once again 50 percent of the total representation.

Although it continued to be true, as Chairman Gardiner repeatedly emphasized, that the "City of Toronto is the financial anchor of the metropolitan government," the suburban governments were straining to increase their influence within the Metropolitan Council and demanded a "new deal." The newspapers also continued to press for a formal review and a fundamental change in the organization of Metropolitan Toronto. However, unlike the traditional suburban municipalities, they were pressing for the creation of one large metropolitan city with an elected mayor and council—in short, the complete abolition of the 13 local governments.

Goldenberg reported in June 1965, and recommended the continuance of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, with a fundamental reorganization of the 13 area municipalities into four cities. The four-city plan would have added several small municipalities to the City of Toronto, which would continue as one of the four cities.[18] The three large townships would become cities and would annex other local governments so that the original 13 municipalities would be reduced to four, all to be designated as cities within the meaning of that term in the Municipal Act of the Province of Ontario. The significance of the designation was closely related to the provision of provincial grants for various purposes and could have meant substantial losses in provincial assistance.

Throughout the province the municipalities designated as townships received the highest grants per capita for educational and general purposes (such as the development and expansion of policing and welfare services), while the "cities" received far lower grants in

proportion. Although this was the system, it clearly had little relevance within Metropolitan Toronto. The villages had large populations by comparison with villages in the rest of the province. The towns were similarly beyond the population of most towns in the province, and the townships had grown into municipalities of substantial populations, ranking among the top 10 or 15 local governments in the entire country.

The Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto was a milestone in the continuing reorganization of the services of metropolitan Toronto. For nearly a year the report was analyzed within various provincial departments; it was not until January 1966 that Prime Minister John Robarts issued a substantial statement indicating the decision of his government concerning the future organization of Metropolitan Toronto.[19] The fundamentals of that determination by the government of Ontario constitute the system which prevails in the 1970's.

REORGANIZATION OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO: 1967-1972

The fact that the provincial government did not accept much of the fine detail within the "Recommendations" of the Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, led many observers to the view that the commission's work had been futile. The fact is that the most significant recommendations of Commissioner Goldenberg were enthusiastically embraced by Prime Minister Robarts, and the government retains this position with little change in the 1970's.

The most important of the recommendations accepted by the provincial government was that a two-tier system of metropolitan government be retained and strengthened. The alternative was the creation of one large city with a unitary form of government, and presumably, with a directly elected mayor and council. The Prime Minister chose instead to reorganize the composition of the federated Metro Council to ensure that it was more nearly representative of the reality of population growth and distribution. The Metro Council was expanded to 32 members, 20 of whom were allotted to the suburban municipalities, while the city retained its 12.[20] Moreover, the 20 members from outside the city were distributed on a population basis which, while somewhat inexact, did take into account the populations in the new boroughs.

This latter fact constituted the second major acceptance of the "Recommendations" of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, specifically, that the number of municipalities within Metro should be sharply decreased. Commissioner Goldenberg recommended that the 13 municipalities be reduced to four cities. The government accepted the principle but not the specific details, and decided to reduce the number of municipalities to six as of January 1, 1967.[21] Within the

Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto there would be the City of Toronto, expanded by the addition of two small villages, and five boroughs, each based upon the prior existence of a large township. Two of the three largest townships would become boroughs within any consolidation of other municipalities. The third largest township, in the northwest sector of Metro, would absorb three small municipalities along the lakeshore to the west of the city. The two townships with the smallest populations in 1966 (about 75,000 and 100,000 respectively) would each absorb one additional small municipality. Since the beginning of the year following the Prime Minister's announcement, therefore, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto has consisted of the city and five boroughs.

Although the representation of the City of Toronto was reduced to 40 percent on the Metro Council, a proportion which nearly coincided with the distribution of population and assessed valuation within the total metropolis, the city was given a continued major role within the powerful executive committee. This committee was expanded from seven to nine members, including the Metro chairman, and the city retained its long-term proportion of 50 percent of the membership.[22] This was clearly the government's way of creating certain checks and balances between the burgeoning suburban boroughs and the financially strong central city. The Royal Commission recommended, in addition, that the chairmanship of the Metropolitan Council continue to be appointive. The clamor for the direct election of the Metro chairman had increased in strength during the mid-1960's, and a number of presentations before the Royal Commission urged election at large. The government rejected these pleas, and the office is now filled, as it was from 1954, by election from candidates within or outside the Metro Council at its meeting following the municipal elections.

Commissioner Goldenberg had also recommended that the term of office of all elected municipal officials within Metropolitan Toronto be extended to three years, and this the government accepted.[23] Thus, the Metro chairman to be elected in January 1967 would serve for three years. Moreover, all elections were to be held on the same date (the first Monday) in the preceding December and at three-year intervals.

Education

The second major set of Goldenberg recommendations (the first was the four-city proposal) was in the field of education, and was rejected by the government of Ontario. For reasons which were never explained adequately or satisfactorily as far as the public was concerned, the Royal Commission recommended a system of educational districts which did not coincide with the four cities it had recommended and exceeded the number of municipal units by more than 100 percent.[24] The Metropolitan Board of Education was to

be continued with all the functions it had been assigned previously and with some additional responsibilities, but the system of relationships between the metropolitan board and the so-called district education councils recommended by Goldenberg appeared complicated, if not tortuous. Prime Minister Robarts made it clear that he could not accept these recommendations, and this strengthened the view that the work of the Royal Commission had been largely in vain.

In the field of elementary and secondary education, the government specified that the Metropolitan Toronto Board of Education would be continued and that there would be six new boards of education for the expanded City of Toronto and the five boroughs.[25] This meant that in two of the boroughs there would be almost no change in the system of local educational administration, since these boroughs had not absorbed any of the smaller area municipalities. In the remaining three boroughs the educational administration had to be expanded to absorb those area municipalities which were about to vanish as they were incorporated in their respective boroughs.

At the commencement of 1967, several important additional service functions were transferred to the metropolitan jurisdiction. All were announced in the Prime Minister's statement of January 10, 1966, and followed recommendations of the Royal Commission. The first and most important of these changes lay in the unification of the welfare departments throughout the 13 municipalities into one metropolitan department of welfare.

The history of this unification should have been a sober lesson in metropolitan politics for the elected and appointed officials outside the City of Toronto, but it is by no means certain at the present time that the lesson has been learned. Public welfare was a responsibility of minor import in most of the 12 suburban municipalities. In the City of Toronto, rested the heaviest load of financial and social service responsibility for unemployable persons and their families, for the disabled and the chronically ill, and for the mothers with dependent children whose husbands had deserted them (until these families could be placed on the provincial rolls in the program known as Mothers' Allowance). In a word, most poor and disadvantaged people lived in the urban core.

Welfare

As the suburban municipalities expanded rapidly, the disparity in welfare expenditures between the city and the 12 area municipalities grew more noticeable. Simultaneously, property owners within the city became more aware of the utilization of their tax payments by the metropolitan government to build up the physical requirements of burgeoning suburban areas. Toronto's taxpayers were responsible for huge sums to provide water and sewage facilities, arterial roadways, and a tremendous expansion of educational facilities beyond the city's boundaries. There was no clear redistribution in the opposite direction to take care of the working poor and the indigent who congregated within the central city.

In fact, there is no doubt that zoning bylaws, pressures against the creation of public housing in the suburban areas, and the sheer lack of social services for people in need reinforced the residential location of disadvantaged persons in the city and helped to keep them out of the suburban municipalities. At a critical juncture in the early 1960's the province awarded Metro several million dollars to be distributed to the various municipalities to assist with the severe pressures of welfare and social service expenditures. Metro proceeded to allocate this money on the basis of population; as a consequence, several area municipalities made a "profit" out of this grant while the city continued in a severe deficit position.

The outcries which this form of political greed and ineptness aroused led directly to the provincial government's decision in the mid-1960's to remove the municipal share of welfare expenditures for general assistance (20 percent, whereas the Province paid 30 percent, and the federal government 50 percent) and to assign the local responsibility to the Metropolitan Council. This further step in consolidation was consummated on January 1, 1967, and meant the loss of an additional area of local government responsibility. Once more, the lesson was the clear possibility that, with the approval of the provincial government, Metropolitan Toronto would become one unitary system, through attrition of local government functions rather than through annexation by the City of Toronto.

In 1966-67 the Prime Minister created a metropolitan library system. Most of the 13 municipalities had library systems, and the City of Toronto, with the largest resources (the Central Reference Library was adjacent to the heart of downtown), was in the forefront. It was clear that the library needs of a metropolitan population could not be met through divided jurisdiction, so on January 1, 1967, the Metro Toronto Library Board was created. The new board took over the Central Reference Library and began to create a metropolitan system. The City of Toronto Library Board continued to exist, but all others have been absorbed within the metropolitan system without great difficulty.

Solid Waste Disposal

Moreover, in the 1966-67 reorganization responsibility for solid waste disposal was assigned to the metropolitan government. From the beginning of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, responsibility for garbage collection and disposal had remained with the local municipalities. By the mid-1960's, however, the problem of disposal had become severe because of the great expansion of population and the relative affluence of that population by comparison with the war-time and

early post-war years. Garbage collection *per se* has remained with the city and the boroughs, but Metro is now responsible for waste disposal. This assignment of responsibility seemed relatively innocuous at the time, but it has since become one of the most contentious issues in the politics of governmental organization in Ontario.

In a word, no one wants Metro's garbage. The Metro Council acquired a series of landfill and other disposal sites in the townships beyond the boundaries of Metro, townships substantially rural throughout the 1960's. As Metro began to utilize these sites to the full, a new opposition arose, specifically, a number of citizens' and quasi-professional groups dedicated to the preservation of the environment. The townships surrounding Metropolitan Toronto to the west, north, and east were growing rapidly in population (with the exception of the municipalities to the east towards Oshawa), and the forces of opposition to continued metropolitan sprawl and the forces of environmental protection coincided.

Metro was blocked in its utilization or acquisition of additional disposal sites, and in 1971-72 it called for proposals from the two major Canadian railroads for the delivery of solid waste from the Toronto metropolitan area to other sites and its disposal in some creditable form. The Canadian Pacific Railway came forward with a proposition to acquire sites approximately 100 miles from Toronto and to deliver regularly hundreds of tons of Metro's garbage for landfill in different rural areas. Whenever proposed sites became public knowledge, local councillors and local residents were almost at once "up in arms." In the 1970's the problem has become very serious, without any relatively extensive or simple solutions in prospect. It appears that the only technological solution available at this time is one involving expensive compacting approaches and burial of the compacted products.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

If the major problems of the greater Toronto area in the immediate pre-War and post-War decades were physical and quantitative in nature, then Metro has been a huge success. If, on the other hand, the problems of Metro Toronto have changed significantly, particularly in the last two decades, in the direction of a "quality of life" approach, rather than the provision of basic municipal services, then Metro has become somewhat of a failure. In due time, perhaps a quarter-century hence, historians and social scientists will evaluate the balance between these two sets of interrelated needs and requirements, and the final judgment as to success or failure will be made.

The problems which led the government of Ontario to create a metropolitan form of government in the Toronto region were substantially physical in nature. The 13 municipalities were able to function, primarily because they had more than 100 formal and informal intermunicipal agreements which made the services available within the City of Toronto also available to the relatively small populations outside its boundaries. Toronto water was distributed to several municipalities—at a price, of course; Toronto sewage disposal facilities were utilized by several municipalities which did not have access to Lake Ontario; and intermunicipal agreements were required to permit the improvement of certain arterial roadways. By 1949-50, however, the City was finding it increasingly difficult to supply the requirements of the rapidly expanding suburban populations. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult to undertake capital projects, particularly in the field of transportation, by virtue of stiffening resistance on the part of municipalities.

In the context of these historical difficulties and the basic physical requirements of urban dwellers, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto has been an enormous success. It is not germane to this argument to cite the increased production of millions of gallons of pure water; similar data with respect to sewage disposal facilities; hundreds of miles of metropolitan arteries improved, widened, or built; the expansion of public and private transportation facilities in terms of miles or cost per mile; the large amounts of money that have been borrowed, disbursed and directed towards the creation of substantial components of social capital for a metropolitan area which has doubled in population in 20 years. The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto has created great increments of social capital—elementary and secondary schools, community centers, libraries, health and welfare centers, and hospitals and universities (where its contributions have been largely in the form of financial grants).

To point out that the fundamental problems of Metropolitan Toronto in the 1970's are not primarily physical does not obviate the problems of ongoing physical expansion of capital facilities and the balancing of capital priorities, for example, between public transit and arterial roadways and expressways for private transportation. The remaining problems of basic municipal service provision are largely questions of planning and the determination of priorities. In the field of housing, there is an overwhelming shortage of serviced land available for residential purposes, but the fact is that there is almost no residential land left within the boundaries of Metro itself. The screams of anguish from public officials, citizens' groups, and developers in the late 1960's and early 1970's can do nothing to dissolve the fact that the 240 square miles of Metro Toronto are almost entirely built up. What remains to be urbanized will shortly be utilized; it is simply a question of fulfilling the plans of the various borough, city, and Metro planning boards, with respect to priorities and timing. No amount of screaming can speed up this process, particularly when the amount of land available for housing purposes is negligible.

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Metro's problems are now primarily social—issues concerned with the quality of life in a metropolis blessed with freedom from the internal strife which has plagued the major metropolitan areas in the United States since the end of World War II. If the argument must turn to the question of the quality of life, what have been the failures, or to what extent has there indeed been a failure? It is surely inaccurate and unfair to present the impression that the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and its constituent area municipalities have been simply negligent during the past 20 years. In the fields of health, education, and welfare, Metro's bias has been more or less evident. In large part, its role has been dictated by the distribution of functions between the metropolitan government and the local governments, and also by the urgency of certain problems. There is no question, for example, that during Metro's first decade the problems were primarily physical in nature; priorities were directed appropriately. By the mid-1960's, however, the questions which were coming to the fore were in public housing, urban renewal, and social and health services. In these areas Metropolitan Toronto had played only a modest role, partly because this was the clear wish of its indirectly elected councillors and partly because all levels of government in Canada have devoted much less attention to these fields than to others. For example, until recent years, the provincial government's expenditures on highway construction exceeded those on health, welfare, and education combined. This situation has been reversed, however, by the tremendous expansion required in educational facilities.

In the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, public health services continue under divided jurisdiction in the 1970's. This may be because officials of the government of Ontario feel that without responsibility for public health and fire protection there would be little or no reason for six lower-tier local governments to exist. Nevertheless, on several occasions, the Ontario Department of Health has attempted without success to induce the city and the five boroughs to create one metropolitanwide department of health.

There cannot be substantial progress in the development of such new approaches as community health centers when six departments of health remain. There is no question that the nature of the services available and their quality differ from borough to borough, and between the boroughs and the City of Toronto, but no intergovernmental formula has yet been devised to induce consolidation.

In the field of public welfare, as was noted previously, important forces coincided in the early 1960's to force the provincial government to make changes in responsibility and ultimately to prescribe a Metropolitan Toronto Department of Public Welfare (now designated as the Metropolitan Toronto Department of Social Services). However, this department continues to be concerned primarily with the administration of general welfare assistance and other income security programs,

including determination and continuing review of eligibility.

The Metropolitan Toronto Department of Social Services is not providing "social services," as social workers and social scientists understand this term. At least, this is not an important part of its responsibilities, whatever its senior officials would like. During the years 1968-71, the number of persons receiving basic, financial assistance through the Metro department rose to nearly 60,000—a matter of concern to Toronto citizens but small by comparison with the number of beneficiaries in similar American metropolitan areas.

By 1973 this figure had dropped below 40,000 persons. The drop resulted from changes in the legislation governing unemployment insurance at the federal level and new programs initiated by the governments of Canada and Ontario, separately and in cooperation, to provide grants to citizen groups and for projects in tune with new approaches to lifestyles in an urban metropolis. In short, there is no overwhelming problem in the so-called "public welfare" sector of Metro Toronto, but there is an enormous lack of attention to the provision of social services.

In all fairness, the Metro department has moved a considerable distance since it was initiated on January 1, 1967. In the field of day care and nursery services, Metro is substantially involved by comparison with the previous 15 years. In the provision of hostel accommodation and services to transients, Metro's record is by no means barren. In the field of voluntary services (that is, not covered by federal-provincial funding), Metro provides extra facilities and services to persons requiring special health care, special diets, drugs, and dentures. Metro has not ventured substantially, however, in that wide area of social welfare services perhaps encompassed within the traditional phrases "social casework," "social group work," "community work," or alternatively, in the entire field of practice with individuals, families, small groups, and communities.

In the field of the elderly, Metropolitan Toronto has assumed substantial responsibilities. The legislation requires it to maintain homes for the elderly (some beyond the boundaries of Metropolitan Toronto), hospitals for the chronically ill, various convalescent health care services, and the like. Moreover, housing for the elderly has been a responsibility of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto since its initiation in 1953. Metro took over the first local governmental venture (128 dwelling units, built about 1953) and has since expanded its program of housing for the ambulatory elderly to more than 4,000 dwelling units. This accommodation is generally excellent in quality, its services within such accommodation exemplary, and its continued attention to the improvement of these services and facilities admirable. As a consequence, it has huge waiting lists ranging from elderly persons who are ambulatory to the chronically ill, mentally enfeebled, or senile.

In education services, there is no need to dwell upon

Metro's accomplishments, for there is little to which one can point as a major failure or omission of attention to significant requirements. The rapid expansion in elementary and secondary facility construction in the 1950's and 1960's resulted inevitably in an over-supply in the early 1970's as the decline in birth rates (noticeable after 1960) began to affect enrollments within the school systems. At the same time, the educational system is divided between one supported by adherents of the Roman Catholic faith (separate) and one supported by all others (public). The nature of the vast immigration to Metropolitan Toronto has placed an enormous burden on the Separate School System (parochial) and, while there is a Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board, it receives little assistance from either Metropolitan Toronto or the provincial government.

In the 1972 election the new government leader, William G. Davis, enunciated his government's policy of not paying grants to separate schools from grade 10 on. The provincial government continues, as it must, to place its resources in the public school system. In the total assessment of Metro's role in the educational field, however, one cannot neglect the observation that the vast increase in the Roman Catholic population has not clearly been accompanied by an expansion in education resources.

What is the essence of Metro's failure in the "social field"? It rests almost entirely on the fact that by the early 1970's it was obvious that the central city of the metropolis--the "financial anchor of Metro Toronto," in the words of the first chairman--was beginning to reveal the effects of neglect by comparison with the urbanized boroughs. This entire matter of the relationships between the boroughs and the city, between the Municipality of Metro Toronto and the city, is one of the most significant issues facing Metro in the 1970's. The issue is pervasive, extending both to the replacement of physical and social capital and to the provision of services in a service-oriented metropolitan society.

MAJOR ISSUES IN THE 1970'S

As Metropolitan Toronto entered the 1970's, it appeared to be in an excellent position to fulfill its functions. The great debates of the 1960's were past, and the governmental reorganization ordered by the Prime Minister in 1966 had been accomplished with relatively little strain. The second chairman of Metro, William R. Allen, Q.C., suddenly announced his retirement in the spring of 1969 to take effect September 1. The election of the third chairman, Albert A. Campbell, however, was carried out smoothly, and his position was confirmed for a three-year term at the first Metro Council meeting in 1970. The great physical problems of the previous 15 years were well under control, and generally speaking, both the provincial government and those who had served the Metro Council for some years

had reason to experience a substantial degree of satisfaction.

The great issues of the 1970's, however, were not far beneath the surface, nor were they entirely new. It seems that certain problems common to most large urban areas—the issues, for example, of a policy and program of balanced transportation between public and private opportunities—are permanent. They are substantially matters of degree, and the concern felt waxes and wanes depending on current fashions in economic and social policy. Other major issues are relatively new and are not the product of urbanization, but stem from new approaches in political and social action.

Growth Versus Quality

By 1970, Metro Toronto was forced to face the overriding question of its continued growth. This was surely not a question in the 1950's and early 1960's. By 1965, however, the provincial government was well on its way towards the development of policies for regional government, not only in its center of largest population but throughout the province. In 1966 and again in 1968 the Prime Minister of Ontario delivered major statements to introduce formal policy documents entitled, "Design for Development: Phase I"; "Design for Development: Phase II"; and in May 1970, "Design for Development: The Toronto-Centered Region."[26] In essence, it had become clear some years before the 1970's that the provincial government did not see the continued growth and, in particular, the geographical expansion of Metro Toronto as a desideratum. Its policy of regionalization gradually emerged, but there was no doubt that it was the government's intention to create regional governments to the north, west, and east of Metro Toronto. If that were indeed to be the case (in fact, the regional Municipality of York north of Metro came into being on January 1, 1971), it was clear that Metro had to reconsider its policies with respect to continued urban growth and development.

In 1953 regional planning beyond the 240 square miles within the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was assigned to the Metro Council. The huge area (720 square miles) which the provincial government felt should be "controlled" by the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board was designated the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Area. That area, however, included not only York County (in which Toronto lay) but covered a good part of Peel County to the west and Ontario County to the east. If regional governments were to be created both to the east and west of Metro Toronto, it became clear that Metro's responsibility for urban planning beyond its boundaries would sooner or later have to be curtailed. The provincial government made it clear in 1971 that Metro's planning function would be cut back to its own boundaries. The implications of urban sprawl and clear spill-over of Metro's burgeoning population into the surrounding areas would

be the responsibility of the new regional governments when they were created, but the implications of this for Metro Toronto itself did not seem to bear full consideration.

Metro's third chairman, Albert Campbell, fought vigorously against this proposed policy. He made speech after speech during the years 1970-72 declaring the government's policy "a hemming in" of Metro. Under his leadership the Metro Council voted on several occasions to ask the provincial government for additional land, particularly to the east in Ontario County, while the major rural township to the east voted to become a part of Metro Toronto. These pleas were refused, because the government was dedicated to the creation of a regional government extending from Metro's eastern boundaries to encompass the city of Oshawa (100,000 persons) and even further to the east.

In the October 1972 election the government's policies on regionalization throughout the province were sharply attacked, but the Conservative government was re-elected without difficulty. As special by-elections were held in vacant constituencies in 1973, however, the government suffered serious defeats, which it attributed to its policies on regional government. Although regional governments had been created in Ottawa (the national capital), Thunder Bay (formerly Port Arthur and Fort William), Kitchener-Waterloo, Sudbury, Muskoka (the so-called "recreation playground" of Metro Toronto), and York, no immediate action was taken by the provincial government on the regional proposals east and west of Metro. They remained under study until mid-1973 when legislation establishing four new regional governments was enacted.

In the meantime, Metro faces an absolute shortage of serviced land, and its capacity to create housing accommodation for a population increasing at the rate of 60,000 persons (about 3 percent) per annum is severely limited. Nevertheless, the Metropolitan Council appears to many observers to remain dedicated to continued physical development. The expansion of its geographic boundaries will permit that "tried and true approach." After all, many Metro councillors understand clearly the problems involved in the expansion of water and sewage facilities, the building of schools, the building of roads, and the provision of such physical facilities as community and day care centers.

On the other hand, many Metro councillors find, quite understandably, that social planning is an undefined art and that it is extremely difficult to meet the problems involved in such concepts as "improved quality of life" and "conservation of the environment." Critics hold that Metro Toronto should be confined to its present boundaries and forced to turn its attention to housing rehabilitation, urban development, neighborhood conservation, and a general improvement in the standards of the social and health services. The Metro Council apparently finds, nevertheless, that a role

restricted to maintenance and revitalization of urban living within an area of 240 square miles is relatively uninteresting.

In the early 1970's this great issue of growth versus consolidation of urban requirements, particularly within the central city, was by no means resolved. The government of Ontario continued to be dedicated to its program of regional government and what that implied in terms of limitation of Metro's growth. No amount of "wringing of hands" on the part of Metro politicians would change that situation, but, in the view of some persons attuned to provincial politics, there was far more to the matter than merely intelligent regional development policies on the part of the provincial government. Some observers were beginning to argue in the early 1970's that the real objective of the provincial government was to lessen the prestige of Metro Toronto, and to destroy its capacity to rival the provincial government in influence within the urbanized society which the province of Ontario will become, almost in its entirety, in another 15 or 20 years.

Central City Needs

The nature and distribution of Metro Toronto's own population, growth, and urban development constituted the heart of the second major issue of the 1970's. In 1965, Commissioner Goldenberg saw, and the provincial government recognized, that a 50-50 distribution of representation on the Metro Council was not consistent with the distribution of population and assessed valuation within the metropolis. On January 1, 1967, the city's representation was reduced to 40 percent, and in the 1970's this issue increased in intensity again. This is the prime example of an old issue that comes and goes and never disappears; it dates back to the original conception of the metropolitan form of government itself. From the viewpoint of the Metro Council, particularly those members from outside the City of Toronto, the matter is relatively simple. The principle of representation by population should prevail, and to some extent the distribution of assessed valuation should be brought to bear. If this argument were accepted in the early 1970's, it was alleged that Toronto's representation on the Metropolitan Council would probably be reduced at least 5 percent, and perhaps decreased to one-third of the total.

Originally the seats on the Metro Council were distributed evenly to give some representation to each municipality and to recognize the overall population and financial importance of the City of Toronto. However, the city was almost entirely built up by 1950, and its population since that time has varied very little. Officially, it has not exceeded 700,000; the annual data collection by Metro assessors has provided estimates ranging between 670,000 and 695,000. On the other hand, unlike the central cities in many major North American metropolitan areas, the City of Toronto has

not declined or deteriorated significantly in either its physical or economic importance. There has, in fact, been a tremendous building boom within the heart of the central city. Although few of the largest chartered banks in Canada maintained substantial headquarters in the City of Toronto as late as 1960, all the major financial institutions erected huge structures in downtown Toronto during the decade 1965-74.

Employment in the city center, increased enormously rather than declining as it has in many other metropolitan areas. The capacity of the central city to absorb this influx of new employment opportunities was enhanced with the completion of the first north-south subway line in March 1953, and its continued extensions. It is, however, a moot question whether Toronto has the capacity by itself to maintain all the services required by such commercial expansion, not to mention the great variety of cultural and educational facilities these capital installations require and demand.

In short, the City of Toronto in the 1970's is back where it was in the mid-1940's. It is the heart of a vast metropolitan area into which flow hundreds of thousands of persons each day for employment, shopping, educational opportunities, cultural enrichment, and the like. Most commuters drive into the city, and their automobiles must be parked and serviced. Roads must be provided between their places of work, recreation, and residence. The burden upon the City of Toronto has been heavy; yet it is difficult to demonstrate that the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto has meant much to the city in financing its huge requirements of physical and social capital.

These matters are not irrelevant to the question of representation, and the city appears destined to have less and less significance as time passes. Yet the lives of those who live in Metro Toronto outside the central city are directly related in one way or another to the nature of the City of Toronto itself. Most people recognize, particularly from their tax bills, that they live in one of the boroughs rather than in the city. But in any place other than Metro Toronto they describe themselves as residents of Toronto. The influence of the central city can scarcely be measured by its specific population or even by its assessed valuation, which has increased significantly while falling below 40 percent of the grand total for the metropolitan area. This issue of representation cannot be considered in isolation, because it is part of the larger issue of unification versus a federal system.

Federation or Unity?

The third great issue in the 1970's continues to be the question of the form of government in Metropolitan Toronto. The provincial government's 1953 decision to create a two-tier system has been strongly opposed by some interests, as has been mentioned previously, but for the most part the general public appears apathetic.

When there were 13 municipalities citizens talked about local autonomy. They talked about the special nature of some of the smaller villages and towns, and the services with which they provided the people, along with the voluntary efforts of many persons who worked with children, teenagers, and in a variety of social and recreational efforts. In the 1970's little talk on these subjects is heard or reported, because, for one thing, the smaller municipalities have vanished and become part of relatively large boroughs. Government has become further and further removed from the ordinary resident of the metropolis, and, while he may still be a volunteer in many community activities, these are no longer the source of overt pride designed to maintain that indefinable "local autonomy."

The boroughs were always large in terms of geography, and they have now become large in terms of populations and assessed valuation. The question is whether they should remain, continue to grow, and assume an increasing importance within the upper level of government in Metro Toronto. In the early 1970's the boroughs were literally playing a game of "political brinkmanship." Their strong pressure to force a further reorganization of representation within the Metro Council, sometimes intermingled with demands for the direct election of the Metro chairman, played directly into the hands of those who advocate a unitary city. Borough politicians were clearly more influential in the 1970's than ever before, yet they did not seem to have grasped the essential fact that the ultimate logic of their arguments was the dissolution of their very political autonomy and the amalgamation of all six area municipalities into one huge city of nearly 2.5 million people.

Support for continued growth of Metro Toronto, in the form of boundary expansion or annexation of part of the adjacent municipalities in the county to the east, would also have the same result. It is not alleged that support for the expansion of Metro Toronto beyond its original boundaries came only or primarily from the five boroughs. There were Metro Council members from both the city and various boroughs who strongly endorsed the growth concept. Borough politicians had a special incentive, in that creation of additional area municipalities or the enlargement of their own would further reduce the status of the City of Toronto within the metropolitan federation. The advocates of growth did not appear to realize, however, how firm the position of the provincial government was on the "containment" of Metro. By 1973 the population within Metro Toronto was 30 percent of the total population of the Province of Ontario. There was little doubt that many elected legislators and senior officials of the provincial government were determined that a huge metropolitan government at the very heart of the province would not become a rival, perhaps so important that it could plead a successful case for secession as a modern city-state.

The major issues of the 1970's were, therefore, essentially political and closely intertwined. The issue of growth versus containment was clearly related to the aspirations of the borough politicians for increased representation within the Metro Council. However, the continued aspirations of the City of Toronto for an amalgamation of the six area municipalities through a form of annexation to the city was really the other side of the coin. City politicians expressed the view more frequently than in the past that the "metro concept," so clearly enunciated in the 1950's, must now work in reverse and be utilized to strengthen and revitalize the urban core. The question of amalgamation, espoused for 20 years by city politicians, was no longer based on the case that the suburban municipalities were weak, inept, and required the city to support their continued development. It was based upon the argument that, by the 1970's, it was the City of Toronto that had become neglected, that required redevelopment. To accomplish this, it was essential that a unitary form of government based upon the substantial commercial and industrial assessment of the central city be created.

At the same time, the issue concerning the direct or indirect election of the Metro chairman was closely related to the question of representation and struggle for influence within the Metro Council. The third chairman had been the mayor of what became the second largest borough after January 1, 1967, and Campbell clearly understood the history, the ideas, and the aspirations of those who lived outside the central city. Nevertheless, he became, like the first two Metro chairmen, a solid advocate of continued growth and development of Metro Toronto, based upon a two-tier political system, with the Metro Council indirectly elected within the six area municipalities (the city and the five boroughs).

There are two strongly diverse points of view on the major issue of the state of the central city by the 1970's. On the one hand, there is visual evidence of tremendous commercial building, expansion of cultural facilities, improvement of arterial roadways, and expansion of the rapid transit system to facilitate access into the city. Moreover, Toronto has not deteriorated at the core. In the important aspect of physical and social capital, educational facilities within the city have been almost entirely rebuilt under the auspices of the Metropolitan Toronto Board of Education since the mid-1950's. Unlike New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and elsewhere, the elementary and secondary schools within the central city were not permitted to crumble and deteriorate. They were systematically demolished and built anew, or thoroughly rehabilitated and expanded to meet the needs of the vast array of newcomers from abroad. There was no possibility, therefore, of charging Metro with total neglect of the city to the point where it had become a second downtown Los Angeles.

On the other hand, city politicians, following the second three-year election in December, 1969, were correct in their view that residents of the central city had paid, and paid enormous sums through local taxation to provide the physical and social capital which enabled the three large boroughs to increase their population by 10 to 20 times in the quarter-century following World War II. It was now, in their view, the city's turn. A major metropolitan study of urban renewal found that most of the neighborhoods which logically could be designated as urban renewal areas and most of the major neighborhoods where the techniques of rehabilitation and conservation could be employed were located within the central city.

The question was really whether the Metro Council, composed 60 percent of borough representatives, would place a high priority on the needs and requirements of the City of Toronto. Major capital works were required, including a rebuilding of the sewage system within the city, estimated to cost as much as $300 million. In the early 1970's, the city was progressing steadily on a deliberate step-by-step rehabilitation costing $5 million per annum. If the experts were correct, it could take 25 to 50 years or more to complete the job. This is not to suggest that Toronto was in danger of a fundamental breakdown in essential physical services, but rather to emphasize that the Metro Council seemed relatively unsympathetic and unconcerned. The Metro concept was not "working in reverse."

Metro Politics

By 1973 serious concern was expressed in the press and throughout the community when a major illness afflicted Metro Chairman Albert A. Campbell. He chose, at the first council meeting in January 1973, despite major surgery late in 1972, to stand for re-election for a two-year term. He was unopposed, but there were strong hints that he would resign by mid-summer. Unfortunately, he was forced to submit his resignation by late spring, to take effect July 30, 1973. In the manner laid down by the legislation, the Metro Council scheduled a number of meetings in June and July so that candidates might be selected and exposed to public scrutiny and perhaps even open questioning at public meetings.

Under the circumstances, the argument was put forward that Metro was in fact not functioning. This was far from the truth. Chairman Gardiner had built a strong departmental organization in the 1950's and had selected the best municipal administrators in the metropolitan area. In turn, the strength of the civil service was maintained, and the third chairman further expanded his administrative organization when he appointed an executive assistant in the late 1960's. Thus, Campbell's illness did not render the Metro Council impotent, and there was an established procedure for the selection of an acting chairman pending his recovery or resignation.

One of the most experienced municipal reporters on the Toronto newspapers wrote, in early May 1973:

> The one-time showpiece of municipal

government, the civic federation of Metropolitan Toronto, has become a shadow of its former years of glory, hope and achievement.

Metro government with its 5,650 employees, 13 departments and numerous sub-agencies, was established 20 years ago by the Ontario Government and today is without influence, leadership, prestige, or direction. . . .

Recent decisions by council combined with ineffectual leadership from an ill-prepared policy-shaping executive has demolished a once-cherished metropolitan concept. . . .

The executive committee, with its six area mayors so preoccupied with the local rather than Metro issues handled the general budget review this year so ineptly that in future years it will be done behind closed doors by a budget staff and a special sub-committee.[27]

It is not this writer's view that Metro has deteriorated so badly that its days are numbered. However, the Metropolitan Toronto federation has become politicized to a degree not dreamed of in the 1950's and 1960's. In the struggle for political influence; for increased local autonomy outside the city for growth, development, and expansion beyond the original boundaries and in opposition to the provincial government's regional governmental policies, Metro has lost out.

The Metro Council has become a political battleground in which the real issues of the quality of urban living do not seem to appear. In superficial terms, this argument may not be accepted, because it was strongly alleged that the December 1972 elections put into office so-called "reform councils" in the city and in several boroughs. What reform actually meant and what in fact the new councils undertook in the name of reform was not at all apparent half a year following the election. For the first time frequent city-suburban split votes, evenly distributed, are occurring. In the first 15 years of Metro history not more than twice had there been an even distribution of city and suburban votes on important issues. In the 1970's, city representatives on the executive committee frequently voted evenly against the suburban representatives. A major issue in transportation policy (namely, the route of the Spadina rapid transit system promised when the provincial government wiped out the famous Spadina Expressway in a decision in 1971) was decided by a vote of the Metro chairman. With the chairman's serious illness and the unsettled matter of succession, the political climate within Metro threatened the relative harmony and continued progress of Metro's 20 years of significant achievement.[28]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Albert Rose, "A Brief to the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto," May 20, 1964.

[2]Civic Advisory Council of Toronto, Committee on etropolitan Problems, *First Report,* Section I, (Toronto, 1949), Table II, p. 11.

[3]Albert Rose, "The Challenge of Metropolitan Growth," *Community Planning Review,* IV, (1954), p. 100.

[4]Civic Advisory Council, Committee on Metropolitan Problems, *First Report.*

[5]Ontario, Ontario Municipal Board, *Decisions and Recommendations of the Board* (Toronto: Queen's Printer, January 20, 1953).

[6]Bill 80, whose tentative title appears above, was finally entitled The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act.

[7]Albert Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto: A Social and Political Analysis 1953-1971* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 25-26.

[8]Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto,* pp. 26-27.

[9]Ontario, Metropolitan Toronto Commission of Inquiry, "First Report" (Toronto: March 14, 1958), mimeographed.

[10]F. G. Gardiner, "A Submission to the Commission Appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council of the Province of Ontario to Inquire into the Affairs of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto", June 15, 1957, pp. 1-2.

[11]Ontario, Metropolitan Toronto Commission of Inquiry, p. 11.

[12]Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto,* p. 36.

[13]Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto,* p. 37.

[14]F. G. Gardiner, Address to the Inaugural Meeting of the Metropolitan Toronto Council (Toronto: January 13, 1961), pp. 69-70, mimeographed.

[15]Ontario, Department of Economics, *A Report on the Metropolitan Toronto System of Government,* prepared for the Sub-committee on Metropolitan Affairs (Toronto: November 1961).

[16]Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto,* p. 89.

[17]Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto,* p. 103.

[18]Ontario, *Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto* (Toronto, 1965), p. 200.

[19]Ontario, *Statement by the Honourable John Robarts, Prime Minister of Ontario, Re the Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto* (Toronto, January 10, 1966).

[20]Ontario, *Statement by the Honourable John Robarts,* p. 13.

[21]Ontario, *Statement by the Honourable John Robarts,* p. 11-12.

[22]Ontario, *Statement by the Honourable John Robarts,* p. 15. The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act was amended by Bill 201 in 1969 to provide that the four alderman members of the Executive Committee of the City automatically become members of the Metropolitan Council's Executive Committee. This provision came into effect January 1, 1970.

[23]Ontario, *Statement by the Honourable John Robarts,* pp. 10-17.

[24]Ontario, *Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto,* pp. 205-206.

[25]Ontario, *Statement by the Honourable John Robarts,* p. 22.

[26]Rose, *Governing Metropolitan Toronto,* pp. 144-152.

[27]Alden Baker, "Metro Toronto's Prestige, Efficiency, Morale on Decline," *The Globe and Mail,* May 9, 1973, p. 4.

[28]The fourth Chairman of Metro, Paul Godfrey (at age 34 the youngest incumbent in that Office) was in fact elected by Metro Council in July 1973. He was a member of the Board of Control of the Borough of North York. Current proposals are to enlarge the Metropolitan Toronto Council to 37. The addition of five new suburban members would recognize the changes in the relative populations of the City of Toronto and the suburban boroughs. Premier Davis has indicated that if Metro agrees on a formula, the necessary legislation will be passed to implement it.

Chapter IV

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM IN THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

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
Local government reform in the Province of Quebec has become a topical problem for many of the same reasons as in other parts of Canada—basically the need to change institutions as society itself has changed. There has been the same accumulation of out-of-date boundaries and small, obsolescent units, problems of financing local services, and questions of the role of central government in relation to local needs and institutions. These have particular point in Quebec where a "Quiet Revolution" has seen a transformation of the provincial government and many of its institutions, including recent attempts to develop a non-political civil service. All of this, coupled with the urgency of meeting manifold social and economic needs out of limited fiscal resources, has made the evolution of local government chaotic.

Local government, as a social or political institution, is not deeply rooted in Quebec culture. Early attempts to develop or impose a local government system met with mixed success, and it was only in the latter half of the nineteenth century that the present structure appeared. The basic unit evolved from the rural church parish. Any populated area could form a municipality, parish, or township (the terms are practically interchangeable). Any group of 60 houses could form a village or town. The 75 counties never developed as a significant upper tier because until recently rural society was parish-oriented, and because county boundaries in many cases are not closely related to the larger social, economic, and functional communities of interest.

The incorporation of urban municipalities has been a simple process, and the larger cities have generally gone their own way. This has been particularly true of the City of Montreal. While the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs was formed in 1918, it was for many years a minor department, concerned principally with municipal accounting and finances. Traditional values and programs have been persistent in Quebec, and it is only with the advent of the "Quiet Revolution" that urban problems have been given attention commensurate with the extent of urbanization. No matter which political party held provincial power, the tenor was low taxes and a low level of government activity.

It is therefore not surprising that local government structure consisted of a large number of municipalities, most of them quite small (see Table IV-1). Of the 1,635 local municipalities in 1969 (not including the counties), over 90 percent had less than 5,000 population and nearly 50 percent had less than 1,000. At the other extreme, the three largest cities had a combined population of 1,855,000, or 30 percent of the provincial total estimated at 6,255,000. In 1871 only 24 percent of the population (272,000) lived in cities, towns, and villages of 1,000 population or more. By 1966, however, the figures were reversed, with about 80 percent of the population (4,525,000) urban out of a total of 5,781,000. Of these, 68 percent lived in the three largest

metropolitan areas: Montreal, Quebec, and Outaouais. While 76 percent of the municipalities have less than 1,500 population, many of them are isolated communities, chiefly scattered through the Laurentians, northern Quebec, and Gaspé. Many urban municipalities are also small, a situation fostered by simple incorporation procedures.

Dissatisfied with the state of local government and the slowness of reform in 1970, the Minister of Municipal Affairs announced a program of reorganization:

> ... the evolution of this system (of local government) has not always kept pace with the rhythm of Quebec's evolution and that the rigidity of the structures as well as the general attitude of the state have prevented our municipalities from taking on greater responsibilities in setting up policies for town planning, territorial organizations and economic and social development.
>
> A stock-taking of the situation in which the Quebec municipal system now finds itself will allow us to understand what is lacking and will convince us of the need and urgency of the advocated reform. The topics which seem to us appropriate to develop relate especially to:
>
> > multiplicity of administrative units;
> > restriction of their powers;
> > appearance of new problems;
> > inflexibility of structure;
> > weakness of administrative and financial capacity;
> > lack of municipal-provincial co-ordination machinery.[1]

Professor Guy Bourassa considers the absence of local self-government, as known in the Anglo-Saxon countries, to be the main factor explaining the indifference of Quebecers to municipal government.[2] A new trend is apparent, however. Rural legislators persisted in opposing the foregoing proposals to reorganize municipal government, and the result was a major change of policy.

The Quebec legislature passed a new law, Bill 276, assented to in December 1971, which amended the old voluntary amalgamation law to give more power to the Minister. Now he may direct a study of a territory covering municipalities he feels should be examined for amalgamation purposes, and then proceed to amalgamate them. The Minister has not used this power too freely in rural areas because government priority has been placed on regrouping in the fast-growing urban areas. The rural municipalities also have continued to lobby against the Minister's intention. Recently, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Maurice Tessier, declared his intention to abolish counties,[3] declaring at the Annual Conference of the County Governments' Association that they were obsolete. The association demanded the resignation of the Minister, and the Prime

Table IV-1

**Number and Population of Municipalities in the Province of
Quebec and Total Population: 1969**

Category by Population	Number of Municipalities	Percent of Total	Population	Percent of Total Population
MONTREAL	1	.06	1,460,000	23.4
LAVAL	1	.06	220,000	3.5
QUEBEC	1	.06	175,000	2.8
50,000 - 99,999	9	.55	598,000	9.6
25,000 - 49,999	20	1.22	630,000	10.1
15,000 - 24,999	27	1.65	505,000	8.1
10,000 - 14,999	23	1.40	282,000	4.5
7,000 - 9,999	34	2.08	279,000	4.5
5,000 - 6,999	27	1.65	160,000	2.6
3,000 - 4,999	88	5.37 ⎫		
1,000 - 2,999	604	36.95 ⎬	1,945,000	31.1
0 - 999	800	48.95 ⎭		
Total:	**1,635**	**100.00%**	**6,255,000**	**100.00%**

Source: Data from Municipal Repertory, Quebec Statistical Office, 1970.

Minister promised no further action before a complete inquiry by his office. Tessier was transferred to another department in February 1973.

It is too early to say whether the 1971 changes in the 1965 Voluntary Amalgamation Act will be effective. Until 1971 the government had tried but largely failed to consolidate municipalities. The 82 that were abolished from 1965 to 1971 initiated the process themselves or were more or less accidentally the victims of government intervention. These provincial policies therefore have little or no bearing on the attempted reforms of the three metropolitan areas of Montreal, Quebec, and Outaouais, which present the overwhelming bulk of serious urban problems to Quebec Province. The most significant is Montreal. Its Census Metropolitan Area embraced 45 percent of the total population of the province in 1971.

METROPOLITAN MONTREAL

Canada's largest and second oldest city, Montreal, is located at the head of main navigation on the St. Lawrence River just below the confluence of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers. It occupies the central section of the Island of Montreal. From the initial site between the St. Lawrence River and the municipality of Mount Royal, development has spread up the slope, around the mountain, along and across the rivers (see Map IV-1). Today the City of Montreal has a population of 1,214,352; the remaining 29 municipalities on the Island of Montreal, forming the Montreal Urban Community, have 720,554, for a total of 1,934,906.[4] Table IV-2 indicates the changes in population between 1966-1971. The losses evidenced on the Island of Montreal help to explain Montreal City's fight against the suburbs and the periphery.

The other major demographic factor is that the City of Montreal and the eastern part of Montreal Island are largely French-speaking and lower class, and the western part English-speaking and middle and upper class. There are varying amounts of mixing, however, and there are significant Greek, Italian, and Jewish groups (which are English-speaking). With its confined site, the Montreal area has reached higher population densities than is usual in Canada. Because of the mountain and rivers, communication has been a major problem, and the requisite bridges have been built by the provincial and federal governments. No one has been able to demonstrate that provincial or federal parties have played roles of any significance in municipal elections. Mayor Drapeau's Civic Action Party has almost monopolized the Montreal City Council for many years.

While not growing as rapidly as its rival, Toronto, in recent years, the Montreal area is still dynamic. One set

Map IV-1
MUNICIPALITIES IN THE
MONTREAL METROPOLITAN AREA
1972

ST. LOUIS-DE TERREBONN

TERREBO

BLAINVILLE

LORRAINE BOIS-DES
FILION

STE-
THERESE ROSEMERE

STE-THERESE-OUEST

RIVIERE DES MILLE-ILES

LAVAL

ST-EUSTACHE

RIVIERE DES
PRAIRIES

DEUX
MONTAGNES

STE-MARTHE-
SUR-LE-LAC

PIERREFONDS ROXBORO

POINTE CALUMET

ST-RAPHAEL
DE
L'ILE
BIZARD

MONT RC

PIERREFONDS

DOLLARD
DES
ORMEAUX ST-LAURENT

STE-GENEVIEVE

COTE-ST-LU

VAUDREUIL HUDSON L. DES DEUX-MONTAGNES

POINTE-CLAIRE MONTREAL OL

DORVAL LACHINE

SENNEVILLE KIRKLAND

ILE CADIEUX

STE-ANNE BEACONSFIELD ILE DORVAL

ST-PIE

VAUDREUIL
SUR-LE-LAC DE-BELLEVUE

BAIE D'URFE

TERRASSE
VAUDREUIL VILLE
ILE PERROT L. ST. LOUIS

CAUGHNAW

DORION
PINCOURT

CHATEAUGUAY

VAUDREUIL NOTRE-DAME-
DE-L'ILE PERROT POINTE
DU-MOULIN

CHATEAUGU
CENTRE

LERY MERCIER

MAPLE GROVE

MELOCHEVILLE

CANAL BEAUHARNOIS BEAUHARNOIS

L'ASSOMPTION

VILLE DE
L'EPIPHANIE

L'EPIHANIE

VILLE
L'ASSOMPTION

ST-PAUL-L'ERMITE

-HENRI-
MASCOUCHE

REPENTIGNY

CHARLEMAGNE

CHARLES-DE-LACHENAIE

ILE STE THERESSE

VARENNES

ST-AMABLE

MONTREAL

POINTE
AUX-TREMBLES

MONTREAL-EST

ANJOU

STE-JULIE

ST-MATHIEU-DE-BELOEIL

EONARD

T-JEAN-DE-DIEU

BOUCHERVILLE

BELOEIL

NTREAL

McMASTERVILLE

MONT-ST-HILAIRE

TREMONT

LONGUEUIL

ST-BRUNO
DE MONTARVILLE

OTTERBURN
PARK

LEMOYNE

ST-BASILE-
LE-GRAND

ST-LAMBERT

ST-HUBERT

WESTMOUNT

GREENFIELD PARK

ST-MATHIAS

AD

NOTRE-DAME

VERDUN

RICHELIEU

STE-MARIE-DE-MONNOIR

ALLE

BROSSARD

MARIEVILLE

STE-CATHERINE
D'ALEXANDRIE

CHAMBLY

CARIGNAN

NOTRE-DAME-DE
BON-SECOURS

LAPRAIRIE

CANDIAC

CARIGNAN

DELSON

-CONSTANT

FLEUVE ST-LAURENT

RIVIERE RICHELIEU

ILES BOUCHERVILLE

1/2 0   1   2   3   MILES

Table IV-2

Population—Montreal Urban Community

	1966	1971	Change
MONTREAL	1,293,992	1,214,352	- 79,640
EAST SECTOR			
Anjou	22,477	33,886	+ 11,409
Montreal East	5,779	5,076	- 703
Montreal North	67,806	89,139	+ 21,327
Pointe-aux-Trembles	29,888	35,567	+ 5,679
Saint-Léonard	25,328	52,040	+ 26,712
WEST SECTOR			
Baie d'Urfe	4,061	3,881	- 180
Beaconsfield	15,702	19,389	+ 3,687
Dollard-des-Ormeaux	12,297	25,217	+ 12,920
Kirkland	659	2,917	+ 2,258
Pierrefonds	27,924	33,010	+ 5,086
Pointe-Claire	26,784	27,303	+ 519
Roxboro	7,930	7,633	- 297
Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue	5,334	4,976	- 358
Sainte-Geneviève	2,596	2,847	+ 251
Saint-Raphael-de-l'Ile Bizard	2,637	2,950	+ 313
Senneville	1,413	1.412	- 1
CENTER SECTOR			
Côte-Saint-Luc	20,546	24,375	+ 3,829
Hampstead	6.158	7,033	+ 875
Lasalle	48,322	72,912	+ 24,590
Mont-Royal	21,845	21,561	- 284
Montreal West	6,612	6,368	- 244
Outremont	30,881	28,552	- 2,329
Saint-Pierre	7,066	6,801	- 265
Verdun	76,832	74,718	- 2,114
Westmount	24,107	23,606	- 501
CENTER-WEST SECTOR			
Dorval	20,905	20,469	- 436
Dorval Island	7	7	0
Lachine	43,155	44,423	+ 1,268
Saint-Laurent	59,188	62,955	+ 3,767
TOTAL M.U.C.	**1,918,231**	**1,934,906**	**+ 16,675**

Source: Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada,* Catalogue 92-708, I, Part 1, January 1973, pp. 8-1, 8-2.

of forecasts predicts that by the year 2001 the Montreal region will have a population of 6,374,000, compared to Toronto with 6,510,000 and the third largest city, Vancouver, with 2,482,000 persons.[5]

The City of Montreal was originally incorporated in 1832. This charter lapsed but it was reincorporated in 1840, by which date it was already Canada's largest city. Between 1850 and 1900 the population increased from 69,000 to 296,000, and problems of outdated and inappropriate boundaries were chronic.

The first territory annexed by Montreal was the Town of Hochelaga in 1883. During the next 35 years, 28 towns, villages, and parishes were annexed in whole or in part. These annexations were not in all respects favorable to Montreal, since those annexed often had inferior services and large debts. To a great extent Montreal did not seek these acquisitions; in some cases annexation was forced on it by the provincial government. There was more than a suspicion that some suburbs deliberately made large capital expenditures, anticipating that Montreal taxpayers would be responsible for the debt payments. On the other hand, the wealthier suburbs, and those with the fewest demands for services, maintained their corporate identities. Under simple incorporation procedures, the numbers of municipalities increased, and marked differences in levels of service and tax rates among muncipalities arose.

In 1921, Montreal-Nord, Saint-Michel, Point-aux-Trembles, and Laval, which were in a precarious financial position, requested annexation to the city in order to avoid bankruptcy. Saint-Michel had a ratio of debt to value of assessed property of 82 percent (when a more realistic valuation roll was prepared in 1930 it went up to 240 percent). Montreal agreed to annex the four municipalities if all other prosperous adjacent municipalities were also included. The latter refused, and Montreal gave up its annexation policy.

The issue could not be left unresolved, and in 1921 the provincial government created the Montreal Metropolitan Commission to help the four municipalities that were in difficulty.

Montreal Metropolitan Commission: 1921-1959

The two functions of the Montreal Metropolitan Commission were to restore the financial position of the four distressed municipalities and to control the financial operations of the other municipalities except Montreal. The commission had 16 members, of which Montreal had eight. Seven members represented the 14 other municipalities and one, the Department of Municipal Affairs.

The commission had complete control over the four municipalities. Their deficits and the commission's administrative expenditures were paid by the members according to their taxable valuation. Initially Montreal

paid 90 percent of the total. In 1929, the commission's charter was amended to permit expropriation of land for the building of Metropolitan Boulevard (a main east-west highway). This cost would be shared by all the island municipalities according to their tax valuation. During the 1930 economic crisis, all municipalities except Montreal West and Westmount had to renegotiate their debt repayment periods. By 1946, the cumulative deficits of the four municipalities amounted to $22,089,340.

Montreal agreed to write off most of the debt of the four municipalities, amounting to $17,902,600, while the other municipalities wrote off $4,186,739. This situation was looked at in a report by George S. Mooney of the commission's department of planning and research in 1938. In his report, "A New Form of Administration for the City of Montreal," Mooney recommended:

> a) An extension of the powers of urban communities not only that they might exercise a wider range of home rule over their internal affairs but that they might exercise a more direct and immediate responsibility over the emerging problems of urban life,
> b) A more flexible but more uniform classification of cities, and an appropriate distinction between the wider powers essential to urban or metropolitan communities and the less extensive powers required by the remaining local authorities of the province,
> c) Facilitate the elimination from the metropolitan areas of atrophied authorities like the township, and foster consolidation and cooperation among local urban governments.[6]

No action was taken by the provincial government, and another study was undertaken from 1952 to 1955. The provincial government directed that this study deal with:

> the administrative problems stemming: from the existence on the Island of Montreal of several cities, towns or other municipal corporations, neighbouring or contiguous, certain of which are surrounded by the territory of the City of Montreal; from the fact that the latter, while forming an economic and geographic whole, are submitted to a different and independent administrative system; from the practical impossibility, for certain of them, to organize adequately on a local basis various public services or those of a metropolitan nature; from the unequal distribution and, in certain cases,

> the complete absence of distribution of the cost of services, works and improvements of benefit to all; of transportation by taxi; and generally from the administrative relations between these various cities and towns and municipal corporations.[7]

It was evident that the Montreal Metropolitan Commission was not settling the basic inter-municipal problems. Its creation was no more than a makeshift solution to the financial dilemma, and the study deplored this situation.

> In matters affecting intermunicipal needs, with the single exception of authority granted to the commission to plan for and construct a metropolitan boulevard, there is no efficient means at the present time whereby services and facilities required can be planned, co-ordinated, financed and administered effectively on an intermunicipal basis.[8]

The commission never became an effective body for a variety of reasons. A fatal problem was its composition. The fact that Montreal City had eight out of the 16 members brought criticism from the City of Saint-Laurent, which was seven times larger than 15 years before; Saint-Michel was 10 times larger; Hampstead, twice as large; Montreal-Nord, five times larger; and Mount Royal, four times larger.

Montreal Metropolitan Corporation; 1959-1969

In 1959 the commission was replaced with the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation by act of the provincial government. The 29-member corporation was allowed to exercise the following functions:

1) collector sewers and purification plants;
2) water intake, reservoirs, and distribution (from water intake to the limits of the municipality or municipalities served);
3) main traffic arteries and their equipment, bridges, and tunnels connecting the Island with the mainland;
4) standards for fire protection and services;
5) clinics, nursing, and food inspection;
6) intermunicipal parks;
7) markets;
8) master plan, regulation of nuisances;
9) economic and tourist development;
10) civil defense;
11) mass transportation;
12) off-street parking connected with intermunicipal activities;
13) certain public buildings and utilities; and
14) all other services considered as intermunicipal by agreement between the

municipalities concerned or by decision of the corporation.

The corporation* was unable to solve its internal difficulties, and it did little to use any of the foregoing powers during its existence. The provincial government initially decided to move slowly and the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation emphasized conciliation or arbitration. The City of Montreal lost the majority it had on the old commission. Out of the 29 corporation members it had only 14 nominees; the suburbs had 14 also, and the provincial government appointed the last member to control the decision in case of a tie vote. From the first, Montreal opposed this corporation, but in 1961 and 1962 failed in requests to the legislature for changes to regain control. The suburban mayors opposed this move through a resolution at a Montreal Metropolitan Corporation meeting in January 1961.[9]

The new, balanced representation in the corporation, however, did not improve the situation. Montreal kept trying to obtain special powers from Quebec. The corporation's life was seriously endangered when its president, Roland Chagnon, resigned in 1961, blaming the lack of cooperation by Montreal. Earlier in 1961, Montreal had applied to the legislature to obtain the following:

    1) a veto right in the corporation;
    2) an absolute majority of the seats;
    3) Montreal's prior approval on all decisions about expenses in which Montreal was interested;
    4) possibility to annex suburbs with the approval of the Quebec Municipal Board;
    5) control of the subway.

Montreal was able to obtain only the last. The fight intensified when Lucien Saulnier, Montreal's powerful and able chairman of the executive committee, and Mayor Jean Drapeau publicly declared that they intended to make of Montreal one island, one city.[10]

The conflict continued. A provincial body, the Champagne Commission, studied the Montreal administrative system. Montreal continued its pressure in the Quebec legislature in December 1961 by asking that all sales taxes collected by the provincial government in its territory be returned to the city and that a master plan for the Island be prepared. Montreal finally succeeded in obtaining the right to prepare a master plan for the Island, as well as cancellation of the obligation to underwrite future borrowings of the corporation.

Montreal's apparent strategy to obtain control of the corporation area piece by piece, was not effective, however. In 1963, Montreal wanted the province to expedite the annexation procedure for Rivière-des-Prairies and St. Léonard-de-Port-Maurice. The provincial government refused, maintaining the decision must be by referendum in accordance with the existing Cities and Towns Act. Under bankruptcy, Rivière-des-Prairies did amalgamate in 1963, as did Saraguay in early 1964 following a referendum. Later attempts to annex Saint-Michel, Pointe-aux-Trembles, and Roxboro were unsuccessful, even though Pierre Laporte, Minister of Municipal Affairs, made several public declarations favoring amalgamation while the new provincial government commission, the Blier Commission, was studying Montreal Island municipal problems.[11] Saint-Michel and Roxboro voted against annexation, and Pointe-aux-Trembles voted for it.

The only other concession Montreal obtained was control of the Montreal Transport Commission. A 1964 law stated that all important decisions of the MTC must have prior approval by the executive committee of the City of Montreal and the budget must have approval of the Montreal City Council.

Change of Provincial Government

In 1964, the Department of Municipal Affairs clearly indicated its intention to reduce the number of Quebec municipalities: "Where village and parish constitute one agglomeration, where the city expands into suburbs, it should become one entity."[12] The study and annexation procedures were set in motion for both Montreal and Île Jesus. The second proceeded quickly and in 1965 the government imposed amalgamation on the 13 municipalities of Île Jesus to form the municipality of Laval. The Montreal study was assigned to Camille Blier on February 24, 1964; the two other commission members were Lucien Saulnier, chairman of the executive committee of the City of Montreal, and Reginald Dawson, mayor of the suburban town of Mount Royal since 1951.

Dawson had also been president of a seven-member committee representing the 31 suburbs which met December 28, 1960, to negotiate a settlement on the intermunicipal front. In a public statement, the suburbs had said, "If Montreal wants war, they will have it."[13]

Although no brief was presented by Montreal, its oral arguments to the Blier Commission were based on the four following considerations:

    1) Inadequate representation in the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation;
    2) That services provided by Montreal exceed local responsibility (social welfare, traffic, Municipal Court, police, fire protection, public health, transportation, public works, city planning);
    3) Unfair distribution of the proceeds from the sales tax; and
    4) Objections to amalgamation.

In their proposed solutions, the municipalities spoke of voluntary cooperation and discussed apportionment of social costs, intervention of the provincial government, a board of control system, metropolitan govern-

ment, and borough councils. Their objections to amalgamation were based on:

1) Their desire for autonomy;
2) Inefficiency of administration in a large city;
3) The fact that the size of an amalgamation for the whole Island would create a state within a state;
4) The extension of the Montreal economic region beyond the boundaries of the Island of Montreal; and
5) Their fear that annexation is no solution because no one knows when it would stop.

In its December 1964 report, the commission spoke of two possibilities: amalgamation or coordination. Although it recognized that amalgamation would achieve the two-fold objectives of efficiency of public service and equity in taxation, the commission believed that implementation would cause practical difficulties and delays. It then opted for a new organism, "The Montreal General Council."

This partly satisfied Montreal, because on a 70-member council, the city would have 46 members and seven of ten executive committee members. Council powers and responsibilities would go so far as to amalgamate, coordinate, or integrate all the following municipal services and functions:

social welfare;
fire protection;
public health;
waterworks and sewers (plants);
municipal court;
regional parks;
regional planning;
assessment;
police;
public transportation;
libraries;
incinerators;
place des arts (cultural center); and
main thoroughfares

Costs would be apportioned according to the standardized (i.e., equalized) taxable real estate valuation for all the municipalities unless the council was not able to provide a particular service to a municipality. Mayor Dawson approved this report with the exception that any recommendation concerning the alteration of boundaries should be submitted to the general council upon the request of the municipalities concerned. No action, however, was taken.

The Quebec Government changed in 1966, and in December 1967 it released the findings of the La Haye report of the Provincial Planning Commission. Its main recommendation favored a regional level of government to assure proper communication between the provincial and local governments. It recommended specifically the creation of metropolitan councils for Montreal, Quebec, and Hull. For Montreal, the region would include an area with a 40-mile radius. The new council would prepare a regional plan and regionalize the municipal administrative structures.

In 1968-69 came the publication of a comparative study on metropolitan government by the Department of Municipal Affairs. It concluded that the urban communities in the province should combine the unicity solution with federation in such a way as to avoid disparities in size and resources among the municipalities. The Quebec Prime Minister had declared in March 1968 that the Quebec region would have its structures modified before the end of the year,[14] but nothing was said about Montreal. The statements at the 1967-68 Congress of the Union des Municipalités were revealing. The Minister of Municipal Affairs spoke of citizen education for the survival of the municipalities, and his deputy minister spoke of the duties of mayors and councillors.[15] It appeared that the Quebec government was not ready to intervene. However, in 1969 the government announced its intention to form urban communities for Montreal, Quebec, and Outaouais (Hull region across the Ottawa River from Ottawa). These would be regional municipalities composed of representatives of the constituent municipalities; they were envisaged as having major responsibilities.

Montreal Urban Community

On December 23, 1969, the law forming the Montreal Urban Community was enacted. Metropolitan problems in Montreal in 1969 were entirely different from those in Toronto in 1953 when its reform took place. In Toronto, the problems were mainly in "hard" services such as transport, water, and sewers. The Toronto population was not conscious of such problems as pollution, nor did the economic situation at that time seem to bring about poverty, unemployment, crime, and social agitation. In 1969, in Montreal, "soft" services connected with pollution, crime, social agitation, poverty, and unemployment were the main factors affecting municipal administration in both the city and the suburbs.

The 1969 political context forced City of Montreal representatives to compromise with the provincial government and accept reform. The Montreal City police strike resulted in excessive material damages by crowds, and fear of a major breakdown in the political system brought about a quick solution—"a forced adaptation."

Socio-Economic Characteristics. Ethnic and class factors are perhaps more relevant variables in the Montreal case than in Toronto. In 1953 in the Toronto metropolitan area, both the core-city and suburbs were mainly Anglo-Saxon. In Montreal, the island is divided

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between a French eastern side and an Anglo-Saxon western side. Even the City of Montreal follows this geographic demarcation. The economic variable, when combined with the ethnic factor, reinforces this cleavage. Chairman Saulnier of the Montreal Urban Community indicated in a speech at a public meeting of the council on December 29, 1971, that the average single dwelling in Westmount, on the west side, is worth $44,000, while for Pointe-aux-Trembles in the east, the comparative figure is $11,000. Homes in St.-Pierre, a French municipality located in the west, average $12,000; in Montreal City, $18,000. Twenty-two out of the 30 municipalities are suburbs located in the affluent west side.

Another variable is average salaries and wages. In the east, the municipalities of Anjou, Montreal-East, Montreal-Nord, Pointe-aux-Trembles, and St.-Léonard in 1961 had a low of $4,454 and a high of $5,959. Montreal City's average was $4,934. In the west central sector and the west sector the lowest municipality was French St.-Pierre, with an average of $4,613; the highest were dpredominantly English municipalities, Mount-Royal and Baie d'Urfé with $11,160, Hampstead with $10,769, Montreal-West with $9,898, Beaconsfield with $9,363, Senneville with $9,501, Westmount with $8,834, Point-Claude with $8,371, Côte St. Luc with $7,968, Dollard-des-Ormeaux with $7,816, Dorval with $7,575, and Roxboro with $7,378.[16]

Geographic and Demographic Characteristics. Metropolitan Montreal has been described by Statistics Canada as comprising the Island of Montreal and its periphery. The Montreal Urban Community, however, deals only with the island. There has always been a problem in defining the boundaries of the metropolitan area.

One of the major arguments in the suburbs' opposition to the Montreal Urban Community is that only the island suburbs have to pay for the cost of integrated services. Suburbs outside the island, whether on the south or north shore, do not participate in the costs, although these municipalities are made up of residents who work on the Island of Montreal and use its facilities extensively.

The size of the two contestants and their geographic locations are other variables. The small eastern suburbs have feared the Montreal giant. In 1971, Montreal City had a population of 1,214,352 while that of the most populated suburb, Montreal North, was 89,139. In the west and west central sectors the most populated was Verdun with 74,718.[17] Montreal City, in the center of the island, divides the two suburban blocks.

The increase of suburban population has been a cause for concern among Montreal City administrators. Census figures for 1971 indicate that 13 of the 19 communities in the census metropolitan area that lost population in the previous five-year period are located on the island. Nine of the 13 were the City of Montreal and its contiguous suburbs, among them Outremont, 8 percent,

Montreal, 7.4 percent, Verdun, 3 percent, Dorval, 2.3 percent, Westmount, 2.2 percent, and Mount Royal, 1.7 percent. Suburbs on the island which have shown major increases are Dollard-des-Ormeaux, 105.6 percent, St. Léonard, 105.4 percent, LaSalle, 50.9 percent, Anjou, 50.6 percent, Montreal North and Beaconsfield, 20 to 30 percent.[18] The 1971 census metropolitan area (CMA) includes 103 municipalities, compared with 63 in the 1966 Dominion Bureau of Statistics area. The total figures show that the City of Montreal has shrunk by 79,640 persons while the Montreal Urban Community has grown by only 16,675, totaling 1,934,906. These data point to a widely declining capacity to pay the property tax. Coupled with the cost increase of soft and new municipal services, this led to the strong line adopted by Drapeau and Saulnier as executive heads of the City of Montreal for the past decade.

The Local Services Situation. Before the Montreal Urban Community was set up, most of the hard services seem to have been delivered efficiently in both the core city and the suburbs. The subway had been built, for example. The suburbs were dissatisfied that they had to contribute financially without having much say in the Montreal City Transport Commission. With the creation of the Urban Community, however, the commission became its responsibility, so the suburbs could examine its operation directly and participate even more in the financing of the commission.

Sewers represented a problem, but no municipality was far from a major river and so this could have been accommodated without amalgamation. This situation contrasts strongly with that in Toronto in 1953 where water supply and sewage disposal for three suburbs located at a distance from the lake were the main service problems. Industrialization had started earlier in Montreal than Toronto, and its pace was slower. As a result, the hard services problems were relatively manageable in Montreal.

By 1969, however, the concentration of population in the core city brought soft services problems of increasing severity to the City of Montreal; thus creation of a metropolitan government appeared necessary. Montreal City has the highest density of the major metropolitan areas in Canada. In 1966 its population was 21,095 per square mile—higher than Toronto, Winnipeg, Vancouver, or Ottawa.[19] The concentration of population in Montreal, as elsewhere, was accompanied by an increase of criminal activity, unemployment, social agitation, housing deterioration, unhealthy conditions, traffic congestion, and pollution. The question was whether the suburbs would sense the urgency of the situation and be willing to work with the city. Tax increases for police integration were rejected by the suburbs, but there were signs that the crime rate disturbed them and would generate cooperation.

The cleavage between "have" and "have nots" widened in the sixties with the continuing increase in the

number of rural and other immigrants to the core city. Slowly, the east and downtown areas of Montreal became inhabited by lower-class citizens. A provincial party, the Parti Quebecois, appealing to the lower-class vote, elected in this district six out of its seven legislators for the entire province in 1970. Citizens' committees were easily formed in these sectors and have been active for the last few years. These committees are unlike ordinary suburban citizens' associations, which are occupied with traditional municipal problems. Their action is political, with emphasis on unemployment, human dignity, and poverty.

In comparison, Metro Toronto's 1953 middle class, original Anglo-Saxon make-up and post war immigrants had less impact than in Montreal. Winnipeg, on the other hand, had undergone by 1960 a rural immigration effect that increased its attention to the soft services more like in Montreal.

By 1969, the disparity between Montreal and its suburbs in soft services had reached a dramatic stage, particularly in police. The increased budget for those services could not be met by Montreal alone.

Creation of the Montreal Urban Community (MUC). When, in June 1969, a bill was introduced in the Quebec legislature to create the MUC, Mayor Jean Drapeau of Montreal and the executive committee chairman, Lucien Saulnier, strongly opposed it. They had been advocating amalgamation of the entire Island for the past 10 to 12 years. Reports on metropolitan reform, made by the City of Montreal and the Quebec provincial government, all ended on the shelf. In September 1969 the Congress of the Union of Quebec Municipalities was held in Montreal with "the urban community" as the principal theme. The Montreal Executive Committee chairman, in a speech at that congress, flatly rejected the urban community structure proposed by the provincial government.[20] The speech of the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Robert Lussier, on the same occasion, described his department's education program for muni-

Table IV-3

Land Area and Density of Population in Canada's Five Largest Metropolitan Areas: 1956, 1961, 1966

METROPOLITAN AREA*	Land Area** (sq. miles)	1956		1961		1966	
		Population	Density per Sq. Mile	Population	Density per Sq. Mile	Population	Density per sq. Mile
MONTREAL							
City	57.94	1,109,439	19,148	1,191,062	20,557	1,222,255	21,095
Fringe area	457.80	636,461	1,390	919,617	2,009	1,214,562	2,653
TORONTO							
City	34.96	667,706	19,099	672,407	19,234	664,584	19,010
Fringe area	773.29	834,582	1,079	1,152,182	1,490	1,493,912	1,932
VANCOUVER							
City	43.33	365,844	8,443	384,522	8,874	410,375	9,471
Fringe area	465,19	299,173	643	405,643	872	481,911	1,036
WINNIPEG							
City	30.20	255,093	8,447	265,429	8,789	257,005	8,510
Fringe area	239.54	157,439	657	211,114	881	251,754	1,051
OTTAWA							
City	45.44	222,129	4,888	268,206	5,902	290,741	6,398
Fringe area	289.78	123,340	426	101,555	558	203,794	703

  * Area as of 1966
 ** Revised 1966 land area used for density figures for all years.

Source: DBS, *Canada Yearbook*, 1968, Table 5, p. 193.

cipal civil servants, winter public works, water treatment, urban renewal and housing, but not the proposed urban community. Even though delivering a closing speech at the congress, Lussier only touched on the question of regionalization when he said that the Department of Municipal Affairs was going ahead with its policy of regionalization of water and sewer systems whenever technically and economically reasonable.[21]

In December, three months later, the bill creating the Montreal Urban Community was passed with no opposition from the City of Montreal. The change in position can only be attributed to the October 1969 police strike. In 1962 terrorist bombs exploded in the rich western suburbs. The movement escalated when Canadian Army buildings and the Montreal Stock Exchange were attacked by the "Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ).

In the next seven years, less violent events occurred, which affected a greater proportion of the population on the entire island and the provincial government. The march, "McGill en Français," an attempt by French nationalists to render this English-speaking university French, had rallied some 25,000 people. The marchers, mostly Montreal East residents, caused such concern to the Montreal police force that it requested the support of the Canadian Army. This event was followed by the St. Léonard march on September 3, 1969. St. Léonard is a suburb on the Island of Montreal where some school commissioners were trying to force the immigrants to go to French schools. In the McGill march, the route was from the east French sector to the west English side of the City of Montreal. The St. Léonard march followed a similar pattern from the Montreal City French district to the Italian sector of St. Léonard.

The one-day police strike of October 1969 was a culminating event. Vandalism caused extensive damage and the army was again called in to assist the provincial police. Montreal merchants were pressing the authorities for compensation. A few days later, the entire province was affected by the debate on the government's Bill 63, which was intended to permit a free choice of educational language. Again a march started from Montreal East and ended in front of the legislative buildings in Quebec City. Montreal City had become a riot center, and the police could hardly handle the situation. Over and above this political unrest, the high unemployment rate in Montreal, the rapid growth of the nationalist Parti Quebecois, and the repeated occupation of universities by students all contributed to an unstable political climate, forcing the provincial government to intervene.

The Police Strike. The Montreal police force at that time was asking pay parity with the Toronto Metro police. They argued that a Montreal policeman had to be bilingual and had to face permanent social agitation which justified parity if not higher pay. The Montreal City budget was increasing all the time and police coverage in the city was more extensive than in the suburbs. When the police went on strike, everyone was alarmed. It can be hypothesised that the Montreal west suburbs, the members of Parliament representing the island seats, and the Montreal City Council demanded an immediate solution. The provincial and federal governments were affected by the turmoil. The responsibility of the provincial government, according to the Canadian Constitution, is to control the municipal institutions, and the federal government must assure peace and good order on all Canadian territory. This political situation was a major factor in the decision making, resulting in the acceptance of police demands. Pay parity was granted.

Once the police strike was settled, the costs had to be met. The Urban Community promised to provide a means both of spreading the costs over a wider area and of improving the quality of police services.

The Montreal Urban Community was created December 23, 1969. Police integration became effective in 1972, but cost-sharing was retroactive to January 1970.[22] The City of Montreal spent $129 million for police services in 1971, but it would receive in 1971-1972 a reimbursement of $51 million from the suburbs. This amount includes $13,501,431 for the period of January 1, 1970, to December 31, 1971. The first $13 million was paid without too much criticism, but the remaining $38 million was the direct cause of the December 1971 Montreal Urban Community crisis, when the suburbs refused to approve the 1972 budget.

December 1971: Montreal Urban Community Crisis. The suburbs were faced with paying the increased expenditures and were only partly assisted by grants from the Quebec government. The basic contention of suburban mayors was that the additional $38-million cost resulting from the police integration was only partially met by the special 40-cent surtax on buildings over $100,000 assessment (which brought in taxes of $16,195,963) and the special Quebec grant ($6,658,146), leaving a deficit of $15,881,897.[23] This deficit was to be shared among the major suburban municipalities, as follows, with lesser amounts from the other municipalities:

St.-Laurent	$2,269,211
Pointe-Claire	1,027,334
LaSalle	1,447,063
Mount Royal	1,388,942
Westmount	662,691
Beaconsfield	688,838
Lachine	1,102,268
Dollard-des-Ormeaux	735,394
St.-Léonard	1,247,846
Anjou	934,455
Dorval	929,520
Côte-St-Luc	895,782

The proposed 1972 MUC budget that caused the trouble showed expenditures of $160,227,440. The main items were $84,633,800 for the public security

council and police department, $38,736,006 to be reimbursed to certain municipalities following the standardization of police costs for the period from September 1, 1970, to December 31, 1971, and $14,202,442 to be reimbursed to the City of Montreal for expenditures on the subway. Article 248 of the Montreal Urban Community law stipulates that the meeting to discuss the MUC budget shall be adjourned as often as necessary and shall not be closed until the budget of the Community, prepared by the executive committee, and the budget of the transit commission are adopted. If the budgets are not adopted by the council by December 31, they automatically come into force. This statutory procedure has created severe dissatisfaction among suburban mayors because the City of Montreal has a majority of seats on the executive committee, which prepares the budget.

For Lucien Saulnier, now MUC Chairman, the sharing of costs by suburbs corrected a situation "under which Montreal police served citizens from all over the Island, while Montreal taxpayers paid the cost."[24] While the budget was under discussion, Chairman Saulnier said that according to conversation he had with the Quebec Premier, MUC would receive financial assistance to meet this $16-million deficit. He also indicated that the law permitted the municipalities to pay this over a 20-year period. The suburbs flatly refused this procedure, saying that the provincial government should assist the MUC financially or the expenses should be reduced. Their contention was that police investigation and duties in the Montreal City core have provincial and even national implications and should be paid by higher governments.[25] The suburban mayors launched a campaign to arouse public opinion over the tax increase. Some officials told their constituents that the increase would be as much as $260 for the 1972 tax bill.[26] The figures, according to Lucien Saulnier, were falsely reported by certain mayors, who charged the increase in one year instead of distributing it over 20 years as the law permitted. The official figures given by Saulnier would mean, on a $10,000 home, a decrease of $3.79 for Montreal property owners and increases ranging from $3.12 for Montreal North to $53.31 for Dorval. Other suburbs lay between these extremes; the big increases came principally in the wealthy Anglo-Saxon suburbs.

Even though the suburbs opposed it, the budget by law went into effect.[27]

In an attempt to make the Urban Community more acceptable, a number of amendments have been made in the organic law. Initially, the executive committee chairman was to be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in council (the provincial cabinet) for a four-year non-renewable term. This was changed so that after the first term future chairmen will be elected by the council.

Another amendment changed the voting method. Each member has a number of votes equal to the population of his municipality divided by one thousand, multiplied by the numbers on the council representing that municipality. Remaining fractions equal to or more than one-half confer one additional vote upon the members of the council representing the City of Montreal or the other municipalities. This gave 756 votes to the suburbs and 1,484 to Montreal. But a majority vote also had to include a third of the members present appointed by Montreal and one-half present appointed by the other municipalities. This was changed to one-half for the City of Montreal. Each, therefore, has in effect a veto. During the December 1971 budget crisis, the municipalities were able to reject the budget by a narrow margin although Montreal had a clear majority.

A 1971 amendment postponed the adoption of the new assessment rolls by one year, and imposed a tax of 40 cents per $100 valuation on the excess of the valuation of taxable real property over $100,000.

Bill 75, which became law December 1, 1971, contained several amendments: it authorized the Community to establish an economic promotion service by by-law; extended the allowed period to January 1, 1974, for the establishment of a health department; enabled the Community to authorize the executive committee to issue orders related to the by-laws on the regulations and inspection of food; extended to January 1, 1974, the period to adopt a plan for integrating the electrical commission of the City of Montreal into the Community; and repealed the $3.00 per capita provincial subsidy to the Community for the years 1970-71-72. This $6-million subsidy was replaced by the approximately $6-million collected from the 40-cent surtax on real property over $100,000 value. This surtax would yield $16-million throughout the Community, but Montreal already was collecting $10-million per year from the surtax within its boundaries.

On January 24, 1973, the Minister of Justice announced a special grant of $10.5 million toward the cost of police for 1972 and 1973, "... recognizing our obligations toward the MUC whose police force carries out services to the benefit of all Quebec society."[28] And in March 1973, the new Minister of Municipal Affairs, Dr. Victor Goldbloom, declared publicly that there will be no forced amalgamation of suburbs with the City of Montreal.[29]

OTHER URBAN COMMUNITIES

In 1969 the provincial government also created urban communities, for the province's two other major metropolitan areas—Quebec and Outaouais. Outaouais is the name of the area across the Ottawa River from Ottawa and includes the City of Hull. The governing body in each is a council, and in Quebec and Outaouais each municipality has one representative on the Council. Thus, there are 26 on the Quebec Council and 31 on the Outaouais Council. The Montreal Council consists of the

mayor and councillors of the City of Montreal and one delegate from each of the 29 other municipalities.

The executive committee is composed of seven members in Quebec, eight in Outaouais, and 13 in Montreal. Financing arrangements also differ. Costs are assessed on the basis of the proportion of total assessed taxable real property in each municipality in the Montreal Urban Community. In Quebec and Outaouais, financing is based on taxable real property or a tax based on its annual value, or both such taxes at once.

Table IV-4 indicates the functions attributed to the three urban communities. The letter "D" indicates that the urban community must handle that service, the letter "P" means it may if the members so request. Not all services were to be assumed immediately.

Quebec Urban Community

In the Quebec case, as with Outaouais also, the provincial government conducted meetings with the mayors of the affected municipalities before passing the law. Jacques Godbout studied the Quebec case and identified three distinct stages in the reorganization process. First, beginning in March 1968, information was gathered by the Department of Municipal Affairs and a dossier was prepared to show the advantages of reorganization. In September 1968, the department initiated consultation meetings with the mayors of the 31 municipalities affected. On June 2, 1969, a bill was introduced; it was amended on December 1, 1969, following presentation of public briefs and discussion in the parliamentary committee. The law (Bill 276) was passed on December 19, 1969, creating the Quebec Urban Community (QUC). Godbout claims that this process represents a new mode of exercising power by the provincial government whereby information is given to the municipal representatives to allow them an institutional apprenticeship. The same process was followed successfully in the Outaouais reform. In the Montreal case, however, the process was restricted to negotiations between the province's Minister of Municipal Affairs and the executive committee chairman of Montreal, Lucian Saulnier.[30]

Godbout feels that the consultation by the Department of Municipal Affairs with the QUC municipalities facilitated the formation of the QUC. "Besides, certain procedural characteristics are typical of the new style of Quebec government. For example, the drawing in of the elected leaders in the process, an involvement we do not find elsewhere."[31] Godbout deplores the fact that nothing in the law provides for citizen participation in this federal structure. He fears that with the current indifference the metropolitan government might become very bureaucratic, perhaps making planning at that level dysfunctional.

Godbout thinks that the main advantage of the QUC is the regional consciousness that has developed. To what extent is this regional consciousness a reality? Louise Quesnel Ouellet, a Laval University professor, concluded that some change in identification following the structural reform has accelerated the reform movement. Loyalties have been transferred from small- to middle-sized municipalities but not to the regional level. The smaller municipalities facing the Quebec City giant want to regroup. Will this be a step that will be followed by further integration or will it give sufficient power to the new middle-sized municipalities for them to be satisfied with a status quo?[32]

The QUC budget also caused dissatisfaction at the suburban level. St. Foye, for example, blamed the QUC for an increase of 10 cents per $100 evaluation in its 1972 budget, and Sillery blamed it for a 15-cent increase. At a council meeting held December 20, 1971, the mayor of Sillery stated that although its contribution to the QUC was $105,525.57, it only received $20,000 in services, for the preparation of the assessment roll and for tax collection. The mayor added that Sillery's contribution represented a $7.00 per capita payment while Quebec City, St. Foye, and Charlesbourg paid only $4.00 per capita. It should be noted that Quebec and St. Foye together control the vote at the QUC, for St. Foye has broken a suburban coalition against Quebec City. Other municipalities also blamed the QUC for their tax increases. Mayor Bérubé of Giffard blamed the increase on the assessment roll, which formerly cost them $7,000 and now through the QUC will cost $47,000.

The Quebec government's intention to reduce the number of municipalities through Bill 276 is probably a good incentive for them to amalgamate in the present QUC context. In fact, municipalities are already studying amalgamation to decide with whom they would like to unite and also to improve their position in the QUC. Six municipalities on the Beauport shore east of Quebec —Giffard, Beauport, Courville, Villeneuve, Montmorency, and St. Thérèse-de-Lisieux—are considering such an amalgamation. Belair, Loretteville, Val Saint-Michel, Saint-Émile, and L'Ancienne-Lorette also have discussed the possibility, to prevent amalgamation with a larger, too powerful municipality. This movement would also oppose the plan submitted to the Quebec government by the mayors of Quebec, Charlesbourg, and Saint-Foye to divide the QUC into four large municipalities. Minister of Municipal Affairs Tessier was also reported in Quebec's daily L'Action as favoring such a plan. Quebec has already annexed three municipalities and was negotiating the annexation of Charlesbourg-ouest in 1973. Nevertheless, suburban opposition in the Quebec Urban Community is not as united as that in the Montreal Urban Community. The new structure is working and has not met with the difficulties of the Montreal Urban Community.

Table IV-4

**Functions Attributed to the Three Urban Communities,
Province of Quebec**

"D" indicates the community must perform the service.
"P" indicates the community may perform the service if its members so request.

		Quebec	Montreal	Outaouais
1.	Assessment of taxable or non-taxable property, the revision of assessment, and the local census	D	D	D
2.	Centralized department for data processing, preparation of a collection roll for municipal and school taxes, and the sending of tax bills	D	D	D
3.	Standardization of traffic regulations, synchronization of mechanical traffic control systems	D	D	D
4.	Minimum standards for construction	D	D	D
5.	Development plan	D	D	D
6.	Intermunicipal water systems (water treatment for Quebec and Montreal)	D	D	D
7.	Public transportation	D	D	D
8.	Industrial funds and industrial promotion	D	-*	-*
9.	Promotion of tourism	D	-*	-*
10.	Intermunicipal sewers and water-purification works	D	D	D
11.	Coordination and, if need be, integration of police departments and the coordination of fire protection	P	D	P
12.	Integration of fire protection	-*	P	-*
13.	Garbage disposal	P	D	D
14.	Air Pollution	-	D	-
15.	Public health	P	D	P
16.	Intermunicipal recreation and parks	P	P	P
17.	Construction of subsidized housing centers	-	P	-
18.	Low cost housing	P	-	P
19.	Intermunicipal libraries	P	P	-
20.	Prepare a plan for reorganization of municipal boundaries	D	D	D

*Regarding the establishment of industrial funds and industrial promotion, Montreal was partly granted this power in December 1971. "The Community may, by by-law, establish an economic promotion department."[1] Insofar as the Hull community is concerned, it is called the Outaouais Regional Community as its territory includes rural municipalities. Bill 77, assented to December 23, 1969, Article 251, created the Outaouais Development Corporation to promote the economic progress of the Outaouais region and to carry out projects for industrial, commercial, recreational, and tourist facilities. Regarding fire protection, the Outaouais regional community may coordinate the fire protection service.

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[1]Second Session, Twenty-Ninth Legislature, Bill 75, "An Act Respecting the Montreal Urban Community." Assented to December 1, 1971, Quebec Official Publisher, Article 167.

Outaouais Regional Community

The Outaouais community is called "regional" rather than "urban" because it includes rural municipalities. *The Quebec 1971 Yearbook* stated that the Outaouais Regional Community was formed to provide the National Capital Commission with a valuable spokesman, and that this Community will be a force equal to the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, its Ontario counterpart. How is the community accepted after one year's operation? Reginald Cameron, a Buckingham city councillor, declared that the Outaouais Community was imposed by the province without consultation. It is said that 13 out of the 32 municipalities have declared their intention to withdraw from the Community.[33] Five mayors have officially asked the Minister of Municipal Affairs to grant this request. Lucerne has even refused to pay the Community $20,921, representing its share of the cost of the regional water filtration plant, on the grounds that it does not benefit from it.

The amalgamation movement among small municipalities, aimed at obtaining strength against the bigger municipalities, is a competitor with the Community here as in Montreal and Quebec. Aylmer and Lucerne have asked the Department of Municipal Affairs to conduct studies to determine amalgamation possibilities. Touraine, Pointe Gâtineau, Gâtineau, Templeton-Est, and villages are also studying the possibility.[34]

The Outaouais Community has also been slow getting underway, but not paralyzed to the extent Montreal is. In all three cases, the new metropolitan structure has been seen as a radical move by the Quebec Government, and the municipalities are attempting to substitute for the Communities partial amalgamations effected according to their own will. The examination of the three urban or regional communities gives a good idea of the reform movement in Quebec as it covers 70 percent of the province's population. To what extent they were conceived as compatible with, or as models for, reforms in the balance of the Province is not yet clear.

Evaluation of the Urban Communities

If the gradual metropolitan reform of Toronto is compared with the abrupt reform in Montreal, it can readily be seen that the latter circumstances were not conducive to success. The more deliberate reforms in the Quebec and Outaouais Communities appear to be successful, although they are only beginning to assume significant functional responsibilities. In contrast, the Montreal government thus far is a failure. Some municipalities have openly defied the law, refusing to pay their share of police integration costs, and the police budget for 1973 was rejected by the suburbs at the November 15, 1972, meeting.[35] The provincial government realized that MUC was not working, and on March 9, 1972,

the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Maurice Tessier, announced the creation of a study group to make recommendations on the following points:

> 1) fiscal aspects;
> 2) sharing of costs;
> 3) efficiency and the cost of the services;
> 4) planning (middle- and long-term) of municipal services;
> 5) regrouping of municipalities within the Island; and
> 6) mode of representation in the MUC and amendments warranted in view of the proposed changes.[36]

The Toronto reform followed the precept of Karl Deutsch that entities must receive tangible gains from accepting a new mode of living, "rewards before burdens, consent before compliance."[37] At first, only non-controversial functions or programs were initiated by Metro Chairman Gardiner. This gradualist approach also assured a parity in gains for the central city and the suburbs. Indeed, by Metro's inception the City of Toronto was able to settle transportation problems while the suburbs settled water problems. In Montreal, however, a tax increase was the first result of metropolitan reform. The minority position of the suburbs on the council also caused resistance. This is different from the Toronto case where core city and suburbs had equal votes and the provincial nominee, the Metro chairman, had the deciding vote. The Montreal reform obviously was not based on a well thought-out strategy.

OTHER RECENT AMALGAMATION ATTEMPTS

While the establishment of the Montreal Metropolitan Community is the most conspicuous reform in local government, that event cannot be understood if viewed only in the context of the Island of Montreal. Changes elsewhere were also taking place, of interest in their own right. The generally unsatisfactory state of local government in Quebec was touched on earlier. Most of the other reforms have been related to the problems of specific areas, but there have also been a few far-reaching attempts at reform.

Voluntary Amalgamation Act

The first of these was the 1965 Voluntary Amalgamation Act, which allows two or more municipalities to amalgamate following a council's resolution to that effect. A request for amalgamation is addressed to the Cabinet, which may approve or refuse it. If the Minister of Municipal Affairs or a set minimum number of property owners want it, the Quebec Municipal Board may conduct an inquiry. The Voluntary Amalgamation Act led to the number of municipalities being reduced

by 82.[38] Of these, 48 are attributed at least in part to this act.

Provincial agencies involved with economic and social development of specific regions were also concerned that the inadequate municipal structure was an obstacle to development. In June 1966, the Bureau of d' aménagement de l'est du Québec (BAEQ), an ARDA[39] project, submitted proposals for municipal restructuring for the experimental region of Bas-St.-Laurent, Gaspésie, and Îles-de-la Madeleine.[40] It recommended the amalgamation of 200 municipalities into 25. The criteria used to determine the new municipalities were:

    1) The existence of a service center which would be the center of the new municipality;

    2) A minimum of 6,000 residents;

    3) A transportation network connecting all sectors to the center of a new municipality; and

    4) An absence of topographic barriers.

The basic purpose of this reform was to set up local entities able to cooperate with the master plan for the whole region. The multiplicity of governments represented a difficulty in agricultural and tourist projects as well as planning coordination. The proposed approach to amalgamation was to create "social animation groups" and to have the Minister use incentives as well as coercive measures. The Voluntary Amalgamation Act would be the legal means of changing the system. These recommendations were never implemented. It has been said that the animation approach disturbed the people more than it assisted them.

Provincial Initiatives for Amalgamation

In 1970, following the federal government's decision to locate a new international airport at Ste. Scholastique, the Department of Municipal Affairs decided to amalgamate, by special legislation, the 12 municipalities located in the immediate vicinity. The purpose was to set up a single municipal government to work with the higher levels of government on the airport. The Minister created a special planning agency with the responsibility of completing a master land-use plan for the surrounding region, which comprised 34 municipalities. The government also enacted a law requiring these 34 municipalities to prepare their own master plans. The consensus and control approach followed in the QUC formation was also used here by SATRA (Service d'aménagement du territoire de la région aéroportuaire), the government agency responsible for preparing the regional plan. It succeeded in forming an intermunicipal planning commission to assure coherence among the municipalities.

In its 1970-71 annual report, the Department of Municipal Affairs states that it participated in the preparation of master plans for the industrial and urban zones in eastern Quebec handled by l'office de dévelop-

pement pour l'est du Québec (ODEQ), a development mission for the Quebec Planning and Development Office. The department had also favored the formation of inter-municipal planning commissions.

By 1960, the suburbs of Montreal lying outside the Island of Montreal had reached a stage where jurisdictional fragmentation was causing substantial problems. The battle in Montreal between the central city and the suburbs was partly repeated in Île Jesus. Mayor J. N. Lavoie of Chomédy, the most populous municipality of the island, favored two cities instead of 13 municipalities. The entire population of the island in 1964 at the time of the provincial amalgamation study was 169,932, of which Chomédy accounted for 38,986. The Sylvestre report on the island's municipal problems which was submitted to the then Minister of Municipal Affairs, Pierre Laporte, in December 1964, identified two groups:

    1. The traditionalists, represented by the island mayors, who recommended a two-tier system with the supra-municipal government having a coordinating responsibility. They advocated local autonomy for better democracy.

    2. The radicals, who recommended the formation of one, two, or six cities for the island.

The Sylvestre report recommended one city for the island. This was implemented by the government in 1965.

The Quebec Government launched a study of the south shore of the St. Lawrence River across from Montreal in March 1966. The 1968 recommendations favored the formation of three cities from the 13 municipalities studied. It also proposed a second-tier government with the following responsibilities:

1. police,	6. fire,
2. water,	7. sewage treatment,
3. garbage disposal,	8. assessment, and
4. transport,	9. planning.
5. data processing,	

The representatives on this regional board were to be directly elected. Although there was only minor opposition, the report was never implemented. Six municipalities there did elect to amalgamate through the Voluntary Amalgamation Act a few years later.

Dissatisfied with the Voluntary Amalgamation Act, the Department of Municipal Affairs submitted a five-year, comprehensive plan for municipal reorganization in 1970, the REMUR plan. Deploring the great number of municipalities and their incapacity to assume their responsibilities, the plan recommended a network of urban and regional communities. The plan indicated that 70 percent (800) of the municipalities of 1,500 people or less spend no money for recreation; 50 percent spend

none for garbage disposal; and 70 percent spend none for water and sewer services.[41] The report then stated that the present mechanisms to modify the situation or improve it by cooperation were not adequate:

1. Annexation—The council of the annexed territory must agree and if requested, the population affected will vote in a referendum. This was considered too complex.
2. Amalgamation—The effectiveness of this as a voluntary mechanism has been described.
3. Intermunicipal Agreements—Municipalities can, with the approval of the Minister of Municipal Affairs, effect agreements for public works execution, organization, and administration of municipal services. The law also speaks of at least forty possibilities of intermunicipal cooperation. Moreover, the water board has the power to order sewer and water integration.

Experience indicated that municipalities were not using these mechanisms to any great extent. This REMUR reform would follow two steps: (1) creation of urban and regional communities (20 units); and (2) studies by the communities to create larger municipalities within the communities by amalgamation. The reforms would include a regional bureau to coordinate the activities of the different provincial departments in the region, called the "regional administrative conference of civil servants." Financial assistance similar to that given the three urban communities created in December 1969 was announced. The powers and functions of the 20 new communities were to be somewhat similar to the three urban communities already in existence. There would be four urban and 16 regional communities.

The government changed in April 1970, and a White Paper published in March 1971 set out the proposals of the new government. The government retained the community concept but the number of communities increased to 131.

The basic problems mentioned in the 1971 White Paper are the multiplicity of administrative centers, limitation of powers, new problems, rigidity of structures, weakness of financial and administrative capacity, and absence of mechanisms facilitating provincial-municipal coordination. The objectives of the reform are economic, socio-cultural, and administrative.

Economic Objectives
1. Coherent development of the territory
2. Involvement of the municipalities in economic growth
3. Coordination of public investment to avoid duplication
4. Optimum use of municipal service at lowest cost

5. Correction of disparities between municipalities

Socio-Cultural Objectives
1. Community services
2. Amalgamation of provincial, municipal, and school community equipment
3. Creation of a recreation policy and coordination of public institutions to render recreation services accessible to everyone
4. Increase of subsidized housing

Administrative Objectives
1. Improved fiscal and administrative autonomy
2. Increased municipal functions
3. Increased territory
4. Stronger municipal structure that will act as a responsible government in provincial-municipal relations

The functions to be given to the communities are planning and development, economic promotion and industrial funds, assessment, data processing, traffic, a housing bureau, and environment control. Each municipality was to nominate one of its council members to act on the community council. The White Paper envisioned a second stage of fiscal reform, and a final one to create regional governments.

This new proposal would divide the province into 10 regions comprised of 13 communities each. The larger number of communities, it was felt, would recognize more fully the wide range of population in different parts of the province. For example, in 1969 the Montreal region had a population of 3,607,343 in an area of 692 square miles, while the Côte-Nord region had 86,333 with an area of 3,502 square miles. One municipality in the Montreal region had a population of 229,629 in 1969 and an area of 107 square miles, while in the Côte-Nord region one community had 4,960 inhabitants and 2,142 square miles.

The main criticism of the White Paper was the size of the communities in relation to the obligations or functions to be fulfilled. It was objected that 74 communities would have fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, and 25 fewer than 9,999 inhabitants; thus they would not have the financial resources to employ qualified technical staff to handle the new responsibilities. One party stated that among the 131 proposed communities, 44 percent would not have the administrative capacity to go beyond routine maintenance of minimum services, and 65 percent would not be able to attain a dynamic level of local government and handle the functions of the proposed communities. In other words, the communities would be either too small, or too poor, or have too diffused a territory to support acceptable administrative capacity. The critics specified the minimum size a community should have as 30,000 persons. Other critics came from the county councils. They recommended that the county governments be modified to perform the

functions that the White Paper would give to the communities.

Supporters of the White Paper came mostly from urban districts and the Union des Municipalités du Québec board of directors, which includes the majority of Quebec municipalities.

The Provincial-Municipal Conference in May 1971, an occasion for consultation, brought changes from the Minister of Municipal Affairs. He declared that, to create a new community, instead of 75 percent of the municipalities and 75 percent of the population of a designed community, approval by only 60 percent of the municipalities and 50 percent of the population would be required. He also reduced the functions of the new communities from seven to three: Planning and development, economic promotion and industrial development, and assessment and local population census.

Apparently the strong opposition from the county councils succeeded in halting government action. A few months after the May conference it was declared that the White Paper was put aside and the 1965 Voluntary Amalgamation Act would be made more workable.[42] A new law now gives the Minister of Municipal Affairs power to establish "grouping units" comprising cities, towns, villages, and parishes, and to attach non-organized territory. These units will then be studied for possible amalgamation. Priority will be given to the three urban communities, to urbanized territory, and to parish-village municipalities that are contiguous. Parish-village amalgamation alone would reduce by 300 the number of municipalities, and would correspond to a request by the county councils who recognized that this move was needed. For other rural municipalities, nothing will be done to force amalgamation. They may volunteer for amalgamation if they so desire. The "grouping units" will be based on data which in the opinion of the Minister show amalgamation to be advantageous or at least indicate the need for such a study.

Before an amalgamation can be considered by the Minister, the law states that 50 percent of the municipal councils representing 50 percent of the population must pass a resolution, to be published in local papers and the Official Gazette, which states that any property owner or tenant may, within 30 days, object to the amalgamation or to its conditions in writing to the Quebec Municipal Board. A public inquiry must be held if a single opposition is recorded or if the municipal board calls for one. Following the inquiry, the board may order a referendum in one or all the municipalities affected, although it does not have to follow the results of the vote. In the event that, following the designation of a "grouping unit," the municipalities elect not to amalgamate or to carry out a study, the Minister may order such a study at their expense. A subsidy of $3.00 per capita for five years may be granted to municipalities that amalgamate.

THE SLOW PACE OF REFORM

It is too early to see the consequences of this 1971 law. Indeed, the Minister said that grouping units and studies will not bring concrete results for a year or two. The law has not gained much publicity because it was passed quickly before the Christmas holidays without much discussion. The press has been rather quiet. The *Sherbrooke Tribune* entitled an article on this law, "A Christmas Tree Shining with a Thousand Stars: Bill 276."[43] The paper said that people have had no time to appreciate the law and object particularly to the 50 percent minimum requirement to request an amalgamation.

In the urban communities, municipalities are presently considering amalgamation. Montreal Island would become four or five municipalities and Quebec Urban Community territory on the north shore would become four municipalities. Other municipalities have publicly voiced their opposition to amalgamation or even to studies to that effect, but the two main municipal associations have not come out with strong opposition or support. The County Councils (L'Union des Conseils de Comtes), which so vehemently opposed the March 1971 White Paper, only regretted that the law was prepared without consultation with them.[44] The Three-Rivers newspaper, *Le Nouvelliste*,[45] approved the principle, but also objected to the quick passing of the law and the lack of consultation and discussion. Certain municipalities, such as Kenogrami, Jonquière and Jonquière Parish, Rimouski, Rimouski Est, and Pointe-aux-Père, have decided to meet to study the advantages of an amalgamation.

Jean-Louis Morin, the editorialist of "La Revue Municipale," believes the municipal reform movement in Quebec has been carried along by electoral strategy. The Liberal Party, supported by an urban vote, will not hesitate to carry out reform that might affect rural territory unfavorably. The Union Nationale Party, whose support comes from rural municipalities, will not hesitate to affect urban municipalities.[46] As examples Morin gives Bill 276, passed by a Liberal government, which will affect rural municipalities, and the urban communities laws, passed by the Union Nationale government. Such emphasis on parties may not be wholly accurate, however. For example, Bill 276, passed by the present Liberal government, will most likely affect urban territory. Indeed, the urban regions are the priorities of the Department of Municipal Affairs. Another contrary example is imposed amalgamation by the Union Nationale government of the Percé and Gaspé rural municipalities. Moreover, the urban and regional communities created by the Union Nationale were supported by the Liberal government.

Other factors help to explain the slow pace of reform. Although Quebec Province is rapidly becoming industrialized, rural and traditional behavior still has firm

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roots. The "esprit de clocher," or parochial attitude, is certainly a factor that has impaired the reform movement. Professor Guy Bourassa, in an article on Quebec municipal administration, mentions the following reasons in explaining the slow adaptation of the municipal system:[47]

1. Only recently has the municipal government been considered to be more than an administrative government. Today it is considered political as well.
2. A strong local self-government culture is lacking.
3. The traditional services rendered have been water, sewer, transport; other important functions such as welfare, recreation, and planning, have been neglected.
4. There has been a predominance of elitist elected representatives of the traditional type.

Professor Bourassa feels, however, that the following factors will bring reforms in the not too distant future: a new type of political person at the municipal level, extended voting rights, new demands created by an urban and industrial society, a more involved provincial government, financial implications for Quebec province, and the apparent desire for more citizens to participate.

Throughout the description of Quebec municipal reforms several dualities have been prominent: rural-urban, traditional-modern, rich-poor, French-English. Transition and adaptation cannot be easy. The multiplicity of the relevant factors is certainly the major cause of a slow reform pattern. However, the studies conducted by different government levels and interested groups in the 1960's should bear fruit in the 1970's. Some people feel that of paramount importance will be the citizen participation needed to give local self-government its place in Quebec.

FOOTNOTES

[1]*Proposals for the Reform of Municipal Structures*, Department of Municipal Affairs, Quebec, 1970, pp. 5-6.

[2]Guy Bourassa, "L'Administration Municipale," *Recherches Sociographiques*, IX, 1-2, 1968, pp. 48-49.

[3]County government in Quebec is two-tier government. The counties have very limited functions, but rural municipalities provide additional services.

[4]Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada*, Ottawa Catalogue 92-708, I, Part 1, January, 1973.

[5]N. H. Lithwick, *Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects*, (Ottawa: Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1971), p. 145.

[6]George S. Mooney, Memorandum prepared for the Mayor's Committee on a New Form of Administration for the City of Montreal, Department of Planning and Research, Montreal Metropolitan Commission, 1938, p. 2.

[7]Commission for the Study of the Metropolitan Problems of Montreal, (Paquette Commission), *Report* (City of Montreal: 1955), p. 2.

[8]Commission for the Study of the Metropolitan Problems of Montreal, p. 68.

[9]Study Commission of Intermuncipal Problems on the Island of Montreal, (Blier Commission), *Report* (Quebec: Department of Municipal Affairs, 1964), p. 17.

[10]Roger J. Bedard, *La Bataille des Annexions* (Ottawa: Les Editions du Jour, Inc., 1965), p. 14.

[11]Bedard, *La Bataille des Annexions*, p. 53.

[12]Bedard, *La Bataille des Annexions*, p. 53.

[13]Bedard, *La Bataille des Annexions*, p. 56.

[14]Jacques Godbout, "La formation de la communauté urbaine de Québec et le rôle de l'etat dans la restructuration des pouvoirs locaux," *Recherches Sociographiques*, 12 (2), (April-May 1971), pp. 182-225.

[15]*La municipalité au Québec en 1968*, (Montreal: L'Union des municipalités de la Province de Quebec, 1969), pp. 195-247.

[16]Official figures of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics established during the 1961 Canada Census. *Study Commission of Inter-Municipal Problems on the Island of Montreal* (Quebec: The Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 19.

[17]Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada*, Catalogue 92-708, I, part 1, January, 1973.

[18]*Montreal Star*, December 31, 1971, pp. 1-2. On the other hand, several municipalities that do not presently share in the Urban Community expenses and are located in the metropolitan area show substantial population increases: Brossard, 97.1 percent; Saint-Bruno-de-Montarville, 48.3 percent; and Boucherville, Repentigny, Chateauguay Centre, Longueuil, Greenfield Park, Saint-Hubert, and Beloeil, from 20 to 30 percent.

[19]See Table IV-3.

[20]See report on the Conference given at the Congress, *Conférences prononcées au congrès annual de l'Union des municipalités de la Province de Quebec les 24, 25, 26 Septembre, 1969*, document prepared by the Union des Municipalités de la Province de Québec, Montreal, October 1969, p. 16

[21]*Conférences prononcées . . .* p. 6.

[22]Fourth Session, Twenty-Eighth Legislature, National Assembly of Quebec, Bill 75, "Montreal Urban Community Act," assented to December 23, 1969, Quebec Official Publisher, 1969, Article 228.

[23]Montreal Urban Community, Proposed Budget for 1972, p. 48.

[24]*Montreal Star*, December 30, 1971, p. 1.

[25]*Montreal Star*, January 11, 1972.

[26]*Montreal Star*, January 6, 1972.

[27]It could be added that Article 248 stipulates:

However, if the budget of the Community or the budget of the transit commission comes into force automatically under this section without having been formally approved by the council, ten members of the council representing the City of Montreal or five members of such council appointed by other municipalities may apply to the Quebec Municipal Commission, by a petition served upon the Community, and, where such is the case, upon the transit commission, and filed with the Quebec Municipal Commission before the ensuing 16th of January, to have such budgets amended in whole or in part.

After it has been notified the municipalities concerned and heard those which have expressed their desire to be heard, the Quebec Municipal

Commission must render its decision before the ensuing 15th of February. In such decision it may confirm or amend the budget.

The Quebec Municipal Commission held public hearings and maintained the budget as presented. Some 20 municipalities had contested the budget. The judgment rendered on February 15, 1972, recommended that extensive studies be completed to analyze the fiscal problem. *La Presse*, February 16, 1972.

[28]*Montreal Star,* January 24, 1973.

[29]*La Presse,* March 6, 1973.

[30]Jacques Godbout, "La formation de la communauté urbaine de Quebec", pp. 205-6.

[31]Godbout, "La formation de la communauté urbaine de Québec . . .," p. 214.

[32]"Regionalisation et conscience politique regionale à la communauté urbaine de Québec," *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* IV, 2 (June 1971), pp. 191-206.

[33]*Le Soleil,* Quebec City, December 24, 1971.

[34]*Le Droit,* Ottawa, December 21, 1971.

[35]*La Presse,* November 16, 1972.

[36]*La Presse,* March 10, 1972.

[37]Karl W. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration," in R. E. Jacob and J. V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities,* (New York and Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964).

[38]See *Municipalité 70,* bulletin published by the Department of Municipal Affairs, II, No. 4, June 1970, pp. 1-2; *Municipalité 71,* III, No. 2 (February 1971), pp. 6-7; *Répertoires des municipalités du Québec 1966-67-68-69-70.* Quebec Government Publisher.

[39]ARDA is a federal-provincial planning and development program in the Gaspé peninsula covering some 200 municipalities. This is one of the most underdeveloped regions of Quebec.

[40]Kamouraska County was added for this recommendation.

[41]*REMUR,* Ministère des Affaires Municipales, Hôtel du Governement, Quebec, 1970, p. 5. REMUR stands for "Renouveau municipal et régional." "Municipal or Regional Reorganization," a publication by the Quebec Government, Department of Municipal Affairs.

[42]These shifting positions are probably related to memory of the Liberal government's defeat in 1966, which was partly related to fears aroused by their regionalization of the school system.

[43]Jean Vignealt, "Un Sapin brillant de mille feux," *La Tribune Sherbrooke,* December 20, 1971.

[44]*La Voix de l'est Granby,* December 20, 1971.

[45]*Le Nouvelliste,* Three Rivers, December 20, 1971.

[46]Jean Louis Morin, "La loi du regroupement: tout est accompli?" *La Revue Municipale,* January 1972, No. I, p. 7.

[47]Guy Bourassa, "L'administration municipale," *L'Urbanisation de la société canadienne-française, Recherches sociographiques.* Quebec, 1967, pp. 45-55.

Chapter V

MUNICIPAL REFORM IN

NEW BRUNSWICK

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
On January 1, 1967, the Province of New Brunswick implemented a radical program of municipal reform. In effect, the program called for abolishing county government and transferring responsibility for education, welfare, health, the administration of justice, and property assessment to the provincial government. It initiated a period of provincial-municipal relations reflecting a great change in the responsibilities between the two levels of government and in the approach of the provincial government to its reponsibilities.

THE SETTING FOR REFORM

To understand why drastic reforms were undertaken, one needs to understand the development of sub-provincial government in New Brunswick as well as some of the economic and fiscal conditions prevailing in the early 1960's. This historical section is followed by a description of the new system, its passage through the legislature, and a summary of its effects to date.

Governmental Structure

In 1784 the part of the Province of Nova Scotia north of the Isthmus of Chignecto was separated to become the Province of New Brunswick. However, local government as such did not develop for another 90 years. Between 1784 and 1877, 15 counties were created as geographic and administrative units. Local government in this period was patterned on the English system of "quarter sessions," which vested local power in the hands of a group of appointed lay-magistrates or justices of the peace. These met once or twice a year in county quarter sessions to deal with legal cases and to appoint county and parish officials. Unfortunately, many magistrates did not have the qualities, intellect, or knowledge of the law conducive to the development of sound institutions.

The City of Saint John was incorporated in 1785 by royal charter, but it was only from about 1840 onward that any serious attempt was made to create responsible local government. For many years after that date, the people generally opposed municipal incorporation, principally from fear of direct taxation. The legislature concerned itself mainly with local issues and expenditures of provincial funds in the constituencies. Settlement, however, had reached a stage where some counties and a few urban municipalities were incorporated— Fredericton (1848). Moncton (1855), Woodstock (1856) and St. Stephen (1871). In spite of local indifference and the objections of magistrates and assemblymen, in 1877 the legislature passed a municipal act forcing all counties to incorporate. During the next 20 years so many towns were incorporated by special act of the legislature that a Towns Act was passed in 1896 prescribing the procedures whereby the inhabitants of an area of at least 1,000 population could become incorporated.

Because there were areas with pockets of people who wished powers more extensive than those given to counties but less than those of towns, the Villages Act was enacted in 1920. Several villages were incorporated in the next 20 years, but all except one eventually changed from village to town status.

In the first half of this century, special legislation was passed providing for the creation of 12 local administrative commissions to provide such services as fire protection, water supply, street lighting, and sewers. By 1945 the demand for this type of incorporation became so heavy that the Local Improvement Districts Act was passed, allowing the inhabitants of an area to incorporate to provide one or more local services. This type of incorporation was so popular during the next 20 years that over 70 such districts were established, although a few did not prove viable.

On December 31, 1966, the last day of the old municipal system, there were in New Brunswick seven cities, 21 towns, 15 counties, one village, one township, 65 viable local improvement districts, and 12 local administrative commissions for a total of 122 municipalities (local governments).

The system of municipal government begun in 1785 with the incorporation of Saint John served its purpose and, until about 1940, probably served it well. The situation, however, began to change. For example, county responsibilities were narrowed in 1945, when all roads outside cities and towns became a provincial responsibility. From 1950 on, legislation was not adequate to accommodate the changes in municipal and school operations. The most conspicuous problems were clearly in education financing.

Before the 1940's, each county was divided into a large number of school districts, each responsible for levying and collecting its own taxes. In addition, there were 16 city and town school boards. This system of education stemmed from the Schools Act of 1871, which established the principle of free non-sectarian schools, supported primarily by compulsory local taxation of property in school districts and supplemented by provincial government grants. The over 1,200 school districts existing in 1943 had been reduced to 470 by 1962.

A major factor in this change was the County Schools Act of 1943, intended as a major step toward the equalization of education opportunity, which superimposed a new unit, the county school finance board. This board established a minimum level of service for all schools in the county, based on school district budgetary submissions, and these were financed by a county rate and provincial grants. The districts were responsible for all capital expenditure and for current expenditure over the minimum. Each board had four members appointed by the county council and three appointed by the provincial government.

There can be no doubt that the system of education improved under the county unit system—better buildings, improved transportation systems, better teachers, and better salaries. Yet often the consolidation had little relation to economy or practicality. There were instances of failure to consolidate and instances of over-consolidation. Consequently, there were duplication and under-utilization of buildings, staff, and equipment.

Before 1943, municipalities were responsible for financing only those services they provided. A notable exception was that in most cities and towns councils were responsible for raising school taxes. The 1943 Act transferred the responsibility of raising school taxes from local school boards to the municipal councils. Since school levies included both operational and capital costs, the budgets of all county councils increased from about $2 million in 1940 to nearly $17 million in 1966. As the education system improved, costs increased, municipal budgets increased, and in spite of increased school and municipal grants, municipal tax levies increased drastically from year to year. For example, in 1956 the tax levy of the 15 counties was $8.3 million. Ten years later in 1966, it was nearly $17 million. In 1956, provincial grants to the counties were only $800,000, compared with $2.9 million in 1966.

By the end of 1966, three counties were in effect bankrupt. Two or three more were on the verge of bankruptcy, and in another five to ten years nearly all the counties and several smaller towns would probably have been in a similar state.

While the financing of education was the decisive factor, the local government system was in trouble in a number of areas. The problems were rooted in the changing nature of the province. The cities and towns, as well as the counties, were experiencing soaring municipal taxes. County governments were not able to meet the new responsibilities thrust upon them, and several of the smaller towns were also in difficulty. Even with increased provincial grants and higher municipal taxes, inequalities and inadequacies in local services persisted. By 1960 it was apparent that parts of the local government system were breaking down. A major overhaul was necessary and patchwork legislation would not meet the new challenges.

The Economy

The reforms put forward by the government from 1965 on under the slogan "Equal Opportunity Program" was directed to a cluster of social and economic problems. Economically, New Brunswick's greatest prosperity came in the mid-nineteenth century. With the end of the age of sail and the cutting of the best stands of timber, the impetus given by ship-building and lumbering for the British market was lost. Twentieth century industrialization and urbanization passed the province

by. Traditional industries declined, and New Brunswick lagged conspicuously behind the rest of Canada, despite the presence of some prosperous agricultural areas—chiefly the St. John River valley in the west. Pulp and paper, fishing, and mining are the other main employers; all are primary industries and subject to economic fluctuations.

New Brunswick is not an urbanized province. The largest cities in 1971 were Saint John with a population of 89,000, Moncton with 48,000, and Fredericton with 24,000. While half the population of 634,557 lives outside cities and towns, today less than 50,000 are classified as dependent on farming and the farm population is decreasing rapidly. Some of the rural population is actually in small pockets scattered through the woods and along the Gulf of St. Lawrence, many of them "stranded" by changes in the traditional primary industries. The rate of population growth is currently one of the lowest in Canada—between 1961 and 1971 it was only 5 percent, compared with the national rate of 16 percent.

In the early 1960's there seemed to be signs of improvement in the provincial economy. Certainly there was a great deal of concern at the national level about disparities in regional economies, and attention was given to the problems of economic development, industrialization, and disparities in services. The same concerns were voiced about problems within New Brunswick, and the Byrne Report gave particular point to them. The availability throughout the 1960's of substantial additional federal government grants for welfare, education, and regional development, together with an increase in federal block payments to the provincial governments improved New Brunswick's financial capacity.

New Brunswick politics traditionally had been a game of ins and outs between Liberals and Conservatives, alternating about every two or three terms. The highly localized basis of the political parties,

> ". . . in which each local representative is primarily concerned to secure a share of public expenditure for his constituents leaves little room for maneuver by the government. Policies that would emphasize the development of certain promising regions or resources can be undertaken only if compensating concessions are granted to other areas and interests.[1]

A recurring theme in the Byrne Report is the lack of competence in the public services, both local and provincial, and a distrust of the capacity of the political process to produce efficient services.

Traditionalism and localism perhaps persisted longer in New Brunswick than in most parts of Canada (the observation quoted above was made in 1961). By the 1950's it was beginning to change, and with shifts

towards cash incomes, greater population mobility, and rising standards of education, the pre-eminence of traditional social and economic elites was weakened.[2]

THE BYRNE COMMISSION REPORT

On March 8, 1962, a royal commission headed by E. G. Byrne was appointed to review, study, and make recommendations with respect to finance and muncipal taxation in New Brunswick and related matters. The commission worked quickly and submitted its report[3] in November 1963. Three years of debate and study followed. While not all the recommendations were accepted, they formed the core of reform legislation which became effective on January 1, 1967.

Findings

The failure to meet the rising demand for public services was clearly described in the commission's report. The general standards left much to be desired. Expenditure on education per pupil and teachers' salaries per pupil in 1960 were only about two-thirds the Canadian average ($203 vs. $327 and $110 vs. $148 respectively).[4] Education expenditure per pupil and per capita was the lowest of all the provinces and considerably below the levels of Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland (which have even lower per capita incomes).[5] The share of expenditure on elementary and secondary education supported by the provincial government was also the lowest (19.7 percent).[6]

These averages concealed great disparities in standards within the province. Expenditure per pupil varied from a low of $132 in Kent County to a high of $279 in urbanized St. John County. In the more prosperous urban centers and agricultural areas, standards were often good but conditions in other areas were appalling. In some schools the teacher may have graduated from the classroom in which he was teaching only the year before. Forty-five percent of the teachers in Restigouche County had permits rather than certificates (i.e., had no formal professional qualifications), as contrasted with 2 percent in the five cities.[7] There were indications that conditions were deteriorating in some areas. The better teachers, with the mobility provided by formal qualifications, were able to leave, while resistance to tax increases made it difficult to hire well qualified teachers.

The state of other local government services was also a mixed story. Municipalities had largely been relieved of their share of hospital operating costs by the extension of the joint federal-provincial hospitalization plans, but they were still responsible for a large share of hospital capital costs. As a result, the quality of hospital services varies greatly between areas:

> Information coming to the commission is that the number of hospital beds is inadequate in some areas and the standard of building is extravagant in others. It appears that the tendency in some localities to build unnecessarily ornate hospitals is following the extravagant pattern developed by school boards.[8]

The municipalities' expenditures on welfare were increasing rapidly and standards of administration varied greatly. Few welfare administrators had any formal training and in some cases they were themselves recipients. With regard to administration of justice (court facilities, jails, and local law enforcement administration) the commission commented: "The present organization . . . is the cumulative result of applying *ad hoc* solutions to widely varied problems which arose over a long period of time."[9] Administrative and financial responsibilities were divided between the municipalities and the province in a very complex pattern.

The problems of inadequacies in and disparities between services were compounded by the complexities and inequalities in local government finance. To meet the changing demand for public services, provincial grants had increased rapidly (from $2,074,000 in 1952 to $5,988,000 in 1962)[10] and the pattern was complex. Important grants were tied to local expenditure on a percentage basis or to population on a per capita basis, and there was inadequate recognition of variations in need for services. Assistance tended to go to those municipalities with the greatest financial resources— although for cities and towns it could be argued that they generally had greater needs than rural areas.

With regard to local taxation, the conclusion was that the overall burden was not excessive ($49 per capita against a Canadian average of $80 and 4.7 percent of total personal income against an average for the ten provinces of 5.2 percent).[11] There were, however, great differences in the levels of taxation, both between municipalities and within them. The real property tax rates per $100 in 1961 (based on market value) varied from $1.21 to $5.50, with an average of $2.20. The differences within municipalities in assessment levels were as great. Some of the problems arose from the unsatisfactory nature of the law governing assessment: Eleven general acts supplemented by 260 special acts resulted in the law's being "concealed in a maze which is impenetrable to laymen and which might well bewilder experienced solicitors and at best leave room for doubt."[12]

The deficiencies in the law were compounded by poor assessment procedures. In more than half the towns, the assessors were part-time, formal training was rare. It was reported that up to 1960 one county employed an assessor who could neither read nor write.[13] In the 43 municipalities where assessment procedures were tested the variations in the relationship between assessed value and market value were astounding. In one municipality the lowest was 12 percent of market value and the highest 450 percent. This was one

of the worst situations while the best variation was one from 20 percent to 39 percent of market value. "The general standard of uniformity beggars description," read the report. "We can only say that nearly all are bad. Some are deplorable."[14]

The only conclusive evidence of discrimination related to farms. All farms tended to be over-assessed relative to all other types of real property, and low-value farms were over-assessed relative to high-value ones. "In general . . . the assessment rolls in use in 1962 were riddled with inequities."[15]

These inequities were compounded by a series of other problems. The real property tax base had been eroded by a "chaos of exemptions and reliefs from the tax levy."[16] A particular problem was special concessions to industries:

> . . . a practice which once was an accepted custom has continued because of the considerable rates which some municipalities are obliged to levy. This has made municipalities scramble for any chance to extend their tax base and has made industry fearful, especially in places where it would account for a substantial portion of the total assessment, that it would be gouged by an electorate having a relatively small financial liability for the municipal services it might demand.[17]

The inequities in the system were at least as great when one looked at revenue sources other than the real property tax. Of the total taxes levied in 1961 (almost $30 million), real property accounted for $20,284,000; personal property taxes $5,213,000; business taxes $1,788,000 (cities only); and poll taxes $2,519,000. The general comments were that personal property taxes and poll taxes were inherently difficult to administer fairly, usually bore most heavily on those with the lowest income, were generally regarded as even more inequitable than the other taxes, and were really an obsolete method of taxation. They were used most extensively in the poorer rural areas.

> The personal property tax compounds the farmer's problems in two ways: on the average it accounts for over a quarter of his total property tax bill, and it is a major constituent of some of the highest tax burdens found in our survey. The weight of tax paid by most farmers of commercial size in the more properous counties is not occasion for alarm. In Gloucester, however, the median tax paid by farmers in our sample was 17 percent of gross revenue; and in Kent it was 12 percent. We discovered extreme instances of property taxes exceeding 40 percent of the value of farm produce sold. We also discovered a real property tax (on a different farm) equivalent to $21 per

acre. In Gloucester the median combined real and personal property tax in our sample was $7.80 an acre—on farms where the value of cultivated land was little more than $10 to $20 an acre.[18]

Given the multiplicity of units (547 local taxing and tax supported bodies), the often low level of staff competence, and the inequities of the local tax system, it was not surprising that tax collections were low. In some units, the accumulated tax arrears exceeded the annual tax levy.

The commission found that on the whole the poorest residents paid the highest taxes and received the lowest level of public services. There were great variations in the levels of services, while demands were increasing. Further, provincial grant programs were often unrelated and had little net effect in reducing the inequalities in services and local taxation. There was a strong emphasis on efficiency and keeping levels of expenditure down, as befitted a taxation study, but the report went beyond both finance and local government, raising questions of equity and of the manner in which public services were provided.

Recommendations

All details of the Byrne Commission recommendations, as first made or as eventually passed in somewhat altered form by the New Brunswick legislature, need not be related here. It is necessary, however, to list the major features of the system that emerged to illustrate why some critics have termed it "radical" and "revolutionary."

> 1. A clear-cut distinction is made in the allocation of services between the provincial and municipal governments. Services considered to be of benefit to people are the responsibility of the province, while those considered to be of benefit to property are a municipal responsibility. Thus, the services of public health, education, welfare, justice, assessment of property, the municipal share of hospital construction, collection of taxes, and emergency measures became provincial responsibilities, while fire protection, police protection, streets, garbage collection and disposal, street lighting, water, and sewerage are municipal responsibilities.

> 2. The province accepted the responsibility of collecting all municipal taxes for thee municipalities if the latter requested it. Furthermore, the province agreed to pay to the municipalities the full levy regardless of the success in actual collection from property owners.

> 3. To assist in financing the services transferred from the local to the provincial level, the province

levies a rate of $1.50 per $100 assessed value on all taxable real property and business property. Although the $1.50 rate is often referred to as an education tax, this is a misnomer since the revenue derived from it is used to finance provincial government services; no part of it is earmarked for education, and the proceeds from the tax fall far short of expenditures on education alone. The province also has a sales tax that in 1967 was increased from 3 percent to 6 percent and in 1969 to 8 percent. In addition, in 1967 the province began to utilize a 10 percent surcharge on the federal income tax and increased taxes on cigarettes, gasoline, and vehicle permits.

4. Local service districts, as distinct from municipalities, were created to provide local services in areas where concentrations of population exist. In such districts the services voted for by the voters must be provided by the Minister of Municipal Affairs.

5. A system of unconditional grants to cities and towns was introduced; the amount of these grants was based on two main factors: population and ability to pay.

6. Counties were abolished.

In the April 1963 elections, the previous provincial government under Premier Robichaud returned to power for the second time. Then, in November, shortly before the 1964 legislative session was to convene, the Byrne Report was received. No attempt was made to deal with it at the 1964 session, and indeed it was scarcely mentioned except as an excuse to avoid action on subjects covered in its recommendations. The report in fact received little attention at this stage anywhere in New Brunswick.

Action began soon after the end of the session. Recounting how the legislative program evolved and was presented will partly explain the success of the reorganization.[19]

Legislative Passage

In late April 1964, the government began to consider the report. A cabinet committee was appointed, chaired by the Minister of Municipal Affairs with the deputy minister as secretary, and composed of a cross-section of the cabinet and senior civil servants. Between May and September it met on an average of once a week. The committee proceeded through the report, section by section, calling in most deputy ministers and many branch directors to go over pertinent sections. This exercise in mutual education and understanding via free-wheeling discussion drew in many key government figures on a regular basis. It became apparent that many detailed recommendations in the report had originated

in the departments; therefore, agreement was to be expected on many specific points.

In September the committee recommended to the cabinet that the main elements of the report be implemented. The premier instructed the legislative counsel to draft the necessary legislation. However, it was only in January 1965 that the cabinet as a whole understood that the course on which they proposed to embark was more than a reorganization of structure and responsibilities—it was a program with a philosophy calling for an integrated system of government. It was also apparent that such a broad program could not be ready for the 1965 session and could not be presented to the public without careful preparation.

In March 1965, Premier Robichaud tabled in the legislative assembly a major statement of government policy. The "White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government," said, among other things:

> The actions and policies of government must aim towards the objective of guaranteeing acceptable minimum standards of social, economic and cultural opportunity without in any way restricting maximum opportunity for the individual, the community, or any sector of our society.
>
> The massive spread between the low levels of opportunity existing today, and the acceptable minimum which must be the objectives of society, demands a complete re-examination of the role of all elements within our community and social structure and must be the concern of the total society.
>
> The functions of education, health, welfare and justice have always been and will continue to be the responsibility of the provincial government. We have chosen to discharge these responsibilities by a particular pattern of local institutions. That pattern has been based largely on a principle of permitting each locality to do the best job possible within its means.
>
> The essential service performed by the Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation is to challenge the continued appropriateness of local self-sufficiency and to pose an alternative. They suggest that the alternative is the adoption in New Brunswick of the same principles now governing international and national policies. The principles call for an acceptance of minimum standards of service and opportunity for all citizens regardless of the financial resources of the locality in which they live.
>
> The government of New Brunswick is prepared to accept . . . full responsibility for acceptable minimum standards of education, health and welfare, and justice for all New

Brunswickers. The Byrne Report provides one path towards the implementation of that responsibility. We are not yet satisfied that it is the only path.

We suggest that the municipalities and other agencies of government re-examine their role and objectives, within a framework of a changing Canada and a changing society. The needs of the people which can only be satisfied through local effort, local thought, and local action are constantly changing and growing as well. They go beyond those functions which were the concern of the Byrne Commission and a re-examination of provincial responsibilities cannot be complete without a re-examination of objectives by all elements within the fabric of government.[20]

The premier then proposed that at the end of the spring session the legislature recess to meet again in the fall, at which time the government would present a more detailed statement of policies and introduce legislation.

Meanwhile five lawyers were drafting legislation based exclusively on the Byrne Report. The Equal Opportunity Program announced by the government seemed to be greeted with general approval, but doubts were expressed about the Byrne Report itself as it was read and understood more widely. It was apparent by this time that the legislative draftsmen required more guidance. Difficulties were anticipated in implementing the report and in converting recommendations into legislation because of internal inconsistencies.

The increasing extent of government activity and changes in the style of administration which the new government brought placed new demands on the central policy-making and coordinating mechanisms. For some time the use of cabinet committees had been under consideration, as had the strengthening of the civil service side of the central policy-making machinery. The Byrne Report and subsequent developments in government thinking underlined these internal organizational problems. In June 1965, an Office on Goverment Organization (OGO) was created under the premier, followed in July by a cabinet comittee on government organization.

The cabinet committee was chaired by the premier and consisted of the Attorney-General and the Ministers of Municipal Affairs, Health, Education and Youth, and Welfare. It was to determine policy and direct the development of legislation. The secretariat was provided by the Office on Government Organization—a small unit staffed with handpicked civil servants, some of them new to the New Brunswick public service and some from other departments. It was headed by the government's economic advisor, R. F. Drummie, and was responsible for drawing the staff work together, drafting policy papers, preparing or having prepared background papers,

coordinating the legal draftsmen, and preparing a program schedule. Once the legislation was prepared, OGO was to coordinate, under the direction of the cabinet committee, the implementation of the program and to undertake any activities which did not fall to existing agencies.

The committee met regularly—at least twice a week—working on a tight schedule since legislation had to be ready for the fall session. The flavor of the procedure is best conveyed in Drummie's words:

The procedure we followed was to assess draft legislation in the cabinet committee against the policy statement which the government had agreed to. OGO prepared background papers in cases where either the lawyers indicated they had a problem, or where we felt there was a problem, or where the cabinet committee wanted an item argued on paper.

We prepared staff papers on how things should be handled or why things had to be done in a particular way to ensure consistency. From this point on it was a nightmare, because if consideration of the Schools Act and the election of school boards began without some idea of how the municipal elections were going to be held, then work completed was always subject to revision. Once the Municipalities Act was reached, there had to be a review of the recommendations in light of the decisions previously made about the appointment and election of school board personnel. The cabinet committee became a forum on the philosophy of government with a practical point of view. Policy decisions were channelled back to the draftsmen but eventually the draftsmen had to attend each meeting as non-participants. This considerably reduced the communications problems.

From discussion, there developed instructions to the lawyers. The lawyers would then redraft the sections to be returned for consideration, and in the end we began whittling down each act so that the sections agreed upon remained and the sections which had questions on them kept returning through the cycle.

Upon completion of this process, the draft bill was mimeographed and carried forward by the responsible Minister to the full cabinet. The bill was then defended by the Minister in the usual fashion with technical and other assistance being provided by OGO and his own departmental personnel. Refinements required by the cabinet were generally reviewed by the cabinet com-

mittee and, as the New Brunswick practice, the responsible Minister proceeded to present and defend his bill before the government caucus. Often, further changes and revisions were necessary after these sessions.

By the time a bill had reached the cabinet it had the policy agreement and understanding of at least four and generally six Ministers. . . . This proved to be of additional help before caucus and on the floor of the House. There were occasions during the floor debates when three or four members of the cabinet were capable of defending sections of a bill in detail.[21]

The legislative assembly met in November 1965, and a law amendments committee was established to which the program was referred. Legislation was introduced, but it was proposed that it should die on the floor without a third reading and be re-introduced at the next session. This procedure allowed the free debate desirable for radical and complex legislation and gave an opportunity for organizations and private citizens to raise questions and voice opinions. It also made it clear that there was no intention to railroad the program through, that the government wanted participation, and was prepared to discuss and amend its proposals.

There followed a series of major statements by the responsible Minister as the various implementing acts were introduced. This included a statement of the tax changes to take effect in 13 months' time. The only bill passed was the Assessment Act so that the new real property assessments could be made to take effect in 1967 with the rest of the Economic Opportunity Program.

Extensive and at times heated debate occurred throughout the province. In the words of the present Conservative Premier Richard Hatfield, "Then, and in retrospect, there would appear to have been . little difference in the province over the objectives to be achieved: the issues were over alternatives and methods."[22]

Some amendments were made largely on details (in one bill with 62 sections there were 61 amendments), and the legislation was re-introduced in 1967, referred again to the Law Amendments Committee and finally passed. Barring accidents, it could be assumed that the program in its essentials would go through. Thus, within the government the emphasis shifted from policy to administration and implementation. Activity shifted from the cabinet committee and OGO to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and other departments.

The intensive effort in preparing the legislation underlined the need for extensive public information if the program was to be understood and accepted. A public information advisor, hired at an early stage, attended all cabinet committee meetings so as to understand the evolving program thoroughly. The information campaign not only used the standard procedures of legislative debates, which were widely reported, and intensive barnstorming by the responsible Ministers, but also radio, television, newspaper advertisements, and direct mailings about both the program as a whole and particular aspects such as taxation and education. One effective technique involved booths at county fairs and other public places where questions could be asked and answered, sometimes by telephone or return mail.

Implementation

The units remaining to carry out local responsibilities were the city, town, village, and unincorporated local service districts. With the abolition of county councils many people and large areas were left without local government. In many cases county councils had provided limited local services to parts of the county, including fire protection, street lighting, and ambulance service. So that the people might still benefit from the services formerly provided by county councils, provision was made in the new legislation to create local service districts in which the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs would provide the services. In these districts there is no elected council as such, but there may be an elected advisory council to advise the minister and serve as liaison between the people and the minister.

In consolidating school districts, the legislature went even further than the Royal Commission recommended. Instead of the 422 districts existing in 1966, the commission recommended about 60. The new legislation, however, provided for 33 districts. These districts are administrative agencies, responsible for day-to-day operations within the limits set by provincial government. They are financed entirely by provincial funds except when a supplementary program is implemented in a district, in which case the entire cost is borne by the property owners of the district.

Each district was to have adequate school population to justify a strong central high school, with a system of feeder elementary and junior high schools. Certainly a lesson should have been learned from the system of school building in effect before 1967, whereby in several areas two senior high schools offering the full range of academic and vocational courses were built within a few miles of each other without an adequate school population to make the operation economic. One of the chief criticisms of the new program is that in some parts of the province the distance for students to travel on school buses is far too great.

Also, in several districts opposition evolved when attempts were made to close out some of the old senior high schools in favor of one central school. Some of the opposition may be due to local pride and emotion and some may be founded on logic—it is difficult to evaluate the real opposition.

In the first five years of the new program, school construction was administered by the Department of Public Works. Much dissatisfaction resulted, and in 1972 the school building program was transferred back to the Department of Education. The shortcomings of the school building program and the distance involved in transporting pupils seem to be the two major complaints. Dissatisfaction with respect to boundaries in several of the 33 school districts has also been expressed, but in reality the real cause of complaint is probably the desire of the people to retain high schools at various locations throughout the district.

As to welfare, the Royal Commission recommended strongly that the rehabilitation aspect be strengthened, but many critics question the success of this approach. Certainly the standard of assistance has been improved, so much so that many welfare recipients find little difference between the amount of money paid under welfare and wages to be earned if they work. Many retraining programs have been offered to the unskilled. In many cases, however, the educational level of the welfare recipients does not qualify them for retraining. It would appear that the amount of welfare services now given follows the national pattern, and whether the same would have evolved under municipal administration can be questioned. Many argue that the long-range benefits of the education program will in time take care of the welfare program so far as those capable of working are concerned.

The province did not assume ownership of hospitals (except Saint John General) with the advent of the new program. All hospitals except Saint John General were privately owned. However, all future capital construction is the responsibility of the province. Also, operational costs of all hospitals have been paid by the province since 1967.

There seems little doubt that the hospital program will be far superior to that in existence prior to 1967. Emphasis is now on the large hospital that can offer a wide range of medical, surgical, and preventive services. Opposition has arisen and will arise with respect to this program, but in the long run, there can be little doubt as to the logic behind it.

The province is responsible for determining the value of property for tax purposes. The Act calls for property to be valued at its real and true value, which generally means current market value. Thus, the tax base of a municipality is determined by provincial assessors.

The property tax base for both the province and the municipality consists of the value of most real property and property occupied for business purposes. The business assessment is equal to the value of the real property occupied by the business. Several types of real property are exempt from taxation: certain church property, property of non-profit cemetery companies, university and school property used for educational purposes, property of historical and literary societies, and property of charitable institutions. The estimated value of tax-exempt property in the province in 1972 was approximately $225 million; taxable property amounted to about $3 billion. Thus, the tax base has been eroded to a fair degree by the exemption of certain real property from taxation, although the trend for both the federal and provincial governments and their agencies to make payments in lieu of taxes is reducing the anomalies. Existing tax concessions to industry are being phased out rapidly, and new ones are prohibited.

For assessment and tax collection purposes the province is divided into 12 regions and for municipal administration into 11 districts. Such regions follow rather closely old county lines, except that three of the regions consist of more than one county. In each region are an assessment office, a municipal office (responsible for the local service districts, voters lists, and other quasi-municipal functions), and a collection office. In addition to the main collection office, there are one or more sub-offices in each region. The Departments of Health and Welfare also use the regional approach, but the various administrative regions do not have uniform boundaries.

The system of unconditional grants provided in the Municipal Assistance Act is rather generous. Under the formula flat rate and equalization grants are provided. All cities and towns receive a flat rate grant equal to 40 percent of average standard expenditure for the three years prior to the year in which the grant is made. Not all cities and towns receive an equalization grant. In no case can the total grants to a municipality exceed 70 percent of the net budget of a municipality (net budget equals total expenditures less non-tax revenue). From 1967 to 1971 unconditional grants to cities and towns were equal to about 50 percent of the net budgets of cities and towns. Villages are paid a flat rate grant of 45 percent of their net budgets, and the Minister credits a grant of 45 percent of net budgets to local service districts. The net budgets, tax levies, and unconditional grants paid to municipalities for 1967 to 1971 inclusive are shown in Table V-1.

Table V-1

Annual Net Municipal Budgets and Revenue Sources, Province of New Brunswick:
($000,000)
1967-1971

	Net Budgets	Local Tax Levies	Unconditional Provincial Grants
1967	$20.6	$10.4	$10.2
1968	22.9	11.3	11.6
1969	25.7	12.2	13.5
1970	28.8	13.7	15.1
1971	32.0	15.4	16.6

The effect that unconditional grants and payments in lieu of taxes have on the provincial property taxes in the cities and towns is dramatically different from one place to another. For example, for the year 1970 in the City of Saint John the province paid 61.8 percent of the net budget, and the federal government paid 2.8 percent (payments in lieu of taxes on exempt federal property), leaving 35.4 percent to be paid by property owners. In several other cities the percentage paid by local property owners is even less, going as low as 21 percent, while the highest is 50.9 percent. In the villages the proportion of the net revenue paid by the local taxpayer ranges from about 30 percent to 50 percent.

The introduction of the new system resulted in a substantial tax decrease in most of the province, particularly in rural areas. Under the tax system prior to 1967 personal property and inventory were taxed, and there was a poll tax. In some municipalities there were occupancy taxes, business taxes, and a worker's tax. Under the new system, as has been pointed out, only real and business property are taxed. Before 1967, however, a larger portion of the municipal budget went to schools and welfare, and in some counties school taxes alone equalled about 80 percent of the county levy. Under the new system, although valuations were increased in most cases, the rate in the rural areas was only $1.50 or slightly higher if local services were provided. In many areas taxes were decreased by more than 50 percent. In one extreme case a farmer's taxes decreased from about $2,500 in 1966 to less than $200 in 1967.

All property owned by the former counties, as well as all school property, was vested in the province under provisions of the Municipalities and School Acts. The province in turn assumed all obligations of county governments and school boards. In the last months of 1966, some county councils tried to dispose of real property and other assets before the turnover. Some counties showed a surplus on paper, but in reality the only assets left to the province were the court house and delinquent taxes.

The province had to accept responsibility for many unpaid county and school board bills. Some 2,400 checks amounting to $1 million were paid by the Department of Municipal Affairs alone on behalf of county governments. It took 11,000 checks to cover the 5,600 invoices.

In 1966 property owners and other taxable persons in the province paid through real and personal property taxes, poll taxes, and occupancy and business taxes approximately $38.4 million. In 1967, the tax levied on real and business property through the imposition of the $1.50 provincial and the local rate amounted to approximately $37.5 million. Rural areas benefitted to the greatest degree from the new system with respect to taxes on property, but in nearly all areas the municipal tax decreased. In all fairness, however, we must again point out that there was an increase in the sales tax with the implementation of the new program, along with the introduction of the 10 percent surcharge on income tax and increased taxation on cigarettes, tobacco, gasoline, and vehicle permits.

Former county employees as well as city and town assessment and tax collection personnel were absorbed by the province: mainly assessors, tax collectors, welfare workers, county secretaries and treasurers, jailers, maintenance personnel, and hospital staffs. In spite of great variations in the fringe benefits of municipalities, most of the problems of change of employer were solved in a relatively short period.

The Department of Municipal Affairs has faced a prodigious task in establishing realistic and uniform values in the assessment of property across the province. In 1966 municipal assessors used values of a very wide range and there were about 250,000 assessments. In fact, some 12,000 properties were re-assessed in 1972 for the first time since 1966.

On the other hand, the province now has a staff of highly qualified assessors. As trainees are employed and the older assessors retire, the quality of the staff will continue to improve. The so-called older assessors have done creditable work, but they were too old to undertake the training offered in both the assessing and appraisal fields.

Transfer of the responsibility for public health, welfare, justice, and education from the municipal to the provincial level relieved the municipalities of raising money to finance four services over which they had little or no control. Municipalities gained complete control over those services which they must provide. The task of the municipal mayor, councillor, and administrator became far less frustrating than before 1967. Interest in running for municipal office increased with the advent of the new program; this may stem at least in part from a decrease in frustration experienced by both councils and administrators. On the other hand, there has been an apparent lack of interest in running for the office of school trustee. Many trustees since 1967 have been elected by acclamation or have been appointed by the lieutenant governor in council (the cabinet) to fill vacancies resulting from the failure of candidates to file for office.

SUMMARY

The obsolescence of much of New Brunswick's local government structure made it ripe for reform. The Byrne Report focused attention on a series of interrelated problems and presented a coherent solution from which the government could select parts. Within the government, important elements were predisposed towards change. A radical rather than an evolutionary solution was made possible by three conditions: (1) integrated policy; (2) skillful program development; and (3) the relatively small size of the province.

First, the government reached agreement on a coherent solution or integrated set of policies and rejected further improvisation. Leadership by the premier was essential to this integration. Also, a reorganized civil service, in which a small group of influential officials were committed to work hard for reforms, gave a thrust on the administrative side.

Second, the process of developing the program, the relationship between the components of the package, and the method of presentation forestalled or neutralized most potential opposition. The program evolved through a process of approximations. At each stage there were statements of views, and responses from inside and outside government by a variety of interested parties. The Byrne Report was only the first major step in this process. Towards the end, the exercise of publicly and privately expounding the proposed reforms, and the extent of the feed-back, were such that not only had a coherent program been hammered out but the possibility of tripping over questions of detail was also minimized. The program was politically attractive not only as a positive step to improve services and reduce inequalities, but more immediately because it meant a reduction of property taxes and elimination of the personal property tax and other obsolete taxes. In many cases these changes reduced taxes to about one-third of their former level. The abolition of inequitable local taxes and the transfer of the financing of social and personal services to provincial tax sources more closely related to income were also seen as being more equitable, in individual and regional terms.

Potential opposition from within local government was also effectively met, and "local autonomy" did not become an effective rallying cry. The counties might have constituted a focus of opposition but their political day was long since past. In effect they were only tax collectors for a discredited tax system. The money they raised was largely spent by school boards and other bodies, and their direct responsibilities were limited to municipal homes, administration of justice, and other minor functions. Their tax base in fact had collapsed with the decline of agriculture.

The urban areas on the whole were happy with the Equal Opportunity Program. The Byrne Commission had largely ignored urban problems, but the prospect of tax reduction and increased grants gave promise of better ability to meet the rising demand for services. Until 1967, education had been the responsibility of a separate board, and the city had to bear the political consequences of levying its taxes. The transfer of education to the province was greeted with relief by city officials. With the transfer of the other social and personal services, the urban municipalities were left with the physical servies and development activities where interest in community decision making was greatest. To add to the icing on the cake, the province assumed not only the assessment function, but also tax collection on behalf of municipalities, and took over all uncollected taxes, paying 100 cents on the dollar, no matter how dubious the prospects of collection.

The third factor making a radical solution for New Brunswick possible was scale. The limited size of the province—only 600,000 population in an area of 28,000 square miles—made direct provincial administration of services practical. No one is more than half a day's drive from the capital. At the same time, the strengthening of the civil service and reductions in patronage made it administratively and politically possible for the province to assume wider responsibilities. The province took over health, welfare, education, administration of justice, and assessment, because they were adjudged most adaptable to central administration. Several of these services were already regulated in detail by the province so that local discretion was circumscribed and direct control by local officials was limited.

The abolition of county government paved the way for more effective planning in the rural areas. Before 1966 the only planning regulation of any significance for rural areas (with a few exceptions) related to setback of buildings along major highways. Shortly after the new program began, the provincial planning board enacted subdivision, building, trailer, and other regulations for various rural areas. By July 1972 such regulations had been enacted for six counties, and during 1973 the regulations are expected to become effective throughout the province.

The new program deprived many rural residents of local government. Through the local service district, however, the Minister of Municipal Affairs is providing the equivalent or a better standard of service than that before 1967. Through decentralization in the administrative process, residents of any area today find the regional offices of various departments of government quite accessible for the making of inquiries, complaints, and suggestions.

If the restructuring is to be understood it must be seen as part of a transformation of much of the government of New Brunswick. Not only was local government changed drastically but also the implications for the organization and functioning of the provincial government were great. Aside from the considerable political implications, reorganization of several major government departments was necessary (education, welfare, municipal affairs had their responsibilities greatly increased) and provincial finance was re-cast on both the revenue and expenditure sides.

The program of municipal reform of 1967 seems to the authors to have worked quite satisfactorily for the province. It probably was not the only program which would have solved the problems; however, in general it has worked well and is accepted by the people. There seems little doubt that effort should be made to realize several more of the concepts promulgated by the Byrne Commission. At any rate, it would appear that many

benefits accruing from the program will be long range in nature, and the full effects will probably not be felt for another ten to 15 years. Whether the program would function well in another province is a matter of conjecture.

The reform in effect abolished rural local government, but the urban areas were still to be dealt with. With the general tidying-up of the legislation, changes in local finance, and reallocation of responsibilities, urban problems became more manageable. To meet the problems of servicing urban areas which were no longer part of a municipality, a number of new towns and villages were incorporated. There were the usual overspill problems around the cities. In the case of Saint John, the largest city, the boundaries were extended with the 1967 reforms to include the built-up areas of suburban Lancaster and Simonds. The way for this change had been prepared by the report of a Royal Commission in 1963,[23] but the recommendations had been held in abeyance when the Byrne Commission was appointed. Similar studies have since been carried out for six more of the larger urban areas, two of them by federal Senator H. C. Goldenberg as a royal commissioner. The need for periodic consolidation or annexation in urban areas has been specifically recognized in the laws, and the Minister of Municipal Affairs has responsibility for investigating problems. There are provisions for special grants to consolidated areas as well as safeguards to ensure that localities do not lose grant money by consolidating.

When the opposing Conservative Party won the 1970 elections, the reforms seem not to have been an issue. The process of digestion and revision has continued under the Conservative government. In January 1972 a small task force of senior civil servants was appointed to look at municipal financing and structure, and this comprehensive review found general satisfaction with both. The task force not only concerned itself with tidying up a number of loose ends but also recommended the phasing out, over a period of years, of tax concessions and many exemptions, a reallocation of certain services, a system of stimulation grants, and a new formula for unconditional grants for municipalities.

The Equal Opportunity Program was basically concerned with reducing inequalities in the levels of service and redistributing tax burdens, together with cutting away much confusing and out-dated underbrush. In general, it has been successful. Levels of services have improved, many inequitable features have been eliminated, and levels of property taxes have been reduced. These benefits have been most noticeable in the poorer rural areas, but urban municipalities too have benefitted from the more defensible distribution of responsibilities and financial resources.

FOOTNOTES

[1] H. G. Thorburn, *Politics in New Brunswick* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 181.

[2] Thorburn, *Politics in New Brunswick*, Chapter 8.

[3] *Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Finance and Taxation in New Brunswick,* Byrne Report (Fredericton: The Queen's Printer, 1962).

[4] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 79.

[5] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 83.

[6] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 82.

[7] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 127.

[8] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 149.

[9] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 159.

[10] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 104.

[11] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 7.

[12] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 209.

[13] *Report of the Royal Commission*, pp. 220-221.

[14] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 225.

[15] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 228.

[16] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 212.

[17] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 212.

[18] *Report of the Royal Commission*, p. 15.

[19] An elaboration of this story is found in the papers read at the Conference of the Canadian Institute of Public Administration in 1969 by Messers. Allen, Drummie, and O'Sullivan.

[20] "White Paper on Responsibilities of Government," (Frederickton, N.B.: The Queen's Printer, March 4, 1965), pp. 19-21.

[21] These quotations are taken from the paper "Case Study on Change—New Brunswick: Information and Background," by F. R. Drummie, at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Institute of Public Administration, 1969, pp. 18-21.

[22] *In Search of Balance: Canadian Intergovernmental Experience,* Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 62.

[23] *Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Saint John,* (Goldenberg Report), (Fredericton, The Queen's Printer, 1963).

Chapter VI

WINNIPEG UNICITY

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
On Saturday, July 24, 1971, the legislature of the Province of Manitoba gave third and final reading to Bill 36, "The City of Greater Winnipeg Act." The passage of the Unicity Bill ended one of the most bitter conflicts of modern Manitoba politics and ushered in a unique experiment in North American metropolitan government.

Bill 36 is interesting both for its substance and for the process which led to its creation and adoption. The new Winnipeg local government structure is a genuine innovation which attempts to combine political decentralization through extended wards, community committees, and citizen advisory groups with the amalgamation of 12 municipalities and a second-tier metropolitan corporation into one big city. This combination of administrative and service centralization with built-in participatory channels has led observers to label Winnipeg's experiment as the most exciting urban development in Canada since the formation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953.[1]

It is, of course, too early to assess the success or failure of the new structure. The Unicity council was only incorporated January 1, 1972. What can be examined now is the process which led to adoption of the reform. The successful introduction of change is one of the most difficult processes in politics and the Winnipeg experience may contain lessons for other areas.

The first section of this case study describes the political environment of Winnipeg and briefly summarizes the history of local government in the city. Particular attention is paid to the establishment of the Metropolitan Corporation and the subsequent disputes between that body and the City of Winnipeg. The clash of these two bodies so immobilized urban policy making in Winnipeg that the provincial government not only perceived the need for change but was prepared to carry it out. The second part describes the process which led to the creation of the Unicity plan and analyzes the various sections of Bill 36. In the final section, the motivations and strategies of the participants in the battle over the bill's adoption are examined.

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF WINNIPEG

Like any political environment, Winnipeg has been shaped by demographic, economic, and historical forces. The life of a city is a constant balancing between conflict and cooperation;[2] socio-economic forces largely determine the conditions which either increase the sense of community or foster disintegration. Population size, density, and heterogenity, for example, can generate both resources (energy, diversity, economic strength) and conflict (ethnic disputes, overcrowding). Historical events can condition the local political culture, which in turn affects attitudes towards corruption, the scope of local government activities, or the development of a local party system. Some of the more important environmental factors which have affected the life of Winnipeg can be classified under (1) population characteristics, (2) economic indicators, and (3) the ethnic transformation.

Population Characteristics

Winnipeg has a population approaching 550,000 and an area of over 218 square miles. Before amalgamation the region was governed by 13 separate units—the Metropolitan Corporation, the central City of Winnipeg and 11 suburban municipalities (see Table VI-1 and Map VI-1).

The original inhabitants of what is now Manitoba were indians, primarily Cree, Saulteau, and Chippewa. There are now approximately 32,000 indians in Manitoba and 34,000 metis.[3] It is estimated that at the beginning of the 1960's there were only 5,000 to 6,000 indian/metis people residing in Winnipeg, but by 1971, 15,000 to 40,000 native people lived in the city, almost all in the downtown core. A 1971 survey found that 50 percent of the native people had family incomes under $4,000, 17.3 percent were unemployed, and 12 percent were on welfare.[4] This shift in the last decade from rural reserves to downtown Winnipeg helped create the situation recognized by the 1970 government White Paper on Urban Reorganization:

> Social ills and hence social costs tend to concentrate in the core area. These costs have to be borne almost entirely by taxpayers in the central area despite the fact that many of the people requiring social services and creating social costs have migrated to the central area from outlying communities.[5]

With the development of the fur trade in the eighteenth century, French Canadian traders came to Manitoba; many settled in the St. Boniface area, now part of greater Winnipeg. Over 8 percent of the population of greater Winnipeg is French-Canadian. Thomas Douglas, Earl of Selkirk, brought the Selkirk settlers to the Red River Valley in 1811-12; from that time onward settlers from the British Isles and Ontario formed the base for the growing population. Icelanders and Mennonites arrived during the 1870's, and by 1900 thousands of Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, and Jews were being lured by free land and cheap transportation. Table VI-2 indicates the huge jump in Winnipeg's population between 1901 and 1921, with the rise steady but unspectacular after that date. In the early 1900's the city fathers thought Winnipeg would become the Canadian Chicago and consequently built the wide thoroughfares of Portage and Main and the huge aqueduct to Shoal Lake (completed in 1919) to accommodate a population twice the size of Winnipeg at the time. It was a bit of misplaced boosterism that has

Map VI—1

BOUNDARIES OF FORMER MUNICIPALITIES
IN THE GREATER WINNIPEG AREA

ST. ANDREWS

WEST. ST. PAUL

ST. CLEMENTS

ROSSER

EAST
ST. PAUL

OLD
KILDONAN

NORTH
KILDONAN

WEST
KILDONAN

ASSINIBOIA

EAST
KILDONAN

ASSINIBOIA

WINNIPEG

ST. JAMES

TRANS-
COMA

ST.
BONIFACE

SPRINGFIELD

CHARLESWOOD

CHARLESWOOD

TUXEDO

ST. VITAL

FORT
GARRY

TACHE

MacDONALD

RICHO

MAP

0   2   ,4 MILES

LEGEND:

━━━━━━━ Boundaries of area under former Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg.

▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪ Additional areas included under "Unicity."

SOURCE: Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, Planning Division.

eventually earned the accolade of "far-sighted urban planning."

The last demographic indicator of some importance is the rate of growth. Compared to other urban centers in Canada, greater Winnipeg has lagged. From 1961 to 1966 the population increased by 6.9 percent compared with the national rate of 9.7 percent and from 1966 to 1970 the rate was only 5 percent, compared to 16 percent for Toronto, 15 percent for Vancouver, 16 percent for Edmonton, and 21 percent for Calgary. Growth has been concentrated in the suburbs. From 1961 to 1966 the City of Winnipeg lost 3 percent of its people (the downtown core decreased by nearly 10 percent despite the influx of native peoples). Since 1951 the suburban municipalities have doubled their population; they showed about a 20 percent increase from 1961 to 1966. The Unicity reform was aimed at meeting this situation.

Economic Indicators

The growth of Winnipeg has not been dramatic but it has accounted for most of the increase in Manitoba. The 1971 Census of Canada placed the population of Manitoba at 988,000, with Winnipeg accounting for 54.6 percent of this total. The rural population of Manitoba has declined steadily, from 55.9 percent in 1941 to 32.9 percent in 1966 to an estimated 30 percent in 1969.[6] The 1971 Metropolitan Corporation report, *The Place of Greater Winnipeg in the Economy of Manitoba,* showed that from 1961 to 1966, the growth of Winnipeg

Table VI-2

Population Growth for the
City of Winnipeg and Metropolitan Areas:
1876-1966

Year	City of Winnipeg	Metropolitan Area (including Winnipeg)
1876	3,240	
1881	7,977	
1891	25,639	
1901	44,778	48,488
1911	128,157	156,969
1921	179,087	229,212
1931	218,785	294,905
1941	221,960	302,024
1951	235,710	354,069
1961	265,429	475,989
1966	257,005	508,759

Source: *Report of the Social Service Audit* (Winnipeg: Social Service Audit Committee, 1969), p. 7.

accounted for 77.9 percent of the growth of Manitoba and that from 1966 to 1969 Metropolitan Winnipeg continued to grow while the rest of the province lost population.

Winnipeg provides about two-thirds of all the jobs in Manitoba, two-thirds of all provincial income, and about three-quarters of the individual income tax. In short, it is in a paramount position within Manitoba and dominates the province.

Winnipeg's dominant position has had important political consequences. On one hand, it is simply too important to ignore. The economic well-being of Manitoba depends on the health of Winnipeg, and half the population of the province resides there. But its very strength has made rural Manitobans and their representatives eager to swing the weight of the provincial government on the side of rural Manitoba. Within the rurally dominated legislature an "us versus them" mentality often prevailed, and Winnipeg was viewed with suspicion. The 1960 creation of the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg was opposed by several rural members because it would aid the development of the city. This view was expressed again a decade later when Unicity was debated.

This provincial indifference towards Winnipeg's urban problems was more concrete than mere backbench rhetoric. The Metropolitan Corporation report, *The Place of Greater Winnipeg in the Economy of Manitoba,* found that the province had no urban-oriented programs of consequence and that Winnipeg did not receive its fair share of provincial expenditures. In education, for example, Winnipeg received $1.43 from the province for

Table VI-1

Municipalities and Population,
Metropolitan Winnipeg: 1971

Municipality	Population	Area (square miles)
R. M. Charleswood	11,300	36.7
R. M. Fort Garry	26,730	26.8
R. M. North Kildonan	17,599	9.3
R. M. Old Kildonan	1,432	9.4
Town of Tuxedo	3,218	7.5
City of East Kildonan	29,897	3.2
City of West Kildonan	23,962	2.8
City of St. Vital	32,789	22.6
City of Transcona	22,385	9.4
City of St. Boniface	47,553	18.2
City of St. James-Assiniboia	71,762	41.8
City of Winnipeg	259,946	30.7
Total Unicity	**548,573**	**218.4**

Source: *Winnipeg: Canada's Third Largest City* (Winnipeg: City of Winnipeg, 1972), p. 12.

each dollar raised locally, while the comparable figure in the rest of the province was $4.95. For transportation, Winnipeg received only 9.5 percent of provincial highway expenditures despite repeated demands for more assistance. Even in non-financial matters such as the location of provincial buildings—the head offices of the Manitoba Telephone System or Red River Community College—the province paid little attention to Metro development plans. Not until the election of the New Democratic Party (NDP) majority in 1969 did this neglect begin to change. Symbolic of the change was the 1970 White Paper on Urban Reorganization, which called for new provincial-local relationships based on cooperation.

Within Manitoba, then, Winnipeg looms large. But from another perspective, it is relatively small and has many of the attributes of a folksy town. The population is, after all, only half a million. Economically the area is integrated, with most people travelling to work downtown. Shopping plazas of course exist, but most of the major stores and almost all entertainment facilities are downtown. Participation in community projects, such as the 1967 Pan American Games or the former annual diking of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers at flood time, is enthusiastic and citywide.[7] The dictates of the environment (waiting for a street light at Portage and Main in January is one of the supreme tests faced by man) have forced citizens to cooperate since the Selkirk Settlers arrived in 1811, and the relative isolation of Winnipeg has also required them to fall back on their own resources. The city supports, for example, a summer musical company, a symphony orchestra, a professional theatre company, and a ballet troupe that has gained international status—cultural resources unusual for a North American city of its size. Concepts of "community" or degrees of integration are notoriously difficult to operationalize, but by almost any standard Winnipeg was a social and economic whole long before the political unification of Bill 36.

The Ethnic Transformation

The railways have left an indelible mark on Winnipeg. They have made the city one of the major transportation clearinghouses in North America; brought hundreds of thousands of immigrants; and physically divided the city into north and south. The Canadian Pacific Railway tracks between Logan and Selkirk Avenues mark the boundary of Winnipeg's North End, the ethnic center of the city, the province, and probably the prairies. Seventy percent British in 1900, the percentage of Manitobans of British stock has fallen to around 40 percent and Winnipeg is now one of the most ethnically heterogeneous areas in Canada. Groups, however, have tended to settle in definite localities (see Table VI-3). British descendents are inclined to live in the suburbs and the outer parts of Winnipeg (River Heights); French Canadians concentrate in St. Boniface; and the Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians still reside in Winnipeg, particularly its central core.

This ethnic pattern of settlement has played a major role in local politics. M. S. Donnelly has shown that aldermanic elections follow ethnic majorities: Not one alderman has been elected in a ward where he did not

Table VI-3

Ethnic Groups as Percent of Total Population,

Winnipeg Area:

1961

Ethnic Group	Metro	City of Winnipeg	Other Municipalities	City Core Area
British Isles	45.0	42.8	47.7	36.9
German	10.5	11.4	9.5	12.6
French	8.4	5.3	12.3	7.4
Italian	1.2	1.6	.7	2.3
Netherlands	3.1	2.6	3.8	2.3
Polish	5.2	6.2	4.0	6.8
Russian	.9	1.0	.7	1.0
Scandinavian	3.7	3.8	3.7	4.1
Ukrainian	11.3	13.6	8.5	15.0
Other European	8.6	9.4	7.6	8.3
Asiatic	.7	.9	.4	1.4
Other	1.4	1.6	1.1	2.0

Source: *Report of the Social Service Audit* (Winnipeg: Social Service Audit Committee, 1969), p. 12.

have a large community of his ethnic origin to support him.[8] Today, in the province where "foreigners" were once the objects of ridicule, the mayor of the capital city is a Ukrainian Catholic, the premier of the province is a German Catholic, and the two opposition parties are led by Jews.

But the ethnic majority was slow to make its political power felt. From 1920 to 1958 the premiers of the province and the mayors of Winnipeg all had British names: Norris, Bracken, Garson, and Campbell for the province, and Farmer, Webb, Maclean, Queen, Warriner, Coulter, and Sharpe for the city. This was due in part to one of the aftereffects of the 1919 Winnipeg strike. Throughout that crisis, there was widespread vilification of "foreigners" and "agitators" and the ethnic community was generally fearful of entering politics.[9]

In the early 1950's ethnic representatives such as Slaw Rebchuk and Peter Taraska won city council seats in Ward 3 (the North End). The year which really marked the first ethnic breach of Anglo-Saxon dominance was 1956, when Stephen Juba, a third generation Canadian of Ukrainian origin, defeated G. E. Sharpe, the incumbent mayor. Only two non-British candidates for mayor had run prior to World War II, and Juba himself had been unsuccessful in 1952 and 1954. In 1956, however, Juba was presented with an issue concerning alleged misuse of public money and this gave him enough "good government" voters, combined with his ethnic support, to defeat Sharpe. Juba carried the ethnic Ward 3 by 11,000 votes and despite Sharpe's receiving twice as many votes in Ward 2 (the south side), the Ukrainian was elected.[10] Since his first victory, Juba has become almost a folk hero to many ethnic citizens. Combined with his great political skill, this has made him almost unbeatable. Juba has expanded his political appeal beyond his ethnic base and in the 1971 Unicity mayoralty election he had a majority in all areas. His rock-hard strength in the North End, however, has made him the most powerful politician in Metropolitan Winnipeg.

This political strength of the mayor is an important factor. Stephen Juba believed in amalgamation and for 15 years he carried on a crusade in favor of one big city. Politicians came and went but Stephen Juba continued in office, and eventually a provincial government that agreed to his objective came to power.

The Early Years

Economically Winnipeg developed as a single unit, although the various municipalities were created at different times. Some, such as Assiniboia and St. Boniface, had long and vivid histories, while others had more mundane origins: Transcona, in 1912, was formed to facilitate the establishment of a railway center. By 1924, 14 municipalities had been created; this municipal structure did not change until 1960 and Metro.

In 1907, Winnipeg experimented with a directly elected board of control in addition to the city council. A referendum in 1918, however, opposed the board and it went out of existence. In 1960, a referendum resulted in 2,382 citizens voting in favor of a city-owned electrical plant with only 382 opposed. In 1911, Winnipeg Hydro began and for years Winnipeg had the cheapest power rate in the world. This experiment in municipal socialism was also profitable; from 1961 to 1970, for example, the amounts transferred from hydro surpluses to the city's general treasury totalled $18.3 million. Over the years, there have been repeated suggestions that Winnipeg should share this largess with the other municipalities. As recently as 1971 provincial officials hinted that Manitoba Hydro was interested in buying the city's operation, but the Winnipeg council continued to be violently opposed to any transfer.

The event that changed the city's life, however, was the Winnipeg general strike of 1919. Dividing the city into two armed camps, 50 years later the effects of the strike still lingered. Labor, led by radicals R. B. Russell and R. J. Johns, attempted a massive and permanent shift in economic power through the technique of the general strike. The One Big Union Movement was fiercely opposed by the Citizens' Committee (composed of frantic businessmen), the Meighen government, and those who feared chaos and revolution. In June of 1919, the labor leaders were arrested, riots broke out, troops were used, and the strike was broken.

The result was a polarized, hostile, seething city and local politics quickly reflected the yawning class division. On August 20, 1919, 3,000 people gave enthusiastic support to the formation of the Citizens' League, which would continue the work of the Citizens' Committee of One Thousand. The Dominion Labor Party was formed, and the municipal election November 28 was fought on the issue of the general strike. Mayor Grey, the incumbent who had helped stamp out the strike, was opposed by S. J. Farmer, the labor candidate. The Citizens' League placed ads saying, "There is only one Issue—Red or White" and with its usual bias, the *Manitoba Free Press* carried editorials entitled "Bolshie Pulls the Strings."[11] The League won by a narrow margin.

A pattern was set in the 1919 and 1920 municipal elections which has held firm since that time. Every municipal election has seen a business-oriented, anti-labor Citizens' Committee, later called the Greater Winnipeg Election Committee and now named the Independent Citizens' Election Committee, usually elect a majority of the city council. These citizen election committees have been militant in their claim that they have no ties with the older political parties. Created during the era of the Progressives, when western suspicion of the older national parties was at its zenith, the committees have readily adopted the notion of U.S. municipal reformers that "party politics have no place at

the local level." This anti-party bias has now become a strong Winnipeg civic tradition.

The express purpose of these organizations since the 1920's has been to prevent the election of a labor-dominated city council. The anti-socialist bias was most clearly demonstrated after municipal elections, when committee chairmanships and other plums were doled out. Labor candidates always were denied important posts such as finance chairman. Even after the October 1971 election for the new city not a *single* NDP member was allowed to serve on the council's standing committees. Generally, the geographic divisions of 1919 have also held true--labor, CCF, or NDP councilmen have come exclusively from the north side.

This early fusion of the anti-socialist elements at the local level was repeated in the Manitoba legislature when a coalition was formed in 1935 to prevent labor dominance. Rurally dominated legislatures, like Citizen Election Committee members, were reluctant to extend social services, public housing, welfare, or anything that might raise taxes. Leaders of the province and the city were poured from the same mold—conservative, business-oriented, and Anglo-Saxon.

The strike and the reaction struck fear into the hearts of the ethnic community. Aliens, agitators, and foreigners were held responsible, despite the fact that Dixon, Johns, Russell, and the other leaders were of British origin. J. S. Wordsworth said, "Without hesitation I say there was not a single foreigner in a position of leadership though foreigners were falsely arrested to give colour to this charge".[12] The Meighen government amended the Immigration Act to deport immigrants convicted of seditious offenses.

Blamed for a strike in which they had little part and shut out from the labor movement, which was controlled by British workingmen, the ethnic community shied away from politics—particularly politics of a radical or left-wing hue. Tom Peterson quotes a Ukrainian editor writing in 1932:

> Canadian Ukrainians do not have any influence. We are poor and need political help. Ukrainian farmers and workers depend for their livelihood on the more powerful. This forces us to support a politically influential party. Affiliation with small radical parties brings us Ukrainians only disaster and ruin.[13]

When members of the ethnic community at last become active at the local level, following World War II, they tended to adopt the pro-business philosophy of the ruling group. Despite the relative poverty of many North End residents, ethnic councillors, like the mayor, frequently take more conservative positions than their south Winnipeg counterparts and rarely espouse policies considered threatening to the business community. Similarly, until the late 1960's, the ethnic community

worked through the traditional avenues of church, party, and language associations. Citizen groups were few—although rate-payers associations were active in the suburbs.

The Manitoba Club,[14] in which Anglo-Saxon representatives from old, established businesses would meet with their counterparts from the provincial and local government, increasingly began to dominate the city's life. North Winnipeg remained the center of Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (later NDP) strength. Well known party members were at one time or another on the Winnipeg council. Ethnic loyalties gained in importance, however, and ethnic and class interests often seemed to clash. The single most influential politician from north Winnipeg, Stephen Juda, in no way threatened the economic status quo. In short, until recently, Winnipeg's political temperature was low, its style crusty.

THE COMING OF METRO

Before creation of the Metropolitan Corporation in 1960, the municipalities in the Winnipeg region cooperated in a wide variety of services and several intermunicipal special bodies were founded. These included:

> Greater Winnipeg Water District (1913)
> Mosquito Abatement Authority (1927)
> Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District (1935)
> St. James-Winnipeg Airport Commission (1937)
> Metropolitan Planning Commission (1948)
> Metropolitan Civil Defence Board (1951)
> Greater Winnipeg Transit Commission (1953)

There were complaints from the municipalities that Winnipeg dominated these boards unduly, and in cases such as the Greater Winnipeg Water District, there were wide variations in service. But, despite the difficulties, this long experience of intermunicipal cooperation aided the eventual emergence of Metro.

Perhaps the most important board was the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The commission had only an advisory function, and most of its plans went unheeded.[15] However, the board did develop comprehensive schemes for Winnipeg as a whole. More directly, Eric Thrift, the head of the commission, and George Rich, his deputy, actively and sometimes single-handedly battled for the creation of an areawide government. The two spoke to women's groups, service clubs, employee associations, and ethnic organizations—always extolling the advantages of a metropolitan solution to Winnipeg's urban problems. They kept the Metro idea before politicians and the public generally. When Winnipeg's urban problems finally forced the provincial government to intervene, the Metro solution was uppermost in everyone's mind.

Following World War II, the expansion of the urban population in the Winnipeg region created the now

familiar litany of urban problems. Expenditures soared; for example, the school debt of the City of Winnipeg rose from $1,419,952 in 1945 to $10,575,450 in 1956. Revenues were distributed unevenly; industrial plants and warehouses in St. James provided that city with a heavy surplus, while Winnipeg went into debt. Levels at which real property was assessed differed as much as 75 percent from municipality to municipality. The river system caused a particular problem with bridges. Streets, bridges, and recreational facilities were financed by the municipalities in which they were located, and municipalities like St. James were loath to pay for a bridge everyone would use. The municipalities were dumping raw sewage into the Red and Assiniboine Rivers with such gay abandon that the rivers were literally stinking. The Shoal Lake aqueduct was over-taxed and water rationing was common. In short, the Winnipeg region suffered from a variety of problems which demanded an areawide approach.

The seriousness of the above conditions in 1950 led the Manitoba Urban Association and the Union of Manitoba Municipalities to request a major study of Winnipeg's problems. In November the Premier of Manitoba, D. L. Campbell, responded by forming the Joint Provincial-Municipal Relations Committee, made up of representatives of the government and the municipal associations.[16]

This committee was the first of a number of bodies to study local government in Winnipeg. It heard briefs from the City of Winnipeg, area municipalities, and the formal associations outlining the tremendous increase in costs since 1945. It asked the province to increase its grants and take over the more expensive functions, such as health and welfare.[17] The report of the Subcommittee on Local Government in Winnipeg neatly analyzed the problem of the Winnipeg region: "The whole area constitutes one integrated and interdependent unit based primarily upon the commercial, industrial, financial and transportation facilities which serve the whole region." However, there was no corresponding political integration.

> Some municipalities have no representation on existing Metropolitan boards; the costs of some services, which are of general benefit are not being appropriately shared; because it has not been possible to arrange for joint participation in financing, it has not been possible to carry out major projects which would be generally beneficial; through lack of effective coordination, some municipalities carry on procedures which damage the interest of the other municipalities in the metropolitan area.[18]

The subcommittee recommended a single metropolitan board to replace all the special purpose bodies; this was supported in the final report of the committee in February 1953. The premier, in a speech to the legislature on February 25, 1953, agreed that a metropolitan board "could result in increased efficiency and economy" and "the government is prepared, if the councils of the city of Winnipeg and adjoining municipalities so advise, to bring in legislation for that purpose."[19]

To no one's surprise, the municipal councils were not unanimous on the need for a metropolitan board, but once again everyone thought it would be a great idea to study the problem. Accordingly, in 1955 the provincial government appointed the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission (GWIC), chaired by Leslie Bodie, a Winnipeg businessman. C. N. Kushner, a Winnipeg lawyer and later mayor of West Kildonan, became the secretary to the commission.[20] Appointment of the GWIC was the catalyst which led to the formation of Metro. The creation of Metro Toronto strongly influenced the commission and frequent consultations were held with the Toronto Chairman, F. G. Gardiner. Some system of Metro seemed so inevitable that the briefs of the various municipalities dealt almost solely with what form the new council should take and what functions it should perform.[21] Only the City of Winnipeg pushed for amalgamation.

In 1959, the GWIC published its report. The commission concluded that long-term planning was impossible under the existing system and that an areawide government was needed. It recommended that the 19 area municipalities be incorporated into eight cities: Winnipeg, St. Boniface, St. James, St. Vital, Fort Garry, East Kildonan, West Kildonan, and Transcona. The central council would consist of the mayors of the eight cities plus six other elected members. There was to be amalgamation of the fire and police departments and the metropolitan corporation would assume responsibility for water, public transportation, sewage and drainage, airports, metropolitan highways, and assessment. The corporation was to assume all of the duties of the special bodies and have the authority to determine what percentages in taxes each city would pay. The metropolitan corporation was also to establish a metropolitan school board; this board was to select all school sites and would control local board expenditures while the local boards would have the right to appeal any actions.[22]

The reaction to the GWIC report was mixed: In October 1959, the City of Winnipeg, in a brief to the provincial government supported amalgamation and declared that it was unalterably opposed to the creation of a metropolitan corporation.[23] Many of the municipalities were also opposed to the wide powers of such a corporation and the transfer of boundaries. It was now in the lap of the new Conservative administration of Premier Duff Roblin.

Metropolitan Government

In the election of 1958, Duff Roblin's party had decisively beaten the Liberal regime of D. L. Campbell.

The Conservative majority was equally composed of new-found strength in the north, traditional Tory strength in the rural areas, and strong support from the suburbs of Winnipeg. The election had divided the city—the north going CCF and the south and outer suburbs, Conservative. The Premier was cautious but progressive and his government represented a welcome change from the Campbell Liberals, who had become obsessed with economy in government and low taxes.

Metro reform had not played any role in the election campaign but the government realized that something would have to be done. The problems had gotten worse and the publication of the GWIC report demanded some sort of response. The Premier personally took charge of the project. William Johnston, the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, was instructed to prepare a plan. Johnston worked closely with the planning commission and again a delegation was sent to Metro Toronto to assess the experiences of that body. The problem for the government, as stated by a senior official of the Roblin Ministry, was how to get "a new form of government in a way least likely to disrupt the situation."

The Premier and his associates recognized that a vigorous, areawide approach was needed to solve the region's problems. Members of the government were also not impressed with the quality of local councils and felt that new men would be needed to make a metro structure work. Total amalgamation was adjudged as politically impossible, and the implications of one big city representing half the province worried many. The suburbs, areas of Conservative strength, also had to be placated, and suburban municipalities were opposed to the strong powers proposed for Metro by the GWIC.[24]

The result was a plan radically different from the Bodie report. As Bill 62 it was introduced into the legislature in February 1960, and passed six weeks later. The government decided upon a minimal areawide package and returned to the old idea of a metropolitan board—with added powers of planning—which would replace existing special purpose bodies. The GWIC recommendations for a metro school board and an amalgamated police force were dropped. Municipal boundaries were also left alone. The composition of the council was equally unique. Instead of the expected provisions for municipal representation, the government proposed that all ten members of the metropolitan council be elected from special pie-shaped districts which would include both central and suburban areas. It was hoped that the small number of councillors would increase efficiency and that the type of district would encourage areawide thinking. One of the problems with Metro Toronto, the government believed, was that the representatives felt more loyalty to their home areas than to the central body.

Other provisions of the bill included a preferential voting system; a first chairman appointed by the provincial cabinet with succeeding chairmen to be appointed by the council; and an executive director responsible for administration. The corporation was given full authority over all planning, zoning, and issuing of building permits; charged with the responsibility of preparing a master plan that would include long-term planning for major roads (the City of Winnipeg retained its traffic authority), bridges, transit, sewer, water, garbage, and major parks. In addition, the council was given many operating functions such as assessment, civil defense, mosquito abatement, flood protection, sewage disposal (but not collection) and water (excluding local distribution).

Metro was to have four major revenue sources: direct levies on each municipality in the proportion its assessment held to the total assessment; direct fees; a share of the taxes on industry collected by local municipalities; and the sale of debentures. The latter were subject to the approval of the municipal board if the amount exceeded $500,000. Ten municipalities were completely within Metro's jurisdiction, with nine more partly in the Metro area and the outlying "additional zone" where Metro had planning authority (see Map VI-2).

The success of the government's compromise can be measured by the lack of conflict Bill 62 engendered. Premier Roblin led the debate. The basic principles of the bill, he said, were the needs for central planning and centralization of services. The only group to oppose the bill vigorously was the City of St. Boniface with its member of the legislative assembly, Larry Desjardins, who feared for the French identity of his area. The Liberals, under D. L. Campbell, wanted a referendum on the issue. Most of the municipalities agreed in principle with the establishment of a two-tier system (at least partly because of Winnipeg's insistence on total amalgamation), although many felt that Metro's planning powers were too broad and all wanted direct representation. The City of Winnipeg attacked Metro's powers of zoning and land use and again stated that amalgamation would be more efficient. Few interest groups submitted briefs and those appearing before the Law Amendments Committee were in favor. In the end, only six members of the House, most of them rural Liberals, voted against the bill. Initially, at least, the government had achieved its goal of little disruption.

A Decade of Conflict

The history of the years 1960 to 1970 is one of unending disagreement, disharmony, and disputes between the mayor of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan Corporation. The decade began with Mayor Juba declaring in 1961:

> We have taken as much as we can
> take . . . .. Many people are having some
> serious second thoughts about Metro. I am
> offering to lead this fight. I am ready to
> stand or fall on it. . . . if I have learned

Map VI—2
METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG (1960)

— MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY
— METRO BOUNDARY
--- ADDITIONAL ZONE BOUNDARY

0   4   8 MILES

METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG—MUNICIPALITIES AND POPULATION—1960

IN METRO AREA		
B	BROOKLANDS	4268
EK	EAST KILDONAN	26869
NK	NORTH KILDONAN	8649
OK	OLD KILDONAN	1312
SB	ST. BONIFACE	36361
SJ	ST. JAMES	33817
TR	TRANSCONA	14096
TU	TUXEDO	1624
WK	WEST KILDONAN	19675
W	WINNIPEG	256733
		403424

PART IN METRO AREA AND PART IN ADDITIONAL ZONE*		
A	ASSINIBOIA	609
C	CHARLESWOOD	6034
ESP	EAST ST. PAUL	1982
FG	FORT GARRY	16962
MD	MACDONALD	180
RO	ROSSER	350
SP	SPRINGFIELD	220
SV	ST. VITAL	26765
WSP	ST. PAUL	2032
		60622

403424   **TOTAL METRO POPULATION: 464,046**

*The additional zone also included parts of RICHOT (RI), TACHE (TA), ST. ANDREWS (SA) and ST. CLEMENTS (SC).

SOURCE: Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, Planning Division.

anything about fighting, and I have, I will use it all if necessary. This is probably going to get rough.[25]

Metro Councillor Robert Moffat replied that the mayor was using his "favorite weapon—headlines at 4,000 yards."[26] The decade closed with the vendetta unabated. The *Winnipeg Tribune,* for example, on September 11, 1969, contained an attack by the mayor that "super governments, like Metro, lead to duplication, inefficiency and waste," to which a Metro councillor returned, "If the mayor has a policy, it seems to be one of continued opposition, harrassment, obstructionism, irresponsibility and lack of cooperation to any working proposal or method of dealing with metropolitan problems."[27]

The battle was not merely verbal; the two governments found it impossible to coordinate urban renewal policies. Traffic policies were often at odds, and on one occasion the City of Winnipeg refused to release its statistics on garbage pickup because Metro was studying disposal. Metro councillors attacked the location of the Winnipeg city hall while the mayor poured scorn on Metro's proposed convention center. In the case of the Winnipeg downtown development project, each government produced its own plans, groups of developers, and supporters. The intensity of the conflict often deadlocked urban policy, and the provincial government finally intervened in 1970. A senior Metro official commented on the dismal record, "If we thought of it, Winnipeg said it was bad, and vice versa."

In its battle with the mayor, Metro had few political resources. Richard Bonnycastle, the chairman appointed by Roblin in 1960, was a well-known Winnipeg businessman, a former president of the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce, and a man closely associated with the Conservative Party. But he had never held public office before and the fact that he was an appointed official put him at a tremendous disadvantage *vis-a-vis* the mayor.[28]

Bonnycastle's first job was to find high-calibre staff to get Metro started. Elswood Bole, former mayor of St. Vital, left his job as head of the Manitoba Municipal Board and became executive director of the corporation. Bonnycastle and Bole put together a first-rate staff and Metro was an impressive administrative success. But, try as he would, Bonnycastle was no match for the mayor. He once told a reporter, "I used to wake up in the night and say to myself, 'Bonnycastle,' what the devil have you gotten yourself into?"[29] To those who liked and admired him, the question was often repeated.

In the first year Metro suffered from a series of blows from which it never really recovered. During that first year its image became fixed in the minds of many of the public. It was blamed for a series of large tax increases, and the province retreated from supporting its own creation.

The special electoral districts, designed to promote areawide thinking, were an artifact with no correspon-

dence to local feeling. Thus, as a political organization, the Metro level of government was the least visible political unit in Winnipeg. With only ten councillors for half a million inhabitants, people found it difficult to know their representatives, and Metro seemed to be a remote structure. The media, by giving extensive coverage to the city-Metro conflict, legitimized the struggle. Stories and headlines concerned almost exclusively the bickerings between Juba and Metro, and no one in Metro had the mayor's flair for phrase-making.

The most damaging and lasting impression was that Metro was responsible for Winnipeg's large tax increase in 1961. Winnipeg's mill rate had held steady between 43 and 44 mills since 1951. But in 1961, the City was forced to increase its budget by over $13 million and the mill rate went up 7 points. The creation of Metro and the increase in taxes in the same year was too good an opportunity to be missed and the mayor happily blamed the whole thing on the new government. The *Winnipeg Free Press* carried a detailed study of the figures, which showed that despite the fact that Metro had taken over services which had formerly cost Winnipeg $2,300,000, the city's budget was only down $300,000. The mayor and city bureaucrats had been unwilling to reduce staff and thus 57 percent of the increase was due to Winnipeg spending. Education costs accounted for 37 percent, and Metro's increased levy only 10 percent of the total.[30] Despite the publication of these figures and the explanation of Metro spokesmen, the general impression continued that Metro was responsible for higher taxes. The tax issue of 1961 was the first of many such incidents. From that time onward, the remote and almost politically hapless Metro became the favorite whipping-boy of city and suburban politicians alike—if things were going badly, it was Metro's fault.

Metro's one hope in these early years of conflict was visible support from the provincial government. This was not forthcoming. George Rich, the former planning director of Metro, thought "this lukewarm attitude of the provincial government seemed only to encourage the critics to look for further real and imagined causes for complaint."[31] The province gave Metro a transition grant of a little over $100,000, which forced the corporation immediately to raise taxes. The Premier next stated that Metro would receive no special consideration and would be treated like any other municipality. During 1961, when Metro was being roasted from one end of the city to the other, the Premier was silent and even on one occasion said he agreed with critics that Metro had gone "too fast" in taking over services.[32] Metro councillors felt they had been let down. One said, "The Premier has been politically irresponsible in my view in throwing Metro to the wolves with no verbal or financial support.[33]

By 1962, an election year, Metro had become a source of acute embarrassment for the government. A columnist for the *Winnipeg Tribune* wrote, "On Metro

government members and the opposition recognized that the Roblin Conservatives were facing a very real election issue."[34]

The provincial government saw its creation disliked by the public, hated by the mayor of Winnipeg, and opposed by the municipalities. Rather than expend its political capital in a defense of Metro, the government skillfully retreated. Section 210 of the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act called for a review of Metro in 1965. The government moved this date up and established the Greater Winnipeg Review Commission on October 2, 1962. Criticism of Metro lessened after the commission began its work and the government temporarily was "off the hook." It was to resort to a similar strategy four years later.

The three-man commission was chaired by Lorne Cumming, who had written the well-known Cumming Report advocating Metro Toronto. It reported in February 1964 with numerous recommendations described as "relating to technical matters." In their briefs to the Commission the area municipalities were united on three basic criticisms:

1) No direct representation on the Metro Council;
2) Confusion about planning and inequality of assessment; and
3) Lack of funds (payments to education and Metro often took up to 75 percent of a municipal budget, leaving little room for local initiative).

The commission ignored many of the municipalities' compalints; only in the areas of planning and assessment did it recommend important changes.

A main recommendation was that business assessments be subject to the same mill rate as real property. This recommendation had the effect of removing from municipalities the option of choosing between a personal property tax or a business tax. The commission helped clear up some of the confusion about planning by suggesting municipalities have the right to appeal Metro decisions or proposals on planning to the Manitoba Municipal Board. These recommendations were adopted in 1964. The commission also recommended changes in municipal boundaries. At the time of incorporation, nine municipalities were wholly within the metropolitan area boundaries and ten were partly within (see Map VI-3). Following the review commission's recommendations, five rural municipalities (Rosser, Macdonald, East St. Paul, West St. Paul, and Springfield) were withdrawn from the metropolitan area, and two that had been partly within the boundaries were now wholly included (Fort Garry and St. Vital). After the Town of Brooklands merged with the City of St. James on January 1, 1967, there were ten municipalities wholly and three partly within metropolitan Winnipeg, giving it an area of 170 square miles.

On the basic question of the usefulness of Metro, the review commission stated: "We have no hesitation in finding that on the whole the basic advantages of the local government system established by the act have been demonstrated beyond question even at this early date . . .. We have found no justifiable grounds for criticism and no real defects in the internal administrative organization."[35] Metro lauded the report as a vindication of its efforts.

The commission, however, had not come to grips with any of the complaints—in particular the issue of municipality representation on the Metro Council. Implementing the commission's recommendations did nothing to defuse the political situation. This was demonstrated in 1964 when Mayor Juba held a referendum on Metro; the results were not binding but the outcome was embarrassing. To the question of whether Metro should be abolished, 28,389 Winnipeg citizens voted yes and only 12,053 said no. To the question whether citizens wanted total amalgamation, 25,049 voted yes and 15,179 no.

In 1966, Premier Roblin again tried to get rid of his Metro problem by creating the Local Government Boundaries Commission to study it. The commission was chaired by Robert Smellie, the former Conservative Minister of Municipal Affairs, and contained such local government notables as Stephen Juba and Elswood Bole. C. N. Kushner resumed his familiar role as secretary to a commission. The commission was to study the territory and boundaries of existint local government units and other matters considered relevant to the establishment of viable local government units for the entire province.

From 1966 to 1968 the commission spent most of its time studying education boundaries; then it began an extensive program of research on metropolitan Winnipeg. It studied the costs of total amalgamation, different types of local government structures, and the factors which make up a community. During the commission's research, Metro and Winnipeg embarked on a bitter fight over a convention center for downtown development, and the NDP defeated the Conservatives in the June 1969 election. In 1968 Duff Roblin retired from politics after his defeat in the federal election that year. He was replaced as premier by Walter Weir, an undertaker from Minnedosa, who (appropriately) oversaw the demise of the Conservative government. The NDP had long favored total amalgamation, and the change of government brought the possibility of real reform. In September 1970, the commission completed its report (which Mayor Juba refused to sign), but the new provincial government had by then formulated its own plan.

In the main, the commission's recommendations were similar to those of the 1959 Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission. The GWIC had wanted eight cities, the Local Boundaries Commission wanted nine: Winnipeg, Fort Garry, St. Vital, St. Boniface, Transcona, St. James-Assiniboia, Tuxedo-Charleswood, Old Kildonan-

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METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG (1964)

Map VI—3

- —— MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY
- ▬▬ METRO BOUNDARY
- ▬ ▬ ▬ ADDITIONAL ZONE BOUNDARY

METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG—MUNICIPALITIES AND POPULATION—1964

IN METRO AREA

B	BROOKLANDS	4405
EK	EAST KILDONAN	28112
FG	FORT GARRY	19197
NK	NORTH KILDONAN	10541
OK	OLD KILDONAN	1363
SB	ST BONIFACE	41516
SJ	ST JAMES	34459
TR	TRANSCONA	17920
TU	TUXEDO	1942
WK	WEST KILDONAN	20902
W	WINNIPEG	255796
		436153

PART IN METRO AREA AND PART IN ADDITIONAL ZONE*

A	ASSINIBOIA	13489
C	CHARLESWOOD	7121
SV	ST. VITAL	29375
		49985

TOTAL METRO POPULATION ; 486,138

*The additional zone also included parts of EAST ST. PAUL (ESP), WEST ST. PAUL (WSP), MACDONALD (MD), RICHOT (RI), ROSSER (RO), SPRINGFIELD (SP), ST. ANDREWS (SA), ST. CLEMENTS (SC) and TACHE (TA).

SOURCE: Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, Planning Division.

West Kildonan, and North Kildonan-East Kildonan-Elmwood. The Metro Council would be composed of the mayors and aldermen of the nine cities plus ten directly elected representatives. Amalgamation of the police and fire forces was rejected, but again, like the GWIC, a metro school board was proposed. The Local Boundaries Commission thus favored the constant demand of the area municipalities that there be direct representation on the Metro Council, but events had already passed the commission by. In summary, the three local government commissions were useful devices to defuse criticism, but the provincial governments were not very inclined to implement the recommendations.

Evaluation of Metro

Metro clearly was not a political success. Facing a powerful opponent who took advantage of every opportunity to belittle it, possessing few political resources of its own, and having little backing from the provincial government, the Metropolitan Corporation became a misunderstood and disliked structure. However, it had many concrete achievements: The 1970 Local Boundaries Commission noted, "The crisis situation which existed in 1960 in connection with many of the areawide or intermunicipal services no longer exists."[36]

In the area of planning, Bill 62 provided that Metro was to prepare a master development plan. A first draft was completed in 1963-64 but was changed after the Cummings Commission. In 1966, after a second series of public meetings, a plan was formulated and outside consultants were invited to give a second opinion. After several changes the plan was adopted by Metro and approved by the Minister of Municipal Affairs in 1968. In 1971, Bill 36 stated that the metropolitan development plan was to be the approved Greater Winnipeg Development Plan.

Metro was the first local government body to subsidize public transit from areawide taxes and several bridges were constructed. Summer rationing of water ended and Metro built enough plants to treat all Winnipeg sewage. By 1965 Metro had completed an areawide reassessment on a uniform basis. Finally, the 15 acres of parks which metropolitan Winnipeg had in 1960 were increased by 1970 to 2,040 acres.

The greatest effect of Metro, however, was to change attitudes on the desirability of reorganizing local government for Winnipeg. In 1960, total amalgamation seemed remote as a solution to Winnipeg's problem, and creating a two-tier system seemed to be a large step. By 1970, people were used to areawide government and Metro had proved that amalgamation was at least technically feasible. In 1968, the Metro Council went on record favoring amalgamation, and the Commission on Manitoba's Economic Prospects recommended one city. Furthermore, in a debate in the provincial legislature both the NDP and the Liberal Party supported unifica-

tion of the area municipalities. By one standard, Metro was so successful in making the case for areawide government that there was never any question of returning to the pre-1960 era. The issue was simply whether to move forward or not. From this perspective it can be argued that Metro was an evolutionary step on the way to unification.

But if Metro promoted unification by showing that it was feasible, Mayor Juba certainly forced the issue. The political wrangling and constant bickering between Metro and the City of Winnipeg seemed to foreclose the possibility that the two governments would ever cooperate fully—and cooperation was needed for shared functions such as renewal and development. If Metro had been as successful politically as it was administratively there would have been little demand for a new city structure. Mayor Juba, by his power, skill, and obstinancy, kept the amalgamation issue before the public and the senior government. Metro may have ensured that Winnipeg would never return to the fragmented system of pre-1960, but Mayor Juba was the single individual most responsible for making Winnipeg one city.

THE UNICITY CONCEPT

The surprise victory of the New Democratic Party in the June 1969 provincial election made reform of Winnipeg local government inevitable. Previously the third largest party in the legislature, with virtually all its members from Winnipeg, the NDP is a party committed to change and more effective public institutions. The 1969 election saw the City and province polarized; the Conservatives held the rural south, south Winnipeg, and the suburbs, while the NDP held northern Manitoba and north and central Winnipeg. The NDP, led by its two most prominent urban spokesmen—Sidney Green and Saul Cherniack,—both former Metro councillors—had long favored amalgamation. Most of the social ills associated with urban life accumulated in the downtown core while many of the richest revenue sources were located in the suburbs. Amalgamation would result in more equitable distribution of the costs and resources. The NDP was the party of the central city and, as Bernard Wolfe, Vice Chairman of the Metropolitan Corporation, wrote in a brief, "No surprise should be registered at the determination of the present government's decision to proceed with restructuring regional government in the metropolitan Winnipeg area."[37]

At the time of the upset victory, Robert Smellie and the other members of the Local Boundaries Commission offered their resignations to the newly formed provincial government. Premier Schreyer refused to accept the offer and asked the commission to continue working. It soon became evident, however, that the proposals of the commission and the inclinations of the government were at odds. In 1970 the government asked Dr. Meyer Brownstone to prepare a scheme of unification.

Brownstone, a native of Winnipeg, had worked for the CCF government in Saskatchewan from 1947 to 1964. An agricultural economist, he had directed the research of the 1955 Saskatchewan Royal Commission on Rural Life—much of which was concerned with local government in rural areas—and eventually became Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs. The 1955 Saskatchewan Royal Commission emphasized the need for citizen access to the decision-making process, and Brownstone was known as an advocate of grass-roots participation. Many members of the government supported unification, but Brownstone was primarily responsible for the other main thrust of Bill 36—the encouragement of citizen participation and political decentralization. Brownstone put a team of consultants together, including Lionel Feldman and Dennis Hefferon, and actively began work in the summer of 1970.

Saul Cherniack, who headed the cabinet committee which considered the Brownstone proposals, was ultimately named Minister of Urban Affairs. The most influential member of the government next to the premier, Cherniack was formerly a member of the Metro Council. Also on the committee were Sidney Green, a former Metro councillor, Saul Miller, former mayor of West Kildonan, and Al Mackling, alderman from St. James. Thus the committee included representatives of both the center and the suburbs. Cherniack in particular played a key role between the consultants and the government.

During the fall of 1970, the Brownstone recommendations went to the cabinet committee. There was controversy within the cabinet over the suggestions, and some were eventually changed. A main contention was over the continued legal existence of local municipalities. Some members of the cabinet simply wanted one central council with complete power, while others argued for retention of local units. Beyond principles, the actual form of the new system proved difficult to resolve. The impasse over the new structure was resolved with the compromise of the community committee concept. This innovation shifted all legal powers to the center but retained units for local identification with some planning and administrative functions. A suburban supporter could emphasize the community committees while a central city representative could point to unification. In the debate on Bill 36, for example, Frank Johnstone, the Conservative member for Sturgeon Creek, attacked the "hypocrisy" shown by Mackling in preaching the "evils of total amalgamation for six years as St. James alderman" and then supporting the bill. The Attorney General replied to the attack by arguing that Bill 36 was not amalgamation but rather "regional government and a series of community committees."[38]

Although the report of the Local Boundaries Commission had been completed in September, actual publication took time. Most of the contents was leaked to the press. Finally, in late December the report was released, and on December 22, 1970, the White Paper, *Proposals for Urban Reorganization,* was unveiled. Cherniack, designated Minister of Urban Affairs, said the "wholly new approach" would continue the efficiency of centralization with more citizen participation. The Premier, for his part, emphasized that the White Paper meant one city "with provision for recognizing existing communities."[39]

The Concept Examined

The White Paper analyzed greater Winnipeg's urban problems and came to the conclusion that "almost all of the urban area's difficulties stem in whole or in part, from three main roots—fragmented authority, segmented financial capacity and lack of citizen involvement." The solution proposed was a bold combination of unification of the municipalities and decentralization of the political process.

The government proposed to create one city. The 12 municipalities would cease to exist and there would be one central council. The unified council would be the exclusive law-making body, responsible for all programs, budgets, and relationships with other governments. The government hoped that a unified council would end citizen confusion over what authority was responsible for what function, prevent the inequitable exploitation of the tax base, distribute services more fairly, and plan more effectively. As a first step in creating one city, the White Paper proposed that the mill rates of the municipalities be uniform. Under this formula most of the area municipalities and the City of Winnipeg would experience a decrease but the richer suburbs of Charleswood, North Kildonan, St. James-Assiniboia, and Tuxedo would pay more. One of the major issues connected with the unification proposal was the question of how much the new structure would cost. Robert Smellie, Elswood Bole, and many others argued that unification costs would climb drastically (and it makes sense that the policemen in Brooklands would now demand the same pay as their Winnipeg counterparts, *i.e.*, costs would level up to the highest denominator). In fact, Bole estimated that most citizens would pay $100 more in taxes a few years after the amalgamation.[40]

Earl Levin, the director of planning for Metro, and Ellen Gallagher, Cherniack's executive assistant, countered this cost argument in a series of speeches and articles that made the point that the government had not amalgamated to save money but rather to increase the effectiveness of local government through better area-wide planning, distribution of services, and the like.

Political Structure

To govern Unicity, the White Paper proposed a 48-member central council elected from single-member wards and a mayor, chairman of the council. In essence

the White Paper proposed to create a parliamentary system of government. The government was opposed to direct election of the mayor because "areawide election of the mayor would in our view not merely dilute the supremacy of the popularly elected council but leave ambiguous the question of who is really responsible, the council or the mayor."[41] The government eventually retreated from this proposal, and many observers are now asking the same question posed in the White Paper about the new Winnipeg Council. The government adopted the traditional committee system of local government, but here too it made changes. The White Paper proposed to create a central executive committee composed of the mayor and the other committee chairmen. The executive committee would be the overall policy arm of the council and there would be three administrative committees: planning and development, finance, and works and operations. Each of the administrative committees would have six or more councillors; the administrative departments would report to the council through these committees.

To develop a capable and responsive administrative environment, the administrative structure was to be the board of commissioners system, found in Calgary and Edmonton. The board of commissioners would have a chief commissioner as chairman, three members who would also be commissioners of the executive departments, and the mayor ex officio. The board of commissioners would supervise the city administration and make policy recommendations to the council through the policy committees. The emphasis was on a strong, integrated executive closely linked to the political level.

Political Participation

The decision to create 48 wards was the direct result of the government's desire to increase citizen access. The White Paper proposed to have one councillor for every 10,000 to 12,000 people. The wards in fact are probably more like communities than are the areas covered by the community committees. The wards are smaller and tend to group people of similar economic and social characteristics.

The large number of wards, however, clearly made it imperative that there be some informal means of organizing the council. Implicit in the White Paper proposals was the hope that party politics would come to the greater Winnipeg area. The cabinet type of government envisioned in the White Paper merely gave expression to this hope. One of the major issues in the fight over Bill 36 was the charge that the NDP hoped to win a majority on the regional council and had structured the wards to bring this about. However, in an examination of the issue of party politics at the local level, Bill Burdeney, the suburban editor of the *Winnipeg Tribune*, found that out of the 112 local councillors in metropolitan Winnipeg before the passage of Bill 36 only 12 were members of the NDP.[42] Realizing this fact,

several members of the cabinet were less than sanguine about party prospects at the local level. After the election of October 6, 1971, in which the NDP won about seven of the seats it contested, Premier Schreyer said he was surprised at the result but that he had never felt the party would do well.[43] Thus, it was probably a desire to increase participation, not to improve partisan gain, which prompted the creation of a large number of wards, although party officials tried to take advantage of the situation after Bill 36 was passed.

The most innovative participatory device was the concept of the community committee. These committees were to be the key link between the citizen and the new council. The committees were to be composed of the councillors from the wards within their boundaries, i.e., in one sense they were area committees of the council. The White Paper proposed to create eight community committees which largely corresponded with the existing municipalities.[44]

Community committees were to have administrative responsibility for local services like community centers, parks, and libraries, but the White Paper emphasized that "their most important function by far will be to provide ready access by the people to the local government system."[45] Community committees were expected to (1) maintain close communication with local citizens; (2) spur citizens to discuss and develop ideas on policy; and (3) conduct appeal activities.

Formal community conferences of area citizens were to be called once or twice a year, and, on issues affecting the area, officials of the regional government were to explain their progress to the citizens and hear the elector's view at first hand. The White Paper maintained that "the avenues of political access will have been opened, and if openness is exhibited, citizens in our view will respond."[46]

Provincial-Local Relations

One of the least-noted aspects of the White Paper but potentially one of the most important was the design for a new provincial-local relationship. The White Paper called for a "parallel and complementary reorganization at the provincial level to ensure that the autonomy and integrity of the new local government is not merely maintained but strengthened."[47] A new Department of Urban Affairs was to be created, with the responsibility for scanning and coordinating all provincial department programs. The province was now committed to developing an urban policy towards Winnipeg rather than discrete health, transportation, and other policies. One device to help this aim was a system of urban accounts which would record all public activities in the Winnipeg region and analyze the changes in the urban environment.

In response to the problems of Metro Winnipeg and the years of conflict and deadlock, the government

proposed an innovative solution which in part was frankly experimental. At one stroke the Schreyer administration planned to unify the city and introduce party politics at the local level—two issues which had divided the city for years. The White Paper was the opening shot in a battle which dominated provincial politics for the next six months.

ADOPTION OF BILL 36

The political battle over Bill 36 can be divided into two phases. In the first or White Paper stage the government maintained that it was not irrevocably wedded to the White Paper proposals and gingerly explored public reaction through a series of town hall meetings. It knew that municipal officials would be opposed, but the basic question was how the public would respond. Would the White Paper develop into a major public issue like the 1970 dispute over automobile insurance, or were the municipal councils and bureaucracies representing only themselves? Opponents of the White Paper tried to broaden the dispute sufficiently to force the government to retreat. This attempt failed.

The second phase of the battle occurred after the government had presented the bill to the legislature. At this point, the arena of conflict was transferred from public meetings to the legislature. The opposition now attempted to change particular parts of the bill and build up points to be used against the NDP in the October council election. By phase two the "war" had been lost, but several tactical skirmishes remained to be fought.

Preliminary Maneuvers

The technique of issuing a White Paper was a wise move by the government. It had a majority of one, and the move allowed it to present several controversial ideas without being completely committed to the program. The White Paper gave an opportunity to test public opinion, judge the resources of the government's opponents before it actually drafted the bill, and adjust matters of detail. Many times during the next few months various cabinet members said that the government would change some aspects of the White Paper. For example, on February 25, Cherniack said that the government was not "married" to the planned reorganization.[48] This approach gave the impression that the government was open-minded and receptive to public demands. There is some doubt how far the government would have retreated, and the bill which was eventually presented to the legislature differed little from the White Paper. But the government did change some aspects of the bill and thus belied the opposition charges of "dictatorial." The White Paper and the series of public meetings also extended the Unicity issue over a long period of time, which helped defuse the emotional aspects of the debate.

Initial reaction to the White Paper varied. Most representatives stated that they had not read the document yet. Both Stephen Juba and Jack Willis, the chairman of Metro, welcomed the plan while the mayor of Charleswood, Arthur T. Moug, stated, "It's lousy".[49] Within a few weeks, however, the opposition began to form and by February the different camps could be clearly delineated. On January 4, 1971, D. A. Yanofsky, mayor of West Kildonan, wrote in the *Winnipeg Free Press* the first of a series of articles examining the government's plan. He questioned the need for a large central council and said it would bring party politics to the greater Winnipeg area. He also questioned the need to disrupt all of greater Winnipeg in order to solve the financial problems of the City of Winnipeg. Soon the various area municipalities began publicly to oppose the plan. On January 13, the Fort Garry Municipal Council declared an "all out fight" against the White Paper; the next day the Council of St. Vital followed suit. Suburban NDP members like Attorney General Al Mackling were attacked. The local St. James paper said Mackling was the "pall bearer at the death of St. James-Assiniboia."[50]

On January 21, the municipalities grouped together to form a common front against the government. Mayor R. A. Wankling of Fort Garry called the meeting, and ten of the area's 12 municipalities turned out to be opposed to the reorganization. Mayor Stephen Juba was not invited to the meetings because of his known support for amalgamation, and Mayor Stanley Dowhen of East Kildonan favored the central city concept. The mayors agreed to propose alternatives to the plan and coordinate their attacks. In the legislature, the Conservative Party was the strongest opponent of Unicity. In addition, prominent spokesmen like Elswood Bole, former executive director of Metro and Robert Smellie, chairman of the Local Boundaries Commission, kept up a steady attack on the White Paper.

The government gained few outright endorsements of its proposals but received general support from the City of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan Corporation. Each of these governments, while asking for specific changes (Mayor Juba wanted a directly elected mayor) gave the province support "in principle."

The Winnipeg newspapers, unlike their position on almost every other issue in Manitoba politics, were strangely mute on the government's plan. The *Winnipeg Free Press* had long supported amalgamation, and Saul Cherniack was one of the few ministers who had not been criticized by the newspaper. Since the paper supported the idea but opposed the government, it remained silent. The *Winnipeg Tribune* raised several questions about Unicity, but held that "on balance it appears that the concept of amalgamation of the present 12 municipalities into one city has merited support."[51]

The White Paper also received support from the few associations or interests concerned with municipal pol-

itics. The Downtown Business Association and the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce raised queries about certain aspects of unification but basically believed that amalgamation could be good for business. On January 26, 1971, The *Winnipeg Free Press* reported that C. J. Rogers, president of the downtown business group, said the White Paper was "reasonably compatible with what we have in mind." Other supporters of the government included Lloyd Axworthy, director of the Institute of Urban Studies of Winnipeg University, who said that the opposition to one city was nonsense,[52] and the Manitoba Association of Architects, which also favored a single-authority government.

One significant source of support for the government came from the Municipal Employees Union (other unions also backed the NDP). Apart from the elected members of the local councils, the municipal employees were the group most concerned with the proposed reorganization. Cherniack announced that all existing employees would be guaranteed their jobs, although there might be some change in position. He also stated that the pay of the employees would remain at the present level and that "no employees would suffer a loss of rights because of the change." Representatives of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) responded with a brief in support of the government; R. A. Henderson, prairie director of CUPE, said the union was "not impressed by the local politician's internal politics of self-preservation."[53] By guaranteeing the jobs of the municipal union and the local officials, Cherniack secured the support or at least the neutrality of one of the few groups powerful enough to offer significant opposition to the White Paper.

Within a month of the White Paper's introduction the opposing sides could be clearly seen. In January, Cherniack announced that the government would hold 11 public meetings from January 22 to February 24 to explain in detail the Unicity concept and listen to the public's views. With the suburban opposition crystallizing at the January 21 meeting of mayors, the forum of conflict shifted to these public meetings.

Public Debate

The opponents of Unicity attempted to use the public meetings as a demonstration to the government of the unpopularity of the White Paper. The various municipal councils urged their citizens to attend and sent propaganda to the voters. The Fort Garry Council, for example, prepared a sheet which stated on its title page in bold, black type:

YOU WILL LOSE:
YOUR MUNICIPAL IDENTITY
YOUR TAX RESERVES
YOUR LOCAL REPRESENTATION
YOUR COMMUNITY CONTROL

Other council's openly aided citizens groups formed to oppose the plan. The St. Boniface Council sponsored a public meeting on behalf of a group worried about the loss of St. Boniface's identity. A man named Prince, the leader of the St. Boniface group, told the council to "help us prove to them (the government) that they are railroading us."[54]

The opposition to the White Paper presented three main avenues of attack: (1) the cost of one big city; (2) the loss of local identity; and (3) the introduction of party politics to greater Winnipeg. Elswood Bole and Robert Smellie led the attack against unification because of its cost. On January 14, Bole said that centralization, amalgamation of police and fire services, and consolidation of services provided at different levels of the municipality would cost an additional $18 million to $20 million, or an increase of 17 mills.[55] Later he put this into dollar terms by stating that the taxes of most residents would be increased by $100. Robert Smellie called the proposals in the White Paper "a Frankenstein's monster that will come to haunt you when you get your tax bill."[56] The concentration of attention on the issue of cost led Ellen Gallagher to write, "The main theme of the public debate so far has been the cost of unifying services, and while this is perhaps not an entirely irrelevant issue, it certainly is a long way off the central point of the proposals."[57] The main point for Mrs. Gallagher and the government was the quality of service provided.

The issue of local identity was an emotional one; all the area municipalities discussed the issue, but in St. Boniface, with its tradition as the home of the French in Manitoba, it made the most impact. Many citizens saw that St. Boniface, which preceded the founding of Winnipeg by half a century, would cease to be autonomous. A St. Boniface group circulated a petition and planned a march to Ottawa (what good this would do, no one bothered to explain). The intensity of the issue, however, prompted the French Canadian Health Minister, René Toupin, to promise that the government would recognize the cultural identity of St. Boniface.[58]

The White Paper was also criticized for prompting party politics at the local level. Many local mayors concentrated on this point; Robert Smellie put their position most succinctly when he said the White Paper was "the NDP manifesto for provincial control . . . it will require party discipline to make it work, and which of the three political parties is ready to fight an election at this time? Only the NDP. They have designed the entire system in their favor."[59] Many opposition members such as L. R. Sherman, Conservative member for Fort Garry, charged the government with "callous political gerrymandering" in the arrangement of wards under the proposed central city plan.[60] This charge of gerrymandering was one of the most common complaints in the early period of the conflict.

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The alternative plan proposed by the ten area mayors —again only Stephen Juba and the municipality of East Kildonan were opposed—in many respects clearly followed the report of the Local Boundaries Commission. The mayors proposed that:

1) the present municipalities be kept;
2) the present Metro Council be eliminated and a new regional council be formed of the mayors and alderman of the municipalities;
3) services administered by the new council roughly be comparable to those now performed by Metro;
4) a Greater Winnipeg Education Region be established as recommended by the Local Government Boundaries Commission.[61]

The alternative proposal revealed the preoccupation of the mayors with preserving the status quo with limited modifications.

Government Strategy

In response to the attacks on the White Paper the strategy of the government appeared to be to defuse the issue as much as possible. Cherniack refused to enter into a debate over the cost of unification and said, "We are not forcing the unification of any services . . . the council itself will be able to decide."[62] The one positive feature of the White Paper extolled at all public meetings was equalization of assessments: "What we are saying is that if this equalization was in effect in 1970, then 80 percent would have paid less taxes."[63]

What the government tried hardest to do was to project an image of reasonableness and concern (compared to many of the extreme statements of the oppostion). A sampling of headlines for the period contains the following examples: "Changes possible: Mackling . . . City plan can be changed . . . changes likely in urban plan; Cherniack . . . City plan changes possible." In a recent debate over public auto insurance the government had been accused of being dictatorial, rigid, and unbending. Obviously Cherniack's strategy was to change this image and to make his opponents appear committed to the status quo.

In one masterful move, the government took away one of the opposition's most potent charges and reinforced its image of reasonableness. On Monday, February 22, Premier Schryer announced that in response to the charges of gerrymandering, the government would set up an independent commission to review boundaries: "We just want to make clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that charges of rigging the boundaries is just a bunch of childish nonsense."[64] The head of the commission was Judge Peter Taraska; he was joined by Dr. Hugh Saunderson, retired president of the University of Manitoba, and Charland Prudhomme, former clerk of the legislative assembly. On April 21, the commission

recommended that the number of wards be increased to 50, the number of community committees to 13, the boundaries of several wards changed, and the names of about a third of the wards changed. The commission kept the government's criterion of about 10,000 people per ward but it felt that familiar polling divisions used in the past should be retained "as much as possible within the new ward boundaries."[65] On May 14, Cherniack accepted the Taraska report in its entirety and said the government was "most favourably impressed."[66] The Taraska report, of course, did not deal in any important way with the central aspects of the White Paper (the terms of reference were tightly drawn). It merely changed details. But it seemed to give the approval of an independent board to the White Paper, and it took a potent issue away from the opposition.

The success of the government's attempts to cool the political temperature on Unicity can be seen by the response to the public meetings. On January 27, 1971, about 200 citizens of South Winnipeg met to discuss the plan; in subsequent gatherings hundreds of people turned out. Despite the efforts of the local councils, it was apparent that there was as much support for the central city concept as there was opposition. Indeed, as the public meetings continued it became obvious that Unicity was not a "hot" political issue in the minds of most voters. Attendance at the meetings began to fade; in the end only 50 or 60 people were turning up. Sidney Green, as active as Cherniack in defending the plan, stated publicly that the poor attendance revealed the lack of success of the municipalities in whipping up opposition to the White Paper.[67]

A telephone poll conducted by the Institute of Urban Studies of the University of Winnipeg confirmed this analysis: About half the respondents thought that some change in the structure of local government was desirable, but many were ignorant of the government's proposals and most said its stand would not affect their vote. The only clear image to come from the survey was that 87 percent of the respondents favored the direct election of the central city mayor.[68]

A final indication of the real lack of public interest was the St. Vital by-election held April 5. The St. Vital Council had taken a strong stand against Unicity, and the seat had been held by a Conservative. However, the NDP candidate, James Walding, was successful. The by-election occurred in the middle of the White Paper conflict and Walding said his election proved that voters supported the central city concept. However, most observers thought that the central city plan had not been much of an issue one way or another, and that most voters were not affected by it. Nevertheless, if "local identity" was as important to the suburb as the council felt, it is likely Unicity would have been accorded a more essential role in the campaign.

The opponents of the White Paper, then, clearly failed in making the issue as decisive, far-reaching, and

emotional as they had hoped. Their strategy had been to create so much furor that the government would be forced to back down. A recent example of a nearly successful campaign was that in the auto insurance dispute, and if the municipalities had been able to wage a similar campaign they might have succeeded (the government was less committed to Unicity than it was to auto insurance). By the time the legislature with its NDP majority began to debate the bill, the municipalities knew they had lost. The *Winnipeg Tribune* wrote about the brief of the City of St. James, "Mayor Hanks, who up to now has been one of the chief opponents of the Unicity plan, offered little criticism, indicating his suburb and municipality has more or less given up the fight and resigned itself to the idea that the scheme will go ahead."[69]

The government employed a skillful strategy and outmaneuvered the municipalities, but the failure of the suburbs lay deeper than this. In essence, the basic assumption of the suburban politicians—that local identity was an important factor—was no longer valid. Winnipeg had become an integrated unit. It was the local boundaries, not Unicity, which were regarded as artificial. In a revealing quote, William Greenfield, a strong Fort Garry opponent of the White Paper, was asked if he favored a referendum on the government proposals. "I certainly would not," he shot back. "Mayor Juba has done such a good job of selling the White Paper that people in West Kildonan as well as in East Kildonan and even Charleswood believe him."[70] In their attacks upon the White Paper, the mayors of the suburbs only represented themselves, and as soon as the government realized this fact, Bill 36 became a certainty.

Bill 36 and the Mayoralty

On April 28, 1971, the government released the draft of Bill 36. The Minister said that there were no major changes from the government's White Paper, rather, it was "more of an elaboration" of that paper.[71] In response to the demands of St. Boniface, the bill contained in Part III a declaration that the new city "shall make available at its central office persons who could communicate in French and English" and that all notices, bills, or statements made to the residents of St. Boniface would be in French and English. The leading defender of the cause of Franco-Manitobans, St. Boniface MLA Larry Desjardins, soon announced that he would support the bill and was satisfied with the protection given the French language.

Bill 36 did reveal in more detail how bodies like the community committees and board of commissioners were to operate, and it carefully outlined the structure of the committee system of council—a departure from most municipal acts which allow local councils to structure themselves. The bill contained new and complex codes on assessment, taxation and borrowing, although

provisions from the 1956 Winnipeg Charter and 1960 Metropolitan Winnipeg Act were also included. One interesting addition to the legislation was the provision that community conferences elect resident advisory groups of citizens to "advise and assist" the community committees. The bill delegated to the city important and innovative planning and development powers and in its final form the bill increased the size of the executive policy committee from four to ten members to ensure citywide representation. In most major matters, however, the bill closely followed the White Paper (see Figure VI-1).

On May 10, Cherniack introduced the bill for first reading and on June 3 the debate on second reading began. Debate lasted a month and on July 9, 1971, the bill was passed by a vote of 31-15. Liberal Gordon Johnson defected from his party to support the government; independent Gordon Beard followed suit. From July 14 to 16, the law amendments committee heard public presentations, largely from the mayors in the metropolitan area. On July 21, with only one significant change—an amendment allowing the direct election of the mayor—the committee completed clause-by-clause debate. July 24, the bill passed third reading 22-14, with Conservative Inez Trueman, member for the Winnipeg constituency of Fort Rouge, supporting the government.

In the legislature, the three parties simply rehashed the debate which had followed publication of the White Paper. Despite isolated examples of useful criticism, the impression one gets from the legislative discussion is that the members were only going through the motions. The government had a majority and was now firmly committed to the plan. All the arguments had been heard before.

Many suburban politicians, in fact, had turned from trying to defeat the bill, which they knew was impossible, to organizing for the October elections which preceded the January 1, 1972, date for organizing the new council. Independent citizens' election associations began to spring up in the suburbs and then in the city. As the *Winnipeg Tribune* described the activity, "Formations are taking place that look like a gang-up against the New Democrats in the anticipated battle for seats on the proposed one-city council."[72] The *raison d'etre* of the new civic party was independence from the organized national parties, but partisan politics undoubtedly entered into the calculations of its leaders. Prominent individuals in the Conservative and Liberal parties were active in the movement, and while these men were probably genuine about their desire for so-called independence, a more compelling motivation was their fear that the new city council would become controlled by the NDP.

By the summer of 1971, Unicity was won and the only contentious item remaining was the nature of the mayorality. This whole issue was overshadowed by the personality of Stephen Juba. During the winter debate

FIGURE VI-1
GOVERNMENT OF WINNIPEG - 1972

CITY COUNCIL
Composition:
- 50 councillors elected on ward basis
- 1 mayor elected at large
- (1st term only)

EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE
Composition:

Mayor (chairman)	1
Chairman of standing committees	3
Other members of council	6
TOTAL	10

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
Composition:
7 members of council

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
Composition:
7 members of Council

COMMITTEE ON WORKS AND OPERATIONS
Composition:
7 members of Council

COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENT

COMMISSIONER OF FINANCE

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
CHIEF COMMISSIONER

COMMISSIONER OF WORKS AND OPERATIONS

- Planning (including transportation, open space and parks planning, and development of the environment)
- Housing
- Urban renewal
- Pollution regulation and control
- Health and social development

- Assessment
- Finance
- Personnel
- Purchasing
- Protection of persons and property

- Budget Bureau
- Information Systems
- Law department
- Clerk's department

- Transit
- Streets
- Traffic control
- Utilities
- Waste collection and disposal
- Engineering and design
- Parks and recreation
- Cultural facilities

over Unicity the mayor of Winnipeg had been rather silent. He endorsed the government's plan but offered little real support. It was well known that he favored the direct election of the mayor, and it was suspected that he wanted to be that first mayor. At times he hinted to reporters that he had secret studies showing how easily unification could be achieved but "he says he's saving his ammunition for when it counts."[73] Some observers felt that the mayor was biding his time to see if the government got into trouble so that he could intervene and collect some political debts. The government never appeared to be in trouble over the issue, but it was careful to keep the mayorality question open. Early in February, Premier Schreyer said, "We could very easily go for an elected mayor,"[74] despite the points raised against the idea in the White Paper. In his introduction to Bill 36, Cherniack said he was "still open to discussion on the question of a directly elected mayor."[75] Groups associated with the central core, such as the Institute of Urban Studies or the Downtown Business Association favored direct election, while Metro and many area mayors were adamantly opposed.

Mayor Juba was deeply concerned about the issue. Frances Russell, a political columnist for the *Tribune,* explained, "It's a fairly safe assumption to make that no one on the current municipal scene except Mr. Juba could win in a direct election, and it is also a safe assumption that Mr. Juba would not be a likely choice in a council vote."[76] On July 7, Mayor Juba made a strong statement about the subject. If the mayor were elected by the council he would be a "little puppydog to the majority of the council" and "the public have indicated they want to elect the mayor."[77] A week later, on July 13, the mayor got the Winnipeg City Council by a vote of seven to six to favor the direct election. Juba himself had to cast the tie-breaking vote. This episode showed his unpopularity among his own council—if he was going to be mayor he would have to be elected. At approximately this time Juba began to make statements about running as the head of a slate of candidates to contest the fall election. If he had run a slate it would probably have been most effective in North Winnipeg—the center of NDP strength.

As Bill 36 moved to the Law Amendments Committee the only important question was the mayorality. Twenty-seven presentations were made to the committee, but the groups represented revealed the lack of significant interest-group activity in Winnipeg local politics. Thirteen briefs came from local mayors, aldermen, or Metro councillors. There were only two representatives of ethnic groups: the St. Boniface citizens' group and a Ukrainian organization opposed to official languages; other briefs came from the Institute of Urban Studies, the Manitoba Associations of Architects, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Liberal Party. Seven individuals made personal appeals. There were no briefs from taxpayers associations, real estate interests,

planning groups, companies, labor unions, welfare agencies, or community associations. Apparently only the local politicians were interested in what was going on.

The event everyone was waiting for was the address of the mayor. On the evening of Thursday, July 15, he gave a classic performance. He was all milk and honey ("I take my hat off to the NDP") except when he strongly criticized the Local Boundaries Commission ("that was the farce of all Royal commissions ever held"). He made it clear that he wanted to be mayor and that only through direct election could he achieve his dream: "I have a good imagination", he said, "but I can't stretch it that far as to see the council electing me mayor. Can you imagine Wankling (mayor of Fort Garry) or Yanofksy (mayor of West Kildonan) voting for me?"[78]

On July 21, in the only significant departure from the White Paper, Cherniack announced that the mayor would be directly elected. As in the case of the community committee dispute, the final result was a compromise—the first mayor of Unicity would be directly elected, in subsequent years the council would decide.

The cabinet committee considering Unicity split on the issue. One body of opinion held that Winnipeg required an areawide approach towards problems as well as the opinions of the local wards and that this would best be achieved by having the mayor elected by the whole city. Others felt that because Winnipeg was used to mayorality elections the whole transition process would be eased if Bill 36 were changed. Opponents of the direct election argued that the whole logic of Unicity demanded a parliamentary rather than a presidential model of the executive.

The future career of Stephen Juba was not a primary consideration, but those who favored changing the bill may have felt that ensuring Juba's support would avoid creating a powerful opponent of Unicity. Public support for a directly elected mayor may have been generated because the citizens of Winnipeg wanted Stephen Juba as their chief executive. Juba's influence, then, was indirect but pervasive.

The actual circumstances of the change were dramatic. Unable to agree, the cabinet threw the decision to the NDP caucus. The caucus was just as split as the cabinet and the votes were closely divided. Finally, the Premier intervened and cast a tie-breaking vote that brought about the change. The decision bought the government time. If the opponents were right and the directly elected mayor was not working with the council the way he should, the system would revert to its original form in three years. If the compromise was working a permanent amendment could be brought in. In any case, Stephen Juba achieved his dream—he would be the first super-mayor of Winnipeg. Moreover, having a chief executive elected at large might have a healing effect on the divided voters of Winnipeg.

CONCLUSION

The nature of the physical development of Winnipeg has made amalgamation a more acceptable solution than would be the case for many large urban centers. As a prairie city with no significant urban neighbors, Winnipeg is visually distinct from its environs. One has only to watch it rise on the horizon as he drives toward it on the highway. Development is compact by most urban standards, and there is no important commuter hinterland. The earlier suburbs now can be seen as part of a continuous built-up area. The billiard table flatness of the Red River Valley and Winnipeg's limited size mean that the social and economic interdependence of the area is manifest.

Psychologically, the success of Metropolitan Toronto and the widespread publicity attending it also helped. The idea of metropolitan government as something which could actually work (and which need not cause a political backlash) had become acceptable. Even in Winnipeg this was apparent through the existence of a number of special boards providing areawide service. They had enough successes to show the value of cooperation. Yet they had enough deficiencies to show that more far-reaching solutions were needed.

The environment of urban politics in Winnipeg was a curious blend of tradition and change. The impact of Winnipeg on the economy of Manitoba was the major reason why Winnipeg's problems could not be ignored. It was too vital to the life of the province and too many voters lived there for any senior government to leave its problems unattended. Economically, Winnipeg had long been integrated, and this perhaps affected eventual political integration by fostering areawide integration. The ethnic diversity of Winnipeg deeply affected local politics and in particular made Stephen Juba into a powerful participant. The political setting of Winnipeg, moreover, was largely shaped by the events and aftermath of the 1919 general strike.

The strike polarized the city into two main voting blocs and north Winnipeg became a center of support for the CCF and then the NDP. Building on support in Winnipeg, the NDP finally became the provincial government in 1969. Identified with the central city for over 40 years, the NDP was committed to amalgamation. In 1919 a local party of businessmen and more conservative elements was formed; it has usually controlled Winnipeg since that time. Devoted to an anti-socialist, anti-party, pro-business platform, this coalition has set the prevailing style in local politics. By 1970, as Harold Kaplan found in Toronto,[79] Winnipeg's local government could be characterized as an executive-dominant system with a fair amount of consensus and low levels of public or interest-group participation.

In the battle over Bill 36, the political temperature continued to be low. The public did not seem aroused in any significant way; perhaps more surprisingly, the level of interest-group activity was almost minimal. Few pressure groups appeared to enter the conflict over Bill 36 (in contrast to Smallwood's example of London,[80] where several professional groups were important actors), and almost none seems to have influenced the creation of the White Paper. Unlike some issues in Manitoba—notably the dispute over auto insurance—the newspapers, labor unions, and business groups did not appear to be overly concerned. The only active roles were those of the formal decision makers—the local governments, the cabinet, the legislature, and the parties.

The apathy minimized the number of groups to be placated and also minimized any potential opposition. The anti-party, anti-socialist tradition also continued to be successful in the October 1971 municipal election, when the Independent Citizens Election Committee (ICEC) decisively beat the NDP.[81]

The Participants

The active participants in the battle over Bill 36 were, on the one hand, the NDP government supported by the City of Winnipeg, Metro, and professional groups, and, on the other hand, the area municipalities, the Conservative and Liberal parties in the legislature, and some citizens' groups. The initiating factors were a result of the decade-long conflict between Mayor Juba and Metro. The inability of the two most important local governments to cooperate forced various provincial governments to intervene throughout the 1960's. The motivations of Stephen Juba—whose obsession with Metro fueled the dispute—are somewhat obscure but they were probably a combination of ego-drive, a desire to have a convenient whipping boy, and a belief in the merits of unification. His political resources of successful vote-getting, skill at using the media, and ethnic appeal far outstripped Metro's.

The decisive stage was the decision of the cabinet to proceed with amalgamation. The most important participants within the government were cabinet ministers Saul Cherniack and Sidney Green and consultant Meyer Brownstone. Cherniack and Green had both been members of the Metro Council and were personally convinced of the benefits of unification. Brownstone designed the structure and contributed much of the impetus towards achieving greater participation. The government was fed up with the bickering between Metro and the City of Winnipeg and was determined to resolve the situation.

The government received much of its political strength from the central city, and unification would lower taxes and increase the ability of central Winnipeg to pay for services. Amalgamation had long been part of the NDP program and it was committed to reforming Winnipeg's local government structures. One of the constraints upon the government was the desire of suburban ministers like Al Mackling and Saul Miller to

retain some form of local identity. The result of such pressures was the concept of community committees. The government also employed economic inducements as a resource. The mill rates, for example, were lowered for 80 percent of the citizens; where a suburb's rate would go up it received a transitional grant from the government.

The motivations of the area municipalities were simple: their very existence was at stake and hell hath no fury like a politician about to lose his job. The motivations of the Liberals and Conservatives were partisan: the backbones of these two parties were suburban representatives and rural strength. Neither group was much in favor of Unicity. Each hoped to gain in the suburbs by opposing Bill 36; in the case of the Liberals this meant reversing previous party policy favoring amalgamation.

Strategies/Results

For those who attempt to devise a strategy to introduce change, the Winnipeg experience clearly shows the benefits of being able to point to comparable situations. The success of Metro Toronto and the widespread publicity it engendered certainly helped, as did the existence of a number of special boards providing areawide service. The Metropolitan Corporation's success in providing services showed that unification could work. In drafting Bill 36, the cabinet deliberately decided that as much as possible of the 1956 Winnipeg charter and the 1960 Metro Act would be included so the legislation would be familiar. Thus the old, old lesson appears again that proposals for change must be wrapped in as well-known garments as can be found.

The tactic of government-sponsored studies and commissions both to sponsor and delay reform is underlined here. In retrospect, the first major victory for Winnipeg reformers came in 1950 when the provincial government decided to investigate the problem. Both the Provincial-Municipal Committee and the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission built up expectations of change and helped create a climate where change was anticipated. Winnipeg change was not a priority of the Roblin government, but the cabinet knew a major local government report would be released soon after it took office and would force a response. In similar circumstances, the Schreyer government knew that the Local Government Boundaries Commission Report would be coming out and, if it were not to accept its conclusions, it must prepare its own plan. A government, therefore, may sponsor studies to gain "breathing room" on a problem, but expectations rise accordingly and almost force it to take some later action. In the case of both the Metro and Unicity reforms, action was taken within two years of a government's assuming power, thus emphasizing the importance of timing in achieving change.

In the battle over the adoption of Bill 36, the strategy of the Schreyer government was to keep Unicity from becoming a live political issue. The government adopted the tactic of "sweet reasonableness" and was ready to change non-essentials to keep the main outlines of its bill. To avoid being assailed as "dictatorial," it organized a series of public meetings and the Taraska Commission was appointed to review ward boundaries. The transition process was eased when the government guaranteed the jobs of incumbent municipal employees and provided grants to municipalities where taxes would rise. French became an official language to appease the citizens of St. Boniface, and at the last moment (when Bill 36 was safe) the nature of the mayoralty was changed. The government thus appeared to be moderate and responsive, while opponents seemed increasingly shrill and repetitive.

The strategy of the area municipalities was the opposite of the government's: they needed to transform Unicity into an intensive issue with wide scope to attract major currents of opposition. Because of the fight in the cabinet over the community committees, it was felt that the government as a whole was not as strongly committed to Unicity as it has been to other issues. If enough public opposition could be generated, the government might retreat. Opponents to Unicity made strong attacks in the papers, the local councils issued propaganda and aided citizen groups, but the issue never jelled. The suburban mayors simply did not have enough political resources to constitute a real obstacle to the government.

Bill 36, then was an important policy innovation. It was born in response to difficult environmental problems. It contained a novel approach to the solution of these problems, and its adoption was the result of a major political confrontation. The battle over the Unicity restructuring throws light not only on the peculiarities of the Winnipeg political culture but also on some of the general problems of introducing change.

FOOTNOTES

*I wish to thank the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, for permission to reproduce this revised version of my monograph, *The Politics of Innovation: Report Number 2, Future City Series* (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, 1971).

[1] See, for example, the article by Stephen Clarkson, "Winnipeg Shows Way to a Better Metro," *Ottawa Journal,* November 8, 1971.

[2] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).

[3] *Report of the Social Service Audit,* sponsored by the Government of Manitoba, United Way of Greater Winnipeg, the Winnipeg Foundation, Community Welfare Planning Council, June, 1969, p. 6. A "metis" is the offspring of a white and an American Indian.

[4] "The Indian-Metis Urban Probe," a study by the Indian and Metis Friendship Centre and the Institute of Urban Studies,

Winnipeg University, January 1971. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly how many native people live in the city since the population is highly transient. See p. 7.

[5]Government of Manitoba, *Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area* (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 9. Hereafter referred to as "The White Paper."

[6]Planning Division, The Metropolitan Corporation, *The Place of Greater Winnipeg in the Economy of Manitoba* (Winnipeg: The Metropolitan Corporation, 1971), p. 25.

[7]In the late 1960's a floodway was finally constructed. This removed a threat which had plagued Winnipeg since the great 1950 flood, but it also destroyed one of the favorite spring pastimes of students—estimating how high the water had to go before the university was overrun and exams called off.

[8]M. S. Donnelly, "Ethnic Participation in Municipal Government," *Politics and Government in Urban Canada,* Lionel Feldman and Michael Goldrick, ed. (Toronto: Metheun Ltd., 1969), p. 64.

[9]This point is well documented in Tom Peterson's "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba," *Canadian Provincial Politics,* J. Martin Robin, ed. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 69-115.

[10]Ethnicity may also affect turnout. In 1956 almost 58 percent of the electorate went to the polls, the largest turnout since 1938, when an ethnic candidate had also run. In 1960 when Juba was elected by acclamation, the turnout fell to 38 percent, but rose in 1962 when another candidate appeared (even though the mayor was in no trouble). In 1971, when a real contest appeared to be threatening Juba's position, the turnout rose to a record 60 percent.

[11]See J. E. Rea, "The Politics of Conscience," Canadian Historical Association, *Historical Papers 1971,* pp. 280-281, for a description of the 1919 municipal election. This discussion of the strike relies heavily on Rea's fine article.

[12]Wordsworth quoted by Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba," p. 81.

[13]The *Canadian Farmer,* June 8, 1932.

[14]The Manitoba Club on Broadway is the traditional watering hole of the WASP elite. Jews and members of other non-conforming minorities still are not eligible for membership.

[15]George Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years," in *Urban Problems,* Ralph Krueger and Charles Bryfogle, ed. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 360.

[16]The Manitoba Urban Association was composed of representatives of the municipalities found in the greater Winnipeg area, while the Union of Manitoba Municipalities included all the rural local governments as well. The committee included the premier, four ministers, a Winnipeg alderman, a suburban mayor, and three rural representatives.

[17]See the submission of the Manitoba Urban Association to the Manitoba Provincial-Municipal Committee, on July 28, 1952, and the City of Winnipeg brief, in August 1952.

[18]See the Report of the Exploratory Sub-Committee on the Organization of Local Government Service in the Greater Winnipeg Area, *Manitoba Provincial-Municipal Committee Report* (February 1953), pp. 83-84.

[19]Hon. Douglas Campbell, "Statement of Government Policy," contained in the *Manitoba Provincial-Municipal Committee Report* (February 1953), p. 174.

[20]Kushner has spent much of his time on local government reviews. Secretary to the GWIC in 1959, he held the same position on the 1966 Local Government Boundaries Commission. In between, he was on the 1963 Municipal Enquiry Commission. The reports of the GWIC and the Local Government Boundaries Commission are remarkably alike.

[21]The opinions of both the City of Winnipeg and the municipalities in 1957 were virtually unchanged in 1971. In July 1956 and May 1957, the City of Winnipeg stated that a Metro solution would be acceptable under certain conditions, but that amalgamation was inevitable and highly desirable. This galvanized the suburban municipalities to write a joint brief (Assiniboia, East Kildonan, West Kildonan, St. Vital, North Kildonan, Fort Garry, St. James, Transcona and Tuxedo) which attacked the whole idea of amalgamation and advocated a metropolitan government with the members of the central council composed of the mayors and aldermen of the participating municipalities.

[22]Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission, *Report and Recommendations* (Winnipeg, 1959).

[23]City of Winnipeg Council, "Submission to the Government of Manitoba" (October 1959).

[24]This assessment of the options faced by the government has been gleaned from interviews.

[25]*Winnipeg Tribune,* June 3, 1961.

[26]*Winnipeg Tribune,* June 5, 1961.

[27]*Winnipeg Tribune,* September 22, 1969.

[28]Bonnycastle once told an interviewer that his only previous political experience was in the 1920's when as a student in Oxford he worked in London for the election of Winston Churchill—Churchill lost.

[29]*Winnipeg Free Press,* October 1, 1960.

[30]*Winnipeg Free Press,* May 23, 1961.

[31]George Rich, "Metropolitan Winnipeg," p. 368.

[32]*Winnipeg Tribune,* April 10, 1962.

[33]*Winnipeg Free Press,* February 13, 1962.

[34]Jim Hayes, *Winnipeg Tribune,* April 10, 1962.

[35]*Greater Winnipeg Review Commission, The Metropolitan Corporation* (February 1964), p. 32.

[36]Local Government Boundaries Commission, *Provisional Plan for Local Government Units in the Greater Winnipeg Area,* 1970, p. 66.

[37]B. R. Wolfe, "A Review of Restructuring for Regional Government," a brief to the Law Amendments Committee, Province of Manitoba, July 1971.

[38]*Winnipeg Free Press,* June 10, 1971.

[39]*Winnipeg Free Press,* December 23, 1970.

[40]White Paper, p. 11.

[41]White Paper, p.27.

[42]Bill Burdeney, "Party Politics and Regional Government" in *The Future City,* Lloyd Axworthy, ed., (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, 1971), p. 34.

[43]*Winnipeg Free Press,* October 7, 1971.

[44]Mergers were to take place between East and North Kildonan; Old and West Kildonan; and Charleswood, Tuxedo, and Fort Garry. The number of community committees was later increased to 13.

[45]White Paper, p. 36.

[46]White Paper, p. 43.

[47]White Paper, p. 44.

[48]*Winnipeg Tribune,* February 25, 1971.

[49]*Winnipeg Free Press,* December 24, 1970.

[50]*Winnipeg Free Press,* January 22, 1971.

[51]*Winnipeg Tribune,* July 20, 1971.

[52]*Winnipeg Tribune,* February 13, 1971.

[53]*Winnipeg Free Press,* March 26, 1971.

[54]*St. Boniface Courier,* May 12, 1971.

[55]*Winnipeg Free Press,* January 14, 1971.

[56]*Winnipeg Tribune,* January 27, 1971.

[57]*Winnipeg Free Press,* March 13, 1971.

[58]*Winnipeg Free Press,* February 4, 1971.

[59]*Winnipeg Free Press,* March 21, 1971.

[60]*Winnipeg Free Press,* February 12, 1971.

[61]*Winnipeg Tribune,* April 2, 1971.

[62] *Winnipeg Tribune,* January 22, 1971.

[63] *Winnipeg Free Press,* January 21, 1971.

[64] *Winnipeg Tribune,* February 23, 1971.

[65] *Winnipeg Free Press,* April 21, 1971.

[66] *Winnipeg Free Press,* May 14, 1971.

[67] *Winnipeg Tribune,* March 2, 1971.

[68] *Winnipeg Free Press,* April 18, 1971.

[69] *Winnipeg Tribune,* July 15, 1971.

[70] *Winnipeg Free Press,* January 13, 1971.

[71] *Winnipeg Free Press,* April 29, 1971.

[72] *Winnipeg Tribune,* June 19, 1971.

[73] *Winnipeg Tribune,* June 26, 1971.

[74] *Winnipeg Free Press,* February 11, 1971.

[75] *Winnipeg Free Press,* April 2, 1971.

[76] *Winnipeg Tribune,* July 15, 1971.

[77] *Winnipeg Tribune,* July 7, 1971.

[78] *Winnipeg Tribune,* July 16, 1971.

[79] Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metropolitan Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

[80] Frank Smallwood, *Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

[81] In the October 6 election only seven NDP candidates were successful. The turnout was a record 60.7 percent and Stephen Juba defeated his old rival Metro Chairman Jack Willis, 139,174 votes to 49,014.

Chapter VII

THE SYSTEM OF REGIONAL DISTRICTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

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
The incorporation of the first regional district in British Columbia in 1965 inaugurated a unique province-wide system of regionalism. These regional districts provide an example of administrative centralization of local governmental functions on a regional basis unlike the economic development regions organized in other provinces. Politically these districts can be considered confederations with limited functions and with representation largely based on delegates from constituent municipalities. The regional district in British Columbia is what the former Minister of Municipal Affairs, Dan Campbell, termed "an extension of the municipalities,"[1] and is heavily dependent upon municipal governments. Functional amalgamation is the key feature of a regional district. Each district is multifunctional, and responsibility for coordination of planning and resources is vested in each regional board. Regional development goals were factors in the creation of the regional districts, but in practice such goals are achieved largely as a by-product of their other activities.

Because of the mountainous terrain, the distribution of population in British Columbia has always been uneven. In the early 1800's the Hudson's Bay Company had to decentralize for decision-making purposes since most areas were too remote from the main coastal center. When the colonial government was formed, the theory of local autonomy was dominant in the western United States, and this concept was picked up in British Columbia. Consequently, provincial governments were reluctant to try to force local government upon communities or to contain the sprawl of population.

Before 1965, then, there were two types of territory in British Columbia. "Organized territory" was any politically established area, including cities, towns, villages, and district municipalities (equivalent to a township in other provinces). "Unorganized territory" referred to any area of land, populated or otherwise, not within a municipal boundary. In 1966, only 2,870 square miles out of a total area of 366,000 square miles were included in incorporated areas. Of the total 1971 population of 2,184,621, just under one-sixth lived in unorganized territory.

Numerous factors are cited as leading to the creation of regional districts. Most common among these is a desire to eliminate what Minister Dan Campbell called the "cancerous parochialism" which "tends to block or kill the benefits which could otherwise be achieved by a community."[2] Connected with this were the major problems of poor land use and uncontrolled sprawl, not only in unorganized territory but even in some municipalities. Municipalities also faced these questions: how to handle problems transcending municipal boundaries; how to affect amalgamation or federation to cut down unnecessary duplication of services and thereby save money; and how to provide certain necessary services to small municipalities which could not afford them.

In the unorganized territory the only form of government was the province, which provided a limited range of services either through field offices or directly from the capital. Many people did not identify with the province, nor did they like paying taxes without some more local form of government. Traditional municipal structures were deemed inadequate for most of these areas. The provincial administration was too small to deal with the vast territory for which it was responsible, and indeed it was almost totally ineffective. In the unorganized territory outside municipal boundaries there were no local means of controlling development, except the ineffective area planning boards established by the Department of Municipal Affairs. More and more people moved into unorganized territory to avoid paying municipal taxes and immediately demanded the amenities they used to have when living within municipal boundaries. Regionalism seemed to be the only solution to all of these problems.

For the more urbanized parts of the province, there was a further incentive for regionalism. In 1960 the Metropolitan Joint Committee studying local government in the Greater Vancouver area concluded that it was "feasible and practical to place under the jurisdiction of a single metropolitan board" such functions as wholesale supply of water, trunk sewers and treatment facilities, public health and air pollution controls, land-use planning, and major parks. It also recommended that all member municipalities be represented on the policy-making body, and that a municipality have the right of appeal against decisions of the metropolitan board. Although a referendum on this report failed to pass, there is little doubt that its recommendations had a direct bearing on the subsequent thinking in the Department of Municipal Affairs.[3]

Underlying these visible problems was the particular nature of British Columbia government under the Social Credit Party, which held power for 20 years until its 1972 defeat by the New Democratic Party. The Social Credit government's attitudes were basically conservative. The population not living within municipalities was growing and was demanding services from the province. The result was pressure to increase provincial expenditures and staff, as well as more complex demands on both central and field offices.

Consolidation of British Columbia school districts in 1960 also served to encourage adoption of the regional district scheme by the Department of Municipal Affairs. The 1960 report of the Royal Commission on Education noted it had received a number of criticisms of excessive central control over local school boards.[4] The government, however, ignored requests for more local autonomy, assumed full administrative responsibility for education, and created larger school districts with weak boards. This measure met with little lasting opposition, and the general public became accustomed to the new structure without much difficulty. The restructuring of school boards served as a political test, and success induced the government to go ahead with a program for establishing regional municipal structures.

There are two additional types of single-purpose districts in British Columbia which have had a direct bearing on the formation of the regional districts. The first is the improvement district as established in 1947 under the Water Act. These districts were organized in areas without municipal organization at the request of community residents for improving, or instituting, street lighting, fire protection, ambulance service, or aid to hospitals. Each district had just one of these functions, and it was financed at the sole cost of the residents. Administration was by a board of elected representatives. In many areas there were two or more improvement districts which overlapped, and the tendency was therefore to combine the functions. In addition, there was a variety of other special purpose bodies operating in both organized and unorganized territory. These included school districts, water and drainage boards, and community planning boards. A particular problem of the planning boards was their lack of authority to implement decisions. They were largely dependent on provincial civil servants for advice, and major decisions required provincial approval. The growing complexity of demands for services, the problems of urban-rural relationships, and the inadequacy of the existing structures and legislation meant that the problems were not limited to the large urban areas but affected all parts of the province.

The second type of single-purpose district is the wholesale water supply district. Two of them exist: the Greater Vancouver and Greater Victoria Districts. These districts provide water on a wholesale basis to the municipalities of the two major urban areas, but they differ from improvement districts in having a full-time administrative staff responsible to a board appointed by and from the participating municipal councils. This district's structure most closely resembles the regional district, with two basic differences. First, the regional district and its board were allowed responsibility for more than one function, and second, non-municipal areas were allowed representation on the regional board and participation in its functions as if they were municipalities.

REGIONAL DISTRICTS

British Columbia was faced with the increasingly complex problems of local government in a period of rapid change, together with increasing demands for services in unorganized territory. Philosophically the provincial government was opposed to expansion of its own activities, and practically in the early sixties it was faced with severe budget and cash flow problems. There was also a desire to reduce the proliferation of single purpose improvement districts which rarely bore a discernable relationship to one another. It is not surprising that unlike New Brunswick a local, rather than provincial, solution was sought, for as one municipal administrator said, "If it [an appropriate approach]

could grow from within, it would be more successful." The department rejected the experiments in Seattle, Metropolitan Toronto, and Metropolitan Winnipeg, since they resembled too closely the amalgamation of municipalities, long bitterly resisted in British Columbia. Provincial officials chose, rather, the concepts of local initiative and the ability to "opt out" of any or all regional functions. The regional district format of a joint service board was hammered out and sold in Greater Victoria between June and September 1964, before provincial legislation creating the regional districts was passed in early 1965.

Senior staff then began to tour the province to explain the system they felt should be implemented. The province was divided into five areas, one for each senior man in the Department of Municipal Affairs. These officials held meetings in the more prominent centers of the proposed regions with municipal officials and representatives from non-municipal areas. The department representatives outlined the new legislation, what the department hoped to achieve, and what powers could be operative in that particular region. If there was interest, a working committee of representatives from each municipal council and from the unorganized areas was established. This committee then met periodically with department officials to work out the boundaries, internal organization, and general framework of the particular region.

Once agreed upon, the regional district was formally established and incorporated by letters patent.[5] During this period and afterwards the department undertook no staffing or staff training for the regional districts; this was left to the regions. With regard to the question of how boundaries were determined, the Assistant Deputy Minister commented, "The scheme was set up around more or less trading areas" with regard for lines of communication, an adequate assessment base, and a sufficient number of people. In the electoral areas, those officials who made boundary decisions tried to maintain a "common community interest" grouping.

One description of the initial stages of the Central Fraser Valley Regional District referred to the regional district system as "one of Mr. Campell's creations," and added that two senior members of the department called a meeting in the area at which they stated "they were going to establish a regional district." This approach met with strong opposition since "the people resented being told what to do." The two officials subsequently revamped their approach and returned to "sell" the idea. They described the benefits of amalgamating certain municipal functions, and told the people in the unorganized territories that they would have more localized representation to go along with their current taxation. Although suspicions remained, the regional district was eventually created.

The "selling" of the system was a major source of criticism in a number of areas. One municipal official

was emphatic in stating that "the idea and its adoption were strictly unilateral—there was no prior consultation." The department called a meeting in Victoria of all the municipal officials in the area at which, according to one official,

> the Minister said in effect "this is what it's going to be. Ask any questions, but I won't change it. You will appoint representatives or we will nominate them. . . . I won't tell you what functions it will assume—some important functions you don't decide to adopt, we'll give them to you."

A regional administrator commented in a somewhat different manner that the department "used the candy rather than the cane approach":

> Their official said, "We won't force you to do anything, except hospitals. We suggest you appoint the people to the Regional Hospital District Board and they can look after the regional district. If you don't want to appoint them—and we're not saying you have to—but if you don't want to appoint them, we will appoint them for you and you will have it any way.

Another regional administrator saw it differently. He noted that in most of the province "there were several meetings at which the government people provided a *surprising* amount of leadership." Previously they seemed to work more as inspectors, but now "they are there to help you if you get into trouble, and nothing more." The executive director of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) augmented this view of the implementation method when he noted that "the Minister tried to sell it in a hard way," but "he may have been correct in this approach since the initial resistance was strong."

Two other entities have had roles to play in the regional district system—the school districts and the regional hospital districts. The 89 school districts in British Columbia were set up along lines of communication and highways. Consequently, it was possible, with a few minor exceptions, for the regional district boundaries to coincide with the boundaries of groups of school districts. The result is that each regional district now contains on the average three or four school districts.

Regional hospital districts, with boundaries coterminous with the regional districts, were established in early 1967 by the Regional Hospital Districts Act. This Act, explained an official of the Department of Municipal Affairs, "has been imposed on the regional districts, so we now have the raising of money for capital hospital purposes on a regional district basis, and the load is spread across the entire region on an equal mill rate." Previously hospitals were not run by the municipalities, although their location, planning, and capital costs were responsibilities of the municipality concerned. Operation of hospitals is today, as before, the responsibility of the provincial Department of Health Services and Hospital Insurance. However, the regional districts have taken over the functions of municipalities with respect to hospitals. With better roads and ambulance service, larger hospitals that are centrally located are getting greater emphasis than smaller local hospitals or clinics.

There are certain factors, however, that set the hospital function apart from all other functions of the regional districts. First, it was initially the only statutory function and was mandatory for all regions. Second, in legal terms a regional hospital district board is a separate group. In fact, however, the law specifies that the boards and administrators of the regional hospital districts and the regional districts are to be the same people. The common expression is that "they merely change hats" to deal with matters of the regional district after they have completed the business of the regional hospital district. At a board meeting of the Greater Vancouver Regional District, there were two agendas, and matters of each legally distinct body were discussed informally at the same meeting. It was not a case of adhering to one agenda before starting the other; rather discussions moved back and forth between the two.

Third, there is a regional hospital district financing authority charged with borrowing for all hospital construction in the province. Each regional hospital district submits a statement to the authority of how much capital is required for what construction and then issues debentures through the authority. The authority determines the maximum rates of interest and manages all sinking fund accounts as trustee for each board.

The Regional Hospital Districts Act was described by one regional official as "the one they used to force regional government in British Columbia." Certainly the timing would tend to support this assertion, for at the beginning of 1967 only half of the province had incorporated regional districts and resistance to the system in the other half was still strong. Other people also have referred to the Act as the "tool" with which regional districts were finally installed in British Columbia. Certainly their imposition fits the pattern of limiting provincial expenditures. Demands for hospitals were increasing, and where there was no municipality, the province was looked to for financing what would normally be the local share of construction costs (approximately one-third).

DISTRICT ORGANIZATION

That the regional districts are conceived more for political and administrative purposes than for economic development is revealed in their structure.

On the recommendation of the Minister of Municipal Affairs (after the preliminary studies described above), the Lieutenant-Governor in Council[6] may, by letters

FIGURE VII-1
CAPITAL REGIONAL DISTRICT REGIONAL BOARD REPRESENTATION

POPULATION

City: Victoria 57,453

Districts:

Central Saanich 3,640
Esquimalt 13,180
North Saanich 2,891
Oak Bay 18,123
Saanich 58,845

Town: Sidney 3,165

Electoral Areas:

Colwood 6,370
Langford 7,084
Metchosin 1,114
Sooke 2,954
View Royal 3,500
Saltspring Island 2,240
Outer Gulf Islands 808

Voting Unit: 5,000 Population
Total Number of Directors: 18
Total Voting Strength: 43

3 = 1 Director with 3 Votes

Sidney	Victoria			Central Saanich	Esquimalt	North Saanich	Oak Bay	Saanich		Secretary-Treasurer
	4	4	4	1	3	1	4	4		
1										
2										
	2	1	1	1	1	1	4	4		
Colwood	Langford	Metchosin	Sooke	View Royal	Saltspring Island	Outer Gulf Islands	Saanich	Chairman	Vice-Chairman	

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
patent, incorporate any area of land and residents into a regional district.[7] Its functions are provided either in the original letters patent or in supplementary letters patent approved by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Minister. Before this, the Minister must receive from the regional board a request to undertake a function which identifies the member municipalities taking part and the way in which costs are to be shared. The regional board must have (1) the consent of the council of each municipality taking part, and (2) the assent of three-fifths of the electors who vote in a referendum in each electoral area taking part. A council may, if it wishes, refer the question of its participation to its owner-electors for assent. Thus, many functions of a regional district are adopted at the request of the residents of that district. Some of the more important ones, however, have been delegated to all regional boards by provincial statute, often without much consultation with the municipalities. Two or more regional districts may merge, or part of one regional district may be taken away and made part of another one, but again the department encourages such actions to originate in the regional districts.

Letters patent incorporating a regional district must be specific.[8] Each district is a corporation with the formal name, "The Regional District of . . ." It has the power to acquire, hold, and dispose of real and personal property, and to contract for materials and services.[9]

Representation

The governing body of a regional district is the regional board, which consists of "the requisite number of directors appointed by the council or trustees" of a municipality ("municipal directors") and "the requisite number of directors elected" from the electoral areas ("elected directors").[10] An electoral area is previously unorganized territory now part of the regional government. The "requisite number of directors" is determined by a pre-defined number called the "voting unit." This divisor is a certain fraction of the total population arrived at by negotiation, keeping in mind the minimum population figure in the region and the overall balance of population throughout the regional districts. The voting power of a municipality and an electoral area on the board can now be determined as being the total population of that entity divided by the voting unit of the regional district. Each fraction goes up to the next integer. Since no director can have more than five votes, the number of directors of a member municipality is the number of votes already allotted to that municipality divided by five, again any fraction being taken up to the next integer. Referring to Figure VII-1, for example, the voting unit of the Capital Regional District is 5,000, the population of the City of Victoria is 57,453; hence Victoria is allotted 12 votes on the board, divided among

three directors. The number of votes of each municipal director is negotiated at the council level, but must be divided as evenly as possible. No director may split his votes, and he may not vote on a function unless his municipality or electoral area is directly involved in sharing the cost of that function in the current or ensuing year.[11]

Each municipal director is appointed annually, on or before February 1, by resolution of the council or board of trustees from its own membership. He holds office for a year, or until the appointment of his successor, whichever is later. The directors from the electoral areas are elected every two years, and each electoral area pays for its own elections.[12]

In both the municipalities and the electoral areas alternate directors are appointed. In the former, there is one alternate appointed by council from among its membership for each director representing that council. The alternate substitutes for the director if the latter is absent, and may replace him, if council so decides, in the event of the director's resignation, disqualification, or death. In the electoral areas the director appoints as alternate, with the written consent of two duly qualified electors, a person qualified to be director.[13] If an elected seat becomes vacant, the alternate director assumes the seat until an election is held to choose a new director.

Table VII-1

Finances of Regional Districts, Province of British Columbia

(000's of dollars)

	1966	1968	1970
Revenue			
Tax Revenue	$248	$1,014	$5,791
Grants	107	308	537
Total Revenue	**363**	**1,523**	**7,093**
Expenditures			
General Government	83	607	1,165
Regional and Community Planning	63	232	1,233
Local Works and Services	1	160	708

Notes:
1. Only 11 districts were functioning in 1966, as against all 28 by 1968.
2. Of the total expenditures in 1970 of $8,146,000, Greater Vancouver Regional District made $2,964,000 and Capital (i.e., Victoria) $1,214,000. Expenditures for the other 26 ranged from $23,000 up to $424,000, with the majority spending less than $208,000.

Source: *Municipal Statistics,* 1966, 1968 and 1970 (Victoria: Department of Municipal Affairs).

Regional Board Meetings

Meetings of the regional board are called by the secretary-treasurer on instructions from the chairman or any two directors. An emergency meeting (less than five days' notice) requires the consent of two-thirds of the directors having among them two-thirds of the votes. A quorum is a majority of the directors having among them a majority of the votes. Unless otherwise specified, all bylaws and resolutions are decided by a majority of the directors having among them a majority of the votes.[14] These double stipulations, rather unique in Canada, were included in the legislation to prevent domination by either a large municipality or a group of small electoral areas and/or municipalities. At the first meeting each year the directors elect from their membership a chairman, and for this decision *only* each director has one vote.

Administrative Officials

The regional board is similar to a municipal council in deliberating issues that come before it; it also supervises the administrative apparatus. For this purpose, the board may appoint a secretary, a treasurer, and whatever other officers and employees it deems necessary, and fix their remuneration. In practice the offices of secretary and treasurer are combined, and the secretary-treasurer is the chief administrative officer of the regional district. Administrative staffs are still rather small.

Apportionment of Costs

Costs incurred by the regional board are apportioned among the municipalities and electoral areas on the basis of assessment taxable for school purposes. Remuneration for directors, alternate directors, and the administrative staff not specifically attributable to a function are apportioned among all municipalities and electoral areas in proportion to their assessed values. The costs of the administration of a function form part of the net cost of that function, and as such are apportioned among the areas participating in it. Any surplus or deficit of funds for a function at the end of a year must be considered revenue or expenditure of that function in the succeeding year.

On or before December 31 of each year the board must adopt a provisional budget for the following year and send copies to each member municipality and the Inspector of Municipalities (who is also the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs). This budget must detail expenditures by function, and must show revenues by function from all sources. Similar strictures apply to the official budget for the current year, which must be adopted by bylaw on or before March 31 of that year. Copies of this budget must be sent to the municipalities in the region, and to the Inspector of Municipalities for

"registration." After this date, amendment by function may occur only "to the extent that additional revenues are available for that function."[15]

Regional districts may not levy taxes. Instead they requisition budgeted amounts from municipalities and electoral areas. Aggregate finances for regional districts are shown in Table VII-1.

Reserve Fund and Debts

A regional district, by bylaw, may establish a reserve fund from contributions by all the municipalities and electoral areas based upon assessment taxable for school purposes. This fund covers the expenditures of feasibility studies related to the possible adoption of a function, the provision of service for a particular area (for which the owner-electors subsequently are assessed), or the provision of work by a municipality. All expenditures are ultimately charged to the function, specified area, or work concerned to restore the reserve funds to the level established by the original contributions. If a function is investigated for future adoption but is later rejected by the board, the costs of the study are treated as normal administrative expenditures.

Regional districts may incur debts from the issue of the standard types of municipal debentures. All borrowing by a regional district is upon its credit at large. Since municipalities and electoral areas could not go to the market with their own debentures and sell them at a reasonable rate of interest, the regional district issues debentures to cover its needs plus those of the member municipalities. In the event of default, therefore, an indebtedness is created for which the member municipalities are "jointly and severally liable."[16] All borrowing must be done by bylaw, and all money bylaws of a regional district must be approved by the Department of Municipal Affairs.

Problems Related to Structure

Among the problems that have arisen for regional districts is staffing. The general trend has been for the board to employ a senior administrative officer, usually a former municipal officer, as the secretary-treasurer; thereafter this man seeks the additional people he feels best qualified to fill new positions or vacancies and submits his recommendations to the board for final approval. There is, however, a rather acute shortage of qualified municipal officers in relation to the growing number of positions to be filled. Officers must of course be certified by the provincial board of examiners.

Already some tensions have arisen between a council and a board where top municipal people have been hired by the regional district. Some regional districts use an active committee system rather than a large permanent staff, while the Capital Regional District uses a number of professional consultants. This latter method, however, is too expensive for most regional districts.

Table VII-2

REGIONAL DISTRICT FUNCTIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1970 IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Function	Alberni-Clayoquot	Bulkley-Nechaco	Capital	Cariboo	Central Fraser Valley	Central Kootenay	Central Okanagan	Columbia-Shuswap	Comox-Strathcona	Cowichan Valley	Dewdney-Alouette	East Kootenay	Fraser-Cheam	Fraser-Fort George	Greater Vancouver	Kitimat-Stikine	Kootenay Boundary	Mount Waddington	Nanaimo	North Okanagan	Ocean Falls	Okanagan-Similkameen	Peace-River-Liard	Powell River	Skeena A	Squamish-Lillooet	Sunshine Coast	Thompson-Nicola
Regional Planning[1]																												
Community Planning[1]																												
Building Inspection[1]																												
Contract Services[1]																												
Local Works and Services[1]																												
Grants-in-Aid[1]																												
Ambulance					P			P	P		P		X			P			P			X						
Airport Facilities									P																			
Air Pollution	X												X															
Bus Transit																	P											
Civil Defense				X																								
Control of Gatherings	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Elderly Citizens' Housing										X							P											
Firearms		P				X			P	P							P							X		P		X
Fireworks	X	P				X			P								P							X		P		X
Health Regulation									P				X															
Home Nursing											P																	
Library Study																							X					
Nuisance Control		P							P				X															
Okanagan Basin Water Board							X													X		X						
Pest Control					P	X										P						X						
Public Housing															X													
Recreation Facilities		P			P	P				P										P		P						
Recreation Program					P	X		P	P							X												
Refuse Disposal	X				P	P			P			P					P			P				P			X	
Regional Parks	X	P				X			P	P		X		X			X							X				
Sewers			X		P												P											
Soil Removal	X											P								P		P						P
Urban Renewal											P																	
Water											P																	X

Note: Legally, the regional hospital district is separate from the regional district, although the same people serve on both.

Source: Department of Municipal Affairs, *Annual Report,* 1970, p. 32.

[1] Assigned by statute to all regional districts
X = Indicates function
P = Indicates application of function in part of regional district only

A second problem is failure by a large number of municipalities to accept the idea of the regional district. They still think along local lines and distrust the regional aspect. In the Central Fraser Valley Regional District, for example, the mayors use the regional district as a vehicle to reach certain ends, but do not want to relinquish any municipal powers to it. They ask the board to undertake specific functions or short-term works for which it is given the appropriate authority, but when the task is completed the board is asked to redelegate the authority back to the municipalities. The Municipal Act does not specify how long a regional district is to retain authority assigned to it.

Recent events in one region amplified a third problem in the basic structure—the difficulties which can be encountered with the use of referenda. In the Nanaimo Regional District there were 17 organized recreation commissions. A study of recreation in the region was made by the board, and its report published. Shortly afterward all the local commissions asked the board to create one regional recreation commission. Such a question must be decided by a referendum in the electoral areas, but a municipal council may put the question to its electors. Accordingly, the Villages of Parksville and Qualicum Beach went to referendum, and the Namaimo City Council chose to wait to see what happened elsewhere. In a series of poorly-attended "town hall meetings" the regional and a few recreation commission representatives tried to sell the idea to the voters. The proposal was defeated in five of the nine electoral areas and in both villages. Voter turnout was approximately 6 percent of the total electorate. The Nanaimo City Council then said, "We won't touch it." This problem of referenda is by no means peculiar to Nanaimo, and several officials commented on the need for changing the legislation to remedy the loopholes allowing a council to side-step questions.

A fourth, unresolved problem concerns representation on the district board: Do the directors speak for the councils that appoint them, for themselves, or for a third alternative? Since the regional district is, by the Minister's definition, "an extension of the municipalities," they might represent their councils' opinions on items before the board. Others draw the fine distinction that directors are not the representatives but rather the "contributions" of the councils to the regional board, and as such they should always think along the line of what is best for the region. The present chairman of the board of the Capital Regional District urged his fellow directors at the end of the first meeting in 1970 to "think region. Don't think where you're from. Think region!" One departmental official shed a bit of light on this dilemma when he noted that municipal candidates who show support for the regional concept tended to be elected over opponents of it, and that present trends would indicate "any candidate ... who neglects the regional concept is in trouble." Two layers of power are

on the voters' minds, and there is strong justification for a municipal director to vote with an eye on the region rather than his council.

DISTRICT FUNCTIONS

Table VII-2 indicates the variety of functions of the regional districts. Some functions are performed by only one or two districts. Some of them cover an entire region, while "partial functions" are undertaken for only a part of a region. Obviously some regions are more active than others, because some regions do not yet have adequate staff, and there is still some resistance in the rural parts of the province.

A wide variety of services may be carried out, but the most important is planning. Each regional district is now required to formulate and adopt an official plan. The regional plan for the lower mainland, adopted in 1966 by the old Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, has been continued and is currently administered by four regional districts. Every regional board is also responsible for developing community planning services for its constituent electoral areas. Already most boards have passed zoning and building bylaws covering large parts of their respective areas and have created advisory planning commissions.

When a board adopts a function, it has wide discretion. It may borrow money to carry out any functions. The municipalities play no direct part except to vote funds at budget time, for they relinquish any active administrative role when they agree to have the regional district undertake that function. If the letters patent authorizing a function are not adequate for the proper administration of a function, the municipal council is consulted on an amendment to the letters patent. Obviously, however, the regional board has the advantage in such a situation, and the tendency has been for the department to support the regions in almost all the requests.

Technical Planning Committee

Only the regional planning and the hospital functions are specified in the Municipal Act. This act also requires that in each regional district there be a technical planning committee (TPC) established by the board. The chairman of this committee is the regional planning director, or, if there is none, the secretary-treasurer. Other *ex officio* members are the medical officer of health of the district as appointed by the province; one municipal officer at the option of each municipality; a planning officer from the Department of Municipal Affairs; and one representative at the option of (1) each of the three branches of the Department of Lands, Forests, and Water Resources, (2) the Department of Agriculture, (3) the Department of Highways, (4) the Fish and Wild Life Branch and the Parks Branch of the

Department of Recreation and Conservation, (5) such provincial crown agencies as are designated by the Minister of Municipal Affairs, (6) the board of trustees of each school district in the regional district, and (7) such crown agencies and departments of the government of Canada as designated by the Minister. The stipulation that federal agencies may be represented allows federal, provincial, and municipal cooperation and participation in essentially local matters.

The TPC advises the board on all planning matters, draws up any and all regional plans, and acts as "liaison between the administration of the board and the respective government departments and the member municipalities."[17] All planning matters which require legislation by the board must go before this committee at least 30 days before any official action on the part of the board. The TPC, by the nature and scope of its role, may well prove to be an influential part of regional district organization.

Advisory Planning Commission

For the electoral areas a board may establish advisory planning commissions. These are composed mainly of residents of the respective areas, and they advise the board on planning matters that affect the electoral areas. In practice they also serve as aides to the elected directors in their search for the opinions of their electors. The board may, on the basis of information supplied by the advisory planning commissions, exercise any powers in the field of building regulations in the electoral areas as would be exercised by the council of a municipality. No such bylaws, however, may come into force without the approval of the Minister. The costs of this function, less any revenues from building fees, are borne by the electoral areas.

Regional Plans

A regional board, if authorized in the letters patent or supplementary letters patent, prepares regional plans and revises them when necessary. These plans, as maps, reports, or in any other form, may apply to any or all areas of the regional district. The board may, by a bylaw requiring the affirmative vote of two-thirds of all the directors having among them two-thirds of the votes of the board, adopt an official regional plan. Neither the regional board nor any municipal council may "enact any provision or initiate any works which would impair or impede the ultimate realization of the objectives of the regional plan."[18] The official plan does not commit the board or any council to undertake the projects suggested or outlined in the plan, but it does prevent them from acting contrary to the objectives of the plan.

All regional districts receive a grant from the province of from $5,000 to $25,000 to aid in meeting planning costs. The province plays no other specific role in regional planning except to provide advice or assistance when asked by a regional board to do so.

Increasing Functions

Table VII-2 indicates that in 1970 six statutory and one generally applicable function had been placed under regional jurisdiction by the province in addition to hospitals. The increase in required functions since 1968 represents a trend negating the initial statements from departmental officials about local iniative and choice. Instead of presenting a completed package at the beginning, the department seems prepared to settle for a more extended period for acceptance of its desires to see a number of functions and services performed regionally. The department first wanted metropolitan government for Vancouver and Victoria, and now it has all but realized its goal. The regional district scheme was chosen for this purpose, but initial emphasis was placed on providing local government for the previously unorganized areas. In effect the province attacked the problem of implementing a metropolitan form of government in Vancouver and Victoria by concentrating on the rural areas, the traditional stronghold of the Social Credit Party. Avoiding the term "regional government" in the first few years facilitated selling the concept to many parts of the province. Once this had been achieved, opposition to the new structure in the two major urban areas became pointless. They could not exert sufficient political pressure to force the government to abandon the scheme and were able to request revision of minor details only.

CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

The system of regional districts in British Columbia may be thought of as providing centralization or decentralization. The Department of Municipal Affairs refers to regional districts as devices for combining functions, and thus the system is one of "functional amalgamation" and "not political amalgamation."[19] Functions are adopted by a board at the request of member areas, partly because many or all of those areas want or have in varying degrees activities they would like regionalized to save money. These are functions which, because of a lack of coordination at the municipal level, must be "salvaged from intermunicipal squabbles" for them to be handled properly at all. There are also certain services which individual areas may need but could not possibly afford alone, and which the province is not prepared to provide or to share in the cost of providing.

As for political centralization, it must be considered as an inescapable eventuality. At the present time it is on a minor scale, but the very nature of the forces which produced the regional district system makes for a growth in the responsibility of the regional board as it acquires

more functions. Then there will probably be an increase in public awareness of the regional entity and, as with Metropolitan Toronto, the region may come to overshadow the municipality. A number of officials feel that within a decade all directors will be elected. The municipal structures will, however, remain, because certain functions by nature perhaps have to stay at that level and because people will still want a political structure with which they can easily identify. If it turns out that municipal directors are not elected directly by the people, then the tendency will probably be for local politicians to use the council simply as a stepping-stone to the regional board. Political centralization, therefore, may not characterize the regional district system now, but it is difficult to see it as anything less than likely for the future.

Decentralization as an aspect of the regional district system occurs primarily with respect to the electoral areas, or previously unorganized territory. The Minister stated in Duncan in 1967:

> Either the people must devise or have given
> to them a device to locally control planning
> and decide on land use, or the province in a
> central way must do it.[20]

He added that the regional districts, not the province, are to be the vehicles for taking care of the local needs of these areas. On the other hand, the province, according to the director of regional planning, "has never had any effective centralized planning control." The provincial government has not been willing to provide adequate manpower or facilities to fulfill its obligations, and now the regions are starting to undertake these responsibilities themselves.

For this reason, the Cowichan Valley Regional District adopted the function of public health inspection in electoral areas, a responsibility formerly held by the province but seldom effectively fulfilled. The control of subdivisions in the electoral areas is under the authority of the Department of Highways. The Nanaimo Regional District is presently negotiating to assume that responsibility, since the situation in the subdivisions between Parksville and Qualicum Beach is chaotic. In this area the Department of Highways has shown no interest in anything but highways, with the result that the new residents have had nowhere to turn regarding water, sewage, and the like. Hopefully, the regions will now do what the province has never done. Whether the result is centralization or decentralization depends upon the perspective.

PROVINCIAL-REGIONAL
RELATIONS

In October 1969, at an all-region seminar, the representatives of the Department of Municipal Affairs outlined some proposed changes in the legislation. This practice is rare in government circles and so is indicative of rather good provincial-regional relations. The Deputy Minister referred to the department's role as one of "help, advice, suggestion, and encouragement" rather than of tight control. "The rules of the game," a regional official observed, "are that anything you want to do that's agreeable among the member municipalities, you go ahead and do." There is no sharing of responsibilities between the province and the regional districts at the present time, nor is staff loaned to the regions. They are essentially on their own, a principle with which all officials interviewed were in hearty agreement.

Regional boards, however, are not completely free to do as they wish, for there are a number of controls available to the province. To begin with, regional districts are "creatures of the department," and thus the latter has in theory complete control. The actual exercise of that control, however, has been minimal. The department has powers of approval over virtually everything a regional district wishes to do, since money bylaws and supplementary letters patent must be acceptable to the provincial officials. Nevertheless, no requests for letters patent have yet been refused, and it has been rare for a budget or other money bylaw to be rejected. The main reason for this low degree of enforcement, perhaps, is that politicians and administrators are not going to do anything contrary to the Act since they know the controls exist. To say that the province's relationship to the regional district is a paternalistic one would seem to be the best description.

Influence of course is a type of control, and in Canada the influence of a Minister of Municipal Affairs is usually measured in extremes by municipalities. Minister Dan Campbell mailed out two types of letters in 1967, one to the two "metropolitan regions" and the other to the "trading area regions." In these letters he detailed what he felt each type of region should be doing. He reiterated his position recently, indicating that a few functions should be assumed more quickly by a number of regional boards. Since regional planning became a mandatory function by an order-in-council[21] effective January 1, 1970, his statements are to be taken seriously. Regional administrators try to keep in close contract with the department to keep up good relationships and minimize any friction, but they are not always successful. If a region is slow to adopt a function, gentle pressure is usually applied. Department officials, for example, feel that the Central Fraser Valley Regional District must adopt automated data processing in the near future; that is a first step towards assessment being handled regionally. Assessment is one of the functions listed in the Minister's letter.

The department provides planning and general administration grants to each regional district. Regional boards each receive an annual administrative grant of $6,000, and a planning grant of 15 cents per capita with a minimum of $5,000. Some local and regional administrators refer to these as "token grants" since, for

example, experience shows a minimum of $30,000 per year is needed to carry out a basic regional planning function, while several of the planning grants are approximately $6,000. In one region the secretary-treasurer has been trying to get financial assistance from the province to help with other activities, but has been unsuccessful.[22] The department suggests that amalgamation of a few municipalities would solve the problems, but there is a strong argument that in fact it will not have this result. Amalgamations do not necessarily reduce costs of servicing, particularly when provision of those services is being expanded. The most amalgamation can accomplish is a reduction in some of the costs of administering a given service. It would seem that these are not just routine complaints, but rather are valid criticisms of the province's reluctance to offer more financial assistance to its subordinate levels of government.

REGIONAL-MUNICIPAL RELATIONS

The general relationships between the regional districts and the municipalities are good. Administrative contacts seem to be close and tend to reduce problems. There are few indications that municipalities feel threatened. In most cases they decide what activities regional districts will undertake, and many regional functions were not dealt with previously by any other level of government. Municipalities recognize they are better off with regard to finances since borrowing is easier and somewhat less costly. This is particularly important to them in the currently difficult bond market.

When regional budgets are being drafted, discussions with municipalities are not always necessary because the directors are present. If a major increase in costs is imminent, such discussions take place in most regions, so that the municipalities know what to expect when the budget is made public. In a few cases there have been loans of personnel between regional districts and municipalities, but this is not a general practice. Councils are showing concern about the heavy flow of personnel from the municipalities to the regions.

In some of the regional districts there is a major problem with the relationship between the regional board and the municipal councils. It may turn out to be a primary weakness in the regional district concept that the board and councils will remain at arm's length from each other. The question of whom the directors represent is unresolved, and often there is no dialogue between board and council.

With a new organization, with a new and in nearly all cases very small staff, problems of communication are to be expected. Experimenting goes on, but written reports and minutes are little used. In addition, there has been a lack of awareness by representatives as to where the regional district fits into the pattern of the local government structure and as to the necessity for

feedback. If the board is remote from the councils, it will cease to be the extension of municipal government it was originally intended to be.

One regional official cited the lack of dialogue as a possible point of breakdown for the system, but he attacked the problem from a different angle. By way of example, he pointed to a pattern which he has seen occurring in councils repeatedly. The council relies on its representatives to tell them what is happening at the regional level. Often, however, directors have been reluctant to discuss matters with the other members of the councils from which they were appointed. Coupled with this is the failure of the board to provide adequately detailed information relating to regional matters for all the municipalities. Certain councils also fail to allot a reasonable amount of time in their meetings to discuss with directors regional affairs and the councils' roles in those affairs.

The Victoria city manager hopes the department will study this problem of dialogue, while the secretary-treasurer of the Capital Regional District is taking steps to increase the flow of communications between the board and the councils. In its attempt at a solution, the Nanaimo Regional Board has hired a professional public relations person to let the councils know what is going on at the regional level.

One regional administrator tries to keep councils well informed on regional matters by sending comprehensive minutes of board meetings to all members of municipal councils. In the Central Fraser Valley Regional District where almost all the municipal directors are senior council members, there has been little dialogue between directors and councils and now each councilor receives comprehensive minutes of board meetings. In the Greater Vancouver Regional District, even though the councilors who were not on the board were somewhat aware of events at the regional level, they resented being left out of regional activity. It is now a policy of that board when study committees are required, that a conscious effort be made to staff them with councilors who are not on the board, except for the position of the chairman. It is hoped, explained the assistant secretary-treasurer, that this will "give them more of a sense of what's going on and a feeling of participation in the whole system," as well as aid in correcting the previously mediocre communications between the board and the councils.

One can imagine municipalities resisting board decisions in a number of ways or even feuding openly. As yet this has not occurred. It is possible for a municipality to request the return of authority transferred to a board once the function has been completed, and this has already occurred in the Central Fraser Valley Regional District. The Act provides an additional constraint that a member municipality may place upon regional action—a formal appeal to the Inspector of Municipalities. If an appeal is lodged, the inspector may,

by himself or by another person authorized by him, hold a public inquiry into the actions of the board and the reasons for the appeal. Any and all orders made by the person conducting the inquiry are binding upon the regional board and the member municipalities. Only one such inquiry has been held to date, and the decision upheld the actions of the board.

Public Participation

One relationship between the regional district and the municipality has been touched upon in the *Municipal Officers' Bulletin:* the contrast between the composition of a council and that of a board.[23] In almost every municipality the members of the council have strong business backgrounds. Occasionally there are professional people elected to a council, but membership is still preponderantly from the business community. On a regional board, the backgrounds of directors can be diversified. The Nanaimo Regional Board, for example, has a logger, a pipefitter, an insurance salesman, and a real estate salesman. The inference, therefore, is that there is more diverse public participation in affairs of the districts than in those of municipalities.

The situation in the electoral areas seems more promising than that in the municipalities. Usually voter turnout for election of directors is low, but in a number of regions there has been improvement. There are more provisions for direct public participation in regional activities than in municipalities. The election of directors is direct public participation. All money bylaws must be approved by the owner-electors, as must all proposals for adoption of a function. There are ratepayers groups in both types of areas, but apparently there is much better attendance of elected directors in their areas than by municipal directors in their municipalities. Except for the Central Fraser Valley Regional District, which has only one electoral area, there are several advisory planning commissions in heavy use by elected directors. These commissions are the counterparts of the councils of the appointed directors, but the primary difference in practice is that the elected directors refer to these groups far more than the municipal appointees refer to their councils. Most regional districts are undertaking extensive publicity campaigns to encourage more direct participation by the people in all parts of the region, but it would seem at present that their greatest success will be in the electoral areas. Present knowledge of and interest in the regional entity in many urban areas is extremely low.

URBAN-RURAL RELATIONSHIPS

Traditional urban-rural relationships show signs of changing, and credit for this change can be attributed to the regional district system.[24] In a regional district the municipalities and electoral areas have equal status,

relative to population. This sense of equality has tended to lessen the tensions and traditional suspicions between them, and a willingness to listen has resulted in an increase in mutual understanding.

In Greater Victoria one can still witness an attempt by the small municipalities and electoral areas to prevent domination by the more populous core, while at the same time they are seeking more development to broaden their own tax bases. Nonetheless they are at least sitting around a table discussing their problems and expressing their opinions, for there are problems to be solved. The board is fully responsible for planning in the electoral areas, and certain safeguards are built in for the elected directors, including the system of voting on the board and the necessity of approval from the owner-electors before a planning bylaw or resolution becomes valid. These safeguards may or may not be needed in practice, since a sense of responsibility between the two types of areas is growing as opposition to the system is waning.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

As to the future of municipalities, one provincial official stated that they will "have a very real role to play" since there will be many things which can only be handled on a municipal basis. The region will be the wholesaler, as it were, while the municipality will be the retailer of certain works and services. There are activities, however, a municipality cannot carry out on its own, and it must cooperate with its neighboring municipalities and electoral areas. He sees the regional district as a new level built into the existing governmental structure to deal with problems which have transcended municipal boundaries.

Another provincial respondent sees it partly in a different light. To him the main alteration in the present municipal system will be the elimination of several small governmental units, to be replaced by single boards. Municipal representatives may have gained in influence on a board, but municipal politics in general must decline in status as the regions develop. For the purposes of political identification the municipal structure will remain in a number of areas since the regions are large. The status of a council, however, will probably decline.

Most regional and municipal officials hold this same view, but a few of them go a little further. One regional administrator foresees this same reduction in functions performed by a municipality and adds that when real powers begin to go to the regions many problems will arise. Even though it would further reduce the status of a council, he would like to see the municipal directors elected by the people at large. The executive director of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities thinks the long-sought amalgamation of many municipalities of Greater Vancouver will be much easier because of the regional district system.

Another municipal official views the current relationship as a transitional one. He feels that for some years to come the municipalities will maintain their identities, but in the long range the regional district "is a stepping-stone to some type of amalgamated local government that will take over all functions." This is an evolutionary process he considers inevitable. Amalgamation now would "re-erect the long-standing barriers and parochial ideas." The process has to go hand in hand with the generational changes of politicians, administrators, and voters who do not see municipal boundaries as sacrosanct. In the future, therefore, the regional district will not become another level of government—it will become *the* level of local government.

School and Improvement Districts

Officials in the Department of Municipal Affairs hope that present school districts will be eliminated and their boundaries redrawn to be coterminous with those of the regional districts. This would make education a function of the regional board, or it would create a district identical in structure with the regional hospital district. Improvement districts are being phased out since the regional district is now considered the vehicle for providing the services formerly made available by the improvement districts.

Regional and Municipal Financing

Regional and municipal financing underwent a major alteration in 1970, when the Municipal Finance Authority Act was passed:

> to take the consolidated future debt obligations of regional districts including their member municipalities and issue its own debentures, which in the aggregate would not exceed the total approved obligations presented to the authority by the regional districts.[25]

The authority comprises regional district representatives from whom a board of seven trustees has been established to approve investments. The key person is the chief financial administrator, who was to be a person highly qualified in municipal financing and investment procedure, who knows his way in the money markets of Canada and the United States.

The finance authority is essentially a means "to try to see if we can overcome the present crisis in capital financing." The executive director of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities added that there are a number of regional districts, as well as municipalities, which could not provide adequate security for the investor to make possible a reasonable rate of interest. Under the authority, debenture security rests upon three guarantees. First, there is the basic obligation of the regional districts and their member municipalities to

meet their financial commitments. Second, the authority is to establish a "debt service reserve fund" by setting aside "an average semi-annual repayment of principal and interest in respect to each issue."[26] This fund is to be available to cover any deficiency in payments receivable from regional districts. Third, the authority has the power to impose a tax on all real property subject to taxation for school purposes if the debt service reserve fund "suffered a draw-down of 50%,"[27] to restore the fund to its actuarial requirement. This general tax may also be used to create and maintain a general reserve fund.

The Inspector of Municipalities must check the authority to ensure compliance with the regulations of the legislation, and he is to certify either the security-issuing bylaws or the debentures of the authority, or both. Unlike the financing procedure for school districts and regional hospital districts (upon which this finance authority is obviously modeled), the provincial government does not guarantee the debentures issued. The only apparent reason for the failure to guarantee debentures was simply the reluctance (some referred to it as "stubbornness") of the then Minister of Finance.

It was primarily the lack of a guarantee that caused the initial strong opposition from the Greater Vancouver Regional Board towards the authority. The board wanted to control its own financing. Its credit rating was high enough that, if it were to remain apart from the authority, it would probably have experienced no greater difficulty in selling its own debentures. By refusing to guarantee its issues, the provincial government was effectively reducing the credit rating of the authority. The board further argued that by joining the authority it could not augment the authority's credit rating enough to matter. If Premier Bennett would have pledged to guarantee the authority's debentures, the problem would have been solved to the board's satisfaction.

On the other hand, Greater Vancouver has almost one-half of the total tax base of all the regional districts. It would have to be a member to give "muscle" to the authority, for money was, and still is, in short supply. Indeed, in 1970 the municipalities of British Columbia were indebted to banks in excess of $80 million for interim financing.

One would suspect that ultimately Greater Vancouver had to become a member of the authority for a number of reasons. If it did not join, the authority's attractiveness to investors would be weakened. The Minister was well aware that practically as well as politically the scheme must not fail, and Greater Vancouver represented the key to success.

A second reason probably proved more convincing for Greater Vancouver. If deficits occurred in the reserve fund, all real property in the province would be taxed. It is unlikely that any voter in the Vancouver area would like being subjected to taxation to restore a fund to its

original level when he had no voice in how those funds were used in the first place. Third, if the government forced Greater Vancouver to join the scheme, the government would not suffer too much politically, since the real strength of the Social Credit Party has traditionally come from outside the Vancouver area.

The final product, however, may well represent a compromise. When first proposed, the authority was ostensibly intended to handle municipal and regional financing for all purposes. The Act, however, specifies the object of the authority as providing financing for water, sewer, and pollution control and abatement facilities *only*, through its debentures issued at the request of, and on receipt of notes of indebtedness from, the regional districts requiring capital financing. This reduced scope of activity for the finance authority plus a provision that two of the seven trustees must be from Greater Vancouver represent a compromise by the province to induce Greater Vancouver to join the scheme. This does not preclude an extension of the Authority's responsibilities in the future, for this was the approach taken by the province in many instances throughout the history of the regional district system.

Adoption of Functions

At present it is possible for a municipality or electoral area to refuse to participate in any functions proposed by the regional board, except in cases where two-thirds of the directors having among them two-thirds of the votes agree that a function will apply to all areas. Such a method of adoption is not necessarily detrimental to either type of area, for the procedure for adoption would require almost every director to agree. Most regional administrators feel that this clause will make the system more efficient and yet not sacrifice any municipal powers since municipalities will still be able to appeal any decision of the board.

As time goes on, more responsibilities probably will be handed to the regional districts by the municipalities. The parallel between Metropolitan Toronto and British Columbia is apparent. In Toronto there was a backlog of works, such as roads, sewers, and water, which the various municipalities seemed incapable of doing. The metropolitan system proved to be a good structure for handling these problems. Toward the end of its first decade, however, the metropolitan entity was becoming involved in social problems, and this necessitated a restructuring to allow it to deal with these questions effectively. The regional districts may be following a similar path, not just because their functional beginnings were so similar, but also because the districts are so flexible.

Planning will remain at both levels, and the coordination between them will tend to increase. One regional administrator foresees metropolitan fire protection, housing, welfare, transit, and possibly policing by the

region. The Cowichan Valley Regional District will probably take on pollution, transportation (roads), parks, assessment, and water supply. In the Nanaimo region, the future should see parks, recreation, publicity, water supply for some areas, garbage disposal, and assessment on a regional basis. The Greater Vancouver Water Board and the Greater Vancouver Sewer and Drainage Board will soon be subordinated to that area's regional board, but will remain legally separate entities, as has the regional hospital district. Subsequent functions of the board will probably include electronic data processing, assessment, and arterial roads.[28] For the Central Fraser Valley Regional District the secretary-treasurer foresees civil defense, sewage, data processing, and assessment as regional functions. These opinions indicate that, generally speaking, regional districts will adopt only those functions common to most if not all of their constituent areas. The circumstances in each region will tend to determine whether the emphasis will be on functions for the entire region or for certain areas on a contract basis.

In the "metropolitan regions" (Vancouver and Victoria) the British Columbia Hydro will probably transfer control of the bus system it has operated since British Columbia Electric was nationalized. Since the routes cross municipal boundaries, the two regional districts will probably be required to take over operation of the systems in their respective areas. Former Minister Campbell has mentioned that policing, where it is currently under municipal jurisdiction, might better be handled regionally. As one municipal official stated, however, "Control of the police force is one of the strongest influences that a local government has, and they are not going to give that up readily." If a regional police force is imposed by the department, he added, then the erosion of municipal powers would become a real problem, but it would seem unlikely for this to occur for at least the next decade. The regional district must first tackle a number of service problems so that the people will begin to look to it for results.

CONCLUSIONS

To say that the regional district system in British Columbia is a better form of regionalism than is presently in existence in other parts of Canada would be somewhat unrealistic. One of the most pressing considerations was the vast number of problems in the metropolitan areas. The system of regional districts was utilized as a back-door method of getting at solutions to urban problems, particularly inter-municipal problems where there were clashes which apparently could not be resolved in any other way. The key to successful implementation of the scheme was selling the concept to local officials and people, following the Minister's

favorite tactics of suggestion, persuasion, or cajolery, and leaving open the possibility of compulsion. Being able to bring other people around to his way of thinking is a politician's most important tool, and how well he uses that tool usually determines the future of a venture.

The system has a lot in its favor, especially the fact that already there has been a good deal of success in establishing the groundwork for tackling inter-municipal problems effectively and economically. It is flexible enough to change with the changing needs of the people. Indeed, its flexibility may further be witnessed in the successful application of a basic regional district structure in all parts of the province. With a few exceptions, the enabling legislation and letters patent do not pose a straight-jacket on regional boards.[29] Not only the municipalities, but also the electoral areas, can theoretically solve their own problems, and the atmosphere created by the concept has tended to undermine the parochialism that had existed for many years. Rural areas are beginning to explore regional questions with the municipalities, and in so doing they are breaking down the old barriers which restricted, and in some areas even made impossible, mutual understanding and cooperation.

Tables VII-2 and VII-3 indicate that, except for some mandatory functions, most regional districts are not doing very much. It must be remembered, however, that from the beginning the Social Credit Government followed a policy of gradual implementation; in this context it is the implications for the future which became most important. The regional district scheme is established. The former Minister of Municipal Affairs virtually made it his personal project after departmental officials persuaded him. One suspects the New Democratic Party government elected in late 1972 cannot ignore it very easily. The people are gradually becoming used to thinking in terms of "regional" approaches to problems, and this widening community of interest should reduce much of the remaining opposition to regional government. Over the next few years, new functions will be added to the list of regional responsibilities, and some of these will be obligatory for all

regions. The regional position shows every indication of strengthening with the passage of time, particularly in the two metropolitan areas.

Local politicians, already competing for membership on regional boards, will play a large part in the transformation to a more active and meaningful government at the regional level. Especially in the larger municipalities like Victoria, the voters are still, unfortunately, ignorant of local affairs. Voting turnout has not improved for years. Although board meetings are open, there is no public involvement from the municipalities. The only formal, direct participation by people in municipal areas in regional matters occurs when councils choose to let the voters decide whether to accept a proposal for a new function to be adopted by the board. Possibly it is desirable, as one regional administrator argued, that residents of municipalities limit their involvement to the municipal level, since the regional district is but an extension of the municipalities. On the other hand, if the theory of extension is valid, if local politicians and administrators are sincere in their hopes for greater public participation in local (including regional) matters, and if the boards want healthy regional growth, then it would seem desirable to encourage more involvement by the people at both levels, municipal *and* regional. Both would, by the very nature of the regional district system, benefit from such an increase.

The strongest opposition to regional districts at the present time comes from municipal officers and administrators. Local politicians will maintain their positions, but administrators see the system as a threat to their jobs. As one secretary-treasurer commented, however, "Regions will grow despite these guys, because the people are beginning to want it." There are other problems facing regional districts, some of which are internal and could develop into major clashes. Since these are still the formative years of the system, more study must be undertaken to isolate problems and to arrive at effective solutions. The question remains whether superseding municipalities by regions is either desirable or necessary.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Except where noted, interviews by the author with provincial and local officials constitute the sources of information.

[2]British Columbia, Department of Municipal Affairs, "The Changing Face of Local Government" (Victoria: The Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 3.

[3]See Metropolitan Joint Committee, *Final Report to the Minister of Municipal Affairs*, British Columbia (Vancouver: Metropolitan Joint Committee, 1960), p. 35.

[4]British Columbia, Royal Commission on Education, *Report*, (Victoria: The Queen's Printer, 1960).

[5]Letters patent are issued by the provincial government under enabling legislation and are the equivalent of a municipal charter in the United States.

[6]This term refers to actions of the provincial cabinet as approved by the provincial representative of the Crown.

[7]British Columbia, Department of Municipal Affairs, Municipal Act, as amended to July 1, 1969 (Victoria: The Queen's Printer, 1969), sec. 767(1).

[8]Municipal Act, sec. 767(1). The letters patent must specify (1) name and boundaries of a regional district, (2) the member municipalities and electoral areas, (3) the population making up the voting unit, (4) the date by which the municipalities will appoint their first director of the board, (5) the time and manner of first election of directors in the electoral areas,

(6) the returning officer at this election, (7) the polling places for this election, (8) the day, time, and place of the first meeting of the board, (9) the maximum amount which can be borrowed to meet the current lawful expenditures of the regional district, and (10) the dates to be observed initially, as opposed to the regular statutory dates.

[9] Municipal Act, sec. 768(1) and (2).

[10] Municipal Act, sec. 769.

[11] This latter stipulation does not include functions in which that municipality or electoral area *will* be involved in the future, the adoption of a borrowing bylaw (since all areas are jointly and severally liable), the adoption of a regulatory bylaw, or a contract.

[12] See Municipal Act, secs. 31-147. These are the same basic voting laws as in other municipalities in Canada.

[13] See Municipal Act, secs. 50-51, for qualifications.

[14] Municipal Act, sec. 778.

[15] Municipal Act, sec. 783(3).

[16] Municipal Act, sec. 788.

[17] Municipal Act, sec. 797B2(b).

[18] Municipal Act, sec. 797(1).

[19] British Columbia, Department of Municipal Affairs, "The Regional Concept: What it is; How it Works," (Victoria: The Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 1.

[20] Department of Municipal Affairs, "The Changing Face of Local Government," 1967.

[21] That is, by action of the provincial cabinet.

[22] A study done recently for the Union of B.C. Municipalities emphasized the need for a restructuring of grants to municipalities and a reduction in the amount of educational and social welfare costs borne by the municipalities. The report stated that a continuation of the present system would result in "an increasing incapacity to provide the primary municipal services . . .." The province has something of a history of assigning responsibilities to subordinate governments without being prepared to provide sufficient financial support. See T. J. Plunkett and Associates, *The Municipal Picture in British Columbia* (Vancouver: Union of B.C. Municipalities, 1971), pp. 59-64.

[23] This description is based upon an article by R. Collyer in the *Municipal Officers' Bulletin* (Fall 1969).

[24] For a somewhat less optimistic view based on current urban-rural relationships, see Dennis A. Young, *Regional Districts—A British Columbia Approach to Urban Growth*, an address to the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, Brandon, Manitoba, September 1971, p. 7. (Mimeograph.)

[25] British Columbia, Department of Municipal Affairs, "Proposed Municipal Finance Authority," p. 2. See Municipal Finance Authority of British Columbia Act, 18-19, Eliz. 2, 1970, chap. 30.

[26] Department of Municipal Affairs, "Proposed Municipal Finance Authority," p. 1.

[27] Department of Municipal Affairs, "Proposed Municipal Finance Authority," p. 1.

[28] It should be noted that, as of January 1, 1972, the Vancouver Fraser Park District became a department of the GVRD, though it remains a separate legal entity. The Capital Regional District assumed municipal welfare services in 1973 and will absorb public health in 1974.

[29] See Young, p. 2.

Chapter VIII

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT IN VANCOUVER: THE STRATEGY OF GENTLE IMPOSITION

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A metropolitan government was established for Greater Vancouver in 1967.[1] In structure the new government follows the local federation model pioneered on this continent in Toronto and later introduced in Winnipeg. However, the way in which metropolitan government was created in Vancouver differed remarkably from the ways followed in Toronto and Winnipeg. There were, in fact, two quite separate attempts at creating metropolitan government in Vancouver. The first followed neither of the major Canadian examples but was patterned instead upon American experience. It failed completely. The second attempt in its main elements followed neither Canadian nor American experience. It was both unique and successful. In this paper we examine the creation and early growth of Greater Vancouver's new government.

Successful formation of metropolitan governments is much more a Canadian than an American phenomenon. In recent decades attempts to form metropolitan government have taken place in more than 100 American cities. In virtually every case these attempts have been mounted by local idealists and other people who saw advantages in larger government. State governments have, with few exceptions, remained aloof and have even been hostile at times. In most cases local reformers have hired consultants or formed study committees which have, predictably, recommended metropolitan government. Finally, the proposals have been submitted to public referenda (a legal requirement in many states, in others the accepted device for legitimizing major governmental change) and defeated. Thus, metropolitan government has been achieved in relatively few American localities. Canadian attempts, on the other hand, have usually been mounted by provincial governments without public referenda. The major Canadian attempts have either been successful, as in the cases of Toronto, Winnipeg, and the second Vancouver try, or, as in the other cases now underway, at least look promising.

In this perspective, the 1957 attempt at metropolitan government in Vancouver is an intriguing exception to the general Canadian pattern. The provincial government was involved in the attempt, but only to the extent of enacting enabling legislation which left the essential decisions in local hands.[2] Hugo Ray, Q.C., and several faculty members of the University of British Columbia, none of whom was active in provincial politics, were evidently chiefly responsible for the proposal. The provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs played no direct part in the matter. A study committee containing 22 members from 11 municipalities in Greater Vancouver, with Ray as chairman, began its work in 1957. In 1960 the committee issued its report recommending formation of a metropolitan government. According to the 1957 legislation the Minister was now empowered, although not compelled, to "direct the councils of the municipalities . . . to hold a referendum based upon the

report . . . to ascertain the opinion of the electors . . ."[3] If a majority of those voting in each of at least two-thirds of the municipalities voted in favor of the recommendation, a metropolitan government called "The Corporation of Metropolitan Vancouver" could be established by the provincial government "in substantial accordance with the report."[4] However, no referendum was held—not because the Minister refused in the face of local urging, but rather because local reaction to the report was extreme apathy. Even the study committee members declined to press the matter further. Ray died soon after the committee completed its work.

In essence, then, the 1957 attempt was carried by a local citizens group working, initially at least, towards approval of their proposals by the public in Greater Vancouver. Neither the provincial government nor existing municipal councils were to play any decisive role; any provincial action was to be in accordance with the local committee's proposals and the municipal councils were given no voice at all. It is now difficult to say whether the 1957 reformers, in choosing to follow what was basically an American approach to metropolitan reform, were acting out of commitment to populistic values or whether they had no other choice in light of the provincial government's unwillingness at that time to proceed as the Ontario government had already done in the case of Toronto. In any case, the American way was no more successful in a Canadian setting than it has generally been in the United States.

THE CAMPBELL STRATEGY

Within the Greater Vancouver area in ensuing years there were no further demands from any quarter for metropolitan government. Within the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs, however, a significant policy proposal emerged by 1964. The department has always been among the smallest in the province, and until that year it had been among the least consequential. In 1964 it consisted of about 30 officials. The new policy they evolved called for introduction of regional government throughout the province. The policy was not a response to immediate problems or to pressure from outside the department. It was created by civil servants who sought to provide a framework for orderly development of local government in the future.

In March 1964, a new Minister, Dan Campbell, was appointed to the department.[5] Campbell almost immediately committed himself to the policy, and by June 1964 the basic strategy for regionalization had been decided upon without any participation from outside the department. The strategy rested on what may accurately be termed gentle imposition of departmental policy upon existing municipalities.

Subsequently, the process of implementation would be marked by the Minister's own personality and political style. His stance toward local leaders would be

that of the self-assured schoolmaster who wishes his charges to progress to self-sufficiency along predetermined paths. By turns he would suggest and persuade, scold and cajole, while always leaving open the possibility of compulsion should preferable methods fail. In his manner there was a certain insouciance, a delight in stating bald truths about his goals and strategies, while at the same time concealing them from all but the least parochial in a blanket of banality and camaraderie. In his first major public address, to the Union of B.C. Municipalities (UBCM) in September 1964, he said, "You will either get what you want or come to want what you get. In short, I believe we can together rationalize our regional problems here in British Columbia."[6]

The machinery of regional districts was envisioned as equally applicable to urban, rural, and mixed urban-rural areas. The province would be divided into some 30 districts corresponding to informally recognized economic regions or "trading areas." Only those covering the Vancouver and Victoria areas would be substantially urban and contain a number of contiguous municipalities (about one dozen in the case of Vancouver). Municipal councils in any district would choose members of their own councils to sit on the district council; unincorporated areas would directly elect their representatives to the district council. Thus in districts having no municipalities the district councillors would all be directly elected and the district would in effect be merely a new rural municipality. In Greater Vancouver, however, almost all members of the district council would be delegates from existing municipalities and the district would be a new level of urban government—or, quite simply, a potential metropolitan government. As part of their strategy, however, the provincial officials avoided any appearance of giving different or special attention to Greater Vancouver—even though the senior departmental officials assumed from the beginning that metropolitan government would emerge as a result of the planting of regional institutions in Greater Vancouver.[7]

In fact, however, a major part of the provincial strategy was directed towards introducing the new institutions in the two large urban areas, especially Greater Vancouver. In these areas the scope and complexity of potential opposition was much greater than in the remainder of the province. No group beside the academics and professionals, who had been ineffective in 1957-60, could be counted on to support metropolitan government, while those most affected, the municipal politicians and bureaucrats, might easily unite in opposition.[8] Even more important, single-purpose authorities already existed in the large urban areas, and the new concept would be a direct challenge to their existence. In these circumstances lies the explanation for the major elements in the provincial strategy of gentle imposition.

In the provincial strategy, because of the unreliability

of local groups and the local population in supporting provincial policy, no reliance was placed on study committees or referenda—much less on royal commissions, about which the Minister was contemptuous on several occasions. The basic regional district legislation was simply enacted in early 1965. The Lieutenant-Governor in Council,[9] on recommendation of the Minister, was empowered to issue letters patent[10] to incorporate a regional district, to set its boundaries, to name it, and to assign its functions.[11] The legislation was purely enabling in nature. It did not create any districts or set time limits, nor did it specify any list of functions the districts could or could not be assigned. These particulars were left entirely to the Minister, and he proceeded slowly. In August 1965, several months after the legislation was passed, the first district was created—in an out-of-the-way part of Vancouver Island which included most of the Minister's own legislative riding.[12] The district for Greater Vancouver was not created until June 1967, when 13 other districts had already been established.

SINGLE-PURPOSE AUTHORITIES

Understanding the remaining elements in the provincial strategy requires some knowledge both of the single-function regional authorities which already existed in the province and of the way these authorities were perceived by local politicians and bureaucrats. Such authorities were more numerous and more developed in Greater Vancouver than in other areas. The first, the Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District, was created in 1914, and in 1926 the Greater Vancouver Water District was created. These two authorities were always separate legal entities, but they had virtually the same membership and had a common staff under one director. Between 1936 and 1948 four boards of health were established, each serving several municipalities. In 1948 the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board was established for the entire lower Fraser River Valley, an area including, but much larger than, the Greater Vancouver area. The planning board, which eventually served 28 municipalities, succeeded in producing a regional land-use plan for the entire lower mainland. In 1966 the Greater Vancouver Parks District was formed to serve 11 municipalities, most of them in Greater Vancouver; its responsibilities were confined to purchasing land for future park use. In early 1967 the Greater Vancouver Hospital District was created to finance and plan hospital construction in the area.

With the exceptions of the water district and the hospital district, both of which were formed essentially at the initiative of the provincial government, the authorities were formed on initiative of the municipalities (although in each case the formal creation and granting of authority were effected through provincial legislation). All authorities were similar in structure: a

board of directors was composed of delegates from municipal councils; the board chairman, who had no special authority, was selected from among its members by the board. Each authority (except in the case of the combination under the sewerage and water boards) had its own staff under the direction of a permanent official. There was a strong tradition that the individual municipalities were left entirely free to decide whether to participate in, and be affected by, the decisions of any regional authority—they could enter or withdraw at their own discretion.

In general, the regional authorities were accepted as an integral part of local government machinery and their development gave the municipalities no cause to fear arbitrary action at the regional level either by the provincial government or by the regional authorities themselves. The continued existence of separate regional authorities was, however, incompatible with the provincial goal of a single regional government for Greater Vancouver.

As soon as the provincial goal of regional governments was settled in 1964 the Minister commenced a wide-ranging attack on the principle of single-purpose regional authorities. In his first major public address he asked:

> In any definable trading area can the functions of regional planning, regional water and sewer utilities, regional parks, regional garbage disposal, regional health and regional welfare continue to be solved through a proliferation of single function regional boards with few if any definable interrelationships?[13]

This statement, and many similar ones contained in press releases, speeches, and interviews by the Minister, must be seen in light of the fact that no "proliferation" actually existed: Greater Vancouver had only the few authorities already described; similar authorities were scattered sparsely over the rest of the province. The Minister's aim was to weaken the legitimacy of single-purpose authorities rather than to describe an actual problem. Neither he nor any one else brought forth evidence of contemporary poor performance or lack of coordination among the existing regional authorities.

Second, every effort was made by the Minister and his officials to present the new regional district concept as entirely compatible with the tradition of existing regional authorities. The terminology of the provincial policy was taken directly from the tradition of the single-purpose authorities. The terms, "regional," "district" and "board of directors," were in common use and devoid of threatening implication. The new term, "regional district," besides being redundant, had no undesirable meaning (indeed, it had no specific meaning). It was thus much less a red flag than such terms as "Metropolitan corporation" and "regional government" would have been. The Minister actually denied re-

peatedly that metropolitan government was in the offing for Greater Vancouver, although he once permitted himself to say that the regional district was "an alternative to metro government" that would do "the same job as metro government."[14] Not until 1970 did he allow himself to refer to his creation as regional government. Similarly, the ruling body of a regional district was to be called a "board of directors" rather than a "council" in order to avoid any implication of threat to municipal councils.

More generally, the provincial officials glossed over the fundamental distinction between the existence of several separate single-purpose authority with no limit on the functions it could acquire. The provincial tactic of avoiding the equating of regional districts with metropolitan government in the urban context was successful. The new government was already established by the time it was generally realized that the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) was actually something that would elsewhere be called metropolitan government.

There was, however, more than mere terminology to the provincial strategy. Much was made of the circumstances that in the context of the large urban areas the board of directors would not be directly elected by the public and would have no power to levy direct taxes on local residents. The Minister used this circumstance to support his statement that no new government, much less a metropolitan government, was being created. Such is the absence of communication between British Columbia and the East that it was never realized publicly that the same circumstances existed in Metropolitan Toronto and, until 1972, in Metropolitan Winnipeg.

The most significant single element in the provincial strategy was the "opting out" provision contained in the 1965 legislation. The tradition by which individual municipalities could decide whether to participate in single-purpose authorities was continued under the legislation for the new districts. As has been indicated, a municipality would not be free to decide whether it would be a component of a regional district, but it would be free to "opt out" of particular functions assigned to its regional district. For example, should the Minister assign the function of mosquito control to a regional district, a municipality could decide to control its own mosquitoes, in which case it would pay a levy to the district for mosquito control and its delegates on the board of directors would have no votes concerning mosquito control. In theory a municipality could even opt out of all functions assigned to its district. Undoubtedly this provision, which was well publicized, served to minimize any lingering fears about provincial motives and to allay fears of the smaller municipalities and unincorporated areas about domination by neighboring large municipalities. Clearly the opting out provision would mean that the regional districts would be significantly different from metropolitan govern-

ments. As we shall explain, however, the opting out provision was subsequently repealed.

GREATER VANCOUVER REGIONAL DISTRICT

The regional district for Greater Vancouver was actually created when the Minister had letters patent issued in late June 1967. The letters patent merely provided that the regional district would now exist and have a board of directors; no functions were assigned. At this time the public was unaware of the development and its importance, and no effort was made to publicize the event or explain its significance. Two other features (besides the fact that no functions were assigned) served to obscure the event. First, the term "Greater Vancouver" was avoided. The name given, "Regional District of Fraser-Burrard," had no substantive meaning and since the words "Fraser" and "Burrard" referred to bodies of water and had no particular governmental connotation, the name itself gave no hint of its own significance. The case would have been different if the name had been "The Corporation of Metropolitan Vancouver."[15] This tactic proved so successful that difficulty was later encountered when the district began issuing bonds, and so the name was changed in 1968 to Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD).

The second obscuring feature lay in the fact that the new district was not created openly. Rather it was tacked on to an existing single-purpose authority, the hospital district, in the same way that the water district had earlier been tacked on to the sewerage district. An existing organization was given an additional title and role, but no visible change took place. The Minister imposed the hospital district on the Greater Vancouver municipalities earlier in 1967, giving it the same municipal membership that he intended the GVRD to have. In 1967, for the first time, individual municipalities were not allowed the freedom to decide whether to participate in a single-purpose authority. The letters patent creating the new regional district provided that its boards of directors would be composed of the persons who composed the hospital district board of directors. A municipality of unincorporated area would have to have the same persons representing it on the hospital board and on the new regional district board.

The creation of the regional district was thus a most inconspicuous event. The municipalities did not even have to go through the motions of selecting representatives to the regional board of directors, since their hospital representatives had already been selected. Nor did they have to concern themselves with decisions of the regional board, since no functions had yet been assigned to the regional district. The first meeting of the board of directors took place as an adjunct to a meeting of the hospital district on July 12, 1967. The Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs presided over the meeting and carefully explained that the new regional district

was the same entity as the hospital district. At this meeting Alderman Earl Adams of Vancouver City was elected chairman of the board and Reeve Alan Emmott of Burnaby was elected deputy chairman.[16]

At the second meeting (which was also an adjunct to a meeting of the hospital board, as all meetings would be until imperceptibly, months later, hospital board meetings came to be regarded as adjuncts to regional district meetings), arrangements were made to use the office facilities and staff of the sewerage and water districts. The third meeting confined itself to approving the minutes of the previous meeting, since the board had no functions and the members could not think of any matter to discuss.[17] The four remaining meetings in 1967 were devoted mainly to informal discussions among directors on how the board should operate and how activities of the board should relate to activities of the single-purpose authorities.[18]

The Municipal Act provides that voting power and representation on a regional district board is to be based upon a "voting unit" designated in the letters patent creating the district.[19] For the GVRD the voting unit is 10,000 persons. The number of votes a municipality or unincorporated area is entitled to is obtained by dividing its population by the voting unit. If the resulting quotient includes a fraction, the number of votes is taken as the next highest whole number. The number of directors from a municipality or unincorporated area is obtained by dividing its number of votes by five, with the number of directors taken as the next highest number if the quotient includes a fraction. Thus each municipality or unincorporated area is guaranteed a minimum of one vote and one director. Votes are to be distributed as evenly as possible among directors from the same municipality, and a director cannot split his votes. Thus, in 1972, Vancouver City was entitled to 22 votes and five directors, with three directors having 4 votes each and two directors having 5 votes each. Table VIII-1 shows the composition of the GVRD and its board in 1972. Directors from municipalities must be council members; they are appointed annually by their councils. Directors from unincorporated areas are directly elected for a two-year term.

GVRD ACQUIRES FUNCTIONS

During 1968 and 1969 the GVRD came slowly to be recognized by its own directors and many other municipal officials in Greater Vancouver as the proper repository for the functions performed by the single-purpose authorities and for any new regional functions which might emerge. The hospital function came to be commonly regarded as performed by the GVRD (although the legal niceties were formally followed). The first function actually acquired by the GVRD was that of debt management (i.e., borrowing for municipal projects) on behalf of the municipalities. This function was

not bestowed by the Minister, for it was discovered that under existing provisions of the Municipal Act the municipalities could hand over financing to external institutions. During the 1967-68 period, debt financing was a major preoccupation of municipal officials. Without any initiative from the Minister, they realized the material advantage of having their municipal debentures supported by the assessed value of property within the entire GVRD.

GVRD's success with debt financing contributed greatly to the emergence of a favorable view of the GVRD on the part of municipal officials. By mid-1968 several regional directors, perhaps especially Reeve Alan Emmott of Burnaby and Alderman Ernest Broome of Vancouver, had begun to press for a coherent plan for the acquisition of further functions. Under Broome's chairmanship the Political and Administrative Structure Review Committee was established. In its report of February 1969, the Broome Committee recommended a radial change in the procedures and understandings related to the acquision of functions. The committee stated:

> The regional district must adopt the concept of a multi-purpose regional district headed by one Board assisted by one fully coordinated staff which can assume responsi-

bility for all activities of a regional nature which may be brought within their jurisdiction. This concept can be completely negated by the opting in, opting out privilege now enjoyed by member municipalities. We recommend that the "legislation" be amended to eliminate "opting out" of any member municipality or unorganized electoral area of any regional function assumed by the board.[20]

This recommendation was quickly accepted by the Minister and in the next session of the legislature (in early 1970) the Municipal Act was amended to remove the opting-out provision. The elimination was a fundamental change. Henceforward, individual municipalities and unincorporated areas would have no choice but to participate in any regional function imposed by the provincial government.

At the same time, in response to a related suggestion from the Broome Committee, a procedure was introduced by which a regional district could acquire functions at its own initiative, even if some municipalities objected. Essentially, the new procedures were intended to allow disputes to be settled within a region without requiring the Minister to take sides. Under the legislative provisions a regional board could request letters patent bestowing a particular function when (1) at least two-thirds of the votes on the board, had approved the request, and (2) at least two-thirds of the component municipalities and unincorporated areas had given their consent (consent of the former was to be expressed by councils; that of the latter, by the elected director). For the specific functions of public housing and sewage disposal, however, the request need receive the approval of only a majority of the directors having among them a majority of votes.[21] These two functions were not chosen at random; both were being pressed by the Minister but resisted by various municipalities.

By late 1972 the GVRD had absorbed (with the exception of some legal niceties of no practical significance) the functions of all the single-purpose authorities. It had acquired the major new functions, in addition to debt management, of public housing, air pollution control, building regulations, and, for the unincorporated areas, community planning and other municipal services. The advance of GVRD's functional consolidation was affected by several factors. Individual municipalities did not oppose it generally. The voting procedures for dispute-settling were invoked only in the case of the public housing function when some suburban municipalities objected. In this case the compromise agreed upon was that no municipality would be compelled to accept public housing within its boundaries, yet all would contribute to the financing of the function. Acquisition of the air pollution control function was delayed while various provincial departments directly involved came to agreement.

Table VIII-1

Greater Vancouver Regional District Composition: 1972

Member	1972 Population	Number of Directors	Number of Votes
Vancouver	422,300	5	22
Burnaby	125,000	2	7
Surrey	96,700	1	5
Richmond	61,400	1	4
North Vancouver District	57,200	1	3
Coquitlam District	52,200	1	3
Delta	45,200	1	3
New Westminster	42,100	1	3
North Vancouver City	42,000	1	3
West Vancouver	36,300	1	2
Port Coquitlam	19,600	1	1
White Rock	10,300	1	1
Port Moody	10,800	1	1
Lion's Bay	400	1	1
Unincorporated areas:			
University endowment lands	3,550	1	1
Bowen Island	950	1	1
IOCO-Buntzen	218	1	1
Totals	**1,016,375**	**22**	**61**

By far the greatest difficulties arose in taking over the functions of the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board and the combined water and sewerage boards. In both cases the recalcitrance of the entrenched bureaucratic leaders was the main stumbling block. In both cases the intervention of the Minister was required. By late 1972 it appeared only a matter of time before the GVRD acquired the additional functions of regional transportation, solid waste disposal, collective labor relations, juvenile remand-detention facilities, and noise pollution control.

GVRD ORGANIZATION

Until 1971 the only executive structure within the GVRD was the executive committee of the board. It contains nine members selected by the board and is presided over by the board chairman. Membership on the committee has rested on the informal understanding that Vancouver City will have two members while no other municipality or area will have more than one member. Neither the chairman nor the executive committee has any special powers. Since the committee meets more frequently than the board, however, its members can be more knowledgeable than other board members. None of the chairmen has played a dominant role in the executive committee or in the board as a whole. In June 1971 the executive committee was ostensibly supplemented by a management committee consisting of the board chairman, the commissioner of the water and sewerage districts, and the GVRD secretary-treasurer. Whether the management committee remains permanently is yet to be seen, for its formation was a compromise response to continuing disagreement at the staff level over integration of the water and sewerage districts into the GVRD. Whatever the outcome, however, senior staff officials may be expected to become increasingly influential. The reasons are basically the same as those which frequently bring coordinated staffs of full-time technical experts into dominance over politically uncoordinated boards of part-time elected officials.

Within the Greater Vancouver municipalities the senior municipal bureaucrats are crucial decision makers, for the city manager system is the norm. Most councils have neither a strong mayor nor a political executive within the council. For these reasons, relations between the GVRD staff and municipal staffs will have more effect upon the functioning of the GVRD than will relations between the GVRD Board and municipal councils. Within British Columbia local government there is a general tendency for visible elective structures to be duplicated within the bureaucracies. That is, committees of elected councillors are usually advised by counterpart committees composed of bureaucrats, while elected councils are formally or informally guided by a committee consisting of permanent heads of municipal departments.

In keeping with this tradition the GVRD established a Regional Administrative Advisory Committee as one of its first major acts. This committee was composed of the chief administrative officer from each municipality and single-purpose authority. Its main role appears to have been that of keeping the major municipal decision makers regularly informed of developments within the GVRD.

Of greater potential significance, however, is the GVRD Technical Planning Committee (TPC). The Municipal Act provides that all regional districts have such a committee. The Act assigns the TPC two duties: to advise the board on planning matters and to "act as a liaison between the administration of the regional board and . . . departments of government and the member municipalites." The Act stipulates that the TPC be composed of the regional district's chief planning official; a staff member from each municipal bureaucracy; an official of the Department of Municipal Affairs; one representative from each of seven other provincial departments or agencies (Lands, Water Resources, Forestry, Agriculture, Fish and Wildlife, Highways, and Parks) as well as from any others named by the Minister; an employee of each school district in the region;[22] and "one employee of such departments and Crown agencies of the Government of Canada as may be designated by the Minister (of Municipal Affairs)."[23]

The TPC thus has potentially a much broader representational base than does the GVRD board itself. Moreover, the membership of the TPC, unlike that of the board, contains persons who are both technically expert and intimately familiar with policy making and implementation in other governments—local, provincial, and federal. The TPC of the GVRD was set up in 1970 and is only now becoming developed. It has the potential of becoming the major clearinghouse for regional policy and administrative decisions.

THE GVRD TODAY

The general public now has the opportunity to observe and take some part in GVRD activities. GVRD's planning staff sought public involvement in formulation of regional transportation plans and is developing public involvement in general regional planning. During the formative years of GVRD the public took no part at all. GVRD board meetings rarely had public observers present (aside from university students sent by their instructor). Realizing that the people of the region were not sufficiently aware of the existence of the regional district and its possible role in governing urban change, the board of directors approved a public participation program which included 11 activities ranging from general publicity and meetings with community groups to scientific polling of community opinion on issues and potential policies.

In addition to these activities by the planning

department, two groups are having some influence in generating public involvement in and awareness of GVRD decision making. One is the Inter-Institutional Policy Simulation (IIPS) Project—financed by the Ford Foundation and composed of university academics, municipal civil servants, and GVRD staff. The aim of the project is to construct a computer model allowing simulation of policy outcomes. The model and all simulation outcomes are to be open to any interested person or group. The IIPS project was initiated by academics from the University of British Columbia.

The second group is the Vancouver chapter of the International Association for Metropolitan Research and Development (INTERMET). This group includes business, professional and several GVRD directors. The executive director of the chapter is one of the senior GVRD planning staff and the group was formed at his initiative. The public, however, is as yet only marginally involved in GVRD activities.

Whatever the semantics, metropolitan government is now firmly established in Greater Vancouver. In British Columbia's progress towards regional government in general and in Greater Vancouver's progress towards metropolitan government in particular, it is clear that the primary creative policy making occurred not at the local or regional level but rather among a handful of provincial government officials. The provincial strategy for introducing regional and metropolitan government amounted to what we have termed "gentle imposition" of structures and procedures upon a generally unsuspecting body of local officials. The public in the province and in Greater Vancouver was not involved and remained ignorant of the developments and their significance. Opposition to the new level of government did not develop among the local officials because provincial officials proceeded circumspectly, cloaking compulsion in option, presenting the new in terms of the old, while disclaiming great intentions. Yet there were such intentions, and they have now been achieved in Greater Vancouver.

FOOTNOTES

*This chapter is reprinted with permission from *Canadian Public Administration*, 1973, pp. 124-138, with minor revisions. We are grateful to directors and staff of the Greater Vancouver Regional District and to officials of the British Columbia Department of Municipal Affairs for granting interviews and providing information on which this paper is based. We are grateful as well to members of the University of British Columbia Urban Politics Seminar for observing GVRD meetings and dogging the footsteps of GVRD directors. A more detailed case study by the present authors was published in *B. C. Studies*, No. 15 (Autumn 1972), pp. 3-28.

[1] By "metropolitan government" we mean a multipurpose supra-municipal government which conducts significant decision making affecting the people and territory of previously existing municipalities in a large urban area. In the local federation variety the municipalities continue to exist.

[2] Municipal Act, 1957, secs. 772-805, British Columbia.

[3] Municipal Act, 1957, sec. 773.

[4] Municipal Act, 1957, secs. 774-776.

[5] The new appointment did not mark any change in government, for the Social Credit Party had been in power since the early 1950's; nor does the appointment appear to have been made as a conscious attempt by the Premier to alter the policy or role of the department. The Deputy Minister before and after Campbell's appointment was Everett Brown. Campbell ceased to be Minister with the defeat of his party at the polls in August 1972.

[6] Union of B.C. Municipalities, *Minutes of 61st Annual Convention* (New Westminster: UBCM, 1964), p. 108. (Cited hereafter as *UBCM, 1964 Convention.*) Apparently the first sentence was a quotation from George Bernard Shaw.

[7] This point was made unequivocally by an official of the department in an interview with Tennant in March 1967—several months before the Vancouver district was established.

[8] In the more rural areas, on the other hand, the new government could be seen as creating new opportunities for the politically inclined in unincorporated areas; and, since the existing municipalities in these areas were fewer in number and lacking the developed bureaucracies of the large urban municipalities, municipal opposition would likely be less than in the large urban areas.

[9] This expression refers to decisions of the provincial cabinet as approved by the Lieutenant-Governor, the formal representative of the Queen in the province.

[10] "Letters patent" are the equivalent of a charter.

[11] Municipal Act, 1965, secs. 766 ff.

[12] A legislative "riding" is a legislative district.

[13] *UBCM, 1964 Convention,* p. 108.

[14] *Vancouver Sun,* September 10, 1968.

[15] In fact, the institution being introduced in Vancouver under the name "Regional District of Fraser-Burrard" was virtually identical both to that envisioned by the 1957 reforms, when the name "The Corporation of Metropolitan Vancouver" would have been used, and to the metropolitan structures in Toronto and Winnipeg.

[16] Regional District of Fraser-Burrard, *Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors,* July 12, 1972.

[17] Regional District of Fraser-Burrard, *Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors,* August 30, 1967.

[18] Regional District of Fraser-Burrard, *Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors,* September 27, October 18, November 15, December 20, 1967.

[19] Municipal Act, 1965, secs. 765, 770. Similar provisions were later enacted for the hospital district.

[20] GVRD, Political and Administrative Structure Review Committee, "Report No. 1, February 20, 1969," (Mimeograph).

[21] Municipal Act, 1970, sec. 766.

[22] Generally each municipality has its own separately elected school board. There have been no suggestions that education be made a regional function.

[23] Municipal Act, 1970, sec. 798B.

commission members 1973

PRIVATE CITIZENS
Robert E. Merriam, Chairman, Chicago, Illinois
Robert H. Finch, Los Angeles, California[1]
Vacancy[2]

MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE
Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina[3]
Edmund S. Muskie, Maine
Charles H. Percy, Illinois

MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
L. H. Fountain, North Carolina
Al Ullman, Oregon
Clarence J. Brown, Jr., Ohio[4]

OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., Executive Director, The Domestic Council
George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury
Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare[5]

GOVERNORS
Dale Bumpers, Arkansas
Richard F. Kneip, South Dakota
Daniel J. Evans, Washington[6]
Robert D. Ray, Iowa[7]

MAYORS
C. Beverly Briley, Nashville, Tennessee
Richard G. Lugar, Vice Chairman, Indianapolis, Indiana
Jack D. Maltester, San Leandro, California
John D. Driggs, Phoenix, Arizona

STATE LEGISLATIVE LEADERS
B. Mahlon Brown, Senator, Nevada
Robert P. Knowles, Senator, Wisconsin
Charles F. Kurfess, Minority Leader, Ohio House of Representatives[8]

ELECTED COUNTY OFFICIALS
Conrad M. Fowler, Shelby County, Alabama
Edwin G. Michaelian, Westchester County, New York
Lawrence K. Roos, St. Louis County, Missouri

[1] Appointed 5/29/73 to replace Edward C. Banfield, U. of Pennsylvania.
[2] Vacancy created by resignation of Howard H. Callaway, Pine Mountain, Georgia.
[3] Appointed 2/20/73 to replace Senator Sam J. Ervin, North Carolina.
[4] Replaced Congresswoman Florence P. Dwyer, New Jersey.
[5] Replaced George H. Romney, former Secretary of HUD.
[6] Replaced Ronald Reagan, Governor of California.
[7] Replaced Richard B. Ogilvie, former Governor of Illinois.
[8] Replaced Russell W. Arrington, former State Senator, Illinois.

what is acir?

The Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations (ACIR) was created by Congress in 1959 to monitor the operation of the American federal system and to recommend improvements. ACIR is a permanent national bipartisan body representing the executive and legislative branches of Federal, State and local government and the public.

Of the 26 Commission members, nine represent the Federal government, 14 represent State and local governments and three represent the general public. Twenty members are appointed by the President. He names three private citizens and three Federal executive officials directly and selects four governors, three State legislators, four mayors and three elected county officials from slates nominated, respectively, by the National Governors' Conference, the Council of State Governments, the National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of Counties. The other six are Members of Congress— three Senators appointed by the President of the Senate and three Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House. Commission members serve two-year terms and may be reappointed. The Commission names an Executive Director who heads the small professional staff.

After selecting specific intergovernmental issues for investigation, ACIR follows a multi-step procedure that assures review and comment by representatives of all points of view, all affected levels of government, technical experts and interested groups. The Commission then debates each issue and formulates its policy positions. Commission findings and recommendations are published and draft bills and executive orders are developed to assist in implementing ACIR policies.