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State Constitutions in the Federal System

Selected Issues and Opportunities for State Initiatives
The following study of state constitutional law examines a vital aspect of the reinvigoration of the states in our federal union. The study also complements ACIR's pathbreaking report State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials (1988). In addition, this study sheds light on several issues that have been examined in various ways by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations during the past three decades, especially balance in the federal system, the constitutional integrity of federalism, the strengthening of state capabilities, and the sorting out of responsibilities in the federal system.

The American federal system rests on two constitutional pillars: the 50 state constitutions and the United States Constitution. Metaphorically speaking, if one or the other pillar is cut down in size or raised too high, then the federal system becomes unbalanced. In many respects, this is what has happened to our federal system. The law of the U.S. Constitution, particularly as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court during the past 50 years, has come to overshadow state constitutional law to such an extent that state constitutions are, for many citizens, out of sight and out of mind. For example, ACIR's 1988 national poll (see Changing Public Attitudes on Governments and Taxes, 1988) found that fewer than half of the respondents even knew that their state has its own constitution. Yet state constitutions are important democratic governing documents, and they can be all the more important if their role in the federal system is understood properly. As such, a renewed appreciation of state constitutional law is essential for restoring a better balance of national-state authority in the federal system.

A strengthening of the state constitutional pillar is also essential for protecting the constitutional integrity of the federal system. This integrity depends not only on fidelity to the principles of federalism embodied in the U.S. Constitution but also on the independent vitality of the state constitutions. This state constitutional pillar was built first by Americans when they sought to establish home-rule republican governments during the Revolutionary War and the period of Confederation. The U.S. Constitution, therefore, is one of limited, delegated powers. The state constitutions encompass, in principle if not now in practice, the many fundamental powers of government that have been reserved to the states and to the people by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The erosion of these inherent state powers by an imperial vision of federal constitutional law threatens the very foundation of the federal system. The U.S. Constitution does not replace state constitutions; instead, it supplements those constitutions by providing for constitutional governance nationwide on matters of general public interest and, in so doing, protects the states as co-sovereign constitutional polities and guarantees each state a republican form of government.

A renewal of the vitality of state constitutional law is also the foundation for strengthening state capabilities. This is so for three reasons. First, in a constitutional democracy, any enhancement of state capabilities must take place within the context of constitutional rule. In the states, this means that the people must decide on the scope and powers of the state government. Second, most state constitutions contain a great deal of detail, much of which limits state government. Although contemporary reformers often criticize this detail as being too constraining for elected officials, it should be remembered that much of the detail represents efforts by past reformers to assert greater public control over government. The real question is not detail per se, but what kind of constitutional detail represents general public interests rather than special interests, and what kind of detail is harmful rather than beneficial to state action. Third, state capabilities vis-a-vis the federal government cannot be enhanced significantly unless there is strength in, and respect for, the states as constitutional polities in their own right (see also ACIR's The Question of State Government Capability, 1985).

The development of state constitutional law is also relevant to the sorting out of responsibilities in
the federal system. One sees this sorting out occurring in the “new judicial federalism” whereby the U.S. Supreme Court has shown greater solicitude for independent state court protections of individual rights and liberties. If states had no important or independent governing responsibilities, there would be no need for state constitutions. The very existence of dual constitutionalism signifies both a division and sharing of responsibilities between state and nation. Furthermore, many new issues emerging on the public scene are not easily encompassed by the U.S. Constitution, but are, or can be, encompassed by state constitutions.

We should add, however, that not everyone will be happy with all of the state constitutional law developments reported in this study. Those who believe, for example, that federal courts have expanded certain rights, such as criminal rights, too far will be dismayed by activist state supreme courts that have expanded rights even further. Others will be dismayed that many state courts are not yet active enough in developing state constitutional law. If one values federalism, however, and the dual constitutionalism that underlies it, then one cannot let opinions about particular developments overshadow the more fundamental issues of the place that state constitutional law should occupy in a strong and balanced federal system. The prominence of that place is one question; whether that place should be liberal or conservative, activist or restraintist is another question.

It is the second question that has to be answered by the actual constitutional choices made by the citizens of each of the 50 states. Fortunately for the vitality of American democracy, state constitutions provide the general public with many direct and indirect vehicles for shaping the development of state constitutional law. Hence, state constitutions, unlike the U.S. Constitution, call on citizens to participate very directly in framing the fundamental law of their respective polities.

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vi Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
1. **State Constitutions “Complete” and “Balance” the Nation’s Constitutional Framework:**

   **State Constitutions Are Essential**

   The state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution are coordinate documents which, together, provide the total framework for government within the United States. Neither can stand alone. However, with the rise to prominence of federal constitutional law and the expansion of federal power, public and judicial understanding of state constitutional law has been weakened, so much so that when most people think of constitutional law, they think only of federal constitutional law.

   Yet, all of the states in the original confederal Union had constitutions or charters of their own before the U.S. Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1787-1788. Those state constitutions did then, and still do, provide the framework for many aspects of government not covered by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, they provide alternative approaches to aspects of government also addressed in the U.S. Constitution. In some cases, state constitutions supplement and go beyond provisions in the U.S. Constitution.

   Some of the matters addressed in the state constitutions, but not in the U.S. Constitution, are the structure, functions, and finances of state and local governments; the constitutional standing of local governments in disputes with the state; state-local relationships in the broadest sense; limits on the ability of the state to mandate functions and expenses on local governments; and the regulation of property, including the land development process. These are matters of immense significance for intergovernmental relations and for the American federal system.

2. **The States Are Independent Polities with Their Own Philosophies of Government**

   Until the present U.S. Constitution was created, the states were sovereign governments in their own right. In ratifying the U.S. Constitution, they delegated certain of their powers to the federal government and transferred a certain degree of sovereignty. However, they reserved all residual powers to themselves and to the people.

   The state constitutions are based on diverse understandings and philosophies of government, are substantially easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution, provide for direct citizen involvement in the process of amendment and change (unlike the federal Constitution), have a tendency, therefore, to accumulate detailed provisions that some people believe should be left to statutory law, and have bills of rights that often are different from the U.S. Bill of Rights. It is important to understand these differences between state constitutional law and federal constitutional law if the full potentials of the states, and of their local governments, are to be realized within the American federal system.

3. **The United States Constitution Allows Substantial Room for the Development of a Separate Discipline of State Constitutional Law**

   The study of state constitutional law reveals a number of federal constitutional doctrines that potentially limit federal intrusions into state and local affairs, and that limit the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court and federal district courts over matters reserved to the states. For example:

   - A state constitutional grant of authority to state and local governments is unlikely to be preempted by federal courts when it (1) regulates a subject matter traditionally left to the states, (2) uses historic police power objectives concerning health, safety or mor-
als, (3) involves objectives that are compatible with or supplemental to the purposes of any federal regulation in the subject area, (4) concerns a subject area that has not been explicitly preempted by federal law, and (5) affects dimensions of an activity not comprehensively regulated by federal law.

- The “dormant commerce clause” doctrine furthers the federal interest in national free trade, but exhibits a pronounced deference to state government rulemaking in the commercial realm when it (1) is designed to promote traditional police power objectives, such as health or safety, rather than the business interests of the state’s own residents, (2) treats out-of-state and in-state economic entities in an even-handed manner, and (3) does not vary from national standards to such an extent that it imposes conflicting obligations or cumulative burdens on multi-state businesses.

- The doctrine of “adequate and independent state grounds” prevents the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing a state high court judgment that plainly rests on a determination of state law.

- The “abstention” and “equitable restraint” doctrines restrict the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts in favor of state court declarations of state constitutional and statutory law.

Thus, the federal judiciary has created certain opportunities, within its understanding of the U.S. Constitution, for state foresight and assumption of responsibility. The current movement to integrate state constitutions into the process of state lawmaking opens the possibility that the promises of diversity within unity in American federalism can be realized.

4. State Constitutions Are the Business of Governors, Legislatures, the People, and the Courts

Most state constitutions are amended much more easily and frequently than the U.S. Constitution. Citizens promote or affirm these changes by initiative or referendum. In addition, governors and legislatures frequently are involved in providing leadership for constitutional change. Interpretations by state judges, who often are elected, are also a major force for change. However, because of the direct role of citizen participation in state constitutional development, amendment plays a larger role in the change process than it does for the U.S. Constitution. Judicial interpretation, which is the dominant means of giving new meanings to the U.S. Constitution, plays a smaller, though still important, role in keeping state constitutions up to date. Thus, the politically responsive nature of state constitutions is more directly apparent than that of the U.S. Constitution.

The prolific amendment capacity of state constitutions has yielded many reforms in recent years, as well as certain causes for concern. Examples of reforms include home rule, strengthened executive management and budgeting, and more capable legislatures. However, concerns arise when the state judiciaries, often subject to the electoral process, become embroiled in political campaigns, when legislators or governors promote excessive constitutional restrictions on local governments, when citizens fail to vote for constitutional amendments that seem to be too obscure or complex to understand, or when emotional issues of the moment produce constitutional changes that lack foresight or sensitivity to certain groups of citizens.

5. State Constitutional Law Is an Underdeveloped Field with Great Potential

A 1988 Commission poll revealed that only 44 percent of Americans know that their state has its own constitution. Even among lawyers, state constitutional law is relatively unknown and little practiced. Compared to the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions are less frequently mentioned in the history and civics classes of public schools or the university, and regular reporting of state constitutional decisions, as well as the statistics of state court activities, has been, until very recently, quite rare. Even the law schools seldom offer courses in state constitutional law. If the American federal system is to be properly balanced—giving full rein to the potentials of local governments, the states, and the national government—then the field of state constitutional law needs to be developed more fully.
Recommendations

Recommendation 1
Promoting Public Understanding of and Support for State Constitutional Law

The Commission finds that widespread public understanding of and support for the vital role that state constitutions and state constitutional law play in maintaining a proper balance in the American federal system is essential for the full development of the nation's potential. The importance of voter initiatives and referendums in the process of revising state constitutions is a major reason for this finding. Yet, most citizens are unaware even of the existence of the 50 state constitutions.

The Commission recommends, therefore, that:

- The Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution recognize the importance of state constitutions and constitutional law in "completing" the U.S. Constitution.
- State bicentennial commissions and humanities councils include consideration of state constitutions in their public programming.
- State associations of judges and legislators include consideration of state constitutions and constitutional developments in their continuing education programs.
- State and local education agencies require schools to teach units in state history and/or government in which the state constitution and its development are discussed. (State judges, legislators, and executive officials should involve themselves in this activity.)
- Colleges and universities give attention to state constitutions and state constitutional law on a par with that given to the U.S. Constitution in history and government courses.
- The mass media provide regular coverage of state constitutional developments.

Recommendation 2
Developing the Capability to Improve State Constitutional Law

The Commission finds that adequate capability to fully develop the field of state constitutional law does not yet exist within the legal profession or within the political leadership of the states.

The Commission recommends, therefore, that law schools teach state constitutional law as part of their regular curriculum, that state bar examiners include a section on state constitutional law in their bar exams, and that public and private institutions support research on state constitutional law. Among the issues that should be addressed are: the interaction of state judicial, legislative, and executive agencies in the development of an independent state constitutional law; the implications for state constitutional law of elected judiciaries and constitutional documents that are fairly easy to change; how developments in state constitutional law spread from one state to another; and what legal and other barriers exist to inhibit the development of an independent state constitutional law.

The Commission recommends, in addition, the establishment of a clearinghouse for information on state constitutional developments. Such a function could be undertaken by an existing organization (such as the National Association of Attorneys General or the National Center for State Courts) or by a new organization created for the purpose.

Recommendation 3
Recognizing Shared Responsibility for State Constitutional Action

The Commission finds that the growing responsibilities being placed on the states and their local governments require adequate and responsive provisions in state constitutional law. These matters must be addressed independently within each state, taking into account the unique traditions and philosophies of government that exist in each state as well as the
The Commission finds that the recently renewed interest in state constitutional law by judges, attorneys, scholars, and state and local policymakers is an important development in American federalism. Rebalancing of responsibilities in the federal system is necessary in order to give state and local governments greater authority and discretion to serve the needs of their citizens. One necessary feature of such rebalancing is recognition of and respect for the co-equal importance of state constitutional law in the American system of constitutional government. The vitality of federalism rests on two constitutional pillars: (1) independent state constitutional law and (2) protections of federalism in U.S. constitutional law.

The Commission, therefore, commends the U.S. Supreme Court for honoring the “adequate and independent state grounds” doctrine, and recommends that the Court continue to honor this doctrine and to allow the states to experiment with solutions to the difficult issues that confront our society and to develop their own principles of state constitutional law appropriate to the goals and conditions of the people, institutions, and political subdivisions of the different states.

The Commission also recommends that both the Congress and the Supreme Court refrain from imposing restrictions on the independence of the states and their political subdivisions unless there is clear federal constitutional authority to do so and (1) a clear threat to national unity, (2) a clear need for uniform national policy, or (3) a clear conflict with express provisions of the Constitution of the United States. It is as important, for example, to provide antitrust immunity to the political subdivisions of the states as to the states themselves.

More specifically, the Commission recommends that the following federal constitutional doctrines be applied consistently by the courts to limit federal intrusions into state and local affairs concerning matters reserved to the states:

- A state constitutional grant of authority to state and local governments should not be preempted by federal courts when it (1) regulates a subject matter traditionally left to the states, (2) uses historic police power objectives concerning health, safety, or morals, (3) involves objectives that are compatible with or supplemental to the purposes of any federal regulation in the subject area, (4) concerns a subject area that has not been explicitly preempted by federal law, and (5) affects dimensions of an activity not comprehensively regulated by federal law.

- The “dormant commerce clause” doctrine, although it furthers the federal interest in national free trade, should also be used to bolster deference to state government rule-making in the commercial realm when it (1) is designed to promote traditional police power objectives, such as health or safety, rather than the business interests of the state’s own residents, (2) treats out-of-state and in-state economic entities in an even-handed manner, and (3) does not vary from
national standards to such an extent that it imposes conflicting obligations or cumulative burdens on multistate businesses.

- The doctrine of “adequate and independent state grounds” should be invoked to prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing a state high court judgment that plainly rests on a determination of state law.

- The “abstention” and “equitable restraint” doctrines should be invoked to restrict the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts in favor of state court declarations of state constitutional and statutory law.

The Commission recommends, further, that, whenever possible and appropriate, state judges look to state constitutional provisions first, using the “adequate and independent grounds” doctrine, when deciding constitutional questions, rather than turning immediately to the U.S. Constitution. By interpreting state constitutional provisions independently of how similar provisions of the U.S. Constitution are interpreted, state courts can protect their decisions from U.S. Supreme Court review and thereby foster the growth of an independent body of state constitutional law.

The Commission also recommends, as a supplementary measure of protection, that states increase their support for the State and Local Legal Center so as to maintain a strong presence on the many federalism issues that come before the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Commission once again urges the Congress to recognize and affirm the importance of state constitutional law in the American federal system and exercise restraint in preempting state and local responsibilities as well as in mandating responsibilities and expenses on state and local governments. To help bolster the Congress' resolve in these matters, the Commission recommends that the states establish a “federalism impact process” by which they could respond, in a timely fashion, to contemplated actions by the Congress that might diminish state and local authority. The Academy for State and Local Government should be considered for this role.
Chapter 1

Introduction

This study examines selected aspects of the place of state constitutional law in the American system and of recent developments in state constitutional law, particularly as this body of law has been developed by state high courts. The study is not intended to be comprehensive because a full examination of the many facets of state constitutional law would require several large volumes. Instead, we have sought to focus on certain aspects of state constitutional law that highlight the importance, variety, and innovativeness of developments in the states. This study looks, therefore, at the bearings of state constitutions on state government structure, civil liberties, equality, criminal rights (the exclusionary rule), economic and property rights, workers' compensation, and education.¹

This study takes on particular importance when one considers the results of ACIR's 1988 national public opinion poll. Only 44 percent of American adults knew that their state has its own constitution, and 44 percent of the respondents did not know that their state constitution has its own bill of rights.² Perhaps these results are not surprising because, after all, so much attention has been given to federal constitutional law in recent decades that "constitutional law" today is virtually synonymous with federal constitutional law.³

This eclipsing of state constitutional law in the minds of not only the general public but also many policymakers is one indicator of the condition of contemporary American federalism. Renewed attention to and interest in state constitutional law, therefore, must be viewed as part and parcel of any effort to restore a better balance of national-state power in the federal system. The American system of dual constitutionalism represents a unique and highly successful experiment in democratic governance, one that needs constant attention if we are to continue to make it work, and work better.

The Constitution of the United States: The Oldest Written Constitution in the World?

Another indicator of the eclipsing of state constitutions is that during 1987, the year of the bicentennial of the drafting of the Constitution of the United States of America, that revered document was often said to be the oldest, still operative, written constitution in the world. Even forgiving some exaggeration, the careful observer should recognize that the claim is not true. The oldest, still operative, written constitution in the world is the Constitution of Massachusetts, written largely by John Adams and ratified by the citizens of Massachusetts in 1780, a full seven years before the Constitution of the United States was written in Philadelphia.³ The Constitution of the United States, of course, continues to be the oldest, still operative, written, national constitution in the world.

Beyond the need for historical accuracy, the longevity of the Massachusetts Constitution is important because it underscores the limited role that the United States Constitution was designed to serve in the American federal system. The thirteen original states were fully functioning constitutional entities before 1787. Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia all enacted constitutions in 1776. Georgia and New York wrote constitutions the following year, 1777. Massachusetts adopted its constitution in 1780. Only Connecticut and Rhode Island continued to function under their colonial charters until they replaced them with constitutions in 1818 and 1842 respectively.⁴ Thus, Americans had considerable experience with written constitutions before the framers met in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. Indeed, much of the debate that took place, both in the Constitutional Convention itself and in
the state ratifying conventions, demonstrates how the framers of the U.S. Constitution built on these state constitutional experiences. In The Federalist, for example, one finds repeated references to state constitutions, both positive and negative.

The Constitution of the United States as an “Incomplete Document”

The Constitution of the United States is dependent on state constitutions in an even more profound and contemporary way. As Donald S. Lutz has suggested, the Constitution of the United States is “incomplete.” It is predicated on the continued existence and vitality of state constitutions. Unlike many constitutions in Europe and elsewhere in the world, the Constitution of the United States is silent, or mostly silent, on such fundamental constitutional matters as local government finance, education, and the structure of state and local government. These and other constitutional matters are left to the states to resolve, in keeping with their own needs, preferences, and traditions. Thus, the “complete” American constitution includes both the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the 50 states—both as they are written and as they are implemented and interpreted by judges and other government officials.

The Constitution of the United States delegates limited, although important, powers to the national government. When exercising those delegated powers, the laws of the United States are supreme. State laws, and even state constitutional provisions, must yield to these legitimate expressions of national authority. At the same time, because national authority is limited to those powers delegated by the U.S. Constitution, the states retain broad areas of policymaking authority to themselves. The areas of public policy reserved to the states are controlled not by the U.S. Constitution, but by the constitutions of the 50 individual states.

At least since 1937, however, the constitutional delegations of authority to the national government have been interpreted broadly; consequently, there is hardly an area of social or economic life that cannot be reached now by the national government. This is not to suggest that the national government can, constitutionally, control all areas of public policy, only that it can influence them. For example, few Americans would contend that the national government could mandate a uniform curriculum for the nation’s schools. At the same time, few would deny that the federal government has had a considerable impact on curriculum through its grant-in-aid system, its curriculum development projects, and its initiatives in such areas as bilingual education, the education of the handicapped, and school desegregation. Despite this federal presence, however, the states (and their subdivisions) play the dominant role in setting education policy.

Today, few areas of public policy belong exclusively either to the national government or to the states. Rather, policy responsibility is shared between the national government and the states. In some areas, such as foreign policy, the federal government is the dominant actor; in others, such as education, the states play the principal role. Given the expansion of national authority, especially since 1937, one can argue about how much policymaking “room” is left to the states. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that just as we conceive of the federal government as a polity, both energized and constrained by the U.S. Constitution, so also must we think of the states as polities, energized and constrained by their own constitutions.

The States as Polities

From this perspective, the American states are polities within the framework of the American federal system. That is, the primary role of the states is to make policy choices dealing with that wide range of matters assigned to them by their citizens and left open to them by the very incompleteness of the U.S. Constitution. To put the matter somewhat differently, and without disparaging the crucial role of the states in the implementation of national programs, the states are political arenas for the forging of public policy, not administrative agencies for the implementation of policy made by the national government.

As polities, the states require rules both for the management of political conflict and for the determination of what is legitimate public policy. In some federal systems, these basic decisions are made in a single, national constitution. The states of India, for example, do not have their own constitutions; their political authority and organization are provided for in the national constitution. In Brazil, while the states write their own constitutions, they make few important choices because they must conform to the detailed provisions of the national constitution. These arrangements may be appropriate for India and Brazil, where the national government is the principal arena for policymaking, but a different arrangement is necessary where the states play an important policymaking role.

Furthermore, if the American states are policymakers, and have the right to enact constitutions to serve as the frameworks for that policymaking process, then we would expect considerably more variation, both in terms of policy outcomes and policy processes, than we might find in federal systems which are, in effect, merely decentralized administrative systems. Such diversity may be a blessing or a curse, depending on one’s perspective. In the American federal system, there is always a tension between
uniformity and diversity. Unfortunately, there is no clear formula to instruct us on when to opt for one or the other; rather, the choice more usually is made in the various arenas of the political process—legislatures, executive agencies, and courts.

The United States Constitution as a Constraint on the States

Of course, the U.S. Constitution serves as an overarching framework in which the states (and the federal government) perform their governing functions. This framework—as originally written, as amended, and as interpreted—constrains the states in many important ways.

First and clearly foremost, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the Land. . . .]” This supremacy clause makes it clear that the Constitution, along with legitimate national laws and treaties, are superior to state enactments, including state constitutional provisions.

Sometimes, the words of the U.S. Constitution as they limit the states are fairly clear, as, for example, when the Constitution prohibits the states from “grant[ing] Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin[ing] Money; [or] emit[ting] Bills of Credit. . . .” Although even these specific limitations are subject to some interpretation. The range of possible interpretations increases with the indefiniteness of the language, as, for example, when the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to accord their residents “due process of law.” Debates about the meaning of the Constitution are resolved primarily by the Supreme Court of the United States, so that, according to one observer, the Supreme Court is “the umpire of the federal system.”

This umpiring function is performed in three types of cases: (1) where there is an alleged conflict between a state constitutional provision or enactment and a provision of the Constitution of the United States, (2) where there is some conflict between state and federal laws or treaties and the validity of either or both is called into question, and (3) where the constitutionality of a federal law or treaty affecting national-state relations is challenged. The particular issue involved may concern an economic regulation or a personal liberty. Given that the U.S. Supreme Court applies different standards of review for each type of issue, each must be discussed separately.

The Supreme Court and State Economic Policy

When confronted with a claim that a state economic regulation violates some provision of the U.S. Constitution, the record of the U.S. Supreme Court has been quite mixed. The charge that a state economic regulation violates the U.S. Constitution is usually based on one of several claims: (1) that the challenged state action is in violation of that provision of the Fifth Amendment which prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation; (2) that a state regulation violates either the due process or equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that the state law is one “impairing the obligation of contracts” in violation of Section 10 of Article I; (4) that a state law so favors its own citizens that it violates the interstate privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2; (5) that the state law regulates an aspect of interstate commerce reserved exclusively to the national government; or (6) that a state revenue measure is, in fact, a duty on imports or exports in violation of Article I, Section 10.

These claims are treated more fully in chapter 2 of this study; here it merely should be pointed out that the six claims fall into two different categories: (1) that the state has violated a right of its own residents that is protected by the U.S. Constitution (e.g., the just compensation, impairment of contracts, due process, or equal protection provisions), and (2) that the state action has an unconstitutional “spillover effect” on other states (e.g., the interstate commerce, privileges and immunities, or duty on imports or exports provisions).

With regard to the first sort of claim—that the state has violated the property rights of its own citizens—the U.S. Supreme Court since the 1930s has come to the position of allowing the states considerable discretion, only rarely striking down state actions. Although there has been some revival of the “takings” provision of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court has shown little recent inclination to support claims of this first type.

However, the Supreme Court continues to play a more active role when confronted with claims that a state action adversely affects the rights or interests of other states or citizens of other states. For example, the Court will look closely at state actions that allegedly place an “undue burden” on interstate commerce or appear to “discriminate” against other states or citizens of other states.

These two patterns of decisions by the Supreme Court have important implications for state constitutions. First, to the extent that the U.S. Supreme Court no longer protects property rights against state actions, individuals must look to their state constitution and state judiciary for the protection of their property rights. Second, the states would appear to have considerable constitutional discretion in structuring economic relationships among their own citizens, so long as the state action has relatively little impact beyond its borders.
The situation is considerably more complicated where there is an alleged conflict between state and federal laws affecting the same subject matter. Where the conflict is clear and irreconcilable, then, of course, the supremacy clause mandates that the state law must yield.22 When the conflict is not so clear, then the Supreme Court has taken on the role of deciding whether the federal law preempts the field and therefore precludes state regulation of the same subject matter. The standards for deciding whether a field has been preempted by the federal government have not been articulated very clearly,23 and at least one member of the Court—Chief Justice William Rehnquist—has argued that the Court should invoke the doctrine only when Congress has made a clear decision to preempt.24

Finally, decisions of the Supreme Court either upholding or striking down national legislation also have a profound effect on federalism. Prior to 1937, the Supreme Court frequently struck down national economic legislation, often on the grounds that the federal law invaded a field reserved to the states exclusively by the Tenth Amendment.25 Since the “constitutional revolution” of 1937, however, the Court, with one exception,26 has abandoned the Tenth Amendment entirely. This abandonment has been so complete that one might conclude that there are virtually no constitutional restraints on national authority except for those found in the Bill of Rights. Even recognizing the exaggeration, it still does suggest that to the extent that there are any restraints on federal authority, they are more likely to be found through the political process than through the courts.27

The Supreme Court and State Civil Liberties Policy

It should be recalled that the U.S. Bill of Rights, as originally added to the Constitution in 1791, applied only to actions of the national government.28 For protection against state action, individuals had to look to the bills of rights of the state constitutions. This situation began to change in 1925, some 57 years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the U.S. Supreme Court was originally hesitant to use the due process and equal protection clauses as grounds for striking down state action as violative of the U.S. Bill of Rights,29 beginning in 192530 the Court started the gradual process of incorporating provisions of the original Bill of Rights within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby making most provisions of the Bill of Rights as fully applicable against state action as they are against national action.

Furthermore, beginning in the 1950s and accelerating during the 1960s, the Court generally gave broad interpretations to most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights31—now made applicable against the states through the process of “selective incorporation.”

The Supreme Court, as well as other federal and even state courts, also discovered what might be called “new rights” within the Constitution—the right of non-English speaking school children to be instructed in a language they can understand,32 the right of mental patients to treatment,33 the right of prisoners to be free of cruel and unusual punishment,34 and the right of married couples to privacy.35

Finally, the Court found new meaning in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to striking down state-imposed racial segregation in the schools,36 the Court ordered the reapportionment of state legislatures according to the principle of “one man, one vote.”37 The Court also struck down many state laws giving preference to men over women,38 and held that indigent defendants have a right to counsel to appeal their convictions.39

Taken together, these four elements constitute the “revolution in civil rights and liberties” of the Warren Court era. Although these developments had their critics,40 supporters argued that they were long overdue, because if these unpopular causes were not championed by the Supreme Court of the United States, they were unlikely to receive serious consideration at all.41 Whatever merit this argument might have had in the 1950s and 1960s, it needs to be reevaluated in the context of the 1980s. Two important changes appear to make it somewhat less compelling.

First, state political processes are more receptive to the claims of minorities than they were during the 1950s and 1960s. The right to vote is much more widespread,42 legislatures are more representative,43 governors have gained more control over their administrations,44 civil services have been modernized,45 state courts have been unified and professionalized,46 and, most generally, a wide range of interest groups now participate in what have become much more open political and governmental processes.47

Second, the nature of civil liberties issues is different in the 1980s. For example, rights protecting citizens against blatant racial and sexual discrimination, third-degree police tactics, and the suppression of books dealing with sex are all well established. While one should be “eternally vigilant”48 against any erosion of these basic rights, many of today’s issues of civil rights and liberties are both more subtle and more complicated than those of the past. For example, today’s issues of civil rights and liberties often involve a conflict between rights. What should one do, for example, when the claimed right of a journalist to withhold news sources in the name of freedom of the press conflicts with the right of a criminal de-
fendant to all information to plan his or her defense. Or when the right of students to pray on the grounds of a public university in the name of religious freedom clashes with the right to be free of a religious establishment? Or when the right of a newspaper to publish conflicts with an individual's claim of privacy? These are not issues of balancing society's need for security and order against the liberty of an individual; rather, they involve the claim of one individual to a civil liberty against a similar claim by another. At the same time, determining an appropriate remedy for an alleged violation of rights has become more complicated. There is, for example, considerable dispute about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a remedy to the problem of unreasonable searches, especially when the violation appears more technical than willful. Other difficult problems of remedy arise in prisoners' rights cases and some gender equity cases.

These two developments of the 1980s—the increased responsiveness of state political processes to civil liberties claims and the complexity of the issues themselves—may call into question the traditional justification for federal judicial activism offered in the 1960s. At least it should suggest the need for experimentation with both forums and solutions.

There is some evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court has become sympathetic to these changes and is more willing to defer to the states on matters of civil rights and liberties. For example, the Court now may be somewhat more accepting of the standards of local communities in obscenity cases and substantially less willing to see cases transferred from state to federal courts in habeas corpus and other proceedings. Even more important, however, is the apparent willingness of the Court to see cases decided on state constitutional grounds without review by the Supreme Court. One must be careful not to overestimate this tendency, but the trend does seem to provide increased opportunities for states to deal with today's complicated issues of civil rights and liberties on the basis of their own constitutions, traditions, and standards.

While some observers applaud this "new judicial federalism," which would give greater scope to the states in defining civil rights and liberties, others doubt the capacity of the states to protect these rights adequately. There is no a priori answer to this question of whether the states will protect civil rights and liberties; instead, one must look to the record of state constitutions, state judiciaries, and state political processes.

The Nature of State Constitutions

State constitutions differ from the Constitution of the United States in several ways. First, the Constitution of the United States, by and large, delegates authority to the national government. As is well known, the national government has only those powers delegated to it by the Constitution. The states and their citizens retain all powers not delegated to the national government or prohibited specifically to them. This means that state constitutions are more likely to contain limits on governmental authority than is the case with the national Constitution.

Second, state constitutions must deal with matters barely touched on in the U.S. Constitution. State constitutions, for example, have detailed provisions on local government, elections, public education, and land management.

Third, state constitutions may be based on different understandings and philosophies of government. The Constitution of the United States is based on a Federalist conception of the separation of powers, with a single strong chief executive, a bicameral legislature in which the states are represented equally in one chamber, and life tenure for judges. State constitutions, on the other hand, may divide executive authority among several statewide elected officials and provide for the election of judges.

Fourth, state constitutions are easier to amend and change than is the U.S. Constitution. In fact, the 50 American states have had a total of 146 different constitutions since 1775. It may be that the relative stability of the U.S. Constitution has been made possible, in part, because of the capacity of the states to adopt new constitutions to meet changing social and economic conditions.

Fifth, unlike the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions provide for direct citizen participation in the process of amendment and change. All state constitutions provide for citizen ratification of proposed constitutional amendments; 17 even provide for the initiation of amendments directly by the voters, thus bypassing the legislature altogether.

Sixth, because state constitutions must contain limits on government, and because they are relatively easy to amend, some commentators have observed that state constitutions tend to become "cluttered" with details that would be best left to statutory law. Although this charge can easily be exaggerated, it is true that state constitutions contain much more detail than does the Constitution of the United States. This detailed nature of state constitutions has important consequences for state judiciaries and for the practice of judicial review.

Finally, state bills of rights are often different from the U.S. Bill of Rights. Many state civil rights and liberties provisions are more detailed than are their counterparts in the U.S. Constitution. This is frequently the case with state provisions protecting against an establishment of religion, for example. Sometimes the language of state bills of rights appears to go beyond what is required in the U.S. Con-
stitution. Free speech provisions and guarantees of political participation are often of this nature. Most state constitutions contain rights provisions for which there are no counterparts in the U.S. Constitution. For example, 40 constitutions guarantee a right to education, and 19 contain an explicit right to be free of gender discrimination. Again, these differences have important implications for state courts.

State Courts and State Constitutions

The Constitution of the United States requires that state court judges "be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this [the U.S.] Constitution." In implementing this requirement, state constitutions usually require state judges to take a specified oath swearing fidelity to both the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution. For instance, the Pennsylvania Constitution prescribes the following oath for judges: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth..." Given that the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land," state judges, in cases of a conflict between their two loyalties, must give precedence to the U.S. Constitution and law. In fact, the U.S. Constitution makes this requirement explicit. After declaring the Constitution and laws of the United States to be supreme, it goes on to provide that the "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Yet, even with the clear supremacy of the U.S. Constitution, this does not answer the question of whether state judges should look first to the U.S. Constitution or to the constitution of their state when it is claimed that a state action violates both.

Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, state judges, quite naturally, looked to their state constitutions because there was little in the U.S. Constitution to limit state action. Later, when the U.S. Supreme Court began to find such protections in the Fourteenth Amendment—first for property rights and then for personal liberties—state judges also turned to the U.S. Constitution. After 1937, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit state economic regulation, except in the most unusual situations. State court judges, because they are bound by the Supreme Court's interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, likewise turned from the Fourteenth Amendment as a defense of property rights against state action but, of course, continued to use their state constitutions as property rights were challenged by increasingly active state governments.

Similarly, as the Warren Court expanded the scope of national constitutional protections for personal liberties, state judges also turned to the U.S. Constitution when confronted with cases involving personal liberties. In part, this tendency to look to the U.S. Constitution resulted from the nature of the legal strategy employed: because federal constitutional rights were so broadly interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, lawyers naturally argued their client's case on the basis of the U.S. Constitution. State constitutional issues, when they were raised at all, were often seen as secondary.

Furthermore, state court judges began to interpret state constitutional provisions as identical to equivalent national constitutional provisions. For example, the language of Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution's Declaration of Rights—dealing with searches and seizures—is similar to the language of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; consequently, Pennsylvania judges have tended to interpret Section 8 in precisely the same way as federal judges have interpreted the Fourth Amendment. Clearly, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution could not have been interpreted to deny rights protected by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, Section 8 could have been interpreted by Pennsylvania judges to guarantee rights beyond what might be required by the Fourth Amendment.

This raises the difficult issue of "floors and ceilings." If state judges view state constitutional provisions as identical to U.S. constitutional provisions, then interpretations by the U.S. Supreme Court become both the floor and the ceiling for the states. However, if state court judges interpret state constitutional provisions independently of the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the U.S. Constitution, then U.S. Supreme Court interpretations impose a floor only, and the states are free to develop an independent constitutional law that goes beyond that of the U.S. Supreme Court. At least this is the view of a number of state supreme court justices, including Hans Linde of Oregon, Stanley Mosk of California, Robert N. C. Nix, Jr., of Pennsylvania, and Robert Utter of Washington.

Interpreting state bills of rights independently of the U.S. Bill of Rights also raises once again the problem of uniformity versus diversity. Should American citizens have precisely the same civil rights and liberties regardless of where they live? Or should the states continue to play a role in defining civil rights and liberties? If the latter position is admitted, what should be the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in setting basic standards for civil rights and liberties? Because the American federal system is predicated on a pragmatic and dynamic balancing of uniformity and
diversity, one should not be surprised to find these difficult considerations arising here.

**State Constitutional Law and American Federalism**

The development of an independent state constitutional law has important implications for American federalism, implications that go beyond the issues of personal rights and liberties. For example, an independent state constitutional law reaffirms the role of the states as laboratories. It has been argued that today's issues of civil rights and liberties are extraordinarily complicated, often pitting one personal liberty against another. Even the most ardent civil libertarians disagree on how to resolve such issues as free press versus fair trial or the free exercise of religion versus the establishment of religion. These are conflicts in which society might benefit from experimenting with a variety of solutions in different settings without imposing a single uniform national standard. Even beyond issues of civil rights and liberties, experimentation seems a necessity when confronted with such issues as balancing legislative and executive control over bureaucracy or how to achieve equity in educational finance.

In addition, an independent state constitutional law would foster diversity, one of the key values underlying federalism itself. One should not assume that uniformity in constitutional doctrine means better constitutional doctrine. Many contemporary constitutional issues admit of a variety of solutions, none of which is necessarily better than another, only different.

Third, the development of an independent state constitutional law would reinforce the role of the states as polities. Earlier in this chapter, it was argued that the principal role of the states in the American federal system is to make policy for their own citizens in keeping with their own needs and traditions. Constitutional policymaking, no less than legislative and executive policymaking in such fields as education, social welfare, and domestic relations, is an attribute of being a polity. This must not be taken to mean that the states are "sovereign," at least in the classic sense of that word. The American states exist within the framework of the Constitution of the United States, whose supremacy clause assures the superiority of constitutionally legitimate national laws. Nevertheless, no matter how broadly we interpret the powers delegated to the national government, our constitutional bargain assures a considerable policymaking role for the states.

Finally, an independent state constitutional law can be supportive of democracy itself. Constitutions address the most fundamental political questions: what public policies are legitimate, how is political conflict managed and organized, and what are the very purposes of the political community? In the American states, citizens write and approve constitutions, ratify amendments through direct participation, and, in most states, play a role in selecting or retaining the judges who interpret the constitutions. These matters of constitutional choice are at the very heart of democracy. Without vital state constitutions and constitutional development, American citizens would be denied any opportunity to participate in this most basic decision-making process.

**The Organization of this Study**

This study is organized into four parts. Part I, which includes this chapter and the next, explores the role of state constitutions and constitutional law in the American federal system and the contemporary opportunities for the development of an independent state constitutional law. Part II, which includes chapters 3 through 7, explores how state courts have addressed fundamental constitutional issues, including the organization of state government, civil rights and liberties, equality, criminal procedure, and property rights. Part III, chapters 8 and 9, deals with how the development of an independent state constitutional law affects selected areas of public policy—in this case workers' compensation and educational reform. Finally, Part IV, chapter 10, presents the conclusions of the study.

**NOTES**


5 See the comparisons drawn by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton in *Federalist #50 and Federalist #55*, in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., *The Federalist* (Middletown, Con-


10Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 10.


12“... nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” Amendment V.

13“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the自由 of speech or of the press.” Amendment X.

14“No state shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...” Article I, Section 10.

15“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” Article IV, Section 2.

16Congress shall have the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Article I, Section 8. As early as 1851, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances, this power is exclusive with Congress and, even in the absence of national law, state regulation may still be prohibited, but under other circumstances, state regulation is permissible—giving rise to what has been called “the dormant power of the commerce clause.” See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). See also Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).

17“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Impost or Duty on Imports or Exports, except those where may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws...” Article I, Section 10.

18Beginning with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 399 (1937), the Supreme Court reversed a long string of precedents and began to reject constitutional objections to state economic regulation based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The situation with regard to claims brought under the equal protection clause is somewhat more complicated. For discussion of the latter issue, see Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), and Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).


22It was on this point that the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately decided the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).


25See, for example, Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).


27Indeed, this was the precise argument of the majority in Garcia.

28This was reaffirmed in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).

29One of the earliest cases raising the issue of the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Bill of Rights was the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and especially Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

30Gittlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), in which the Supreme Court “incorporated” freedom of speech among the “liberties” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


33See, for example, New York Association for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 356 F.2d 752 (1973).


38Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), for example.


41This is one of the principal arguments of John Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

42See Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, American State Political Parties and Elections (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1982).


“Eternally Vigilant” is the motto of the American Civil Liberties Union.


See Ellis Katz, “Prisoners’ Rights, States’ Rights.”


Miller v. California, 413 U.S.15 (1973), although the U.S. Supreme Court seems to have retreated from this position.


In fact, there is some evidence that state supreme courts may be just as vigilant about protecting individual liberties as is the U.S. Supreme Court. See Craig R. Ducat, Mikel L. Wyckoff and Victor E. Flango, “Can State Judges Be Trusted to Defend Federal Constitutional Rights?” Paper delivered at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.


Albert L. Sturm, “The Development of American State Constitutions.” But Sturm does not include the Connecticut and Rhode Island charters as constitutions, and his survey was completed before the adoption of the Georgia Constitution of 1982. Therefore, the correct number might be 148 rather than 145. See also the information regularly provided by the Council of State Governments in its annual *Book of the States*.


For example, Article I, Section 5 of the Michigan Constitution provides: “Every person may freely speak, write, express, and publish his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. . . .”

For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.” (Article III, Section 14): “The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. . . .” (Article I, Section 27) and “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth because of the sex of the individual.” (Article I, Section 28).

Constitution of the United States, Article VI, Section 2.

Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article VI, Section 3.

Constitution of the United States, Article VI, Section 2.


In fact, the process may have worked just the other way, with federal judges borrowing the concept of substantive due process from state constitutional developments. It may be that the concept was first articulated in New York in Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). See Corwin, *Liberty against Government. . . .*
Chapter 2

Powers of and Restraints on “Our Federalism”: State Authority under the Federal Constitution

In 1971, Justice Hugo Black wrote of “Our Federalism” as “a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” In 1971, however, it was not yet clear that the U.S. Supreme Court had consecrated a new era of greater, though still bounded, federal constitutional support for state regulatory powers. During the past one-and-one-half decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has recast the nation’s image of the U.S. Constitution and has redefined its own authority to interpret the Constitution. These developments should have special meaning for state governments. From the federal judiciary’s recognition of constitutionally expansive federal administrative authority in 1937 to the late 1970s, the federal constitutional landscape was not as hospitable to state exercises of broad police and economic regulatory powers as it is today with the Supreme Court’s new solicitude for “Our Federalism.”

“Our Federalism” has operated on several fronts in federal constitutional doctrine. The Burger Court substantially tempered the activist role that the Warren Court had asserted in expanding individual rights guarantees. In turn, the Rehnquist Court has marginalized the force and reversed the momentum of Warren Court precedents in many areas, including criminal procedure, constitutional privacy, and Fourteenth Amendment state action and equal protection doctrines. At the same time, the Court has acknowledged the potential for independent state protection of individual liberties under state constitutional, statutory, and common law. Additionally, although a narrow majority of the Burger Court refused to continue to enforce substantive restraints on Congress’ commerce powers in the interests of state governments, the Court may be willing to scrutinize the congressional procedures for enacting commerce legislation that directly burdens the states. Moreover, the Supreme Court has limited the access of individual rights plaintiffs to the federal courts, in part by strengthening the procedural barriers of standing and by broadening constitutional preferences for state court powers in the doctrines of adequate and independent state law grounds, state sovereign immunity, abstention, and equitable restraint.

The Supreme Court’s heightened sensitivity to “Our Federalism” yields much ground for activism to states in the development of their own constitutional law. To some extent, state courts have responded to the clarion call for leadership in the field of individual rights protection. Yet, vast territories of state constitutional law remain to be explored by state legislatures, in their economic and civil liberties policymaking, and by state courts, in their interpretation of the mandates of their own constitutions. Particular opportunities—and the nature and scope of state authority to exploit them—will be examined in the following chapters of this book.

This chapter serves merely to sound a warning. In the stir of a much warranted enthusiasm for state constitutional law development, it must be remembered that “Our Federalism” embodies restraints on state authority as well as powers. Inherent in cooperative federalism is an expectation that the federal Constitution will furnish a “floor of security” for the interests of life, liberty, and property below which the states cannot fall in ordering their policy priorities through state law, including state constitutional law.
Generous as the U.S. Supreme Court has been of late in sanctioning the independent evolution of state constitutional law, its recent construction of several federal constitutional doctrines has not been wholly congruent with this attitude. Sound leadership of the state constitutional law movement depends on careful study of the ambiguities in these federal doctrines, which may limit all branches of state government in their lawmaking authority, or affect only the state judiciary in its authority to declare state constitutional law.

Brief analyses of the most relevant of these doctrines follow. The first section examines the contours of major federal constitutional doctrines that channel the economic and police powers of state legislatures, executives, administrative agencies, and courts. In order of treatment, they include the preemption doctrine, the dormant commerce clause doctrine, and the takings clause, and economic due process and equal protection doctrines. The second section describes federal constitutional boundaries on the authority of state courts to interpret state law, including state constitutional law. They involve the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, and various abstention and equitable restraint doctrines.16

### Restraints on State Economic and Police Regulation

#### Preemption Doctrine

The preemption doctrine is rooted in the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. Because federal law is supreme within the realm of its constitutional authority, state law that interferes with the operation of federal law or that intrudes in the realm of federal law can be invalidated by the courts. The supremacy clause is the basis on which the federal and state legislatures and judiciaries delineate the spheres of regulatory power that are delegated exclusively to the federal government and those spheres of concurrent and supplementary federal and state governmental activity. Accordingly, the preemption doctrine is one of the primary constitutional vehicles by which the Constitution defines the profile of “Our Federalism.”

The preemption doctrine identifies two general grounds on which federal law can preempt state law, including state constitutional law. First, Congress may preempt an entire regulatory area within its constitutional authority and prevent state involvement, regardless of the compatibility of state activity with federal rules and objectives, by establishing its decision to “occupy the field.” Second, even where Congress has not displaced state activity in a field of regulation entirely, state law that is in “actual conflict” with federal law may be preempted.

In using the first ground, the judiciary examines a federal statute to determine whether Congress “intended” to occupy the regulatory field. Of course, explicit statutory language may define the extent to which the enactment preempts state law. Even in the absence of such language, however, an intent to occupy the field may be inferred where a scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to preclude supplementation by the states, or where the area is traditionally left to federal control.

The judiciary may find state regulation in “actual conflict” with federal law on a number of bases. Preemption most likely occurs when federal and state laws give rise to conflicting obligations, thus making it impossible for those who are subject to regulation to comply with both federal and state rules. Even when federal and state laws are not contradictory on their face, a state regulation may be invalidated if it conflicts with the aims of federal law, and is, thereby, an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

These standards have not been applied in a uniform and consistent manner over time. Indeed, in any particular era, the Supreme Court’s approach under the preemption doctrine appears to reinforce whatever theory of federal-state relations holds sway in constitutional interpretation at the time of a decision. Whereas the Court’s earlier views of federalism were bolstered by a presumption of federal preemption in any subject area regulated by Congress, the current judicial view of “cooperative federalism” may be driving the Court’s recent preemption decisions. Since 1973, the preemption doctrine has embodied a state-protective presumption: the traditional economic and police powers of the states will not be superseded by federal law unless Congress clearly and manifestly establishes its intent to preempt state law.

This presumption is evident in both grounds of the preemption doctrine. Federal “occupation of the field” will not likely be implied merely from the existence of a federal regulatory scheme. Rather, federal exclusivity may depend on a clear statement, found in the text or legislative history of a congressional enactment, of the national objective to preempt all state regulations of the subject area. In the absence of such an express provision, the parameters of federal exclusivity may be limited to those discrete aspects of an industry that are extensively and comprehensively regulated in the federal statute. Similarly, the second ground of “actual conflict” appears to be restricted to cases in which compliance with both state and federal regulations is a physical impossibility (or an “imminent impossibility”), and in which the state regulation directly and substantially frustrates the purposes of federal law.
Thus, the current preemption doctrine generally accommodates more expansive police and economic regulatory authority in state governments, even in subject areas affected by federal law. In summary, the probability that a state constitutional grant of authority to state and local governments or the police, and economic measures enacted or enforced under such a grant, will be preempted by federal law decreases with the aggregate of the following variables: the state constitutional grant or administrative measure (1) regulates a subject matter traditionally left to the states, (2) has historic police power objectives concerning health, safety, or morals, (3) has objectives that are compatible with or supplemental to the purposes for any federal regulation in the subject area, (4) is in a subject area that has not been preempted explicitly by federal law, and (5) affects dimensions of an activity that have not been regulated comprehensively by federal law.

**Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine**

Federal constitutional powers that lie "dormant" are those that have been granted to the federal government but are not currently being used. Even in the absence of federal regulation that could preempt the operation of state law, dormant constitutional powers might be enforced by the judiciary to limit state authority. Only one constitutional grant of federal power has given rise to substantial litigation under the concept of dormant powers—the commerce clause. The Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional grant of congressional commerce power to imply corollary restraints on state authority to regulate certain interstate economic transactions that Congress has not attempted to control.

The dormant commerce clause doctrine essentially furthers the federal interest in the national free trade unit: it prevents the states from erecting barriers to the movement of goods and services across state lines. By challenging state regulations that aim to protect local markets and industries from interstate competition, the doctrine curbs sister-state retaliation and economic balkanization. On the assumption that congressional "silence" in the face of parochial state legislation does not amount to federal approval of local economic protectionism, the judiciary stands in the stead of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free of state-created obstacles.

The Supreme Court has developed three categories of analysis in dormant commerce clause litigation. First, state economic regulation is suspect if it discriminates against interstate commerce. A scheme is likely to be characterized as discriminatory if, on its face, it treats out-of-state competitors differently than in-state enterprises by imposing greater economic burdens on the out-of-state interests; even a facially neutral scheme may be suspect if, in its operation, it so substantially and disproportionately disfavors out-of-state interests as to evidence a clear state purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce. Once identified as discriminatory, a state economic regulation typically will be invalidated, unless the state can demonstrate that the scheme was designed to serve a legitimate purpose other than protection of the economic interests of its own residents, such as the promotion of a significant local safety or health objective. Even if the state law promotes a non-protectionist purpose, differing treatment for out-of-state goods and ventures must be justified for some reason apart from their state of origin. In all probability, a state economic regulation found to discriminate against interstate commerce will run afoul of the commerce clause.

Although a particular measure may not be discriminatory when viewed in isolation because it treats in-state and out-of-state enterprises in an evenhanded manner, it may nonetheless adversely affect only the economic interests of multistate businesses when considered in the aggregate of all applicable state regulations that the businesses must observe. Accordingly, the second category of dormant commerce clause cases restrains state economic schemes that subject interstate commercial activities to conflicting or inconsistent regulations from state to state. In such cases, of course, a state regulation favors localized commerce by imposing cumulative burdens on national enterprises. Typically, the judiciary requires either a showing of actual conflict among state regulations or of direct regulation of extraterritorial trade to invalidate a state economic regulation on this basis.

The third category of analysis evaluates whether a state rule that is neither discriminatory nor inconsistent with sister-state schemes places economic burdens on interstate commerce that clearly exceed the local benefits obtained. Under this "balancing" approach, the judiciary assesses the nature and the significance of the state's regulatory interests as compared to the extent of the monetary burdens and economic inefficiencies imposed on interstate commercial transactions. The continuing viability of this approach for enforcement of the commerce clause is in some doubt. Of late, a significant minority of the Supreme Court has opposed the balancing approach, arguing that the judiciary is institutionally incompetent to weigh the relative benefits and burdens of state economic regulations. In this regard, judicial skepticism is supported by theoretical arguments that dormant commerce clause analysis requires courts to operate in a quasi-legislative capacity that is explicitly disavowed in other constitutional areas.

In the last decade, a major "loophole" in dormant commerce clause restraints has amplified the...
federal constitutional authority of state governments to favor local economic interests. The "market participant" exception allows the states to burden interstate commerce—indeed, to discriminate against out-of-state business concerns in an open and overt manner—provided the state itself has "entered the market" by subsidizing private businesses\(^5\) or by operating a business as a proprietor.\(^6\) The analytic distinction between the state as a "market participant" (i.e., when state activities will not be subject to dormant commerce clause restrictions) and the state as a "market regulator" (i.e., when state activities will be amenable to doctrinal restrictions) is not a bright line, however. Should a state exploit its economic clout to discriminate against commercial transactions occurring beyond its territorial jurisdiction and outside of the particular market in which it is contracting, its behavior may be deemed "downstream regulation" rather than market participation.\(^7\)

Consistent with the state-protective presumption in the contemporary preemption doctrine, the current doctrine of the dormant commerce clause promises a broad range of state governmental discretion in economic regulation when Congress has not acted to control the field of interstate commerce. Even if the Supreme Court does not totally abandon the balancing approach in dormant commerce clause analysis, its increased deference to state governmental rulemaking in the commercial realm enhances the opportunities for innovative state economic policy under state constitutional and statutory law. In general, a state constitutional grant of economic regulatory powers, or a state constitutional restraint on public and private economic transactions, or any legislative or administrative measure implementing such powers is likely to survive challenge despite its effects on interstate commerce, provided: (1) it is designed to promote traditional police power objectives, such as health or safety, rather than the business interests of its own residents; (2) it treats out-of-state and in-state economic entities even-handedly; and (3) it does not vary from national standards to such an extent that it imposes conflicting obligations or cumulative burdens on multistate businesses.

**Takings Clause Doctrine**

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution limit the governmental power of eminent domain:\(^8\) government may "take" private property, but only for a "public use"; even then, the taking must be accompanied by "just compensation." By conditioning the power of eminent domain on both the demonstration of a public purpose and the government's willingness to pay, the takings clause theoretically promotes several objectives: an expenditure of public monies should secure a public gain, and not merely benefit a politically powerful interest group;\(^9\) moreover, a public good should not be extracted from any discrete and identifiable individuals, but financed by the public at large.\(^10\)

As the Supreme Court has interpreted the takings clause, the legitimacy of a state's exercise of eminent domain can be challenged on four grounds: first, the state has "taken" the property, rather than merely regulated its use by private owners and operators; second, the state cannot establish that the property was taken for a "public use"; third, the state cannot demonstrate that the taking is sufficiently related to the public purpose to be justifiable; fourth, the state has not provided adequate compensation, whether in cash or in kind. As to most of these issues, the takings clause doctrine is both unsettled and opaque.\(^11\) Recent developments in the takings clause, which may have particular impact on state land-use regulation, highlight the importance of unraveling its tangled doctrines, however.

The first question—whether the state has "taken" or merely "regulated" private property—is crucial, for only in the case of a "taking" is the government required to pay compensation for controlling or burdening the private uses of property. The border between a "taking" and a "regulation" of private property is not marked by any bright and definitive line; nevertheless, it is possible to identify polar positions and characteristic attributes in light of which a state activity can be deemed a "taking" or a "regulation."

The classic case of a "taking" is the state's permanent and physical occupation of private property.\(^12\) Without regard to the importance of the public interests served, or to the severity of the imposition on the landowner's usual and expected functions, a state's permanent trespass and appropriation of property is virtually certain to be found a "taking."\(^13\) In opposition, the classic case of a "regulation" of private property is the state's prohibition of a noxious use or nuisance.\(^14\) Of course, when the state banishes or controls a "harmful" use of private property, it may be favoring an alternative private use to which surrounding property had been or will be committed; traditional police powers have been stretched conceptually to include regulatory zoning that benefits a conforming private use, even when the nonconforming use was not recognized as a public or private nuisance at common law.\(^15\)

Apart from these polar cases of physical occupation and noxious use, the distinction between a "taking" and a "regulation" has been made on a case-by-case basis.\(^16\) with the Supreme Court viewing several variables as relevant. Among them, diminution in the value of property, destruction of investment-backed expectations, and reciprocity of benefits figure prominently in Supreme Court precedents. The
more substantial the reduction of the value of the private property, the more likely it is that a “taking” will be found.62 Similarly, the more severe the interference with expectations of a reasonable return on private investment, the more vulnerable a state regulation will be to invalidation for uncompensated losses.63 In contrast, when a state regulatory scheme provides a “reciprocity of advantage” by creating parallel benefits and burdens for all interested parties (for example, in enhancing land value for an alternative activity at the same time that it diminishes land value for the prohibited activity), it is less likely to work a compensable “taking.”

Despite the judiciary’s essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries in distinguishing “takeings” and “regulations,” it is possible to articulate generally the circumstances (apart from the requirements for “public use” and “means-ends fit” to be discussed below) in which a state regulatory scheme may impose uncompensated losses without creating a “taking.” The state regulation (1) should not impose a permanent and physical occupation of private property; (2) should not destroy any traditionally recognized attribute of the property rights; (3) should not substantially diminish the commercial value of the property; (4) should not substantially frustrate expectations of a reasonable rate of return on investment; and (5) if at all possible, should secure some reciprocity of advantage for the burdened parties.

The second issue in takings clause challenges—whether the state has established a “public use” for the private property—is clearly the least problematic in case doctrine, if only because the Supreme Court has virtually abdicated any serious review of state regulation under this requirement. As early as 1905, the Supreme Court intimated that any use conducive to the public benefit was a “public use” justifying eminent domain, whether or not property was actually devoted to use by the public.65 With the erosion of the distinction between public and private purposes under the takings clause, the “just compensation” requirement has become the surrogate for an independent inquiry into the public purpose of a “taking” of private property.66 In its most recent articulation of the “public use” requirement for eminent domain, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the concept of “public use” is essentially “coextensive with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”67

In contrast, the third issue—whether the state can demonstrate an adequate “means-ends fit” (i.e., whether the statutory scheme is sufficiently related to the alleged public purposes)—lately has been resurrected as a potential obstacle to uncompensated land-use regulations, and may prove to be an independent requirement in the future for exercises of eminent domain even when just compensation is provided. A narrow majority of the Supreme Court recently required a showing that the particular land-use regulation chosen by the state would closely and substantially further the purposes or objectives for the regulatory scheme.68 This “standard of precision,” of course, far exceeds the burden of proof demanded of the state under the “public use” requirement in eminent domain or in review of state economic regulation under the due process clause.69 Whether the justices will maintain their heightened scrutiny of the means-ends fit, of course, remains to be seen.

The fourth issue—whether the state has provided “just compensation” for a “taking”—has assumed greater importance since the Supreme Court dramatically changed the constitutional doctrine of “inverse condemnation”70 in 1987. After years of uncertainty over the remedial rights of property owners who establish a regulatory “taking,”71 the Supreme Court has declared that a government must compensate a property owner for whatever “temporary taking” occurs between enactment and invalidation of an offending regulation, at least when the owner is denied “all use” of the property during that period.72 At this point, it is not clear how far-reaching the “temporary takings” doctrine will prove to be. For example, will the damages remedy be limited to temporary denial of all effective use? What substantial time must pass before a “temporary taking” is likely to be found?73 To what damages will the property owner be entitled—consequential damages, loss of good will?74 Ambiguities notwithstanding, it is evident that the “temporary takings” doctrine will be critical for state and local land-use regulators: once the doctrine is extended to zoning cases, government will presumptively be liable for interim damages should land-use restrictions later be deemed compensable “takings.”75 Moreover, the doctrine is likely to increase economic incentives for challenges to administrative rulings that inhibit land development.76

Cloudy and uncertain as the takings clause doctrine rightly appears, several of its elements have been revitalized. At the very least, this indicates the potential for a more stringent protection of private property rights under the federal Constitution that constrains a state’s economic regulatory powers under its constitutional and statutory law. Such a signal is paralleled, as well, in the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine.

**Economic Due Process and Equal Protection Doctrines**

Fourteenth Amendment constraints on state economic regulation also exist under the due process and equal protection clauses.77 Although earlier in this century the Supreme Court regularly invalidated economic measures under these clauses,78 the Court’s decisions since the late 1930s have demonstrated a virtual “hands-off” approach in substantive
review of state economic regulation. Generally, the Court has enforced a rule of “mere rationality”: a state or local regulation affecting private economic and social interests will not be stricken if there is any “rational relationship” between the regulatory scheme and a legitimate legislative objective, even a “conceivable” purpose that might have motivated the regulating body.

In a striking departure from rationality review, the Supreme Court lately has examined much more carefully the legitimacy of state regulations that discriminate against the economic interests of out-of-state enterprises. A discriminatory measure enacted only for the purpose of promoting domestic business at the expense of out-of-state trade might not survive the Court’s heightened standard of review. This development is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, if it leads to an increased judicial solicitude for private economic interests, the Court would be abandoning its post-1930s deference to political decisionmaking in areas of socioeconomic policy. Second, unlike its rulings under the dormant commerce clause, judicial enforcement of the equal protection clause would be binding on the Congress as well, restricting its authority under the commerce clause to permit parochial favoritism in state economic regulation. However uncertain the future of equal protection restraints on discriminatory economic legislation, it is apparent that a state regulation that disfavors out-of-state commercial ventures is vulnerable to attack, even with the approval of Congress, if it only furthers a “naked preference” for domestic industry.

**Authority for State Judicial Declaration of State Constitutional Law**

**Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine**

Unlike the constitutional provisions described above, which restrain all branches of state government in their exercise of police and economic regulatory powers under state constitutions, the doctrines to be examined in this section focus primarily on the federal constitutional authority of the federal judiciary. These doctrines restrain the federal judicial power in the interest of full and effective declaration of state law by state courts. Essentially, these doctrines recognize and endorse independent state judicial development of state law, including state constitutional law.

Clearly, the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine is the most important among them. This doctrine prevents the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing a state high court judgment that ultimately rests on a determination of state law, even though the state court may have erroneously decided an issue of federal law. When resolution of the state ground does not rely conceptually and doctrinally on the federal law ruling (i.e., “independence” of state ground), and when the state court’s judgment would stand even after Supreme Court reversal of its federal law holding (i.e., “adequacy” of state ground), the judgment is immunized totally from appellate review by the Supreme Court.

At least two objectives justify the Court’s self-imposed restraints on appellate jurisdiction under this doctrine. First, the Supreme Court should avoid unnecessary pronouncements on federal constitutional and statutory law, particularly if friction with state substantive policies or state judicial procedural rules might be avoided. Accordingly, the doctrine ensures the necessity for, and the efficacy of, a federal court ruling on appeal that actually resolves a case or controversy. Second, the Supreme Court should manifest its respect for the state judiciary’s role in developing and applying state law, constitutional and nonconstitutional, substantive and procedural. Thus, the doctrine is a gauge of the strength of “Our Federalism.”

The Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine in both procedural and substantive contexts. In the procedural context, a state high court typically refuses to decide a federal law issue because the federal rights claimant has failed to comply with a requirement of state court procedure. In such a case, it is clear that the state procedural ground is “independent” of federal law, and the Supreme Court’s inquiry addresses the “adequacy” of the procedural rationale to bar consideration of the federal law claim. In the substantive context, however, a state high court judgment may appear to rely on both federal and state substantive law, and the Supreme Court’s inquiry primarily explores the “independence” of the state law ground; did the state court understand state law as the basis for its judgment, or did it refer to state law merely as additional support and illustration of a decision controlled by federal law? Discussion will focus on the substantive applications of the doctrine, for it is in this context that the doctrine has evolved into a viable and powerful instrument of “Our Federalism.”

For illustration, compare Case 1 and Case 2 in the following example:

**Case 1:** A state high court holds that a state statute violates both state and federal constitutional guarantees. In its consideration of the state law ground, the court finds that the state constitutional standards violated by the statute are different from those under the federal Constitution.

**Case 2:** A state high court holds that a state statute violates both state and federal constitutional guarantees. The court reasons that the state and federal provi-
sions impose identical substantive restraints, and because the state statute violates the federal constitutional standards, it is also invalid under the state constitution.94

The issue of the “independence” of a state law decision generally arises because the state court’s opinion has not clarified whether a state law guarantee has a substantive content which is separate and distinct from its counterpart under federal law. It is more likely that the Supreme Court would find such independence in Case 1 than in Case 2: in the latter, the state constitutional law decision appears inextricably enmeshed with, and reliant on, the ruling under federal law. Accordingly, the judgment in Case 1 is more likely to be immunized from Supreme Court review than the judgment in Case 2.

In 1983, the Supreme Court refashioned the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine by establishing a standard for review of federal law decisions rendered by state courts.95 The Court will presume that it has appellate jurisdiction over any state high court decision when . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be intertwined with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.96

This presumption can be overcome, however, even if a state court chooses to refer to federal law decisions as persuasive (albeit not authoritative) precedents for its state law ruling:

[The state court] need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.97

The Court’s new standard for resolving the “independence” of state law grounds does balance competing federalism concerns. On the one hand, the approach permits the Supreme Court to maintain the supremacy and uniformity of federal law where a state court decision of a federal claim is both erroneous and determinative of the result in a case; additionally, it informs the state political branches that a potentially erroneous but unreviewable state judicial determination of a federal law issue need not be accorded binding force.98 On the other hand, the approach assures the state judiciary of a firm basis for developing of state constitutional law, by immunizing from review state court decisions based on “bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds.”99

Given the Court’s standard of presumptive review, the burden of demonstrating that a state court judgment “plainly” rests on a state law ruling must be carried by rights claimants in their pleadings, briefing, and argumentation, and by state judges in their legal analysis and opinion writing. How, then, should a claimant’s brief or a state judge’s opinion be written, what analysis should it provide, to ensure insulation of the state court decision from Supreme Court review?

To date, the Court has not proposed or endorsed a set formula guaranteeing nonreviewability,100 and it would be injudicious, if not misleading, to do so here. Nonetheless, it is possible to suggest a panoply of “analytic devices” which, if used in combination, will more likely than not establish an independent state law ground.101

1) A prefatory discussion of the role of state law in the opinion: in light of the rule that federal constitutional issues should be avoided if the case can be decided on alternative grounds, the claim of right shall be determined first under the state constitution; should the state constitution provide independent support for the claim, there is no need to reach the federal constitutional issues;

2) Explicit acknowledgement of a trend of greater protection for the relevant civil liberty under the state constitutional guarantee than its federal counterpart;

3) Citation to state constitutional law precedents alone or primarily to establish governing rules and standards;

4) Where federal court precedents are cited, explicit assurance that references to federal law serve only to guide independent analysis of state constitutional law guarantees;

5) Clarification that controlling state law precedents themselves rest on state law grounds.

The independent development of state constitutional law may demand analytical ingenuity and creativity, careful attention to writing style, and just “plain hard work.”102 This is the price to be paid for the autonomy of the state constitutional enterprise.

Abstention and Equitable Restraint Doctrines

Whereas the Supreme Court fashioned the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine to limit its own appellate jurisdiction over state high court decisions, the Court has developed a number of rules to restrict the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts, which also operate in favor of state court declaration of state constitutional and statutory law. Known as the abstention and equitable restraint doc-
trines, these rules generally apply when a federal district court is asked to grant injunctive or declaratory relief to prevent alleged violations of federal constitutional rights by state executive, administrative or judicial officials in their enforcement of state law. In federal court actions against state and local governments, familiarity of governmental counsel with these rules will maximize the opportunities for state court adjudication of state constitutional law issues.

**Pullman Abstention Doctrine.** Where adjudication of an unclear and unsettled question of state law would dispose of a substantial and sensitive federal constitutional question, a federal district court must temporarily abstain from exercising jurisdiction in order to give the state courts an opportunity to decide the state law issue.

The rule of Pullman abstention recognizes that federal courts should exercise their equitable powers so as to avoid the "waste" of an unnecessary and tentative decision on federal constitutional grounds, and to accord due respect for state adjudication of ambiguous state law issues. Abstention is conditioned, however, on real uncertainty in the interpretation of a state law; generally, the federal court will not be confident that a bona fide dispute over the meaning or purpose of the state law can be resolved by construing the text or by relying on definitive state court precedents. Even significant ambiguity will not trigger abstention, however, unless clarification of the state law may avoid the need for further consideration of the federal constitutional issue. Notably, the Supreme Court has not yet required abstention in the face of a potential state constitutional challenge, although invalidation of the state law on this basis would clearly moot the federal constitutional question.

**Abstention in Diversity Actions.** A federal district court may abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction to adjudicate an unclear and unsettled issue of state law where there is the potential for federal interference with the operation of state law in a sensitive area of state policy.

The Supreme Court has extended the abstention doctrine to federal diversity actions challenging state policies in significant public regulatory fields, such as eminent domain proceedings and management of essential state industries. In these instances, abstention often prevents federal meddling in the operation of complex and technical administrative schemes involving difficult questions of state law. Federal district courts are not required to relinquish diversity jurisdiction, however, merely because policies important to the domestic interests of a state are challenged.

**Equitable Restraint Doctrine.** A federal district court must refrain from exercising jurisdiction in an equitable action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief challenging the federal constitutionality of a state law or an official act which is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding brought by the state against the federal plaintiff.

The Supreme Court's current solicitude for "Our Federalism" first congealed in the crucible of the equitable restraint doctrine. The intricate web of rules subsumed under this doctrine may promote "comity" between federal and state courts in several ways. By refusing to intervene in state adjudications in order to explore a federal constitutional question, federal district courts do not disrupt the normal processes of the state judiciary, and do not foreclose their opportunities for independent development and enforcement of state substantive law, including state constitutional law. Furthermore, the federal district courts demonstrate confidence in the competence and good faith of the state judiciary to enforce the guarantees of the federal Constitution. Whether the equitable restraint doctrine effectively attains its purposes, it symbolizes the dedication of contemporary federal constitutional law, in a number of areas, to the maintenance of "Our Federalism."

**Conclusion**

This overview of eight federal constitutional doctrines only sketches the outlines of the greater federalist design. At the same time that it restricts state action, American federalism recognizes broad state powers to order public rights and private liberties in economic ventures and political and civil activities. In the efforts of state government to strike a balance among competing public policy objectives, state constitutional law has a central role to play. The potential for state constitutional involvement must be understood and the extent of its authority enforced.

Understanding this potential is not, however, an effortless or risk-free task. As the prior discussion should illustrate, successful navigation of federal constitutional restraints requires careful study of the rocks and shoals on which the independent development of state constitutional law might founder. Reliance on any broad-brushed or abstract concept of inherent state sovereignty is unlikely to immunize state action from federal limitations. Only a precise identification of the federal constitutional doctrines implicated by state regulations or judicial rulings, and a detailed analysis of the parameters within which state policymaking may safely operate, will ensure the viability of the state constitutional law enterprise.

The warning of Justice Robert Jackson, written for an analysis of "inherent" presidential powers, takes on a different and special meaning in the context of the evolution of state constitutional law: "But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can
keep power in the hands of state government if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them." The federal judiciary has created opportunities for state foresight and assumption of responsibility. While nascent, the current movement to integrate state constitutions into the processes of state lawmaking signifies that the promises of "Our Federalism" might be realized.

NOTES

2In federal constitutional history, the year 1937 is generally regarded as the birthdate of a radical shift in federal judicial thought, which ratified the expansion of federal administrative authority over economic and police power affairs that formerly had fallen within the domain of state law. This movement in constitutional jurisprudence originated with the Supreme Court's sanction of broad Congressional powers under the commerce clause. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For accounts of the post-1937 "revolution" in federal constitutional doctrine and theory, see Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1988), pp. 297-316, 378-397; David Skover, "Phoenix Rising" and Federalism Analysis," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 13 (1986): 271, 281-284.
4For example, the Burger Court created a "public safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment rules against involuntary confessions in New York v. Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 2626 (1984), and a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 444 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). Moreover, after many years in which federal habeas corpus had encompassed claims under the exclusionary rule, the Burger Court held in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 456 (1976), that it would not be available to review search and seizure decisions reached after full consideration in state courts. Excellent analyses of the curtailing of constitutional rights for criminal defendants recognized by the Warren Court are provided in Leonard Levy, Against the Law: The Nixon Court and Criminal Justice (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogations and Confessions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).
6In its notorious "shopping center" cases, the Burger Court compromised the force of the "public function" rationale for the state action doctrine, which had been used by the Warren Court to protect political speech activities. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. National Labor Railroad Board, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Of course, this development set the stage for independent state protection of free speech under state constitutions. See chapter 4. In addition, the Rehnquist Court seriously undermined the potential for finding state action in a "symbiotic" economic relationship between the state and a private party in San Francisco Arts and Athletics Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 107 S.Ct. 2971 (1987). For an analysis of the potential under state constitutional law for rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine, see David Skover, "TheWashington Constitutional 'State Action' Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action," University of Puget Sound Law Review 8 (1985): 221-82.
7The Burger Court has not materially broadened the categories of "suspect classes" or "fundamental rights," which are especially protected under the equal protection clause, beyond those established by the Warren Court. The Burger Court extended the requirement to hold that a challenge of racial discrimination at the "clear statement" standard. See, e.g., Metro Transit Authority v. City of St. Louis, 471 U.S. 252 (1985).
10The Garcia decision stressed that judicial limitation of Congress' commerce powers in the interest of the states could be justified only by possible breakdowns in the structural or procedural restraints that protect the states within the national political processes. 105 S.Ct. at 1019-20. This emphasis on judicial review of the national political process invites the adoption of standards to ensure adequate consideration and weighing of state interests implicated in federal interstate commerce regulation. These standards might require a "clear statement" in legislative history that conscious and deliberate attention was given to state interests in striking the balance in favor of federal commerce regulation. In fact, the Court has already hinted at the viability of such standards for judicial review of federal commerce clause legislation in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), and has imposed a stringent "clear statement" rule in challenges to commerce clause legislation under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 103 S.Ct. 3142, 3149-50 (1983). For discussion of judicial review of the national political process under the commerce clause, see Skover, "Phoenix Rising" and Federalism Analysis.


14 See Collins and Skover, "The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship," Parts IV-A and IV-B.

15 This chapter's analysis of federal constitutional doctrines often draws on the rulings in U.S. Supreme Court cases decided in the second half of the 20th century. Such a reliance neither implies that the federal Constitution means only what the Supreme Court interprets it to provide nor suggests that the political branches of the federal government play no role in defining the scope of state power under the Constitution. Indeed, it is important not to equate federal constitutional thought exclusively with courts, or to neglect the impact of congressional and executive action on the constitutional process. See Collins and Skover, "The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship" (stressing the need for legislative scholarship); William N. Eskridge and Phillip P. Frickey, "Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era," University of Pittsburgh Law Review 48 (1987): 691-731, 691, 693, 709-10, 716-19, 724-25; Ronald Collins and David Skover, "The Senator and the Constitution: An Interview with Orrin G. Hatch" (interview and annotations presenting a constitutional "profile" of Senator Hatch). Rather, this chapter's focus on jurisprudence is a function of necessity. Two of the federal constitutional provisions discussed in the first section of the chapter—the supremacy and commerce clauses—restrain a state's lawmaking under its own constitution primarily by force of Supreme Court interpretations that either presume an absence of congressional action—in the case of the dormant commerce clause doctrine—or take congressional action as a fait accompli—as in the preemption doctrine. The remainder of the first section treats those federal guarantees of individual property rights—the takings clause and the due process and equal protection clauses—that have been revitalized by recent Supreme Court interpretations to place potentially severe constraints on a state's economic regulatory powers under its constitutional and statutory law. Finally, all of the doctrines described in the second section of the chapter concern the constitutional power of the federal courts vis-a-vis state judicial and political governmental actors, and derive from Supreme Court constructions of Article III of the U.S. Constitution and of congressional grants of jurisdiction.

16 This chapter presents only a partial vision of the restraints under the U.S. Constitution on state lawmaking, including state constitutional law development. Among individual rights and federalism doctrines that are not treated here—the specific limitations on state power in Art. I, 10 (particularly the commerce clause doctrine), the requirements of the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, 2, the restrictions on state taxation of interstate commerce, the breadth of congressional spending power for the "general welfare," the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and the Art. III limits on federal court power (particularly the standing and political question doctrines)—all constrain state authority, to a greater or lesser degree, to regulate economic and sociopolitical interests under state constitutional and nonconstitutional law. Of course, even a cursory study of the full body of these doctrines is beyond the scope of this chapter. Three criteria distinguish the doctrines selected for review here. First, traditional federal constitutional constructs for examination of federalism issues have been fashioned through these doctrines, particularly the preemption and dormant commerce clause doctrines. Second, several of these doctrines have been especially important in the evolution of the state constitutional law movement, including preemption, independent and adequate state law grounds, abstention and equitable restraint doctrines. Third, recent Supreme Court developments in several of these doctrines, including the dormant commerce clause, takings clause and economic equal protection doctrines, have taken unanticipated turns, which may affect significantly the exercise of traditional state police powers, primarily with respect to business and land use regulation.

17 Article VI, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

18 See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 536-37 (1977) (state labeling regulation held expressly preempted by congressional prohibition of any labeling and packaging requirements in addition to those under federal statutes).

19 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (city ordinance regulating aircraft noise conflicted with purposes of Federal Aeronautics Act to insure the efficient utilization of airspace); Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296 (1971) (permissiveness of federal regulation of labor relations precludes state wrongful discharge actions requiring interpretation of labor contract's union security clause). The existence of a federal agency with broad regulatory powers in a particular subject area is relevant to the issue of Congressional intent to preempt a field. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (state restrictions on striking activities preempted by national labor regulations). But a federal agency's existence is not dispositive of the issue of federal occupation, particularly when state regulation of an aspect of interstate commerce may concern itself with "local" matters. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (California statute aimed at the economic problems of storing and disposing of nuclear waste is not preempted by extensive federal regulation of the nuclear power industry through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
Subject areas committed to congressional regulation under U.S. Constitution, Art. I, 8, such as bankruptcy, patent and trademark, admiralty, and immigration, have been focused regulatory fields of dominant federal interest in which state activity may be barred. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act preempted by federal Alien Registration Act because regulation of aliens and foreign affairs is of primary national concern); Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (regulation of Indian educational institutions falls within an area of peculiarly federal interest).


See, e.g., Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (invalidated state unemployment compensation law as applied to deny benefits to applicants because they had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the N.L.R.B.); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. It is possible that judicial enforcement of the full policy objectives underlying a congressional regulatory scheme will have the unanticipated impact of discouraging state constitutional designs that delegate economic and police powers to local governmental units. An interesting example of this phenomenon is found in Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1981), in which the cable television broadcaster regulations of a "home rule" municipality, granted extensive powers of self-government by its state constitution, were held to be subject to the restraints of federal antitrust legislation, as the municipality's economic controls did not enjoy immunity under the "state action" exemption.


Two eras of constitutional federalism—the pre-1930s and the period from 1940 to 1973—were characterized by Supreme Court solicitude for national interests under the preemption doctrine, but for different theoretical reasons. Prior to the 1930s, the Supreme Court's "dual sovereignty" perspective, which rigidly differentiated federal and state spheres of power, was fortified by a presumption of federal preemption in any field that the federal government might constitutionally regulate and did in fact regulate. In contrast, during the Warren Court years, an expansive preemptive scope in any federal scheme that regulated a substantial industry solidified the jurisdiction of nascent federal administrative agencies, and secured the privity of federal control in areas of traditional state economic and police regulation, including labor law, civil rights, welfare entitlements, and criminal law. For an excellent analysis of changes in the Supreme Court's preemption doctrines in tandem with the Court's evolving concepts of constitutional federalism, see Note, "The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court," Columbia Law Review 75 (1975): 623 (surveying common directions in preemption decisions from the early 1900s to 1974).

The term "cooperative federalism" refers to the notion that national socioeconomic policy is the joint product of federal and state governmental regulation. The main features of cooperative federalism—overlapping of federal and state spheres of economic and police powers, sharing of political responsibilities and financial resources, and interdependence of administration—are associated typically with federal grant-in-aid programs. See Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (Claremont, California: Pomona College, Scripps College, Claremont College, 1941); Scheber, "Cooperative Federalism," in 2 Encyclopedia, p. 503.


In the Supreme Court's most recent preemption decision to date, the Justices unanimously articulated this presumption as follows:

As we have repeatedly stated, "we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."


The state-protective presumption for the constitutional preemption doctrine has been reinforced by recent guidelines for federal executive interpretation of legislative policies that have federalism implications. President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order on Federalism requires executive departments and agencies to construe a federal statute to preempt state law only when the statute contains an express preemption provision, when there is compelling evidence of congressional preemptive intent, or when the exercise of state authority directly conflicts with the exercise of federal authority under the federal statute. See Executive Order 12612, Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 210, pp. 41685-688 (October 30, 1987).

See, e.g., C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987) (Indiana statute regulating takeovers not preempted by Williams Act that governs hostile
corporate stock tender offers); Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 106 S.Ct. 2369, 2372 (1986) (state sales taxation of airline fuel not preempted despite the fact that "agencies charged by Congress with regulatory responsibility over foreign air travel exercise power . . . over licensing, route services, rates and fares, tariffs, safety, and other aspects of air travel"). If Congress terminates or substantially reduces regulation of a field, the federal judiciary is not likely to require an express intent to retransfer regulatory authority to the states before finding that Congress has abandoned the field. See Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 4308 (congressional purpose to mandate a freemarket regime in the field of petroleum allocation and pricing and to preempt all state regulation of the field cannot be implied merely from the expiration of a former and comprehensive federal regulatory scheme).

28 For example, in C.T.S. Corp., the Court noted that the Williams Act would preempt a variety of state corporation laws authorizing staggered boards of directors and cumulative voting, if it were construed to invalidate any state statute that may limit or delay the free exercise of power after a successful tender offer. The Court responded:

The long-standing prevalence of state regulation in this area suggests that, if Congress had intended to preempt all state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly.

29 See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 56 U.S.L.W. 4249 (1988) (Michigan statute controlling the approval of securities issues by public utilities which was distributed natural gas in the state preempted by the Natural Gas Act). The Court determined that the Michigan statute was designed to protect investors and ratepayers by ensuring "efficient and uninterrupted service at reasonable rates." The state's attempt to direct rate setting fell within the aegis of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), which had conferred on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exclusive jurisdiction over the rates and facilities of natural gas companies that engaged in the wholesaling of natural gas in interstate commerce. Although NGA had not expressly authorized FERC to regulate the issuance of securities by natural gas companies, the state's pre-issuance review of securities amounted to a regulation in the field of gas wholesaling that Congress "had occupied to the exclusion of state law" by "a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation." The Court concluded:

In short, the things [the Michigan statute] is directed at . . . are precisely the things over which FERC has comprehensive authority. Of course, every state statute that has some indirect effect on rates and facilities of natural gas companies is not preempted. [The Michigan statute's] effect, however, is not "indirect." In this case we are presented with a state law whose central purpose is to regulate matters that Congress intended FERC to regulate. Not only is such regulation the function of the federal regulatory scheme, but the NGA has equipped FERC adequately to address the concerns [the Michigan statute purports to manage].

30 See, e.g., C.T.S. Corp., 1647 (no actual conflict requiring preemption of Indiana takeover regulation, since it is entirely possible for entities to comply with both the Indiana statute and the Williams Act; the Indiana statute provides for vesting of voting rights 50 days after commencement of an offer, within the 60-day maximum period Congress established for tender offers); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963) (California law which regulated the marketing of avocados sold in the state did not actually conflict with federal regulations of Florida avocado production, because joint compliance was not impossible if Florida growers allowed the fruit to mature beyond the earliest picking date permitted by federal regulations).

32 See, e.g., Schneidewind, 4254 (preemption of Michigan natural gas rate regulation supported by the "imminent possibility of collision" between the state and federal laws, without a demonstration that the impossibility of dual compliance would be an "inevitable consequence").

33 In the absence of a finding that Congress has occupied the regulatory field, a state law which either serves identical or similar objectives as federal law, or furthers a traditional state purpose which is distinct, yet consonant with federal objectives, is likely to be sustained as "supplementary" state action. See, e.g., C.T.S. Corp., 1645-46 (Indiana's protection of shareholders from coercive takeover offers furthers the federal policy of investor protection in the Williams Act); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (traditional tort remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages, may be awarded to victims of radiation injuries from nuclear power plants without frustrating the federal purposes to occupy the entire field of nuclear safety concerns under the Atomic Energy Act; whatever compensation standard the state might impose, the nuclear licensee remains free to operate under the federal standards for construction and safety and to pay for any injury that results).

34 Article I, 8, c. 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides:

[The Congress shall have Power] to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.


37 The classic statement of the purposes and functions of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine was articulated by Justice Robert Jackson in H. F. Hood and Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond. 336 U.S. 525, 534-39 (1949):
While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, it does not say what the state may or may not do in the absence of congressional action. [This] Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the Constitution. . . . [The] principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units. . . . Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and that no foreign state will by custom duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.

39Concurring in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941), Justice Robert Jackson explained that congressional inertia in eliminating state obstructions to interstate commerce justified judicial activism under the dormant commerce clause doctrine:

[These] restraints are individually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters. [The] sluggishness of government, the multitude of matters that clamor for attention, and the relative ease with which men are persuaded to postpone troublesome decisions, all make inertia one of the most decisive powers in determining the course of our affairs and frequently give to the established order of things a longevity and vitality much beyond its merits.

In this regard, see also Ernest J. Brown, "The Open Economy: Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary," Yale Law Journal 67 (1957): 219, 222 ("Nor has Congress been so idle that such matters could be assuredly left on its agenda without competition from other business which might often be deemed more pressing"). Public choice theory may support the role of the judiciary in enforcement of the dormant commerce clause. If the benefits of economic parochialism are concentrated within a small, easily organized group of state industries, invalidation of state protectionist legislation allocates the burden of overcoming congressional inertia on the interest group that has the most economic incentive to see a favorable federal regulation. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 366-70 (need for a "watchdog" for the public interest in the case of "client politics"); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-3, 53-65, 125-31 (relatively small groups with concentrated economic interests are more frequently able to mobilize political power than relatively large, latent groups with dispersed economic interests).

38 In one important sense, judicial enforcement of the dormant commerce clause doctrine against state economic regulation differs from constitutional decisions in other contexts, such as enforcement of the commerce clause against congressional legislation or enforcement of the contract and takings clauses against state legislation. It must be remembered that the restraints of the dormant commerce clause operate in the "silence" of Congress. Congress may always displace dormant commerce clause decisions by affirmatively regulating, either to preempt state regulation of interstate commerce or to authorize state interference with interstate commerce. See, e.g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (McCarran-Ferguson Act, reserving to the states the power to regulate insurance, allows for discriminatory taxes on premiums paid to out-of-state insurance firms).

40 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating a New Jersey law which prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste collected outside the territorial limits of the state); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (invalidating an Oklahoma law that barred the export of minnows taken from state waters).

41 See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 349-51 (1977) (invalidating a North Carolina statute that prohibited closed containers of apples shipped into or sold in the state to display any grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard). Despite the evenhanded treatment of local and out-of-state producers on the face of the statute, because North Carolina had no grading requirements at all, the regulation exclusively burdened out-of-state producers with strict grading requirements. The Court attached substantial weight to the fact that, by stripping Washington of the competitive advantages it had enjoyed through its rigorous inspection and grading system, the statute appeared to serve an intentionally discriminatory purpose.

42 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 106 S.Ct. 2440 (1986) (Maine's total ban on the importation of live bait fish, supported by bona fide concerns for the health and safety of the state's wild fish stock, sustained in the absence of reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives to the discrimination against interstate commerce); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (upheld New York law requiring all cattle imported into the state for dairy or breeding purposes to be inspected for Bang's disease).

43 In other terms, the state must demonstrate that out-of-state entities are the peculiar scourge of evil with which the state must legitimately aim to control. Compare City of Philadelphia (New Jersey's legitimate environmental goals could have been met by a nondiscriminatory regulation of the amounts of waste deposited in the state's private landfills, regardless of their state of origin) with Maine v. Taylor (parasites and sea animals that might upset the ecological balance of Maine's unique fisheries were not native to Maine waters, and there existed no satisfactory way to inspect fish shipments to screen the harmful conditions).

44 A solid majority of the Supreme Court recently affirmed the exacting nature of its review of discriminatory state economic regulation under the commerce clause in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986): When a statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.

45 See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (invalidating Illinois' mudguard regulation as ap-
plied to interstate trucking industry, as the regulation varied from the uniform requirements of other states without any evident safety advantage and actually conflicted with the requirements of one state).

46 See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority (invalidating New York price affirmation law, which required liquor distillers and producers selling liquor in New York to seek the permission of the liquor authority before lowering prices in other states, because it effectively gave the state agency the power to control prices beyond the state’s borders); Edgar v. MIKE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) (invalidating Illinois’ takeover statute that regulated tender offers for multistate corporations if 10 percent of shareholders were state residents; criticizing the statute’s extraterritorial sweep, the majority held that a “state has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders”); but, compare C.T.S. Corp. (sustaining Indiana’s takeover statute regulating only the corporations that the state has chartered).

47 The balancing approach in dormant commerce clause doctrine is associated with its most celebrated statement in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (invalidating Arizona law requiring fruit grown within the state to be packed locally). See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating Arizona’s restrictions on the lengths of railroad trains on the basis that whatever slight or marginal improvements to safety the regulation might accrue could not outweigh the great expense and delay that it imposed on railroad travel by deviating from nationally standard practices); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality opinion by J. Powell) (invalidating Iowa limits on the length of trucking “doubles” by balancing state’s safety interest against the burden on interstate commerce).

48 Among the most forceful opponents of balancing in dormant commerce clause cases is Justice Scalia, who argued in concurrence in C.T.S. Corp., 1652-53, that “such an inquiry is ill-suited to the judicial function. … I do not know what qualifies us to make the ultimate (and most ineffable) judgment as to whether, given importance level x, and effectiveness level y, the worth of the statute is ‘overweighed’ by impact on commerce x.” This argument largely echoes the position taken by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist against balancing state safety considerations against burdens on interstate commerce in transportation regulations. See, e.g., Kassel, 691-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Importantly, the majority opinion in C.T.S. did not examine the validity of the Indiana takeover statute under balancing analysis before affirming its constitutionality and, in fact, expressed a reluctance “to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation,” C.T.S., 1651, citing Kassel, 679 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although it may be implied that the Court is increasingly willing to dispense with the balancing approach in the dormant commerce clause doctrine, the rejection of this analysis remains to be seen.

49 See Skover, “‘Phoenix Rising’ and Federalism Analysis,” pp. 295-98 (active judicial intervention in economic regulation under dormant commerce clause doctrine is theoretically and practically inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reliance on “political safeguards of federalism” in recent commerce clause doctrine); Julian N. Eule, “Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,” Yale Law Journal 91 (1982): 425 (evaluation of discriminatory economic measures under different constitutional provisions); Tushnet, “Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause” (focus of inquiry should be distortions in state political processes).

50 See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (sustaining a Maryland program designed to reduce the number of junked automobiles in the state by establishing a “bounty” on Maryland-licensed junk cars and imposing more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state scrap processors than on in-state competitors); White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding an order of the mayor of Boston that all construction projects funded by the city must be performed by a work force including one-half bona fide city residents).


52 See South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnick, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (invalidating contractual requirement of Alaska public corporation that timber sold by the state at preferential prices be processed within the state, for imposition of unconstitutional regulatory conditions downstream in the timber processing market).

53 The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which restricts the eminent domain powers of the federal government, provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Identical limitations on the eminent domain authority of state governments have been enforced through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.

54 As will become apparent, the Supreme Court’s current doctrine on the “public use” requirement understands that this objective—the securing of a public good—is likely to be served by the “just compensation” requirement: that is, public willingness to pay for a transfer of property suggests that some actual public gain underlies the taking.


56 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged as much, in admitting a lack of determinate rules or standards in the takings clause doctrine. Consider Justice William Brennan’s statement in the opinion of the Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978):

[This Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.]

57 See, e.g., Pumphrey v. Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (destruction of private property by government-caused flooding).

58 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized that
a “taking” generally will be found in the case of a governmentally authorized permanent physical occupation of private property. The Court’s decision in Loretto invalidated a New York statute that required landlords to permit a cable television company to install cable facilities on rental land and buildings. Compare Federal Communications Commission v. Florida Power Corp., 94 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1987) (upheld federal statute authorizing the FCC to review the rates that utility companies charge cable operators for the use of utility poles, distinguishing Loretto on the basis that nonconsfinatory regulation of rates chargeable for the use of private property devoted to public uses is not a “taking”). See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (frequent flights immediately above a landowner’s property constituted a “taking” “as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.”).

59 See, e.g., Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyle Park, 97 U.S. 639 (1878) (denying compensation for the banishment of a fertilizing company, originally located outside of Chicago city limits, when the area became inhabited); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 368 (1926) (denying compensation in enforcement of local zoning ordinance); "a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in a parlor instead of the barnyard.

60 See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (uncompensated governmental destruction of red cedar trees infected with a rust endangering nearby apple trees analogized to the regulatory abatement of a public nuisance at common law); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding as a “safety regulation” a zoning law prohibiting a sand and gravel mining enterprise from excavating below the water table, in part on the basis of inconclusive evidence of substantial diminution of the property value).

61 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the judicial finding of a “taking” of property involves ad hoc decisionmaking based on the facts of a particular case. Consider Justice William Brennan’s statement in the majority opinion of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 123-24. [The] question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. . . . [I]n fact, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely “upon the particular circumstances in that case.”

62 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state statute prohibiting underground coal mining which might damage surface property, as applied to affect the rights of a private coal company to engage in such mining under a deed executed by the surface homeowner’s predecessor in title, worked a “taking” as it would “destroy previously existing rights of property and contract.”). Of course, the question that is difficult to answer is how much diminution in value is “too much.” Both before and after Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Supreme Court has indicated a strong reluctance to find a “taking” only on the basis of this variable, at least in the absence of total destruction of property rights. See, e.g., Hadachev v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (decrease of value from $800,000 to $60,000 sustained as an uncompensated regulatory loss); Penn Central, 131 (“[T]he decisions sustaining other land-use regulations [reject] the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a “taking”). Indeed, the viability of Pennsylvania Coal Co. itself is in serious question, as the Supreme Court has appeared to undermine its reasoning (although not to reverse its holding) in the recent decision of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987) (upholding Pennsylvania statute that authorized a regulatory requirement of maintenance of 50 percent of coal beneath structures as a means of providing surface support for public buildings, private residences, and cemeteries, on the ground that the act would not interfere unduly with investment-backed expectations).

63 In this regard, compare Penn Central, 136 (New York’s historic landmarks preservation law permits Penn Central’s continued operation as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions, and thereby “does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel” or its ability to obtain a “reasonable return” on its investment”) and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (federal government create a public right of access to a lagoon that had been dredged for use as a private marina waterfront found to destroy the investment-backed expectations of the private lagoon owner).

64 See, e.g., Penn Central, 137. The New York landmarks preservation law allowed owners of landmark sites who had not developed their property to the full extent otherwise permitted under zoning laws to transfer their development rights to contiguous parcels on the same city block. In its determination that the economic impact of the law fell short of a “taking,” the Supreme Court took account of the provision of these transferable development rights as a feature that “enhances the economic position of the landmark owner in one significant respect.” The Supreme Court’s understanding of the “average reciprocity of advantage” appears to have taken an unexpected turn in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis (balancing the burdens on coal companies imposed by mine subsidence regulation against the benefits accruing to the companies from restrictions falling on others in different regulatory schemes). For an insightful critique of this approach, see Epstein, “Takings: Descent and Resurrection,” in Philip Kurland, ed., 1987 Supreme Court Review (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 22-23 (“For Holmes the test of average reciprocity of advantage was really a way of asking whether the parties whose property was taken received compensation in-kind for the loss in question in the same transaction. . . . Indeed, under Stevens’s misdirected rendering of Holmes’s test, no restrictions on use ever could be unconstitutional because the state might also right the balance on some future occasion.”)


66 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 8-5 and 9-2.

67 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (Hawaii Land Reform Act served a valid “public use” by employing eminent domain to enable homeowners with long-term land leases to purchase the lots on which they lived). In the last three to four decades, the “public use” doctrine has been assimilated conceptually with the “public purpose” and “rational relationship” standards applied in reviewing regulations of economic interests under the due process clause. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Essentially, the Supreme
Court has established that, so long as the state's use of eminent domain is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the "public use" requirement is satisfied. See Berman, 17-19 (discussion of "rational relationship" standard in economic due process doctrine). The relationship between the broad approach to the "public use" doctrine in eminent domain and the due process "public purpose" doctrine is described in Arco Van Alstyne, "Public Use," 3 Encyclopedia, p. 1494, and Harry N. Scheiber, "Public Purpose Doctrine," 3 Encyclopedia, p. 1489.

68 See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987) (invalidating state land-use regulation that conditioned the issuance of a permit to rebuild an oceanfront residence on the property owners' grant to the public of a permanent easement across their beach). The Nollan Court found that the easement condition did not substantially advance the government's alleged purposes, including the public's ability to see and gain access to the beach from the streets in front of the home. The Court concluded that, "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'" Nollan, 3148.

69 "It is [by] now commonplace that this Court's review of the rationality of a State's exercise of its police power demands only that the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective." Nollan, 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

70 In an "inverse condemnation" action, the private property owner sues to establish that the government has effectively appropriated his property and must pay for it. If the court finds a "taking," the court will order payment of just compensation. This action is distinct from a mandamus or a declaratory judgment action, in which the private owner merely claims that a governmental regulation affecting his property violates his due process rights. Should the court find such a violation, it will merely invalidate the regulation as applied prospectively to the property.

71 Typically, state courts have not subjected state or local governments to damages or an inverse condemnation award for a legislative or regulatory action that was found to be a taking; they regarded the invalidation of the regulation as the only proper remedy, leaving the private landowner with full prospective use of his property. Essentially, the state courts had denied the private owner any compensation for the "temporary taking" of his property that occurred between the effective date of the state or local regulation and the effective date of the judicial invalidation of the regulation. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), affirmed on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

72 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987) ("temporary" takings that deny a landowner all use of his property are not different from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation).

73 Ibid., 2389 (indicating that the "temporary taking" doctrine will not apply in the case of "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, and the like").

74 The First Evangelical Court did not address the valuation of the "temporary taking" for purposes of "just compensation." It only indicated that, when such a "taking" is found, the owner must be compensated for the full period.

75 Though exploration of the question is beyond the scope of this analysis, it is interesting to ask whether state and local governments may limit somewhat their exposure to crippling liability for interim damages by enacting more stringent statutes of limitation on inverse condemnation actions challenging land use regulations.

76 Professor Richard Epstein makes the point that a broad reading of First English and Nollan would have a combined influence that could shift the cost-benefit calculations for land developers who perceive an increased "rate of return" from suits challenging land-use regulations. Epstein, "Takings: Descent and Resurrection," pp. 43-44.

77 In pertinent part, Amend. XIV, 1 to the U.S. Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

78 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York law regulating the hours and wages of bakery employees as an abridgement of the liberty of contract that violated the due process rights of both employees and employers); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a law that established minimum wages for women under due process and equal protection rationales). Between 1899 and 1937, the Supreme Court invalidated state or federal economic and social regulations under the due process clause, usually coupled with the equal protection clause, in approximately 200 cases. For comprehensive surveys of the Court's rulings in this period, see Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942), pp. 153-168; Normal Jerome Small, ed., The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).

79 Among the most celebrated cases articulating the contemporary doctrines of economic substantive due process and equal protection, see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (sustaining Oklahoma statute that prohibited an optician from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist, challenged on due process and equal protection grounds); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (sustaining a New York City traffic regulation that banned commercial vehicular advertising, except for the vehicle owner's own products).

80 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 488 ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) ("Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational, they cannot prevail so long as 'it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable.' "). In contrast to the Warren Court years, the Burger Court era appeared occasionally to infuse a little "bite" into the "mere rationality" standard. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985) (invalidating under the equal protection clause the application of a
municipal zoning ordinance to deny a special permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded). Clearly, however, such cases expressed the exception to “mere rationality,” rather than the rule, for the Burger Court.

81 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (invalidating Alabama insurance regulation that taxed out-of-state companies at a higher rate than domestic companies for the illegitimate purpose of promoting the business of domestic insurers by penalizing foreign insurers); Williams v. Vermont, 105 S.Ct. 2465 (1985) (invalidating Vermont automobile sales tax scheme that allowed a credit against state use tax for any sales tax paid in another state if the taxpayer were a Vermont resident at the time the car was purchased).

82 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the majority reasoned:

Alabama’s aim to promote domestic industry is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. Alabama’s purpose . . . constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. . . . [T]his Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by burdening “the residents of other state members of our federation.”

83 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. was decided by a narrow majority of five Justices, with Justice Powell writing the opinion of the Court and Justices O’Connor, Brennan, Marshall and Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent. Of course, Justice Kennedy’s arrival on the Court and any changes in the Court’s composition in the near future would render any projections regarding a “new era” of constitutional protection for private economic liberty (under the equal protection clause, however, instead of under economic substantive due process) totally speculative.

84 This point was demonstrated emphatically by the dissenting Justices in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., who viewed the majority opinion as charting an “ominous course,” that “has serious implications for the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause.” Noting that Congress in the McCarran-Ferguson Act had explicitly placed insurance regulation “within the purview of the several States,” the dissenters objected to the majority’s use of the equal protection clause as an instrument of federalism: “Surely the Equal Protection Clause was not intended to supplant the Commerce Clause, foiling Congress’ decision under its commerce powers to ‘affirmatively permit [some measure] of parochial favoritism’ when necessary to a healthy federalism.” 470 U.S. at 899 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

85 Indeed, soon after Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. was decided, the Court unanimously upheld against challenges under the commerce and equal protection clauses the laws of Connecticut and Massachusetts, that limited the creation or acquisition of in-state banks to banking corporations located in the six-state New England region. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159 (1985). The Court found that a federal statute, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, itself authorized the individual states to balkanize the banking industry. Moreover, the Court deemed the “independence of banking institutions” to be a legitimate state objective to which the laws bore a rational relationship. In concurrence, Justice O’Connor argued that the state schemes in Northeast Bancorp were indistinguishable from that in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., and suggested that the latter ruling might have confined Metropolitan Life to its peculiar facts. 472 U.S. 178-9 (O’Connor, J., concurring).


87 Art. III, 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.

The text of Art III would appear to grant appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review any state court decision involving a question of federal law, regardless of the manner in which the state court resolved the case, and to grant original jurisdiction to inferior federal courts to decide any such case in the first instance. Doctrinal restraints on such an expansive power have been self-imposed by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, in their interpretation of Art. III and federal statutory grants of jurisdiction.

88 As articulated concisely by the Supreme Court in Fox Film Corp. v. Mueller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935), the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine embodies “the settled rule that where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, [Supreme Court] jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.”

89 For example, if a state high court determines that the right of the media to broadcast copies of court tape recordings can be upheld under both the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and state constitutional guarantees of speech and press rights, the U.S. Supreme Court should deny appellate jurisdiction to review the state court’s potentially erroneous decision under the First Amendment, provided the state constitutional law holding does not rely substantively on the federal law decision and would sustain the judgment alone if the federal law holding were undermined upon review. See State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353, 359-62 (1984).

90 In Herb v. Pitcairn, 334 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945), Justice Robert Jackson characterized the doctrine as a preventative against Supreme Court issuance of “advisory opinions” in violation of the Art. III case or controversy requirements. Arguably, use of this metaphor is unfortunate. By casting the doctrine as a device to prevent “advisory opinions,” Justice Jackson raised it to the level of a constitutional justiciability requirement, similar to the standing or political question doctrines. This characterization does not recognize the nature of the restraint as a self-imposed or prudential limitation on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. For critiques of the constitutional basis for the doctrine, see, e.g., Richard A. Matasar and Gregory S. Bruch, “Procedural Guarantees of Speech and Press Rights,” 33 Creighton Law Review 521 (2000).

91 Several well-established principles guide Supreme Court review of a state high court judgment that bars consid-
eration of a federal law claim because of a procedural default:

1) The determinative issue—whether a federal law claim was sufficiently and properly raised in the state courts—is itself ultimately a question of the “adequacy” of the state law ground. Because the issue implicates the scope of the Supreme Court’s own jurisdiction, it presents a federal question as to which the Court is not bound by the state court ruling. Street v. New York, 349 U.S. 576, 583 (1960).

2) The enforcement of state court procedure at the expense of a hearing of a federal law claim, at the very least, must pass muster under the “fundamental fairness” requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955).

3) Even if enforcement of a state court procedural rule would meet “fundamental fairness,” it will not bar Supreme Court review of a federal claim if the rule were applied with a specific intent to deprive a claimant of his federal rights or if it “unreasonably interfer[ed] with the vindication of such rights.” James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-9 (1984) (state procedural requirement had not been consistently applied in prior cases); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383 (1955) (state court refusal to exercise discretion deemed “in effect, an avoidance of the federal right”).

Although the Supreme Court appeared to expand the scope of its review despite procedural default in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (balancing the importance of the federal right against the utility of the state’s enforcement of its procedural requirement in the specific case at bar, insofar as it furthers a legitimate state interest), subsequent retreatment in the Court’s standards for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction may have undermined the intellectual supports for Henry’s broad approach to the Court’s direct appellate review. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (no habeas corpus relief if state court procedure afforded a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate a federal constitutional claim); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (habeas corpus review of state court judgment turning on failure to comply with “contemporaneous-objection” rule barred unless defendant demonstrates “cause” for the procedural defect and resulting “prejudice”).

Assuming the “independence” of a state substantive law basis for a judgment, as long as the basis itself did not violate the federal Constitution, it generally would be deemed “adequate.”

See, e.g., State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (1982) (claimant’s rights sustained independently under Vermont Constitution after determining that there was a corresponding right available under federal law); State v. Cee, 361-62 (first granting relief under state constitutional law, and then proceeding to establish federal claims under federal law).


Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Prior to Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court had adopted a variety of methods for resolving the issue of the “independence” of a state law ground: (1) dismissal in the case of unclear grounds for decision, see, e.g., Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52 (1934); (2) remand to the state high court for clarification of the grounds for decision, see, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940); (3) examination of state law rulings to discern whether state courts generally used federal law model. For some guidance on state law, see, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion). These cases and other similar decisions were cited and characterized as failing important interests of federalism by the Michigan Court, 1038.

Ibid., 1041.

Ibid. (emphasis added).

Laurence Tribe considers this ramification of the Michigan v. Long standard to be central to the autonomy of state law. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law, p. 166.

Michigan, 1041. Critics of the Michigan v. Long approach have argued, of course, that the balance among federalism interests was struck in a manner that accords insufficient respect for state court autonomy. Mr. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Michigan v. Long, claimed to be “thoroughly baffled by the Court’s suggestion that it must stretch its jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court in order to show ‘respect for the independence of state courts’.” Michigan, 1072 (J. Stevens, dissenting). See, e.g., Ronald Collins, “Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts,” Mississippi Law Journal 54 (1984): 371, 400-01 (suggesting a “less intrusive presumption” to vindicate the autonomy of state judiciaries, such as a rule on unreviewability in the absence of a “plain statement” that state law does not provide the relief sought). Contrast Martin Redish, “Supreme Court Review of State Court ‘Federal’ Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism,” Georgia Law Review 19 (1985): 861 (arguing that Michigan v. Long is not “invasive” of state court prerogatives in any meaningful sense).

An enigmatic footnote in the Michigan v. Long majority opinion, 1041 n. 6, gives reason for concern over what, indeed, will constitute a sufficient demonstration of a “bona fide separate, adequate, and independent” state law ground:

There may be certain circumstances in which clarification is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking the appropriate action.

Post-Long decisions indicate that the Supreme Court may well exercise review in the face of any ambiguity over the basis of a state high court judgment. Compare Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984) and Florida v. Myers, 446 U.S. 380 (1984) (appellate review due to failure to indicate clearly that decision was based ultimately on state law] with Uhler v. AFI-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310 (1984) (California Supreme Court’s prohibition of a ballot initiative rested on independent state ground because of state court’s detailed analysis of state law).

All of the analytic devices described in the text were employed to advantage in Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 P.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985) (municipal ordinance banning solicitation of religious donations outside public conven-
tion center violates California’s constitutional guarantees of speech liberties). In particular, see Carreras, 1042-43 (prefatory discussion of the role of state law as first basis for consideration of claims of right), 1042 n.4 (acknowledging rule of avoidance of unnecessary federal constitutional questions), 1044 n.7 (establishing trend of greater protection for expressive activity under state constitutional law than under First Amendment), 1043-45 and 1048-50 (analysis of state constitutional precedents alone for governing rules and standards), 1044 n.8 and 9 (ensuring that controlling state constitutional law precedents themselves rested on state law), 1048 n.21 and 1049 n. 24 and 25 (explicitly stating that citation to federal judicial precedents in past state supreme court decisions, and past adoption of analytical frameworks developed by the Supreme Court under the federal constitution, served only to guide independent interpretation of the state constitution). Given its self-conscious, deliberate, and artful use of the full battery of analytic devices, Carreras stands as an excellent case study and role model for the independent interpretation of state constitutional law. It is interesting to note that a federal appeals court was responsible for such a splendid example of state constitutional exegesis.

102 In this regard, a comparison of two state high court decisions may be instructive. Compare State v. Badger (acknowledging that separate consideration of Vermont constitutional claims is required and that the state constitutional meaning is not identical to federal constitutional meaning even for parallel provisions; relying exclusively on state court precedents in interpreting state constitutional provisions; providing “plain statements” that judgment rests on state constitutional guarantees) with Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325 (1987) (explicitly acknowledging reliance on both federal and state constitutional law because violation of the former is violation of the latter; interweaving discussion of federal and state constitutional texts and court precedents; analyzing the determinative issues as substantively identical under federal and state constitutional law; providing no “plain statement” that the judgment is grounded on state constitutional law).


104 The Pullman abstention doctrine derives from the rule in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (requiring federal district court abstention from decision of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, to afford the Texas state courts an opportunity to rule on the state statutory claim of abuse of discretion in the commission's order to segregate operation of railroad sleeping cars).

105 A federal ruling on a sensitive federal constitutional issue might be tentative or “wasteful” in the sense that interpretation of an unclear state law by the state courts might well moot the federal constitutional issue. For example, the Supreme Court understood in Pullman that because the last word on the statutory authority of the railroad commission could issue only from the Texas Supreme Court, any decision on the constitutionality of the commission’s segregation order would be a “tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state ad-

judication. . . . The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.” Pullman, 500.


107 Abstention to permit a state constitutional law attack on a state law is typically deemed improper where the state constitutional provision is virtually identical to the applicable federal constitutional provision. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (refusing to order abstention to permit state court scrutiny of state liquor regulation under state constitutional law). Abstention in such circumstances would be tantamount to a rule of exhaustion of state judicial remedies before bringing a federal action on federal constitutional grounds, a prerequisite which the Supreme Court has not been willing to impose. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

108 See, e.g., Louisiana Power and Light v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (requiring abstention in a diversity action challenging the authority of state municipalities to condemn utility properties, since the delegation of eminent domain powers to localities is a question “intimately involved with the sovereign prerogative”).

109 See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (upholding abstention in a challenge to a drilling permit issued under a Texas state scheme creating a complex and coherent pattern of administrative and judicial decision-making to resolve oil rights issues); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951) (requiring abstention in a challenge to the commission's order to continue certain local train service, on the rationale that resolution of the dispute depends on the “predominantly local factor of public need for the service rendered.”).

110 For example, in Burford, 326-27, the Supreme Court explained that the Texas legislature had established a unified state administrative and judicial network to regulate the production of oil and gas, and that state judicial review of the Commission’s orders was speedy and thorough. Indeed, to prevent confusion of multiple review of legal issues involving the state scheme, the legislature had provided for concentration of all direct review of the commission's orders in the state districts of one county. The exercise of federal equity jurisdiction in this case would create the “very confusion” which the Texas legislature and Supreme Court feared might result from review by many state courts of the Railroad Commission’s orders.” Burford, 327.

111 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating Wisconsin statute that required court permission for remarriage of a state resident under legal obligation to provide child support). The Supreme Court distinguished Burford v. Sun Oil on the basis that “this case does not involve complex issues of state law, resolution of which would be ‘disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.’ “ Burford, 380. Importantly, the state statute in Zablocki implicated a substantial question of federal constitutional law, on which resolution of the case ultimately turned. Professor Martin Redish argues that abstention from the exercise of diversity jurisdiction
should be restricted to controversies in which (1) the regulatory policy is "of significant and special concern to the state"; (2) the administrative scheme is, "in fact, detailed and complex"; and (3) any substantial and troublesome federal question "cannot be resolved without requiring the federal court to immerse itself in the technicalities of the state scheme." Redish, Federal Jurisdiction, pp. 246, 259. But see Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (diversity suit for trespass, involving no complex regulatory or administrative scheme).

Mr. Justice Hugo Black first used the term "Our Federalism" in the celebrated case of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to announce the principle of "comity" between federal and state courts on which the Court has relied in formulating the rules of the equitable restraint doctrine.

In summary, the equitable restraint doctrine yields the following rules:

1) At the time a litigant initiates a federal proceeding to challenge state action as unconstitutional, if the litigant is a defendant in a pending or ongoing state criminal proceeding, and if the federal litigant can raise the constitutional claims in the state proceeding, ordinarily the litigant will not be able to obtain federal injunctive or declaratory relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal injunctive relief against state criminal prosecution); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (federal declaratory relief against criminal statute enforced in pending prosecution).

2) A federal district court may grant declaratory or injunctive relief against unconstitutional state action if the federal litigant does not become a defendant in a state criminal prosecution concerning the same issues before proceedings of substance on the merits have begun in the federal action. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (federal declaratory relief where genuine threat of enforcement of unconstitutional state statute demonstrated); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (preliminary injunctive relief to preserve status quo pending declaratory judgment); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) ("proceedings of substance" restriction).

3) At the time a litigant initiates a federal proceeding to challenge state action as unconstitutional, if the litigant is a defendant in a pending state civil suit brought by state officials to enforce important state policies, and if the federal constitutional claims may be raised and litigated fully in the state proceeding, ordinarily the litigant will not be able to obtain federal injunctive or declaratory relief. Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975) ("quasicriminal" nuisance abatement action); Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (civil contempt proceeding to effectuate a state damage judgment); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (state civil action to recoup welfare payments obtained by fraud); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (extending equitable restraint to federal issues between the parties that are not directly implicated in the pending state civil proceeding).

4) The rules above do not apply if the pending or ongoing state proceeding has been initiated in bad faith or as part of a program of harassment, or if a federal litigant's constitutional claim concerns the procedural fairness of the very state proceeding in which constitutional claims would otherwise be brought.


In Trainor v. Hernandez, 445-56, the Supreme Court recognized that the exercise of federal equitable jurisdiction at the time that a state civil enforcement suit was pending would "... confront the State with a choice of engaging in duplicative litigation, thereby risking a temporary federal injunction, or of interrupting its enforcement proceedings pending decision of the federal court at some unknown time in the future. It would also foreclose the opportunity of the state court to construe the challenged statute in the face of the actual federal constitutional challenges that would also be pending for decision before it, a privilege not wholly shared by the federal courts.

The Supreme Court has articulated forcefully its purpose to avoid the "unseemly failure to give effect to the principle that state courts have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts, to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 460-61.

For a persuasive critique of the contradictory bases for the equitable restraint doctrine, see Redish, Federal Jurisdiction, pp. 298-307.

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (original reference to "power in the hands of Congress."
In the American federal system, there are few national requirements governing the structure and relationship of state government institutions. States are not even directly required to have constitutions. Some thought was given to a “model” state constitution that would have been mandated by the Continental Congress early in 1776, but the idea was dropped without being considered seriously.1 Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution does provide that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of government. . . .”2 In 1912, however, when the argument was made that Oregon’s constitutional provision for the passage of legislation by popular initiative violated the requirement of a “republican” (government by elected representatives) government, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-held position that this issue constitutes a nonjusticiable political question left to congressional enforcement.3 Congress, of course, may require the inclusion of provisions in a state constitution as a condition to the admission of new states.4

In addition, the federal Constitution does provide a few limitations on the exercise of state power, for example, to regulate commerce and coin money. Most of these restrictions on state power were, in part, direct responses to perceived abuses perpetrated by the powerful, and relatively unchecked, state legislatures during the decade before adoption of the federal Constitution.

Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment and its judicial interpretation for more than a half a century have imposed a range of restrictions on states with respect to various individual rights and liberties. Beyond these limits, however, the American states remain free to devise and change governmental institutions and arrangements as their citizens see fit. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said:

We shall assume that when, as here, a state Constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is nothing to hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned.5

Thus, with respect to governmental structure, a state remains free to, in the famous words of Justice Louis Brandeis, “serve as a laboratory”6 for what Holmes referred to as “social experiments . . . in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states.”7

The American states have played this role of experimenting with governmental structure and relationships since the beginning of the Union. Thomas Paine, defending Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution, which featured a unicameral legislature, weak executive, and virtually no checks and balances, wrote in 1778:

It is in the interest of all the States, that the constitution of each should be somewhat diversified from each other. We are a people founded upon experiments, and . . . have the happy opportunity of trying variety in order to discover the best. . . .8

One very good example of the states’ experiments with government structure can be seen in the area of the “legislative veto.” States put in place mechanisms by which legislatures could, short of enacting a law, disapprove of administrative agency actions. The separation of powers problems with this approach were debated in the state courts, with the nearly unanimous conclusion that such mechanisms could not be permitted. Then the people in various states rejected proposed state constitutional amendments that would have permitted the practice. Most of this activity predated the resolution of similar problems in the federal government.9
Despite the permitted diversity with respect to governmental structure, there are many identifiable patterns and similarities among the state governments. As Frank P. Grad observed: “In spite of their enormous diversity, it is probably safe to say that the similarities between government structure in different states are considerably greater than their differences...”

The Function of State Constitutions Regarding Governmental Structure

At the outset, it must be recognized that the political and legal functions of state constitutions are very different from those of the federal Constitution. The U.S. Constitution creates and defines a government of limited, enumerated, delegated powers. The federal government must point to some explicit or implied grant of power to authorize it to act. Therefore, many of the key questions regarding judicial interpretation of federal power under the Constitution concern implied powers. The state governments, by contrast, are based on a very different fundamental conception of government. State governments, particularly the legislative branch, exercise all residual or plenary powers of sovereign governments, except in situations where they are expressly or impliedly limited by the state or federal constitutions, or by valid congressional legislation or federal administrative action. It is sometimes said that state governments exercise power similar to that possessed by the British Parliament. Therefore, many of the important issues for judicial interpretation of state power under state constitutions concern implied limitations.

In the words of the Supreme Court of Kansas:

It is fundamental that our state constitution limits rather than confers powers. Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby.11

According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, “All legislative power is vested in the General Assembly. . . . Every subject within the scope of civil government which is not within . . . constitutional limitations may be acted on by it.”12

The function of state constitutions, not surprisingly, dictates their form. Generally speaking, because of the necessity to enunciate specific limitations on otherwise virtually unlimited governmental power, state constitutions contain much more detail with respect to the structure and operations of government. For example, state constitutions contain long articles on taxation and finance, two of the most important functions of any government. These provisions restrict state government taxing and spending in a range of ways that is unfamiliar in the federal government.

Further, because state constitutions are easier to amend than the federal Constitution, they have accumulated many limiting details reflecting the concerns of citizens during the various eras of American history. For example, evidence of the periods of distrust of the legislature, the Industrial Revolution, the Progressive Movement, Jacksonian democracy, the settling of the West, bankruptcy in public finance, concern for efficient management, and many other matters can be seen clearly in any modern state constitution.

Finally, the state constitutions include numerous mechanisms for direct popular involvement in governmental decisions that have no analog in the federal Constitution. Amendments or revisions of state constitutions themselves must be ratified by the voters before they can take effect. Beyond this fundamental point, however, direct citizen involvement in such governmental decisions as issuing bonds, levying certain taxes, and even, in some states, approving gambling operations, is often required by state constitutions. States with initiative and referendum provisions in their constitutions obviously permit direct popular participation in the lawmaking process itself. Also, many states permit citizen litigation over governmental matters by authorizing a wide range of taxpayer actions. None of these examples of popular participation in governmental decisions are present in the U.S. Constitution.

State Constitutions and Separation of Powers

James Madison noted in The Federalist, No. 37, that “no skill in the science of government” has been able conclusively to define legislative, executive, and judicial power. As a result, “[Q]uestions daily occur. . . . which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.” Matters have remained just as unsettled in the state constitutions in the 200 years since Madison wrote those words.

Many state constitutions, by contrast to the federal Constitution, contain explicit textual statements of the doctrine of separation of powers. For example, Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides:

The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.

These sorts of statements date from the earliest state constitutions in 1776.13 They express two related concerns: that the powers of government should be separated; and that the persons who exercise these powers...
should be separate individuals. It has always been true, however, that the state constitutions, like the U.S. Constitution, do not provide for a sharp separation of powers; instead, they include a number of blended powers. For example, it is generally conceded that the governor's veto, although assigned to the chief executive officer, is actually a legislative power.

An important question must be asked about the impact of placing explicit statements of the separation of powers doctrine in state constitutions. Should these explicit statements have an impact on judicial determination of separation of powers controversies so as to yield results different from those obtaining under the federal Constitution, where the doctrine is merely inferred from that document's creation of three branches? Courts in Florida have concluded that with respect to delegations of power to administrative agencies a more strict separation of powers is required because of the explicit textual statement in the state constitution. New Jersey courts, by contrast, despite the presence in that state's constitution of a provision virtually identical to Florida's, reach the opposite conclusion:

There is no indication that our State Constitution was intended, with respect to the delegation of legislative power, to depart from the basic concept of distribution of the powers of government embodied in the Federal Constitution. It seems evident that in this regard the design spelled out in our State Constitution would be implied in constitutions which are not explicit in this regard. We have heretofore said our State Constitution is "no more restrictive" in this respect than the Federal Constitution. Indeed in our State the judiciary has accepted delegations of legislative power which probably exceed federal experience.

Generally speaking, however, state courts seem to enforce the separation of powers doctrine, at least in the area of delegations of legislative authority to agencies, more strictly than is the case with separation of powers doctrine in the federal government.

The State Legislative Branch

State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representative government in this country. A number of them have their roots in colonial times, and substantially antedate the creation of our Nation and our Federal Government. In fact, the first formal stirrings of American political independence are to be found, in large part, in the views and actions of several of the colonial legislative bodies.

Chief Justice Earl Warren

Despite the legal and political changes that have occurred since 1776, resulting in the types of limitations on the state legislative branch described below, state legislatures remain extraordinarily powerful. They are the focal point of policymaking in state government. The prevailing view is illustrated by the Supreme Court of Illinois:

Under traditional constitutional theory, the basic sovereign power of the State resides in the legislature. Therefore, there is no need to grant power to the legislature. All that needs to be done is to pass such limitations as are desired on the legislature's otherwise unlimited power.

Limitations on Legislative Power

A commentator observed in 1892 that "one of the most marked features of all recent State constitutions is the distrust shown of the legislature." The transition from early state constitutions granting unfettered legislative power to the more recent constitutions restricting legislative power reflects one of the most important themes in state constitutional law. The clearly established pattern during the founding decade of 1776-1787 was a gradual transition from legislative dominance, or "omnipotence," to an increased role for the executive and judicial branches. The new executive and judicial powers operated as a check on recognized legislative power rather than a sharing of legislative power.

In 1776 and the years immediately following, virtually all of the newly independent constitution-makers' trust was placed in the legislative branch, albeit usually in two houses. It was generally felt that, under the newly flourishing ideas of republicanism, representatives in government should be like the citizens themselves and mirror as closely as possible the makeup of the population. The idea of professional politicians or representatives had not yet developed. Rather, the virtuous members of society would serve, on a rotating basis, for short terms, representing small districts, and honor instructions from their constituents. As Gordon Wood has observed, at this time, "a tyranny by the people was theoretically inconceivable."

The legislative branch had been identified with the people themselves and was viewed as a safeguard against executive abuses rather than a possible source of abuses itself. Under these circumstances, the 1776 brand of legislative supremacy, although not supported unanimously, was not surprising. Effective checks on this legislative power were not viewed by many as necessary because, after so many years of abuses by the British, the newly independent Americans did not foresee that "the people," as represented in the legislature, would also commit abuses.
This philosophy soon began to change, however, as experience under the new legislative supremacy proved to be less than satisfactory. The range of highly visible legislative abuses, such as suspension of debts, seizure of the property of Loyalists, generous authorization of paper money, and legislative interference with the executive and judicial branches, began to raise concerns. Increased executive veto power came to be viewed as not inconsistent with popular sovereignty but, rather, as a necessary mechanism to limit legislative power. In this way, even within revolutionary republican rhetoric, with its absence of reliance on a hierarchical social structure that had justified “balanced government,” the case could be made for checks on the misuse of power by government officials. In Gordon Wood’s words, “The Americans’ inveterate suspicion and jealousy of political power, once concentrated almost exclusively on the Crown and its agents, was transferred to various state legislatures.”

The transition in American history has been from relatively unfettered legislative power to a more evenly balanced distribution of governmental powers among the branches. In addition, the legislative articles of modern state constitutions reflect two important characteristics: (1) the insertion of specific “constitutional legislation” into state constitutional texts, thereby supplanting legislative prerogatives and sometimes leading to a limitation of legislative alternatives through judicially discovered “negative implications” and (2) the insertion into state constitutions of detailed procedural requirements that the legislature must follow in the enactment of statutory law.

Negative Implication

Many state constitutions include provisions that could be relegated to statutory law. When these provisions mandate legislative actions or grant authority to a legislature vested with plenary power, courts can transform these apparent grants of power into limitations on legislative power. As Frank Grad noted:

It must be emphasized that very nearly everything that may be included in a state constitution operates as a restriction on the legislature, for both commands and prohibitions directed to other branches of the government or even to the individual citizen will operate to invalidate inconsistent legislation. . . . In constitutional theory state government is a government of plenaries, except as limited by the state and federal constitutions. . . . In order to give effect to such special authorizations, however, courts have often given them the full effect of negative implications, relying sometimes on the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of another).

For these reasons, many apparent grants of authority become, through judicial interpretation, limits on legislative power. This can be a hidden dimension of state constitutional language, which, when interpreted by state courts, can transform grants into limits. For example, many state constitutions contain fairly explicit provisions on legislative compensation which, of course, would be within the legislative power even in the absence of such constitutional provisions. If the legislature seeks, by statute, to provide some other form of compensation, it is often argued that the constitutional provision contains an implied limitation on legislative authority in the area of compensation.

Procedural Limitations on the Enactment of Statutes

The legislative articles of virtually all state constitutions contain a wide range of limitations on state legislative processes. Generally, these procedural limitations did not appear in the first state constitutions. Instead, they were adopted throughout the 19th century in response to perceived abuses of legislative powers. Last-minute consideration of important measures; logrolling; mixing substantive provisions in omnibus bills; low visibility and hasty enactment of important, and sometimes corrupt, legislation; and the attachment of unrelated provisions to bills in the amendment process—to name a few of these abuses—led to the adoption of constitutional provisions restricting the legislative process. These constitutional provisions seek generally to require a more open and deliberative state legislative process, one that addresses the merits of legislative proposals in an orderly and deliberative manner.

Familiar examples of state constitutional limitations on the legislature include requirements that a bill contain a title disclosing its content and include only matters on a “single subject”; that all bills be referred to committee; that the vote on a bill be reflected in the legislature’s journal; that no bill be altered during its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose; and that appropriations bills contain provisions on no other subject. These procedural restrictions must be distinguished from the common substantive limits on state legislation, such as those prohibiting statutes limiting wrongful death recoveries or mandating a certain type of civil service system, and from the general limits contained in state bills of rights.

Such procedural requirements for enacting statutes provoke criticism on a number of grounds, ranging from the claim that the requirements “have caused considerable damage through invalidation of noncomplying laws on technical grounds,” to the
assertion "that an argument based on the one subject rule is often the argument of a desperate advocate who lacks a sufficiently sound and persuasive one."36 Judicial precedents add little certainty to the application of the generally worded title and single-subject requirements.

Despite such criticism, the limitations on state legislative procedure survived the wave of state constitutional revision that occurred during the middle of the 20th century. Therefore, because these limits have, in effect, been readopted in contemporary state constitutions, they reflect policies relating to the nature of the deliberative process in state legislatures. Further, they represent an important limit on legislative authority and illustrate the lasting result of earlier public disillusionment with legislative abuses.

Although the procedural limits outlined above are usually discussed as if they were all of the same quality, there are important differences. Some provisions require the legislature to act affirmatively, while others prohibit certain acts. A violation of certain restrictions, such as title and single-subject provisions, can be seen from examining the text of the final legislative enactment. By contrast, a violation of other restrictions, such as the prohibition of a bill being altered on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose, will not be reflected on the face of the final legislative enactment. Consequently, a search for this type of violation requires an examination of the procedure leading to the enactment.

State courts have developed a surprisingly wide range of approaches to enforcing restrictions on legislative procedure under circumstances where an act on its face does not violate procedural limitations. Some courts will not "go behind" an enrolled bill, duly signed by legislative officers, to consider evidence of violation of legislative procedure provisions in state constitutions. Other courts will scrutinize the official legislative journals but not other evidence. Still other courts will consider any relevant evidence of such state constitutional violations. Even within single jurisdictions, one can detect inconsistent doctrines and a lack of continuity over time. These widely varying judicial doctrines reflect what are essentially political decisions, made in the context of adjudicating actual controversies, concerning the extent of judicial enforcement of state constitutional norms. On rare occasions, these procedural provisions may invalidate a statute. More importantly, such restrictions make the state legislative process significantly different from, and more rigidly structured than, the congressional legislative process.37

Direct Legislation

The initiative and referendum movement that emerged at the turn of this century was another indication of public dissatisfaction with state legislatures. Initiatives enable the public to bypass unresponsive state legislatures, and referenda provide a check on the effect of unpopular statutes. These devices are more sophisticated than the earlier procedural restrictions, most of which reflected general disapproval of legislative actions. The initiative allows the people to take direct action when the legislature refuses to act. The referendum enables the people to target specific enactments rather than depend on the indirect deterrence of procedural restrictions.

Although state constitutions contained specific provisions requiring a referendum on such questions as assumption of debts and changes in the constitutional text, the people of South Dakota began the process of taking back, or reserving to themselves, a measure of general legislative power in a constitutional amendment approved in 1898. Now, 21 states provide for the statutory initiative, and 25 provide for the referendum.38 One observer predicted that "[t]he more direct legislation you have. . .the greater the body of judge-made law."39 This view raises interesting and complex questions of political philosophy, especially today when many major public issues are resolved at the ballot box.40 Legal questions also arise with regard to initiated statutes: (1) Can they be amended or repealed by the legislature? (generally yes, unless the state constitution provides to the contrary); (2) Can they be vetoed by the governor? (generally no); (3) Do the title and single-subject limitations apply? (generally yes); (4) How should courts interpret such statutes? (according to the understanding of the ordinary, intelligent voter).

The State Executive Branch

Public distrust of the executive branch, as reflected in the early state constitutions, historically has been inversely related to public distrust of the legislative branch. The executive branch began in disfavor,41 but has gained more power and authority over the centuries. State constitutions have been amended gradually to bring gubernatorial powers closer to those assigned to the President under the federal Constitution, including longer terms of office (all but two states now have four-year gubernatorial terms) and stronger budgetary authority.

Constitutional Duties and Agencies

Although the executive branch's main responsibility is usually thought of as the faithful execution of the laws, state constitutions directly assign numerous functions to governors and executive branch officials and agencies. For example, constitutions often assign the power of executive clemency to the governor, thereby insulating the exercise of that power from legislative or judicial interference.

The people in many states have created executive agencies through "constitutional legislation."
The status of such constitutional agencies or offices in relation to the legislature can be very different from statutorily created executive agencies or offices. For example, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated a statute prohibiting hunting on Sundays on the ground that it conflicted with an administrative rule of the constitutionally established Game and Fish Commission. The rule provided for a one-month hunting season that included Sundays.42

Most state constitutions also provide for the statewide election of executive officials other than the governor. Therefore, such officials as attorneys general, secretaries of state, commissioners of education, state treasurers, and others, in states where such offices are constitutionally created, develop their mission. The rule provided for a one-month hunting season that included Sundays.42

The Veto Power

In 1776, the exercise of a veto by the executive was generally thought to be "aristocratic," and too much like the exercise of the veto by the royal colonial governors. That view began to change, however, as it was recognized that there needed to be some executive check on legislative power. Now, the governors of all states except North Carolina have the power to veto enactments of the legislature.

The gubernatorial "negative voice" in legislation, however, was basically an "all-or-nothing" power. The veto power was, therefore, even more broadly expanded with the advent, around the turn of the century, of the item veto over specific line items in appropriations bills.44 Some states go beyond the item veto and permit governors to reduce such line items without vetoing them.45 President Ronald Reagan suggested that the President be authorized to exercise an item veto similar to that of governors;46 thus, the item veto has become a subject of national debate.47 Gubernatorial exercise of the item veto, originally intended to prevent legislative "logrolling," presents a range of complex issues. For example, what constitutes an "item" in an appropriations bill? May a governor veto language or restrictions without vetoing the appropriation itself? What constitutes an appropriations bill? These and other related questions have resulted in a relatively large volume of recent litigation.48

Executive Orders

A recent series of cases concerning ethics and conflicts of interest addressed the extent of gubernatorial authority to make policy through executive orders. Several governors promulgated financial disclo-
Salisbury, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Constitution prohibits the legislature from statutorily overriding court rules. Other states resolve this issue by reference to the specific constitutional language involved. For example, Florida's constitution provides: "These rules may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature." When the Florida legislature passed a comprehensive statutory evidence code, the Florida Supreme Court resolved the potential conflict by adopting the evidence code as a court rule. The Colorado Supreme Court avoided a possible conflict between its rulemaking authority and a rape shield statute by holding that the statute would stand because there was no conflicting court rule on the subject. Taking a different view of its relationship to the legislature, the New Jersey Supreme Court has intimated that because it can make substantive law in common law adjudications there is no need for the court to limit itself strictly to practice and procedure in its rulemaking capacity.

Regulation of the Practice of Law

Another power initially claimed to be inherent in the judiciary relates to the admission and discipline of attorneys. Many state constitutions now expressly confer this power on the courts and, again, as a grant of judicial authority, this power serves as a limitation on the legislature. Surprisingly, to many people, state legislatures may not pass statutes concerning the admission and discipline of lawyers. A recent series of cases in Pennsylvania held that the ethics act could not be applied to lawyers. "Sunset" legislation applying to statutes regulating professions may not apply to the practice of law.

Through the exercise of their power to regulate the bar, courts have promulgated the modern student practice rules that form the basis for clinical legal education. The New Jersey Supreme Court utilized the power to place limits on attorneys' fees for tort cases, and most courts are now grappling with lawyer advertising and specialization. The Florida Supreme Court, now followed by many others, used the power to regulate the practice of law to initiate an innovative program that permits lawyers to place funds entrusted to them in interest-bearing accounts and to use the revenues for various public service projects.

Inherent Powers of the Courts

In recent years, particularly with respect to budgetary matters, state courts have been asserting that the Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent Branch of our Government. This claim of inherent powers raises important questions of political theory. However, the issue of whether the branches of state government exercise delegated or inherent powers is largely academic. Because state constitutions provide that all legislative power resides in the legislature, the important task is to define the legislative power, not to quibble over whether that power is inherent or delegated. State constitutions similarly place the judicial power in the judiciary; consequently, rather than debating whether a court's power is inherent, the inquiry should focus on whether the claimed power is properly and necessarily a judicial function.

Advisory Opinions

Eleven state constitutions authorize or require state supreme courts to render advisory opinions to various governmental officials. States differ, of course, as to which officers may request opinions and when they may do so. The courts tend to construe strictly their authority and obligations under these provisions. Interesting questions may arise as to the precedential value of advisory opinions. After all, advisory opinions are not adjudications of actual controversies, and are not exercises of the traditional "judicial power." According to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:

It has been uniformly and many times held that such opinions, although necessarily the result of judicial examination and deliberation, are advisory in nature, given by the justices as individuals in their capacity as constitutional advisors of the other departments of government and without the aid of arguments, are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis.

There seems to be evidence that, in the context of advisory opinions, courts do not accord the same presumption of correctness to the actions of the other branches that they do in adjudicating cases. The advisory opinion can be viewed as an important safety valve standing in the way of unconstitutional actions.

The Position and Function of the State Judiciary in Adjudication

In addition to these nonadjudicatory functions of state supreme courts, the state courts differ significantly from federal courts even with respect to adju-
Many state supreme courts do not face the same overwhelming caseload pressures and jurisdictional restrictions as does the U.S. Supreme Court. Some state courts even have "reach down" provisions that enable them to obtain jurisdiction quickly over state constitutional conflicts requiring early resolution. Therefore, state courts are able to approach state constitutional analysis on a narrower, more incremental basis than the U.S. Supreme Court, which labors under intense pressure for broader, more sweeping pronouncements.

Finally, state courts may be viewed as closer to state affairs and as arguably more accountable to state citizens than federal courts. Many state constitutions provide for an elected judiciary, or periodic review of appointed judges. Standing and justiciability barriers are usually lower in the state courts. Furthermore, in certain areas, such as criminal procedure, state trial judges are more experienced than federal judges in the problems of administering U.S. Supreme Court formulations on a daily basis. Many state judges now view their roles as sometimes requiring controversial constitutional rulings.

Judicial Review

By contrast to the federal Constitution, the text of a state constitution may provide explicitly for state judicial review of legislative and executive action. For example, Article I, Section 2, paragraph 5 of the Georgia Constitution provides: "Legislative Acts in violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them." The North Dakota Constitution, however, imposes a voting rule on judicial review: "The supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional unless at least four of the [five] members of the court so decide" (Article VI, Section 4).

Contrary to the federal experience, most judiciary provisions of state constitutions have been revised and ratified in this century without a serious struggle over the exercise of judicial review. As indicated earlier, judicial review existed in the states prior to the federal Constitution and the landmark Marbury v. Madison decision in 1803, in which Chief Justice John Marshall established the doctrine of judicial review for the U.S. Supreme Court. The fact that state constitutions are so much more easily amended than is the federal Constitution has led to at least some support for an increased level of judicial scrutiny of statutes because "mistakes" can be more easily corrected by the electorate.

Local Government and State Constitutions

Local governments have a very wide range of powers and responsibilities in the American govern-
mental system. Actually, the existence of local governments predates national independence and the formation of the states. It is surprising, therefore, to note that the first state constitutions were virtually silent on the question of local governments and their powers. As one commentator noted, the early state constitutions did not separate “powers vertically (state-local) as well as horizontally (executive-legislative-judicial).”

This absence of “constitutional legitimacy” for local governments caused a number of problems in developing legal and political justifications for their ongoing existence and exercise of powers. These justifications varied, until finally, by the 1860s, the famous “Dillon’s Rule” of local government subordination to the state legislature gained acceptance:

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.76

This dependent status of local governments, particularly of large cities, became more and more unsatisfactory as cities and their problems grew, while rural-dominated state legislatures tended to give insufficient attention to urban problems. Local leaders began to argue for their own powers, which they could utilize to address local problems without constantly seeking authority from a sometimes distant and unconcerned state legislature. These local concerns led to the home rule movement, a major component of which involved state constitutional amendments granting semi-autonomous powers to local governments.77 The forms of these amendments have followed several different models, have evolved over time,78 and have generated much litigation over the question of whether an area of concern can be dealt with by local government rather than by the state legislature.79 For example, the well-known Village of Morton Grove gun control case in Illinois turned on, among other things, the home rule power to regulate firearms.80

In addition to home rule, many other areas of local government are directly affected by state constitutions. Taxation and finance, for example, including the tax limitation movement of the 1970s, are treated in detail in state constitutions.81 The recent movement to require state funding to enable local governments to carry out state-imposed “mandates” has resulted in constitutional amendments in seven states (and statutory provisions in seven other states) requiring such legislative funding, although those rules are not always effective.82 Finally, there appears to be a significant trend in the judicial interpretation of state constitutions that recognizes “localism” as a state constitutional value, at least in litigation over exclusionary zoning and school finance.83

Conclusion

The evolution of the treatment of government structure in state constitutions reflects, to a great extent, the progressing understanding of American government. As citizens came to understand the need for expanded executive power and the dangers of unfettered legislative authority, the legislative-executive balance was adjusted. As the need for judicial independence, court unification, and additional, intermediate courts was felt, state constitutions were amended to accommodate these needs. Calls by local government leaders for increased powers were, albeit slowly, recognized by constitutional home rule provisions.

The picture of state constitutions as governmental straitjackets, or inhibitors of change, has been changing. There has been movement toward what Daniel J. Elazar calls the “managerial pattern” of state constitutions, characterized by “conciseness, broad grants of powers to the state executive branch, and relatively few structural restrictions on the legislature.”

Still, however, state constitutions contain many costly restrictions on the way state and local governments operate, if not on how they are structured. This is particularly true in the area of taxation and finance. It must be remembered, in the words of Frank P. Grad:

The least we may demand of our state constitutions is that they interpose no obstacle to the necessary exercise of state powers in response to state residents' real needs and active demands for service.85

NOTES

15 New Jersey Constitution. Article III, Section 1.
27 For a case avoiding this negative implication problem, see Eberle v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 572, 306 P.2d 1083 (1957).
29 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
30 See, e.g., Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 9.
31 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
32 See, e.g., Florida Constitution, Article III, Section 12.
34 Ibid., pp. 961-62.
41 “The Americans, in short, made of the gubernatorial magistrate a new kind of creature, a very pale reflection indeed of his regal ancestor. This change in the governor’s position meant the effectual elimination of the magistracy’s major responsibility for ruling the society—a remarkable and abrupt departure from the English constitutional tradition,” Wood, *Creation of the American Republic*, p. 136. See also pp. 132-43.
45 Interestingly, this notion of gubernatorial reduction of appropriation items, as opposed to absolute veto, seems to stem from Pennsylvania’s judicial interpretation in Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 48 A 976 (1901) of its provision to permit such reductions. Virtually all other courts that have considered the issue have rejected this interpretation. See, e.g., Wood v. State Administrative Board 255 Mich. 220 238 N.W. 16 (1931); Mills v. Porter, 69 Mont. 325, 222 P. 428 (1924). A number of states, however, have amended their constitutions to authorize gubernatorial reduction. See generally Note, “Item Veto, Reduction of Items. Elimination of Items Included in a General Sum,” *Southern California Law Review* 12 (March 1939): 321.
49See Petition of the Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 S. 2d 902, 905-06 (Fla. 1949) and cases cited therein. See also Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980).


51See for example, Art XVIII, Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, as amended, cited in Attorney General and Others to Amend Article XVIII of the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, 339 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1976).


56See In re House Resolution No 12, 88 Colo. 569, 298 N.E. 656, 658 (1931); In re Opinion of the Justices, 314 Mass. 767, 49 N.E. 2d 252 (1943).

57Commonwealth v. Welsky, 276 Mass. 398, 400, 177 N.E.656, 658 (1931). The court continued:

When the same questions are raised in litigation, the justices then composing the court are bound sedulously to guard against any influence flowing from the previous consideration, to examine the subject anew in the light of arguments presented by parties without reliance upon the views therein expressed, and to give the case the most painstaking and impartial study and determination that an adequate appreciation of judicial duty can impel.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court "caution[ed] that the opinion is not a judicial decision. . . ." In re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 575, 138 A. 284, 291 (1927). The Florida Constitution provides for "interested persons to be heard on the questions presented." Florida Constitution, Art. IV, Section 1(c).

58Henry Robert Glick, Supreme Courts in State Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 5: "State supreme courts are not simply duplications of the national court at a lower level of the judicial hierarchy. Instead, they are distinctive institutions which are integral parts of state political and legal systems." See also Herbert Jacob and


71 *304 U.S. 64 (1938).*


75 Ibid.


79 See, for example, City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972) (rent control); City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974) (same).

80 *Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 474 N.E.2d 266 (1984).*


Most Americans today view the protection of civil liberties primarily as the responsibility of the U.S. Supreme Court, and they look to its rulings interpreting the federal Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to discover the scope of individual rights. Yet this identification of civil liberties with the federal Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court is a relatively recent development in American history. For most of the nation’s history, the federal Bill of Rights was understood to protect solely against state law and federal law in protecting rights began in the early 20th century. In 1925 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment’s ban on abridgements of freedom of speech by the federal government is applicable to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Over the next 50 years, the Supreme Court continued its gradual process of selectively extending federal constitutional protection on a case-by-case basis against state violations of various other guarantees of the U.S. Bill of Rights. During the 1960s, this process, usually referred to as “selective incorporation,” accelerated significantly, as the Supreme Court incorporated most of the Bill of Rights’ criminal justice guarantees.

Selective incorporation influenced both the forums in which civil liberties claims were advanced and the forms that those claims took. By ruling that the federal Constitution prohibits state violations of rights, the Supreme Court multiplied its opportunities to address civil liberties issues. At the same time, the perception that federal forums were more sympathetic to rights claimants—a perception that oftentimes was quite accurate—diverted cases from state courts, thereby retarding the development of a state constitutional jurisprudence. Even when civil liberties issues arose in state tribunals, attorneys typically ignored state bills of rights or treated state and federal provisions as interchangeable, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court for doctrine and legal precedent. The predictable result was the domination of civil liberties law by the federal judiciary.

Early in the 1970s, this domination was challenged by a few state courts that began to rely on state bills of rights to resolve civil liberties issues. Since then, this development, known as the “new judicial federalism,” has become a nationwide phenomenon. State judges from all sections of the country have reported significant increases in litigation under state bills of rights. Scholars have identified some 400 cases since 1970 in which state high courts have either granted greater rights protection under their state constitutions than was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court under the federal Constitution or have based their decisions affirming rights solely on their state constitutions.

The emergence of the new judicial federalism raises anew the question of what part state law can and should play in delineating and protecting rights. To answer this question, we review in this chapter the debate over the role to be assigned to state law in protecting civil liberties. Next, to assess the contribution of state law in protecting rights, we consider how state law has dealt with selected aspects of the freedoms of speech, press, and religion. Clearly, no set of three issues can be fully representative. However, because the rights at stake in these three areas are so fundamental, our survey of state efforts to protect them furnishes some indication of the role currently played by state civil liberties law. Equally important, our analysis of these issues illustrates the opportunities that the states have to contribute to the protection of civil liberties, the array of legal weapons at their disposal for this purpose, and the use that the states have made of these weapons.

A State Civil Liberties Law?

The basic question to be addressed is whether the states should play any part in defining and protecting rights. Opponents of state involvement have insisted that the protection of rights is properly a federal responsibility because all Americans should enjoy the same rights, rather than having their rights de-
benefits and services because there are important reasons rooted in American as well as in the nature of federalism, for course, hardly proves that there should policymaking by the states. For if one's rights should autonomy and diversity in the provision of presumably should the availability of any other important benefit or service provided by government. However, Americans have long accepted some state autonomy and a degree of diversity in the provision of benefits and services because we believe that, on balance, the system of federalism that permits such autonomy and diversity is a good system. This, of course, hardly proves that there should be interstate differences in rights. Although we welcome diversity in some matters, in others we have opted for national uniformity. Nonetheless, it does suggest that the mere fact of interstate diversity is not, in and of itself, a sufficient argument against participation in protecting rights.

The broader argument in favor of state participation in defining and protecting rights begins with the recognition that such involvement is no innovation but rather an established feature of American constitutionalism. Even before the adoption of the federal Constitution, several states had assumed this responsibility by prefacing their constitutions with bills of rights. Other states inserted protections for rights in the body of their charters. As initially proposed, the federal Constitution largely left the task of protecting rights in state hands, since it did not include a bill of rights. Even when Antifederalist complaints led to the addition of a bill of rights, the First Congress made clear that state declarations of rights could and should continue to provide protection by rejecting a proposal that guaranteed various rights against state infringement. Since then, all 50 states have included bills of rights in their constitutions and also have acted to secure rights through statutes and judicial rulings. Although the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was designed to augment federal power to prevent state violations of rights, the amendment was meant to supplement, rather than to preempt, state protections. Thus, as a matter of constitutional design, the states have from the outset been encouraged to participate in defining and securing rights, and throughout the nation's history they have done so.

Yet in encouraging the states to define and protect rights, the nation almost inevitably committed itself to an interstate diversity in rights. Even at the time the federal Constitution was adopted, there were important differences in the rights enjoying constitutional protection in the various states. Although one might have expected the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights to promote interstate uniformity by providing a model for emulation, in fact this has not occurred. In some instances, the states have looked to their sister states rather than to the national government for guidance: 30 states, for example, have modeled constitutional protections on the Virginia Constitution’s declaration that “all men are born equally free and independent.” Moreover, whereas the federal Constitution has been amended only infrequently to secure rights beyond those contained in the Bill of Rights, the states have not hesitated to amend their constitutions to recognize new rights or to extend protection against new threats to rights. Between 1968 and 1976, for example, 16 states adopted constitutional guarantees of gender equality. Finally, as Table 1 demonstrates, several states have adopted protections for rights that lack any analogue in the U.S. Constitution.

Table 1
Examples of Distinctive State Constitutional Protections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The right to privacy</td>
<td>10 states:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 as part of protection against unreasonable search and seizure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 as free-standing protections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A right to pure water</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bans or limits on imprisonment for debt</td>
<td>39 states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to a legal remedy for injury</td>
<td>36 states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to safe schools</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition against undue harshness</td>
<td>7 states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to fish</td>
<td>California, Rhode Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition against sex discrimination</td>
<td>19 states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The diversity of rights protected by the various states and the addition of new protections by constitutional amendment suggest that the states have often been responsive to their citizens' demands for the protection of rights not secured by the federal Constitution. In addition, the states' inventiveness in discovering rights, as well as the willingness of states to seek guidance from their sister states, underlines a major advantage of permitting states to contribute to the definition and protection of rights. Requiring a uniformity in rights from state to state would prevent the states from performing their historic function as incubators of political change. If uniformity is required, it will necessarily mean adherence to the "lowest common denominator" that is acceptable nationally. If, however, each state is permitted to pursue its own course, within the limits imposed by the federal Constitution, then the states' experiments can contribute to our national understanding of rights. Indeed, American history confirms the importance of state leadership in the recognition and protection of rights. See Table 2.

Yet, ultimately, the fear remains that if each state can follow its own path, basic rights might be jeopardized. Admittedly, there is some historical warrant for this concern. But this concern is less justified in the contemporary political and legal context. As noted in chapter 1, judicial decisions, federal legislation, and intrastate political developments have all combined to make state political systems more representative than in the past. Partially as a result of this, instances of blatant suppression of minority rights are rare. The civil liberties agenda in the states instead tends to be rather different. The states today are more likely to be called on to establish the proper balance when rights seem in conflict—for example, when press claims of freedom of access to pretrial proceedings collide with the right to privacy or the right to a fair trial. Or states may be asked to balance the competing claims of equality and local autonomy, as in school finance or zoning litigation. Thus, the civil liberties issues that the states are addressing today seldom involve whether basic rights should be protected. At the same time, the complexity of these new issues underlines the advantage of allowing various political and judicial bodies in a multiplicity of jurisdictions to contribute their thoughts on how these issues should be resolved.

Finally, it should be remembered that the incorporation of various guarantees of the U.S. Bill of Rights and the passage of federal civil liberties legislation have, in effect, established a "floor" of basic rights that cannot be infringed. This has not ended state experimentation, nor was it meant to. However, the existence of this "floor" has had the effect of channeling states' experiments in the direction of expanding and safeguarding, rather than violating, rights. Thus, state involvement in defining and securing rights should not jeopardize fundamental rights.

### Table 2
**Selected State Initiatives in Protecting Rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>States/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Press Shield Laws:</strong></td>
<td>18 states, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right to Counsel:</strong></td>
<td>35 states, 1850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusionary Rule:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equal Pay Provisions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fair Housing Legislation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Freedom of Speech under State Constitutions**

Every state bill of rights guarantees the freedoms of speech and of the press. During the 19th century, moreover, state rulings interpreting these provisions provided the main body of judicial doctrine on freedom of expression. However, when the U.S. Supreme Court began to address First Amendment issues during the early 20th century, doctrinal debate on the Court quickly detached itself from the body of state cases, pursuing arguments and directions unanticipated by the state courts. Over time the U.S. Supreme Court developed an impressive body of case law, and its decisions spawned a vast scholarly literature. Thus, in the early 1970s, when state courts began once again to address speech and press questions under their state constitutions, they confronted a well-developed and highly sophisticated body of legal doctrine.

In such circumstances, one would expect state courts to rely heavily on federal law and precedent rather than to chart their own independent constitu-
tional course. This has occurred. Yet even where fed-

eral law predominates, state law can make important

contributions where (1) the national government has

left issues to the states for resolution, (2) the national

government has failed to provide adequate protec-

tion for rights, and (3) distinctive state constitu-

tional provisions afford protection beyond that avail-

able under the federal Constitution.

Private Abridgements of Free Speech

By its very terms, the First Amendment protects

the freedom of speech only against congressional

abridgement. As a result of incorporation, the fed-

eral Constitution is now understood to prohibit state

infringements on First Amendment rights; however,

private limitations of expression remain outside its

purview.21 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized

that in certain limited circumstances, namely, when

private entities are performing public functions, they

too are engaged in “state action” and are thus subject
to federal constitutional constraints.22 Nonetheless,

the U.S. Supreme Court has read this “public func-
tion” exception narrowly. In particular, it has con-

cluded that although privately owned shopping cen-
ters may resemble traditional downtown shopping

areas, this does not mean that they are performing a

“public function.” As a result, shopping center own-
ers do not violate the First Amendment when they re-

strict or forbid speech on their premises.23

The U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings, however, are

not the final word on the subject. Although the U.S.

Constitution does not secure a right to speak on pri-

vate property, neither does it accord property owners

a right to exclude speakers. Rather, it allows the

states—through their statutory, constitutional, and

common law—to define the scope of property rights

and to regulate the use of private property in the pub-

lic interest.24 Put differently, the states remain free
to balance, as they see fit, the competing claims of

speakers seeking access and of property owners seek-
ing to restrict speech on their property.

In striking this balance, the states must deter-

mine whether their constitutional protections for

free speech are directly applicable to private restric-
tions on speech. Despite variations, what is striking

about state guarantees is that many do not merely

echo the First Amendment’s ban on governmental

infringements on the freedom of speech. The Michi-

gan Constitution, for example, states: “Every person

may freely speak, write, express and publish his views

on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of

such right; and no law shall be enacted to restrain or

abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”25

Whereas, the second clause of this provision, like the

First Amendment, bars governmental interference

with the freedom of speech, the first does not men-
tion government. Instead, it announces a positive

right of free speech, albeit one subject to regulation
to prevent abuse. In determining the scope of speech

rights under state law, then, the states must consider

whether this affirmative right of free speech extends

beyond the prohibition of governmental infringe-

ments on the right to speak—that is, beyond state ac-
tion—and requires that speakers be accorded access
to private property to convey their messages. In

reaching this determination, however, the states

must also take account of state constitutional protec-

tions for property rights and, more specifically, of

constitutional requirements that they neither take

nor damage property without compensation.28

Within the past decade, several states have ad-

ressed directly the issue of speech rights on private

property. The seminal case is Robins v. Pruneyard

Shopping Center (1979), in which the California Su-

preme Court upheld Robins’ right to collect signa-
tures in a privately owned shopping center for a peti-
tion protesting the United Nations’ anti-Zionism

resolution.27 The California high court noted that

the federal due process clause does not preclude the

states from regulating the uses of private property in

the public interest. It also asserted that the affirm-

ative endorsement of freedom of speech in the state

constitution signals a strong public interest that can,

at least in some circumstances, override the claims

of property owners. More specifically, the court ob-

served that Robins’ solicitation of signatures for his

petition neither interfered with the normal business

operations of the mall nor diluted property rights. It

concluded therefore that he was entitled to protec-
tion under the state constitution.

When the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously up-

held the California court’s ruling in Pruneyard, simi-

lar cases were filed in several other states.28 Because

the affirmative recognition of speech rights in state

constitutions is accompanied typically by an “abuse”

limitation, the courts in these states—like the Cali-

fornia court in Pruneyard—have had to consider

whether speakers had interfered with the legitimate

claims of property owners. This necessarily required

state judges to develop standards for applying the dis-

tinctive state guarantees. Some courts made impres-

sive strides in this endeavor. For example, in over-

turning the trespass conviction of a member of the

United States Labor Party who distributed leaflets on

the campus of Princeton University without permis-
sion, the New Jersey Supreme Court in New Jersey v.

Schmid (1980) considered carefully both the nature

of the private property on which Schmid intruded and

the extent to which Schmid’s expression interfered

with—or, as in this case, promoted—the purposes to

which the property was dedicated. Similarly, in up-

holding an environmental group’s right to collect sig-

natures and demonstrate in a shopping mall, the plu-

rality opinion for the Washington Supreme Court
noted that the right depended on whether "state law confers such a right and ... its exercise does not unreasonably interfere with the constitutional rights of the owner." 29

However, not all state jurists have concluded that their constitutions afford speakers a right to convey their messages on private property. Several of the decisions extending protection against private abridgment of speech have provoked sharp dissents from justices who found a "state action" requirement implicit in the state's bill of rights. Since 1984, courts in Connecticut, Michigan, and New York have all endorsed the dissenters' position. 30 Moreover, even those states that have extended constitutional protection against private restrictions on speech have found it difficult to strike a balance between the rights of speakers and those of property owners. 31

Yet, the fact that one encounters interstate—and even intrastate—disagreements about the interpretation and application of state constitutional provisions is hardly surprising. Rather, it would be surprising if every state, having recognized that its constitution affords independent protection for rights, interpreted its constitutional guarantees in exactly the same way. Moreover, the diversity of interpretation that results from our system of federalism should be viewed as a strength rather than a weakness. This diversity encourages an interstate dialogue about the scope of individual liberties that can promote thoughtful, informed decisions. 32 As state judges consider in new contexts the meaning of their state's distinctive constitutional guarantees—for example, the "abuse" limitations on the freedom of speech found in several state constitutions—and begin to develop a state jurisprudence of free speech, they will undoubtedly benefit from the exchange of views with their colleagues on other courts that is promoted by state protection of civil liberties. 33

Freedom of the Press
under State Constitutions

In general, witnesses must answer all pertinent questions put to them during grand jury investigations and/or trials; those who fail to do so may be punished for contempt. However, exceptions to this requirement have been recognized, when its enforcement would imperil certain confidential relationships, such as those between doctor and patient or between priest and parishioner. Journalists have contended that the relationship between reporters and their confidential news sources warrants similar protection. They insist that because confidential sources often are willing to provide information only if their identities can remain secret, compelling reporters to name their sources and/or testify about the information they receive impedes the gathering of news and its transmission to the public. Whatever the validity of this claim, it has not prompted creation of a federal testimonial privilege for reporters. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment does not protect journalists who refuse either to testify or to divulge their sources to grand juries. Subsequent efforts in Congress to enact a press shield law have also proved unavailing. 34

Perhaps because state courts handle the vast majority of criminal cases, the states had begun to address the issue of a testimonial privilege for reporters long before it emerged on the federal political and legal agendas. 35 In 1896, Maryland enacted the nation's first press shield law, granting a limited testimonial immunity to reporters. A series of highly publicized disputes during the 1930s prompted renewed attention to the issue of testimonial immunity, leading ten additional states to adopt shield laws. During the 1960s and early 1970s, seven more states passed shield laws, in part in response to complaints about the increased issuance of subpoenas to reporters. Finally, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment does not excuse reporters from testifying, seven more states responded by extending protection to reporters.

This is not to say that the states have adopted uniform policies on reportorial privilege. Not all states accord a testimonial privilege to journalists, and even those that do still differ over who is entitled to the privilege and over what the privilege entails. Some states, such as California, have protected reporters against contempt citations but not against charges of obstruction of justice or against directed verdicts in libel cases. Other states, among them Arizona and Ohio, authorize reporters to withhold only the names of sources, whereas others, such as Delaware and Michigan, allow reporters to protect both their sources and the information they receive. Finally, some states afford protection only to professional journalists connected with the formal news media, but others extend protection to freelancers and other persons engaged in news gathering or research.

Even within individual states, significant changes have occurred over time in the protection afforded to reporters. In several states, the scope of press privileges has emerged through interaction between the legislature and the courts, with legislators responding to narrowing constructions of press shield laws by extending broader protection. For example, on three separate occasions, the New Jersey legislature amended the state's shield law in response to judicial rulings that had construed it narrowly. 36 After California's courts repeatedly had narrowed the scope of the state's shield law, the citizens responded by amending the California Constitution to give constitutional protection to reporters' testimonial privilege. 37
Our survey of state responses to claims of reporter privilege leads to three general observations. First, by the time civil liberties issues emerge as part of the nation’s political and legal agendas, oftentimes (as was the case with press shield laws) the states had addressed the issues and confronted the difficult task of defining the scope of those liberties. This, in turn, suggests that the federal government can—and should—profit from the example and experience of the states. Again, this underlines how the nation’s federal system promotes a beneficial dialogue on civil liberties issues.

Second, the willingness of state legislatures to enact press shield laws and to repudiate narrowing judicial constructions of them confirms that state statutory law, as well as state constitutional law, can provide important safeguards for civil liberties.

Finally, the recent flurry of cases involving the state constitutional right of reporters to gain access to pretrial hearings suggests that both state legislatures and state courts will continue to be involved in addressing the right of journalists to obtain information controlled by government.

Church and State in the States

The Constitutional Context

The absence of federal law has afforded states the opportunity to define rights on private property and to protect the confidentiality of reporters’ sources. However, the role of state civil liberties law is not merely interstitial. The states can pursue an independent legal course and make a substantial contribution even when there is a body of federal law bearing on an issue. A prime example of such state independence is to be found in the constitutional law of church and state.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s incorporation of the establishment clause in 1947, the states had primary responsibility for regulating the relationship between church and state. Incorporation inaugurated a new era of federal judicial involvement and doctrinal development. Yet, this increased federal activity has not diminished the importance of state constitutional guarantees. Although both federal and state charters enforce some degree of separation between church and state, state bills of rights typically have avoided the apparent vagueness of the First Amendment’s ban on laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” Instead, most state constitutions contain specific and detailed provisions governing the relationship between church and state. These provisions, when considered in light of the controversies that engendered them, amplify just an independent state jurisprudence.

Generally speaking, state constitution-making on church and state has occurred in two phases. The first phase commenced after independence, when the original states had to determine whether to maintain their existing religious establishments. Although most did not immediately eliminate their establishments, independence triggered a movement toward disestablishment, best exemplified by the famous campaign for religious liberty in Virginia. This movement found expression in early state constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of conscience and prohibiting preference to any religious sect. None of the states subsequently admitted to the Union created a religious establishment, and by the 1830s intra-state pressures, as well as the federal example, led the original states to eliminate the last vestiges of their official establishments. As those states adopted new constitutions or amended their old one, they used the occasion to remove outdated provisions recognizing religious establishments from their fundamental law.

Despite the elimination of official establishments, many states continued to provide unofficial support to Protestant Christianity, particularly in the public schools. As long as the nation’s population remained relatively homogeneous religiously, this support produced little controversy. However, the immigration to America of large numbers of Roman Catholics, who objected to this “Protestantizing” of public education, prompted a second phase of state constitution-making. In response to Catholic demands for state funding of their schools and for the elimination of Protestant religious practices in public schools, several states strengthened their constitutional bans on aid to religious institutions and their mandates that school funds be expended only for public schools. Other states responded to the controversy by adding similar provisions to their constitutions. Finally, several states that were settled later or that escaped sectarian conflict over public education nonetheless borrowed the strict constitutional language of their sister states. As a result, long before the federal courts addressed the issue, most state constitutions had recorded a considered constitutional judgment on aid to religious institutions. In fact, their emphatic and detailed prohibitions of such aid appear to justify a separationist reading that may yield results different from those obtained under the First Amendment.

Aid to Parochial Schools

Given the specificity of these state constitutional prohibitions, it is hardly surprising that few cases have arisen involving direct aid to religious schools and that state courts have consistently struck down such aid as unconstitutional. State cases since World War II have focused instead on indirect aid to religious schools and their students, such as the provision of transportation or textbooks to children attending parochial schools. While the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that such programs do not violate the First Amendment, the states have divided over
their constitutionality. In part, this division reflects textual differences among state constitutions. For example, after their high courts had invalidated programs authorizing the transportation of students to parochial schools, Wisconsin and New York adopted constitutional amendments expressly permitting their reinstitution. On the other hand, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that, given Alaska’s emphatic constitutional ban on aid to religious institutions, the failure to include a clause permitting indirect aid implied that such aid was impermissible.

In part, however, interstate disagreements on the constitutionality of indirect aid can be traced to whether state judges are willing to read state constitutional provisions as independent judgments on the possibility of aid to religious institutions. Generally speaking, those state courts that have invalidated programs of indirect aid have displayed a greater sensitivity to the distinctive language in state constitutions and to the historical experiences that produced it. 

Supreme Court's doctrinal formulations, the Nebraska Supreme Court focused instead on the state's constitutional prohibition of any "appropriation in aid of any sectarian institution or any educational institution not owned and controlled by the state." The clarity of this language, the court insisted, made interpretation unnecessary, and its broad sweep admitted of no exceptions. Moreover, the records of the convention that drafted the provision confirmed that a major aim was to devise a precise prohibition that would prevent sectarian conflict over the funding of church-related schools. The Nebraska Supreme Court therefore ruled the law unconstitutional.

Other state courts have likewise emphasized the distinctive language of their state constitutions in justifying development of an independent constitutional position. The California Supreme Court, for example, concluded that the state constitution's ban on expenditures for "any sectarian purpose" was designed to prevent the state from providing benefits to sectarian schools that furthered their educational purpose. On that basis, the court invalidated a textbook loan program. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court, in striking down a state law authorizing the transportation of students to nonpublic schools, reasoned that the uncompromising prohibitory language in the Idaho Constitution was purposely included to place even greater restrictions on government than that found in the First Amendment. Finally, the Massachusetts high court, noting that a challenged textbook loan program aided sectarian schools in carrying out their essential educational function, held that it violated a state constitutional amendment, adopted following its 1913 decision, which ruled out the "use" of money for maintaining or aiding sectarian schools.

If the U.S. Supreme Court adopts a more accommodationist stance on aid to religious institutions, as has been predicted, it can be expected that state courts will be called on increasingly to determine whether such aid violates the state constitution.

Conclusion

Our survey of how state law has helped to define and protect civil liberties, although hardly exhaustive, permits some general observations. First, state involvement in protecting rights is nothing new. It was the states that first devised bills of rights, and it was the states that had primary responsibility for defining and protecting rights for over a century after the nation was created. Thus, the "new judicial federalism" and the recent upsurge of interest in state civil liberties law should be heralded not as an innovation, but as the rediscovery of a traditional aspect of American federalism.

Second, throughout the nation's history, the states have utilized a variety of legal means to safeguard rights. Among the most familiar of these are state bills of rights, which have been employed to complement, supplement, and extend the protections available under the U.S. Constitution. However, other state constitutional provisions—for example, education clauses banning sectarian influences in publicly funded schools—also have served to safeguard civil liberties. So, too, have state statutes, such as those protecting reporters' confidential sources. Finally, state courts have invoked the common law and their own rulemaking authority to secure individual rights. Thus, our examples underscore the variety of state initiatives on behalf of rights.

Third, as the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia illustrates, these initiatives—constitutional, legislative, and judicial—have served not only to protect rights within the borders of the state but also to provide impetus and guidance for efforts by other states and the national government to secure rights. This coincides with the pattern of cooperative activity that has characterized many aspects of American federalism throughout the nation's history.

Having said this, the fact remains that contemporary state efforts to safeguard civil liberties occur in the context of a federal system in which the federal courts have assumed a major role in protecting rights. This heavy federal influence underlines the crucial importance of the legal relationship between federal and state law—and particularly between federal and state bills of rights. It is well established that state constitutional rulings resting on "independent and adequate state grounds" are exempt from federal judicial scrutiny.
When, then, is it appropriate to interpret state bills of rights independently? Some jurists—notably, Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court—have concluded that the correct answer is always. It is their contention that the logic of our federal system requires that state judges look first to the law of their own state in deciding cases and then to federal law only when a case cannot be resolved on state grounds. Even jurists who have not endorsed this "state law first" position have recognized that, when state law diverges from federal law, it must be given independent effect. A moment's reflection suggests that such divergence is likely to occur frequently.

As we have noted earlier, many state constitutional provisions, such as state guarantees of privacy and prohibitions on undue harshness in punishment, have no federal constitutional analogues. Thus, if states are to remain faithful to their law, they must seek the meaning of those guarantees independently.

Furthermore, whereas federal constitutional guarantees secure rights only against governmental infringement, state guarantees may protect rights against private infringement as well. In some instances, state constitutions do so expressly. In others, as our discussion of state free speech provisions has shown, the state guarantees do not specify to whom their constitutional strictures are addressed. Although some state courts have been influenced by federal constitutional doctrine to read a "state action" requirement into these constitutional guarantees, many scholars and jurists have challenged this practice as unwarranted. Indeed, some scholars have insisted that in the absence of express language to the contrary, state guarantees should be read to reach private as well as governmental action. Whatever the validity of this contention, fidelity to state constitutions demands that the scope of state protection be determined not by reference to federal constitutional doctrine, but rather by independent analysis of state guarantees.

In addition, as our discussion of state provisions on church and state has shown, even state provisions that restrict only governmental action and have some sort of federal analogue often differ from their federal counterparts in language and/or historical origins. In such circumstances, sensitivity to the federal character of the American polity should caution against assuming too readily that state protections are merely functional equivalents of federal constitutional guarantees.

Finally, even when the text of state and federal constitutional provisions are identical, this does not mean that state officials—be they judges, executives, or legislators—are obliged to accept the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal guarantee as authoritative, foreclosing independent interpretation of the state provision. Federal precedent may be persuasive, but it is not authoritative; state officials have an obligation to seek the best possible interpretation of their own constitutions. In fact, some scholars have argued that state courts should avoid taking their cues from U.S. Supreme Court rulings because the institutional positions of the state and federal courts are quite dissimilar. As the nation's highest court, the U.S. Supreme Court is constrained by considerations of federalism and the separation of powers that may prevent it from according full protection to rights. Because state courts do not operate under such constraints, it is argued, they should feel free to go beyond federal rulings that seem to underprotect civil liberties. In the next two chapters, which deal with state constitutional protections of the rights of criminal defendants and of equality, we shall see how they have done so.

NOTES

1 This was established authoritatively in Baron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243 (1833).
2 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 653 (1925) and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), marked the first invalidation of a state law on federal free speech grounds, and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the first invalidation of a state law as an infringement of the federal freedom of the press.
8 Collins and Galie, "State Constitutional Rights Decisions."
9 For further discussion of the protection of rights under state constitutions, see chapters 5 and 6.

It follows that if states have concurrent responsibility for defining and protecting rights, state officials have a constitutional obligation to honor and enforce this body of state law, even though doing so may lead to different definitions of rights from state to state.

Whereas some state constitutions, such as Virginia's and Pennsylvania's, were prefaced by eloquent declarations of individual rights, others—for example, New Jersey's—had no bill of rights at all. Even those states that adopted bills of rights differed in what was protected. For example, the treatment of religion under state law, even though doing so may lead to different definitions of rights from state to state.

Pennsylvania's, were prefaced by eloquent declarations of rights. See, for example, Illinois Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 15: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law." See generally chapter 7 of this study.

This focus on governmental infringements on rights is characteristic of the federal Constitution—often the Thirteenth Amendment directly forbids private violations of individual rights.


This underlines the important point that the states, in exercising their traditional legal responsibilities, often make decisions that affect civil liberties.

Michigan Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 5. Other state constitutional provisions, such as those relating to access to the ballot, may also be relevant in specific cases. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores International, 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983).

On the importance assigned to property rights by state constitution-makers, see, for example, the Arkansas Declaration of Rights, Art. II, Sec. 22: "The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction." On the need to compensate property owners, see, for example, Illinois Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 15: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law." See generally chapter 7 of this study.


635 P.2d at 112.


For a ruling that suggests a possible new direction for state constitutional law dealing with freedom of expression, see Oregon v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Ore. 1987).


Following judicial rulings in State v. Donovan, 30 A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943) and Brogan v. Passaic Daily News,


Relevant cases include: KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298, N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1980), and State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1980).


See, for example, Harfst v. Hoegen, 163 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1942), and Berghorn v. School District, 260 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1953). The sole instance of a state ruling permitting direct aid—Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.E. 464 (Mass. 1913)—prompted a constitutional amendment prohibiting aid: Massachusetts Constitution Amend., Art. 46, Sec. 2.

On bus transportation, see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and on the loaning of textbooks, see Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).


For the common law as a source of rights, see, for example, State v. Zdanowicz, 55 A. 743 (E and A 1903), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a common-law right against self-incrimination, a position that it has confirmed in more recent cases, such as State v. Fary, 117 A.2d 499 (N.J. 1955) and State v. Hartley, 511 A.2d 80 (N.J. 1986). For judicial rulemaking as a source of rights, see People v. Jackson, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27-28 (Mich. 1974), in which the Michigan Supreme Court established a suspect’s right to counsel, absent extraordinary circumstances, during identification procedures.


For an example of state constitutional protection of privacy rights, see Alaska Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 22: “the right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.” The importance of these state privacy guarantees was underscored by the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 342, (1967): “The protection of a person’s general right to privacy... is... left largely to the law of the individual states.” For an example of state constitutional protection against excessively harsh punishment, see, for example, Rhode Island Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 14: “[N]o act of severity which is not necessary to secure an accused person shall be permitted.”

See, for example, Montana Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 4: “Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of... religious ideas.”


See Williams, “In the Supreme Court’s Shadow,” and Sager, “Fair Measure.”
Equality under State Constitutions

State governments are responsible for undertaking or administering most governmental activities that directly affect individual citizens. In undertaking these activities, they are constantly confronted with the task of determining what distinctions between persons are legitimate and what distinctions violate constitutional mandates of equality. Under the federal Constitution, there is only one generally applicable requirement of equality that binds the actions of states. This is the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, which provides that: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." State constitutions, in contrast, contain many different equality provisions, aimed at a range of different but related problems. Although the Fourteenth Amendment equality requirement is well known and extensively analyzed, the state provisions have not received careful attention.1

James Madison contended that in a large, geographically and politically diverse nation, there would be less likelihood of oppression of minorities because of the need for continued coalition, political accommodation, and compromise.2 Madison wrote in The Federalist:

The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.3

Madison’s concerns seem to have been proven generally true. As responses, state constitutional provisions have aimed at a number of demonstrated problems relating to equality over the years.

Most state constitutions do not contain an explicit “equal protection” clause.4 They do, however, contain a variety of equality provisions. In some states, broad guarantees of individual rights have been interpreted to require equal protection of the laws in general.5 Further, most states have generally applicable provisions prohibiting special and local laws, grants of special privileges, or discrimination against citizens in the exercise of civil rights or on the basis of sex. Finally, many state provisions guarantee equality in specific or limited instances—from requiring “uniform” or “thorough and efficient” public schools to requiring uniformity in taxation.

Virtually all of these state constitutional provisions differ significantly from the federal guarantee of equal protection. They were drafted differently, adopted at different times, and reflect the diverse concerns about equality that surfaced during the various eras of state constitutional revision. For example, the broad guarantees of individual rights found in many state constitutions are intended to secure an equality of rights before the law for all persons. The bans on special laws and local laws, however, focus on the substance of the law, seeking to ensure equality (understood as uniformity of treatment) by requiring that laws be of general applicability. The same concern that all citizens be treated uniformly underlies the constitutional prohibitions of special privileges, which protect the general public against preferential treatment for a small group, and the requirement of uniformity in taxation. Conversely, state bans on discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, or race reflect the more familiar concern to protect members of minority groups from majority tyranny. Finally, constitutional requirements of “uniform” or “thorough and efficient” public schools reflect a concern that the state avoid favoritism in the provision of essential state services.
The First State Constitutions

A few early state constitutions contained language similar to the classic language of equality in the Declaration of Independence. Section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, written by George Mason and adopted a month before the Declaration of Independence, provided:

That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.  

Although only Pennsylvania and Massachusetts initially included broad provisions, like that of Virginia, many states now have similarly worded provisions. Notions of equality, however, permeated the first state constitutions with respect to governmental structure, even if not with respect to individual rights. Pennsylvania’s “liberal” constitution of 1776 probably pushed equality of consent as far as any of the first state constitutions by providing for a unicameral legislature, with no executive veto. Of course, most states still denied the franchise to blacks, women, and those who did not own property.

Several of the early state constitutions contained another type of general equality provision intended to prohibit grants similar to royal privileges. Section IV of the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights, for example, provides that “no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services.”

It is important to remember the historical context in which the first state constitutions were written. Contrary to the view prevailing today—that constitutional protections exist to be enforced by the courts—concepts of judicial review were still in their infancy in the late 18th century. In other words, judicial enforcement of bill of rights provisions was probably far from their framers’ minds. Thus, in many ways, these early provisions, sometimes referred to only as “principles of government,” can be viewed as descriptive rather than normative. Moreover, one must question the drafters’ overall commitment to equality because slavery and formal inequality in political participation were allowed to continue, as they were under the U.S. Constitution as well.

Despite these early beginnings, much of the modern judicial doctrine of equality under state constitutions has its textual basis in such state constitutional provisions as Section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights. Even though many of these provisions seem only to declare political truths, they have been interpreted to limit state actions. At the same time, general provisions that do not expressly mandate equality, such as New Jersey’s Article I, paragraph I, have been interpreted to guarantee equal protection of the law generally. The New Jersey provision, for example, served as the basis for the state Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis in *Harris v. McRae* and invalidating state restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortion.

Most state courts, however, have not developed doctrine independent of the federal equal protection clause under these kinds of equality provisions. Instead, they seem content not to read into such provisions anything other than what the U.S. Supreme Court has read into the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Other Generally Applicable Equality Provisions in State Constitutions

Jacksonian Equality Provisions

The wave of constitutional revision in the 1820s did not focus on the generally applicable equality provisions contained in the first state constitutions. Instead, equality issues centered around extending the right to vote to blacks and nonfreeholders and reapportioning legislative representation.

Later in the century, many states amended their constitutions to curb the granting of “special” or “exclusive” privileges. In doing so, voters were reacting to a series of abuses by the relatively unfettered state legislatures, many of which were granting special privileges to powerful economic interests. These provisions were modeled after provisions adopted earlier in other states, such as Section IV of the Virginia Bill of Rights. For example, Article I, Section 20 of the 1859 Oregon Constitution, which was patterned after Indiana’s 1851 Constitution, provides: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” These provisions commonly are found in state bills of rights—not in the legislative articles. They reflect the Jacksonian opposition to favoritism and special treatment for the powerful.

Although these provisions may overlap somewhat with federal equal protection doctrine, closer scrutiny reveals significant differences. As Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has noted, Oregon’s Article I, Section 20 and the federal equal protection clause “were placed in different constitutions at different times by different men to enact different historic concerns into constitutional policy.”

Justice Betty Roberts of the same court has noted further:
Article I, Section 20, of the Oregon Constitution has been said to be the “antithesis” of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. While the fourteenth amendment forbids curtailment of rights belonging to a particular group or individual, Article I, Section 20, prevents the enlargement of rights. There is an historical basis for this distinction. The Reconstruction Congress, which adopted the fourteenth amendment in 1868, was concerned with discrimination against disfavored groups or individuals, specifically, former slaves. When Article I, Section 20, was adopted as a part of the Oregon Constitution nine years earlier, in 1859, the concern of its drafters was with favoritism and the granting of special privileges for a select few.

A provision like Oregon’s, then, does not seek equal protection of the laws at all. Instead, it prohibits legislative discrimination in favor of a minority.

These provisions may differ in other ways from the federal equal protection clause. Justice Linde suggests that Oregon’s provision can cover individuals in addition to classes of people, and that it may not apply to corporations or nonresidents. Moreover, the specific reference to the “passage of laws” may preclude its application to executive action. A similar provision prohibiting grants of “exclusive privileges” was instrumental in the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision invalidating that state’s hospital certificate-of-need statute.

Prohibitions on Special and Local Laws

Closely related to the provisions prohibiting grants of special or exclusive privileges are prohibitions on “special” and “local” laws. These provisions, found in the legislative articles of state constitutions, contain either general or detailed limits on the objects of legislation. Special laws are those that apply to specified persons or a limited number of persons—for example an act granting a divorce or a corporate charter. Local laws are those that apply to specified or a limited number of localities—for example an act providing criminal penalties for conduct in only one county. One variety of local law is the “population act” or law which classifies cities according to population. Many states permit this sort of legislation if the basis for the classification can be regarded as rational. In addition, notice requirements usually are included for those subjects that may be dealt with by local laws, giving residents of localities to be affected at least constructive notice of the legislature’s intended action.

Though intended in part to curb legislative abuses, these proscriptions on special and local laws reflect a concern for equal treatment under the law. In 1972 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the state’s no-fault automobile insurance act violated Article IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable.” The statute required only owners of “private passenger automobiles” to purchase no-fault insurance, but imposed substantial limitations on tort recoveries of persons injured by any type of motor vehicle. In distinguishing Illinois’ “equal protection” clause, which had been added in 1970, Justice Walter V. Schaefer observed:

While these two provisions of the 1970 constitution cover much of the same terrain, they are not duplicates, as the commentary to Section 13 of Article IV points out: “In many cases, the protection provided by Section 13 is also provided by the equal protection clause of Article I, Section 2.”

He concluded that Article IV, Section 13 imposed a clear constitutional duty on the courts to determine whether a general law “is or can be made applicable,” and that “in this case that question must receive an affirmative answer.” The constitutionally infirm portions of the statute were therefore invalidated.

Prohibitions on special and local laws have broad application, but they do appear limited to the legislatures, and therefore not to cover executive action. As with other state equality provisions, many state courts interpret special laws provisions by applying federal equal protection analysis.

Discrimination in the Exercise of Civil Rights

In the mid-20th century, a number of state constitutions were amended to include provisions prohibiting discrimination in the exercise of civil rights. Pennsylvania, for example, added a provision in 1967 which directs that “[n]either the Commonwealth nor any political subdivisions thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.” Similar provisions in other states typically limit the proscription to discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.

These antidiscrimination provisions are products of the civil rights movement of the late 1950s and the 1960s. In this respect, they are a good example of state constitutional amendments that “did not directly, but merely recorded, the currents of social change.” So far, they have not been treated by the state courts as proclaiming any important new constitutional principle.

The express proscription of discrimination against persons in the exercise of their civil rights, in addition to prohibiting the denial of rights, provides a strong textual basis for extending such protection beyond federal equal protection doctrine. For example, in Harris v. McRae, the U.S. Supreme Court held that restrictions on Medicaid funding for abortions did not violate the federal equal protection clause. The Court concluded that a mere failure to fund the
exercise of the federal constitutional right to choose abortion did not unconstitutionally burden or limit the exercise of that right. Failure to fund was held neither to deny the right, nor to impose an “unconstitutional condition” on its exercise.

A state provision, such as Pennsylvania’s, however, provides a different argument concerning such policies. For example, the right to choose to have an abortion is a clearly established constitutional, or “civil” right based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision. So too is the right to bear children, under Supreme Court decisions. It has been argued, therefore, that a state legislature in a state with a provision such as Pennsylvania’s that provides funding only for child-birth, while excluding abortion from the Medicaid program, violates the state constitution.

State constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination in the exercise of civil rights may become increasingly important as state governments expand from regulation into the provision of services. When state governments primarily regulated conduct, prohibiting them from denying persons’ civil rights was, if adequately enforced, an effective limit. States did not have the leverage of attaching “unconstitutional conditions” to the provision of services; therefore, they could not as easily favor one right over another. When the state acts as a service provider, however, as it does in such programs as Medicaid, it has the opportunity, in Laurence Tribe’s words, “to achieve with carrots what [it] is forbidden to achieve with sticks.” Thus, to prevent states from illicitly discouraging citizens’ exercise of their rights, states have adopted provisions prohibiting discrimination against persons in the exercise of their civil rights.

Specific and Limited Equality Provisions

Although many states have interpreted generally applicable bill of rights provisions so as to guarantee equality under the law, other provisions, not usually found in bills of rights, expressly require equality in specific and limited instances. When applicable, these provisions offer state courts sound textual bases for invalidating state actions. At the same time, these provisions extend uniformity requirements beyond those of federal equal protection doctrine. These provisions also allow courts to avoid some of the problems of basing decisions on generally applicable equality provisions.

In Robinson v. Cahill, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held unconstitutional the state’s school financing scheme under a provision in the New Jersey Constitution requiring a “thorough and efficient” education. The provision was added to New Jersey’s Constitution in 1875, partly to reflect public concern over equality in education. After criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to federal equal protection cases, the New Jersey court explained why it chose not to base its decision on state “equal protection” doctrine:

We hesitate to turn this case upon the State equal protection clause. The reason is that the equal protection clause may be unmanageable if it is called to supply categorical answers in the vast area of human needs, choosing those which must be met and a single basis upon which the State must act. . . . We stress how difficult it would be to find an objective basis to say the equal protection clause selects education and demands inflexible statewide uniformity in expenditure. Surely no need is more basic than food and lodging. . . . Essential also are police and fire protection, as to which the sums spent per resident vary with local decision. Nor are water and sundry public health services available throughout the State on a uniform dollar basis.

Thus, the New Jersey court used the state’s thorough and efficient education provision as a more “specific and limited” basis for its equality decision, justifying its limitation to the field of education and ensuring that its holding could not be expanded beyond education.

In addition to the education provisions, most states have uniformity in taxation provisions that provide specific grounds for enforcing equality. Tax uniformity provisions require that once a legislative decision is made to tax a type of property or income, everything subject to the tax must be treated uniformly. The legislature may, however, make a decision not to tax a type of property, thereby exempting it. It is important to note, though, that while these provisions may be limited in focus, they can be far-reaching in effect. The primary effect of tax uniformity provisions is to mandate equality in property taxation. Such provisions go well beyond the restrictions of the federal equal protection clause. Moreover, not all jurisdictions limit their uniformity provision to property taxes. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted:

The constitutional standard of uniformity also possesses widespread and far-reaching application. While some other jurisdictions adhere to the view that uniformity applies only to property taxes, our particular constitutional mandate that “all taxes shall be uniform . . .” is quite clear, and it is settled that this mandate applies to all species of taxes.

Case Study: Gender Equality in the States

During the 1960s, gender equality emerged as a salient political issue, prompting responses from both the states and federal government. For the states, this involvement was nothing new: historically,
it had been state law—constitutional, statutory, and common law—that defined the political and civil rights and the legal capacities of women. State law had, for instance, governed contractual relations, regulating the capacity of married women to enter into contracts without their husbands’ consent. It had defined property rights, including the right of married women to hold property in their own name. It had regulated domestic relations, including such matters as divorce, alimony, child support, and child custody. It had also established police power regulations that affected women’s opportunities to seek and obtain employment.68

Although federal law and judicial rulings have assumed an increasing importance, state law continues to play a major role in defining the legal status of women. However, constitutional changes have dramatically altered the substance of that law. This section documents some of those changes in order to show how state law can contribute—and has contributed—to promoting equality.

State Constitutional Guarantees

Today, in some fashion or another, 19 state constitutions expressly bar gender discrimination.69 Some state guarantees long antedated federal involvement in securing women’s rights. As early as the 1890s, for example, the Wyoming and Utah Constitutions mandated equal enjoyment of civil, political, and religious rights and privileges for all men and women. In its 1947 constitution, New Jersey modified its traditional recognition of natural rights, inserting gender-neutral language in order to ensure gender equality.60 Most states, however, adopted their constitutional bans on gender discrimination between 1968 and 1976, a period roughly coincident with the proposal of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and its submission to the states for ratification.

Given the timing of their adoption, it is not surprising that many of the “little ERAs,” as they are sometimes called, resemble the proposed federal model. However, several have distinctive elements. Montana’s, for example, extends broader protection, expressly barring gender discrimination by private parties as well as by government. Several others omit a “state action” requirement, although the guarantees usually have been interpreted to apply only against governmental infringements on equality.69 California’s guarantee is more focused than was the proposed federal ERA, mandating merely that the right to engage in a profession shall not be denied on the basis of gender. Louisiana’s ERA is more tolerant of gender classifications, prohibiting gender distinctions only if they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

In interpreting state guarantees of gender equality, state courts have generally looked for direction to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the equal protection clause and to commentaries on the (unratified) federal Equal Rights Amendment. However, instead of promoting doctrinal uniformity among the states, this practice has merely duplicated on an interstate basis the complexities of the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court, among others, has interpreted its constitution to require “strict scrutiny” of gender classifications, the same standard used by federal courts in determining the validity of racial classifications.70 Some state courts, however, have adopted a less rigorous standard. The Utah Supreme Court, for instance, has endorsed the U.S. Supreme Court’s “rational relationship” test, upholding gender distinctions as long as they are reasonably related to the achievement of a valid state aim.71 In contrast, some courts—among them, the Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania supreme courts—have read their constitutions as imposing the same absolute ban on gender discrimination that was sought in the federal ERA.72

Although the level and focus of litigation under these provisions have varied from state to state, some general patterns have emerged. First, a number of constitutional challenges have come from male litigants who insisted that state laws or judicial rulings imposed unequal burdens on them. The conflict over child support has been particularly intense. In addressing this issue, courts in Washington, Texas, and Pennsylvania have concluded that child support is a responsibility of both parents. However, mathematically equal contributions from both parents have not been required, and in considering child support judges have recognized that nonmonetary as well as monetary contributions may be relevant.73 Second, men have challenged state laws and practices that allegedly penalize them or deny them benefits solely on the basis of their sex. Illustrative of such challenges are the constitutional attacks on the “tender years doctrine,” under which wives are granted a preference in contested custody cases involving young children.74 Third, defendants have asked courts to strike down criminal statutes, such as rape laws, that have used gender-based language in defining crimes. State courts, however, have generally refused to allow defendants to use state ERAs as a shield from criminal liability.75 Fourth, in several instances, women have invoked state constitutional guarantees successfully against outmoded common-law rules, such as the prohibition on wives’ recovering damages for negligent loss of consortium.76 Finally, women have invoked state constitutional guarantees to challenge denials of access or opportunities, most notably in several cases involving restrictions on their participation on athletic teams.77

What is most striking about the litigation under state ERAs, however, is its infrequency. Whereas one might have expected that the adoption of new state constitutional guarantees during the 1970s would have produced a flurry of challenges to state
laws and practices, in fact, during the decade no state supreme court heard as many gender equality cases as did the U.S. Supreme Court. In part, the paucity of litigation under state constitutional provisions reflects the preference of litigants for federal forums and federal law, particularly in such areas as job discrimination. In part, however, it also testifies to the efforts of other branches of state government to vindicate the constitutional commitment to equal rights. State attorneys general have issued numerous opinions providing guidance on the meaning of these constitutional guarantees, thus reducing the need for recourse to the courts. Even more important, state legislatures have taken the initiative in reforming state law to conform to constitutional requirements.

Legislative Implementation

When 14 states adopted “little ERAs” between 1968 and 1976, they committed themselves to eradicating gender discrimination and securing increased opportunities for women. In some states—for example, Connecticut—this constitutional commitment was reflected in an impressive body of legislation promoting gender justice. In others, adoption of the “little ERA” provided the impetus for state legislatures and state attorneys general to eliminate gender discrimination. New Mexico’s experience in implementing its ERA illustrates the crucial role that state legislatures have played in conforming state law to constitutional mandates. After ratification of the amendment in November 1972, the New Mexico legislature appointed an Equal Rights Committee to oversee its implementation. This committee, with the assistance of special committees established by the New Mexico bar association, reviewed the entire New Mexico code to identify provisions inconsistent with the amendment and recommended statutory reforms needed to eliminate gender bias from New Mexico law. The New Mexico legislature acted quickly on most of these recommendations, approving changes in 26 statutes and two amendments during its first session following ratification of the constitutional ban on gender discrimination.

What occurred in New Mexico has occurred in other states as well. Several states—among them, Alaska, Texas, and Washington—have undertaken a comprehensive review and revision of their codes to bring them into conformity with constitutional requirements. Some, such as Connecticut, have established permanent commissions to monitor compliance with constitutional mandates. Others, such as Hawaii, have sought to ensure gender equality through piecemeal reform of their law. Even states, such as Virginia, that have not mounted a comprehensive reform effort have modified their law to eliminate glaring inequities. In sum, then, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state governments have all played an important role in promoting and safeguarding gender equality.

Conclusion

The states, through provisions included in their constitutional texts and through statutes, attorney general opinions and judicial decisions, have addressed a range of equality concerns over the years since 1776. State law, in fact, contains a much broader range of provisions concerning equality than is found in federal law. A combination, however, of the states’ earlier unwillingness to enforce these provisions aggressively and the highly visible initiatives under federal law since the 1950s, has led to an almost instinctive tendency to look to the federal government to deal with equality issues. As James Madison warned, threats to equality may be more likely to arise within the states, justifying a renewed interest in, and concern with the enforcement of, state law provisions on equality.

Notes

3. The Federalist No. 10, p. 135 (J. Madison) (B. Wright, Ed. 1961). Madison added in The Federalist No. 51: “In the extended republic of the United States and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good,” p. 359.
4. Sidney Z. Karasik, “Equal Protection of the Law under the Federal and Illinois Constitutions,” DePaul Law Review 30 (1981): 270 n.33 (“Illinois was only the eighth state to include an equal protection clause in its constitution.”)
5. New Jersey’s “equal protection” doctrine, for example, is based on a provision that states: “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have natural and unalienable rights, among which are those enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, para. 1 (1947); see, for example, Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 303-05, 450 A.2d 925, 933-34 (1982).
10See e.g., New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, para I (1844).
13Virginia Constitution, Bill of Rights 4 (1776). For a similar provision, see Massachusetts Constitution, Pt. I, Art. VI (1780).

18See, for example, Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974). There, the Kansas Supreme Court observed: "While . . . [the equality] provisions of our Bill of Rights declare a political truth, they are given much the same effect as the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 752-53, 518 P.2d at 365; see also State v. Currents, 111 Wis. 431, 434-35, 87 N.W. 561, 562 (1901) (although phrased like the Declaration of Independence, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" provision judicially enforceable); Winters v. Myers, 92 Kan. 414, 420-25, 140 P. 1033, 1036-37 (1914) (noting that constitutional provisions declare political truths and legislation may not "trench upon the political truths which they affirm").
22See, for example, Haase v. Sawicki, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 311 n.2, 121 N.W.2d 876, 878 n.2 (1963).
24Ibid., pp. 59, 214, 377-24.6
26See note 13 and accompanying text. The concern of the newer provisions was with legislative rather than royal favoritism. See Linde, "Without 'Due Process,'" p. 141.
29Historian Rush Welter observed: "Hence the whole thrust of Jacksonian thought was in the first instance negative, an effort to eliminate institutions and practices that an earlier generation had more or less taken for granted. The "aristocracy" that Jacksonians complained of consisted of selective access to power, prosperity, or influence. At bottom it was a political rather than a social or economic concept: in Jacksonian eyes, an "aristocrat" was someone who was empowered by law to affect the economic and social welfare of his contemporaries, or who enjoyed legal privileges that he could turn to his own account in an otherwise competitive economy." Rush Welter, The Mind of America: 1820-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 77-78 (footnote omitted). As to "Jacksonian Democracy," see R. Lawrence Hachey, "Jacksonian Democracy and the Wisconsin Constitution," Marquette Law Review 62 (1979): 485.
33Linde, "Without 'Due Process,'" p. 142 notes 53 and 54.
37 See generally City of Louisville v. Klusmeyer, 324 S. W. 2d 831, 833-34 (Ky. 1959) (noting that both territorially and substantively "special" statutes are permissible in certain cases). The Tennessee Constitution's "law of the land" provision, Tennessee Constitution, Art. XI, 8 (1996) has been interpreted to allow statutes to be restricted to certain counties by population classification only when "the classification is based upon reason, is natural and not arbitrary or capricious." State ex rel Hamby v. Cummings, 166 Tenn. (2 Beeler) 460, 463, 63 S. W. 2d, 515, 516 (1933).


39 Illinois Constitution, Art. I, 2 provides: "No person shall... be denied the equal protection of the laws."


43 See, for example, New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, para 5 (1947).


45 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

46 This was a Fifth Amendment equal protection case dealing with a federal statute. The companion case, Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980), applied identical analysis to a state statute under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

47 Williams v. Zbaraz, 315-17.

48 Ibid., 317 n.19.


51 This argument, which contends that such federal constitutional rights constitute "civil rights" under the state constitutional provision, was rejected in Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 509 Pa. 282, 502 A. 2d 114 (1985).


53 Of course, many states did not enforce even these earlier provisions in the area of, for example, racial discrimination.


57 See Cahill, 62 N.J. at 501-10, 303 A.2d 287-92. For a decision dealing with equality of educational opportunity for handicapped students under New Jersey's "thorough and efficient" provision, see Levine v. State Department of Institutions and Agencies, 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980); see also In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D. 1974) (holding that failure to provide free education to handicapped children violates North Dakota Constitution's education and equality provisions).

58 The New Jersey court said: "In passing we note briefly the reason why we are not prepared to accept that concept for State constitutional purposes. We have no difficulty with the thought that a discrimination which may have an inviolable base is "suspect" and will be examined closely. And if a discrimination of that kind is found, the inquiry may well end, for it is not likely that a State interest could sustain such a discrimination. But we have not found helpful the concept of a "fundamental" right." Cahill, 62 N.J. 491, 302 A.2d 282.


61 See, for example, Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 147 N. W. 2d 633 (1967).


65 Federal initiatives include passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (57 U.S.C. 206 (1976)), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976 and Supp. III 1979)), and Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 (1976)) as well as Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and subsequent judicial rulings under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State initiatives include not only the constitutional guarantees of gender equality discussed below but also statutory reforms and judicial decisions demonstrating a commitment to securing gender equality even in the absence of express constitutional mandates. See, for example, Sailer Inn v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).


70 See, for example, People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. 1974). For a contrary view, see Hartford Accident and Indemnity v. Insurance Commissioner, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).

71 Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 148 P. 1104 (Ut. 1915), and Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010 (Ut. 1974).

72 Consortium is defined as the "[c]onjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and right of each to the company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation."

73 See, for example, Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 885 (Wash. 1975); Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977); and Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974).


75 The relevant cases, in both "little ERA" and "non-ERA" states, are surveyed and analyzed in G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Porter, "Gender Equality and Judicial Federalism: The Role of State Appellate Courts," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 9 (Summer 1982): 942-950 and 963-973, Tables E-H.


78 See, for example, whereas in Texas the right of married women to revert to their birth names on official records was confirmed by judicial decision, in Maryland and Pennsylvania the issue was resolved by opinions issued by the states' attorneys general. For Texas, see In re Erickson, 547 S. W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); for Maryland, see 57 Opinions of the Attorney General 234 (11/30/72), cited in NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, ERA Impact Project: Summary—Maryland State ERA Experience, pp. 7-8; and for Pennsylvania, see Official Opinion No. 62, Opinions of the Attorney General 172 (8/20/73), cited in NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, ERA Impact Project: Summary—Pennsylvania State ERA Experience, pp. 11-12.

79 Connecticut prohibited gender discrimination by private employers in 1967 and by public employers in 1969 (Connecticut Gen. Stats. 4-61, 31-12, and 53-35 (1979 Rev.)). A year prior to the adoption of the state ERA in 1973, the state had made gender neutral all laws concerning divorce, marriage, alimony, division of property, custody, and child support (Connecticut Gen. Stat. 46b-40 et seq. (1979 Rev.)). It should be noted that many states that did not adopt constitutional prohibitions on gender discrimination nonetheless acted to remove discriminatory provisions from their laws. See Brown et al., Women's Rights and the Law, chapter 3.

80 This account of New Mexico's reform effort is based on NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, ERA Impact Project: Summary—New Mexico State ERA Experience, pp.8-13.

81 For example, two months after the Virginia Supreme Court in Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707 (Va. 1973), upheld an automatic exemption from jury duty offered only to women, the Virginia Legislature replaced the statute with one offering an exemption to anyone who is responsible for the care of a child or a handicapped adult (Virginia Code 8.01-341.1 (Rep. Vol. 1977)).
The States and Criminal Procedure

Rights protections for defendants in criminal cases represent another area where state courts have become very active in recent years. State courts are often holding that a defendant is afforded more protection under a section of a state constitution than the U.S. Supreme Court has granted through its interpretation of the corresponding provision in the U.S. Bill of Rights. This development has resulted, in part, from the changes in the substance of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Under Chief Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist, the Court has slowed the expansion of criminal defendant rights and, in some areas, narrowed the protections granted to the defendant under the U.S. Constitution by the Warren Court.¹

Because of the Supreme Court’s post-Warren approach to defendant rights, the state courts are taking initiatives in this field. Justice William Brennan approves of these state initiatives. He finds that “state courts no less than federal are and ought to be the guardians of our liberties.”² In the past, when defendants’ rights were federalized, the states had no reason to consider their own state constitutions. However, the Burger/Rehnquist Court does not interpret these rights as expansively as did the previous Court.

This chapter will demonstrate that, despite several problems, state courts have turned to their own constitutions to guarantee more protection than the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution grants to the defendant. State courts may and do interpret their constitutions independently of the federal Constitution. State constitutions are not mirrors of the federal Constitution; they have their own language and history, which shape state court interpretation.

In order to avoid Supreme Court review and possible reversal, state courts must make a plain statement that their decision is based on an independent and adequate state ground and note that while federal law may persuade the court it does not compel the result. This chapter focuses on the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This rule has become central to the American criminal justice system. This rule is also important for federalism because, even if a state court is able to use state grounds as the basis of its decision, a federal court may still be able to use the evidence that was suppressed in the state court. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that successive prosecutions in state and federal courts are not violative of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The defendant can attempt to stop the federal court from using evidence that is impermissible under the state constitution even if he or she cannot avoid the federal prosecution. The state court might be able to enjoin the state official, who obtained the evidence in violation of state rules, from testifying or handing the evidence over to the federal prosecutor. The state court might be able to prohibit the introduction of evidence from a federal official who violated the state constitution through the “reverse silver platter doctrine.” In addition, the defendant can make his or her argument to the federal court. If the state court is hesitant to act, the federal judge may rule that the federal officials should not receive evidence that a state official obtained in violation of state law. The federal court can also decide to prohibit state officials from using evidence seized contrary to state law in the federal prosecution.

State Courts and Constitutions

Several commentators assert that the states should take the initiative in the area of constitutional rights. Ronald Collins, for example, maintains that the states must take responsibility to protect individual rights in order to revitalize federalism.³ For Justice William Brennan, the federal courts are still primarily responsible for protecting individual rights, but the states should take the role of expanding protections beyond federal guarantees.⁴ He believes that James Madison would have approved and welcomed the increase in the reach of state constitutional law.⁵ Perhaps, as one commentator suggests, the state rule
should simply act as an alternative to federal law because the states are as able as the federal courts to formulate workable rules for the application of the standard formulated by the Supreme Court.6

However, some observers argue that the state courts should not interpret their constitutions in a manner different than the Supreme Court's understanding of the U.S. Constitution. As Chief Justice Burger stated in *Florida v. Casal*,

... when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law [by referendum in that case] to ensure rational law enforcement.7

Problems may arise, like those in the pre-*Mapp* era before the exclusionary rule was applied to the states uniformly. Two rules of law will exist in each state; one federal and the other state. More cases may arise due to this lack of uniformity between states and the federal government. However, since each state has unique interests, complete uniformity may not be required or desirable.8

Further, there is a custom of looking to federal law for the protection of the defendant. Because courts are accustomed to federal rules, the state judges usually defer to the Supreme Court's interpretation. However, such deference is not necessarily appropriate. Although the U.S. Supreme Court receives the most attention, state courts have often guaranteed particular protections to defendants before the Supreme Court has done so.9

Another problem that can arise is confusion about which rule of law, state or federal, must be followed in a case. Nonuniformity causes difficulties in instructing law enforcement officers in their duties. In many states, the law enforcement officers may find that their duties change when the state court decides to interpret the state constitution more narrowly than the federal Constitution, which had been followed before.

However, state courts are no longer performing any service when they interpret their state constitutions as equal to the federal Constitution because the Fourteenth Amendment applies most of the protections of the U.S. Constitution to the states. State courts must use the state constitutions as documents granting more protections to the criminal defendant in order to make a contribution to the law.10 The state court must make an independent determination in each case.11

The state courts' practice of deciding issues on the basis of state constitutional law before reaching federal law is useful for several reasons. First, the state court will avoid adjudication of federal constitutional questions unless it is necessary.12 Second, state courts are better suited to decide state than federal questions. Third, state adjudication on state grounds takes some pressure off the heavy Supreme Court docket because the Court cannot decide state law issues.13 Fourth, the state court can make its decisions based on the character of the state where it sits. The state can grant benefits to a state defendant due to the capabilities of the state, such as counsel on appeal, while the Supreme Court must be sure that all states can afford to enact this provision.14 The states are free to experiment15 and determine the best procedures and laws for their unique circumstances.

Thus, although the state court's use of its own constitution may cause some problems, these problems do not outweigh the benefits. No other body can so easily and efficiently protect rights owed to the defendant under state law. Because many state courts are becoming active,16 it is now the duty of attorneys in each state to raise and brief the issues based on state constitutions. Local practitioners have an obligation to raise the issue that the state court can grant broader protection under its own constitution, so that the client and future defendants can receive the benefits of those rights. Yet, as the Vermont court stated in *State v. Jewett*, the state court should not "use its state constitution chiefly to evade the impact of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Our decisions must be principled, not result oriented."17

**State Use of Their Own Constitution**

In the first appeal after *Michigan v. Long*—*Colorado v. Nunez*—the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted because it rested on independent and adequate state law grounds. The state court20 decided that the Colorado Constitution grants a trial court discretion to disclose the identity of informants when there is a reasonable factual basis to question the informant's statements, even though the U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that the federal Constitution requires this disclosure.21 Thus, the Supreme Court, in dismissing *Nunez*, permitted the state court to go beyond what was necessary under the U.S. Constitution.

In a concurrence, Justice John Paul Stevens criticized Justice White's opinion. White agreed that the Court had no jurisdiction, but he proceeded with a lengthy advisory opinion. For Stevens, White's opinion simply demonstrated the Court's tendency to involve itself in state court proceedings and encourage litigants to file writs of certiorari. A party may hope for advisement by some of the justices, even if the state decision is based on state grounds.22

In *Turner v. City of Lawton*,23 the Oklahoma court held that its constitution does not permit the introduction of evidence in a civil case that would be impermissible in a criminal case, although the federal Constitution may allow such civil use.24 For the U.S.
The exclusionary rule is simply a judicially created remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In Oklahoma, however, the exclusionary rule was incorporated in the state constitution as a fundamental right before it was imposed on the states by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Mapp v. Ohio*.

Under the Oklahoma Constitution, which has language different and broader than the United States Constitution, the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right. The state court also found that another justification for the stricter state rule is that exclusion of the evidence in civil as well as criminal cases will further deter illegal searches and seizures. The same city law enforcement officers were trying to use the evidence in both situations. The state should be permitted to make its own determination of the best rule for its jurisdiction as long as the federal constitutional standard is met.

Third, in *State v. Koppel*, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the state constitution provides greater protection for motor vehicles than the Fourth Amendment. The court ruled that roadblocks for drunk driving are seizures and are not permissible in the state, even though the U.S. Supreme Court may decide that the U.S. Constitution allows them. The state court determined that the public benefit of eliminating drunk driving is not sufficiently well served to outweigh the intrusion on individuals. The state court wisely declined even to address the federal issue since it decided the case on state grounds.

In a fourth case, *State v. Jones*, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the less protective "totality of the circumstances" test of *Illinois v. Gates* for the flexible probable cause standard of *Aguilar-Spinelli*. The Alaska courts have not been persuaded by the Supreme Court's reasoning in *Gates* and, therefore, continue to follow the earlier test under *Aguilar* and *Spinelli*. The state court increased the protection of the criminal defendant by requiring that both factors of the test for probable cause—reliability and basis of knowledge—must be met, even if the U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that a finding of both is constitutionally required.

Finally, in *State v. Novembrino*, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the good faith exception to the warrant clause as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in *United States v. Leon*. The court excluded evidence based on an invalid warrant, which a law enforcement officer had relied on in good faith. The state court found that the good faith exclusionary rule would undermine the probable cause requirement and that an officer's suspicion and good faith are not enough, at least in New Jersey.

For the U.S. Supreme Court, the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right, but a judicially created remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court cropped the exclusionary rule significantly in the *Leon* exception. However, the New Jersey court held that under its constitution, a source of individual liberties more expansive than the federal Constitution, the state right which corresponds with the Fourth Amendment is a very important right. The exclusionary rule, by virtue of its consistent application over the past 25 years, has become an integral element of our state constitutional guarantee. The state court found that the federal constitutional rule would reduce compliance by law enforcement officers with probable cause.

Not many cases are dropped simply because some evidence is excluded, though in some states a good faith exception may be necessary. In New Jersey, however, the court found that the exclusionary rule does not impair law enforcement. Finally, since the court surmises that, as Justice Harry Blackmun said, the *Leon* exception probably will not be permanent, New Jersey does not have to experiment with procedures that produce uncertain effects when a state constitutional right is at stake. Although state and federal uniformity is often good, it is not essential.

**State Courts' Reliance on Federal Law**

Before *Michigan v. Long*, the Supreme Court usually assumed that the state court was relying on state rather than federal law. Historically, state courts could rely on their own constitution as a source of rights greater than those granted by the federal court. Only in this century has the U.S. Supreme Court assumed the authority to review a state court judgment that protects a federal right. The Court could only review those cases that held against a federal claim in favor of state law.

However, in *Michigan v. Long*, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the Court that:

> ...in determining ... whether we have jurisdiction to review a case that is alleged to rest on adequate and independent state grounds, ... we merely assume that there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.

In a footnote, the Court explained its holding. The Supreme Court should not take jurisdiction if one of two grounds of a state court decision is based on independent and adequate state grounds. The federal court may take jurisdiction if: (1) the case is decided on the federal ground despite the availability of an adequate state ground, and (2) the state court felt compelled to follow federal constitutional considerations or the state and federal grounds are interwoven.
Although the Supreme Court should respect state jurisdiction because of both the inability of the Court to construe state law and the respect due to state courts in a federal system, the Court will presume that it has jurisdiction. To avoid federal review, the state court must include a “plain statement” that the state court is basing its decision on independent and adequate state grounds. Federal precedents are used only as guidance and do not compel the decision.48

The Vermont court in State v. Jewett49 instructed local practitioners to rely on state law rather than on federal law. The court warned that in order to avoid federal jurisdiction, the states should not use federal cases that compel the result. A state court may use federal decisions only for their persuasive value, like decisions from other states.50 If the state court opinion relies too heavily on federal precedent, the U.S. Supreme Court in review might find that it has jurisdiction, even though the state court plainly states that its decision is based on independent and adequate state grounds.

The U.S. Supreme Court may hold that the state court’s reliance on federal precedent in a particular case is misguided and, therefore, reverse the decision if the state’s use of independent and adequate state grounds is not clear. In Florida v. Meyers,51 the appellate state court reversed the trial court conviction potentially on two grounds.52 The first was a restriction on cross examination under state law, which was not challenged on appeal. The second was the use of evidence obtained in an automobile search.53

In the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary per curiam opinion, the issue of independent and adequate state grounds is addressed in a footnote. The Court finds that the state court made no “clear indication” that the issue of cross examination was an adequate ground for reversal, independent of the suppression of the evidence obtained in an automobile search.54

Over the strong dissent of Justice Stevens, the Court held that the search of the automobile was proper under the Fourth Amendment and reversed the state court.55

Stevens asserted that the Court should not have granted certiorari. He noted that since 1981 the Court had summarily reversed lower court decisions upholding constitutional rights 19 times. Stevens stressed that the Court should be “ever mindful of its primary role as the protector of the citizen and not the warden or the prosecutor.”56 Therefore, states must base their decisions clearly on state constitutional grounds to protect state defendants. If federal law is used, the Supreme Court is likely to reverse the decision, possibly with only a summary proceeding.

Similarly, in Massachusetts v. Upton,57 the Supreme Court, in another per curiam opinion, found that the court in the Commonwealth misunderstood the definition of probable cause, which the Court articulated in Illinois v. Gates.58 Gates set out a flexible “totality of the circumstances” test that overruled the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test. The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the judgment of the state court.

Justice Stevens, this time in a concurrence, agreed with the reversal because the state court did not express whether the warrant was valid and supported by probable cause under the Massachusetts Constitution. He suggested that if Massachusetts were to find the warrant under state law to be in violation of its constitution on remand, then the first opinion, in which the court incorrectly pursued federal law, was worthless and insufficient.59 This was precisely what occurred in that case.

The state should look to state law and the state constitution before it turns to the U.S. Constitution. According to the Ninth Amendment, rights are retained by the people of the state and are protected by the state constitution. The state court must guard the liberties of the citizens of the state and may exceed the rights granted under the U.S. Constitution.60

Many state courts are able to grant the defendant greater protections than the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution on remand by explicitly relying on a state ground to obtain a different result. In Commonwealth v. Upton,61 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided that its constitution exceeded the protection of the defendant granted by the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard. The court stated that: “The Constitution of the Commonwealth preceded and is independent of the Constitution of the United States.”62 The two constitutions have different language, and the courts have found different results and understandings of constitutional doctrine under the two documents.

The Massachusetts Court has realized in the past that it may protect the defendant more thoroughly under the state than the federal Constitution.63 It held that the Aguilar-Spinelli test sets a clear and comprehensible standard, encourages careful work by the police, and reduces the number of unreasonable searches in Massachusetts. The court decided that this standard should be maintained in the Commonwealth and is required by the Constitution of Massachusetts.64

In State v. Neville,65 the South Dakota Supreme Court held that it could suppress, under the state constitution, evidence of a potentially intoxicated driver’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that refusal is admissible under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,66 the state, acting as the final arbiter of the state constitution, can grant the defendant more rights than the U.S. Constitution. The court determined that the federal cases did not control its deter-
ministration. The words of the state constitution concerning the privilege against self-incrimination are different and broader than the words in the Fifth Amendment. The refusal to submit to the test is not an admissible physical act, but is a communication that must be protected. The court, therefore, suppressed the evidence.

In addressing state laws and constitutions, however, state courts must be careful. They should use federal precedent explicitly only for its persuasive value and state plainly that they are relying on aspects of their own state constitution rather than the U.S. Constitution.

Nevertheless, even if the state court specifically states that it is using the state constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court may find that the ground is not completely adequate or independent and, therefore, reverse the decision. In a large number of cases in which state courts have protected a defendant’s rights more fully than the Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has reversed in per curiam opinions. However, the Supreme Court may be forced to accept state court interpretations of their own constitutions if there is a plain statement, as required by Michigan v. Long, and if there is no real reliance on a federal precedent that requires the decision.

If the state court fails to rely solely on state law in its first opinion, the state court may reverse the decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court by relying explicitly on independent and adequate state grounds. In response to this action, the Supreme Court has reversed some cases that had protected the defendant without remand to the state court. Therefore, if a state court wishes to have its ruling stand, the state should rely on its own constitution in the first place, not only to avoid repetitious litigation, but also to avoid the problem in Gates.

State and Federal Prosecutions

Even if a state court bases its decisions on state constitutional grounds that are adequate and independent of the U.S. Constitution, the federal courts in the state may still use the evidence that is suppressed in the state court under the less restrictive federal rule. In two cases decided on the same day, the Supreme Court, in Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, did not deny the state and federal governments the power to prosecute the same act.

In Bartkus, the defendant was tried and acquitted in federal district court. Then the federal agents gave the evidence to the officials of the state of Illinois, who proceeded to convict the defendant for the same acts under a state statute. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Moore v. Illinois, “the same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both” the state and federal sovereigns. The Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment did not preclude the second prosecution by the state. Under Bartkus, successive state and federal prosecutions are not in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In another case, Abbate v. United States, the state of Illinois prosecuted and convicted a defendant for violation of a state statute. Then, the federal district court in Mississippi prosecuted the defendant for a violation of a federal statute for the same acts. This situation is the opposite of that in Bartkus. The Supreme Court relied on United States v. Lanza, which held that the state conviction did not preclude the second federal suit. The Court recognized that if the state prosecution barred federal prosecutions for the same acts, “federal law enforcement must necessarily be hindered.” This is particularly dangerous when the defendant’s behavior impinges on the federal interest more than that of the state.

These two cases illustrate that the Supreme Court will uphold prosecution of the same act in the courts of different sovereigns. Thus, if the state court were to hear the case of the defendant and make its decision based on independent and adequate state grounds, the federal court may still hear the case under a federal statute. According to Abbate and Lanza, after the state court granted the defendant protection greater than the safeguards in the U.S. Constitution, the federal court can try the same defendant for the same acts and convict him by using the evidence that was not permissible in state court.

However, the Court in Bartkus noted that many states have statutes that bar a second prosecution after the defendant has been tried by a separate sovereign for the same actions. State and federal officials may decide that the statutes under which the defendant is prosecuted are so similar that a second suit is not warranted or necessary, even though it is not prohibited. The federal government may decide that the federal statute is so much like the statute that the state used to prosecute the defendant that the federal suit should not proceed. Perhaps the expense of the second trial should not be incurred because the defendant is being punished by the state or has received an acquittal after a fair trial. The defendant could argue this point to the federal prosecutor and to the federal judge as grounds for dismissal.

Federal prosecutors have adopted this policy pursuant to the case of Petite v. United States. In response to Bartkus and Abbate, the U.S. Department of Justice adopted a policy that “a federal trial following a state prosecution for the same act or acts is barred unless the reasons are compelling.” In Rinaldi, the U.S. Supreme Court enforced the Justice Department’s policy that bars the second prosecution. The Supreme Court dismissed the federal indictment and left the state conviction and sentence intact.
Under this policy as enforced by the courts, a defendant who is first tried in a state court may be able to avoid a federal suit where the evidence, which would be precluded under the more protective state constitution, could be used. The defendant can argue that the Justice Department policy does not allow the second prosecution and that the court must enforce this policy. The problem is that the Justice Department can change its policy. The court cannot require the department to keep this policy. If the department abandons its policy, a defendant may again be faced with two indictments and trials.

A majority of the present U.S. Supreme Court would appear to limit the protections granted to defendants in criminal cases. This has led the Court to admit evidence to convict defendants who were protected by a state court that did not specify its reliance on state law. The Supreme Court has even decided cases without remand in order to avoid state reversal under state law. There is reason to believe that the U.S. Supreme Court will continue to permit federal courts to grant less protection to defendants in second prosecutions. The lower courts can take many cases which the Supreme Court as a single body cannot hear.

As recently as 1985, the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause does not bar a second prosecution of a defendant for the same acts in a court with a different sovereign than the first. Heath v. Alabama approved two prosecutions for the same acts in different states.83 The Court did not question the fact that consecutive state and federal suits are permissible. A defendant must argue that the second suit should not take place on the grounds of respect for the state court, efficiency, and the wisdom of the doctrine that a defendant should not be twice convicted for the same crime. However, it is doubtful that the federal court is prohibited from hearing the suit.

Avoiding Federal Use of Evidence

State Courts

If a defendant and the state cannot avoid federal prosecution, then federal officials may be unable to use the evidence that was inadmissible under the state constitution. In Rea v. United States,84 the Supreme Court permitted the federal courts to issue injunctions against federal agents to prevent them from giving evidence to the state officials. The Court approved of the action of the district court in enjoining a federal official because the relief was not against any state activity, but only against a federal agent who abused his authority. As the Court said, “to enjoin the federal agent from testifying is merely to enforce the federal rules against those owing obedience to them.”85 It was unimportant that the state might con-

done the procedure prohibited by the federal rule. The federal agent could not be allowed to flout the rules that he had the duty to follow.88

Similarly, perhaps the state courts could limit the activity of state agents. The state courts might be permitted to stop state agents from testifying or giving evidence to federal agents who could use this evidence in federal court. The fact that the procedure used by the state agent was proper under federal constitutional law would be irrelevant. The state court would simply be enforcing its own constitutional rules against the state agents who were bound to follow these rules. If the states could not enforce their rules on state agents, these agents could act as they pleased and violate constitutional rights of the defendants. The defendants would have no remedy.

In his dissent in Rea, Justice Harlan voiced his concern that a federal “injunction [against federal officials] will operate quite as effectively . . . to stultify the state prosecution as if it had been issued directly against New Mexico or its officials.”87 Even if the state enjoined only the activities of the state official, the injunction would, in effect, work against the federal suit. The state court would be able to prevent the prosecution of the federal case. This would awaken the concerns about enabling the sovereign with the greater interest in the case to hold the trial, even if the officers of the other sovereign discovered the evidence.

This problem is exacerbated when it is the state enjoining state officials and interfering with federal prosecutions. The state court could nullify federal law, which must be supreme to state law.88 A state’s nullification of a federal prosecution would turn the supremacy doctrine on its head: the state could often control the federal court by refusing to turn over probative evidence.

In Wilson v. Schnettler,89 the U.S. Supreme Court reflected this concern for violation of a sovereign’s power when it refused to enjoin the use of evidence illegally seized by federal officers in state court. After the defendant was indicted in an Illinois state court for possessing narcotics under a state statute, he filed a suit in the federal district court to impound the drugs and enjoin their use in the state trial. The defendant argued that the injunction should issue against the federal officials who seized the narcotics and who would be called to testify in the state’s case. The defendant failed in the Supreme Court as well as the lower federal courts.

The decision was based on the rationale that courts of one sovereign must avoid interference with the courts of the other sovereign. Otherwise, embarrassing and threatening conflicts between state and federal courts would occur. If each court decided to enjoin the other’s proceedings, litigants would be left without a remedy.90 There would be no finality in the
judgment of the first sovereign, which could be re-
versed in a new trial by the other.91

These ideas, voiced in Wilson, were applied in the
later case of Younger v. Harris.92 That case held that a
federal court cannot enjoin an ongoing state criminal
proceeding unless there is bad faith, harassment, or
some other unusual circumstances.93 Similarly, if the
federal court begins its proceeding, the state court
should not interfere, particularly because of federal
supremacy. If the federal proceeding has not yet
started, the defendant can argue that enjoining the
federal officials is not forbidden and is appropriate.

However, there could occur a race to the court
house between the defendant going to state court and
the federal prosecutor going to federal court. In the
federal system, however, the state court’s supervisory
power over the conduct of state officials with respect
to violations of state laws might be more important
than any inconveniences to the federal prosecutor.
The vindication of a state constitutional right of ex-
clusion of evidence outweighs the federal court’s
right to hear evidence obtained in violation of state
law. One piece of evidence is not likely to cause the
federal prosecutor to drop the suit.

The state court should have supervisory powers
over state officials so as to ensure that the officers do
not flout state constitutional law. In City of Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the
states “may permit their courts to use injunctions to
oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities
on a continuing basis.”94 Thus, a state court should
have no hesitation in supervising state personnel
when that is clearly appropriate.

The state court can also attempt to enjoin a fed-
eral official against violation of state laws. There are
many limitations on the power of state courts over
federal officials. In Tarble’s Case, the Supreme Court
determined that the state court could not inquire
about the validity of the enlistment of soldiers into
the military.95 Further, in McClung v. Silliman,96 the
Court determined that state courts could not issue a
writ of mandamus against federal officials. Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled explicitly
that a state court could not enjoin a federal official,
the Court would probably not allow such an action.
The Supreme Court is likely to find that if the federal
official obtained the evidence, the state court should
not interfere with the federal court’s jurisdiction.

The defendant could argue that the state court
should be able to enjoin its officials, and even federal
officials, from acting contrary to the rule enacted by
the state courts. The federal officials should follow
the state law while they are in the state, if the state
law is more protective than the federal law. This
would encourage state officers to act in accordance
with state law.

However, this law would probably be too strin-
gent for the federal officials. Federal officers would
have to behave differently in each state, and there
would be no uniform rules. Further, the state law is
not supreme; the federal law overrules conflicting
state laws. The federal government and officials are
not bound by state laws.

The defendant may be able to enforce exclusion
of the evidence obtained legally by federal agents,
but which is contrary to the state exclusionary rule in
the state court. The state can follow the theory be-
hind Elkins v. United States97 and eliminate the “re-
verse silver platter” problem that arises in such a sit-
uation. Given that Elkins held that evidence obtained
by state officers in violation of the U.S. Constitution
is inadmissible in the federal courts, evidence ob-
tained by federal officers in violation of the state con-
stitution should not be admitted in the state court.
It would be internally inconsistent for the state court to
use different rules depending on whether the officers
are state or federal.

If a search is unreasonable and, therefore, vio-
lates the state constitution, the products should not
be admitted in the state court, regardless of the ac-
tors. The victim of the search is harmed equally by
federal and state officials. Although federal officers
are not usually required to follow state law, the state
court should not admit evidence that was obtained in
violation of the constitutional rights of its citizens.
The federal officials are not harmed because they
probably will be able to use the evidence in federal
court. The state does not interfere with federal law
enforcement or federal courts.

Federal Courts

If the state court is hesitant to interfere with the
actions of the federal court by enjoining its state per-
sonnel, the defendant can argue to the federal court
that it should refuse to admit the evidence. The fed-
eral court could make an evidentiary ruling that the
federal officials cannot receive evidence that a state
officer obtained in violation of state law. Federal
courts should not encourage state officers to violate
their state laws. Further, the federal court may en-
hance this policy prohibiting the federal officers from
admitting evidence which they obtained by a knowing
violation of the state law where they are working.

A defendant could request an injunction against
the state official in federal court to prohibit a handing
over of illegally obtained evidence. Because the state
actor acted in violation of the state constitution, the
official should lose immunity from suit in federal
court under Ex Parte Young.98 The state officials must
obey the U.S. Constitution; violations of neither one
should be tolerated. The federal court should enjoin
the state officers on state constitutional grounds.

However, this position has not been accepted by
the U.S. Supreme Court. In Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman,99 the Court refused to en-
join a state officer for violation of state laws. Only the
state court has power over state officials. Therefore,
the lower federal courts will probably not enjoin the
state officer in deference to Pennhurst.
In *United States v. Chavez-Vernaza*,100 the federal court refused to encourage the state officers to follow carefully the state constitutional rules announced by state courts. In that case, Chavez wanted discovery of the manner in which state officials obtained evidence against him to determine if their activities violated state law. He claimed that if the evidence was seized in violation of state constitutional law, comity demanded that the federal court suppress it. The appellate court did not agree.

The Oregon court held that evidence is admissible in a federal court under federal standards. Following state law would hamper federal law enforcement by suppressing probative evidence.101 However, the state constitutional rule would not hamper federal law enforcement significantly. Obviously, a state would not adopt a rule that would be impossible for its own law enforcement personnel to uphold. If the rule did not harm the court's enforcement of the law, it is unlikely that a federal court in the state would find it unworkable.

For the *Chavez* court, uniformity among federal courts is more important than respect for the states. Although uniformity is a vital consideration, it does not outweigh the Constitution. A court would never assert that law enforcement officers could uniformly violate the U.S. Constitution. Federal courts should not sanction the violation of a state constitution by state officers. Uniform enforcement by the federal court of rules for federal agents will be maintained while the state constitution is also upheld if the federal court suppresses the evidence.

Finally, the *Chavez* court asserted that if the state desires to discipline its officers, other means are available as sanctions.102 However, although other sanctions exist, none seem to be as effective as the exclusionary rule. In dissent, Judge Harry Pregerson recognized that the federal court should defer to the state exclusionary rule because otherwise the state officers would be able to violate state constitutional law with impunity.103 In *United States v. Henderson*,104 the federal court reasoned correctly that the deterrence of a state exclusionary rule would be lessened if the state officer were permitted to introduce the evidence in a federal proceeding.

In *Elkins v. United States*,105 the Supreme Court supported this policy of encouraging adherence to state law. The majority recognized that it must exclude the evidence in order to avoid conflict between state and federal courts. "When a federal court sitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly seized by state agents, it not only frustrates state policy, but frustrates that policy in a particularly inappropriate and ironic way."106 In dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter agreed that state law is frustrated if the federal court does not suppress the illegally seized evidence. Thus the entire Court agreed that this evidence cannot be admitted.

Justice Frankfurter also asserted that the federal courts should not interfere with beneficial state procedures that assist the defendant by limiting the exclusion of evidence to the minimum in the U.S. Constitution. The state court cannot effectively discipline state officers for violations of state laws that are more protective than the U.S. Constitution. Frankfurter would hold that proper respect for the states demands that the state courts decide whether the evidence is admissible and that federal courts abide by this decision. This doctrine would be particularly applicable in a case where the state is more protective of the defendant under its constitution than the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.

**Conclusion**

State courts, perhaps with the help of federal courts, must try to ensure the state constitutional rights of state citizens. Many states are now granting defendants many rights that the Supreme Court has not found in the U.S. Constitution. The California courts were once the leaders of the crusade to have the state courts become the chief guardians of the liberties of defendants. However, the court's goals were thwarted when the citizens of the state voted in a referendum that the California Constitution is identical in meaning to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.107 New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut are leading the eastern states in broad interpretation of their state constitutions. These states and many others are interpreting their constitutions beneficially for the defendant. Several western states, such as Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, are also leading in state constitutional interpretation.108 Many states, however, have just begun to look toward their own constitutions, or have not yet attempted to use their own constitutions more broadly than the U.S. Constitution.109

**NOTES**


3Collins, p. 17.


5Brennan, p. 103.


11 Ibid., p. 285.
12 Ibid., p. 288.
13 Ibid., p. 289.
14 Ibid., p. 290.
15 Ibid., p. 292.

16 State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985). Since 1970, 250 cases have held that state constitutions are broader than their federal constitutional counterparts.

17 Ibid., p. 235.

20 658 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1983).
22 465 U.S. 329.
23 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1987).
25 Ibid., p. 378. The exclusionary rule was incorporated in Hess v. State, 84 Okla. 73, 202 P. 310 (Okla. 1921).
27 733 P.2d 379.
29 999 A.2d 981.

30 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The Supreme Court has yet to grant a writ on this question presented.

34 462 U.S. 213.
37 519 A.2d 857.
38 Ibid., 849.
39 Ibid., 856.
40 Ibid., 854.
41 Ibid., 856.
42 468 U.S. 928.
43 519 A.2d 857.
44 463 U.S. 1032.

45 Greenhalgh, p. 21. Under this new rule, the Supreme Court will hear the state case if it was based on both state and federal grounds, but the state court increased the protection of the federal right. There is no reason why the Supreme Court needs to hear a case if the federal right has been protected because there is no danger that the federal interest will be lost.

46 463 U.S. 1042.
47 Ibid., 1038, n.4.
48 Ibid., 1041.
49 500 A.2d 233.
50 Ibid., p. 238.
52 432 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1983).
53 466 U.S. 381.
54 Ibid., 381-82.
55 Ibid., 382. Although Stevens’ opinion is a dissent, it did have an effect: per curiam reversals occurred less frequently since he pointed out the Court’s action.

56 Ibid., 387. Between the 1981 and the 1983 term, the Court decided 19 cases in summary fashion in favor of the warden or marshall reversing a decision which held a constitutional right (p. 386).

58 462 U.S. 213.
59 See note 61.
60 466 U.S. 738.

62 Ibid., 555.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 556.
67 346 N.W.2d 328.

68 Ibid., 429.

72 Bartkus, 359 U.S. 122.
74 Ibid., 124. At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was not understood to incorporate the first eight amendments.

75 Ibid., 132.
76 359 U.S. 187.
77 Ibid., 189.
79 Ibid., 195.

80 359 U.S. 138.
81 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
85 Ibid., 217.
86 Ibid., 218.
87 Ibid., 219.

88 United States Constitution, Article VI: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
89 365 U.S. 381 (1960).
90 Ibid., 384 n.4.
91 Ibid., 385.
93 Ibid., 54.
95 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
96 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
100 844 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir, 1987).
101 Ibid., 1374.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., 1378.
104 721 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir, 1983).
106 Ibid., 221.
108 See appendix.
109 See appendix.
Appendix

Cases since Michigan v. Long in Which a State Court Has Granted the Defendant More Protections Than the Supreme Court Finds within the U.S. Constitution.

Alabama
Ex Parte Lynn, 477 So.2d 1385 (1985)
Sixth Amendment: cross-examination
Bradley v. State, 494 So.2d 772 (1986) Dissent
Due Process: pretrial discovery

Alaska
Fourth Amendment: inventory search
Fifth Amendment: custodial interrogation
Fourth Amendment: standing for suppression of evidence
Fourth Amendment: probable cause standard

Arizona
State v. Adult, 724 P.2d 525 (1986)
Fourth Amendment: exigent circumstances, inevitable discovery
Sixth Amendment: right to counsel
Right to trial by jury

California
Due Process: jury instructions
In re Lance, 694 P.2d 744 (1985)
Fourth Amendment: no vicarious exclusionary rule
In re William Misener, 698 P.2d 637 (1985)
Fifth Amendment: self-incrimination
Williams v. People, 709 P.2d 1287 (1985)
Fourth Amendment: search and seizure
People v. May, 748 P.2d 307 (1988)
Fourth Amendment: follow Lance and Proposition 8

Colorado
Due Process: disclosure of informants
Fourth Amendment: good faith exception exists
People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237 (1988) Concur and Dissent
Fourth Amendment: list examples

Connecticut
Fifth Amendment: self-incrimination
Grand jury implied use of state law
Due Process: exclude from witness room
State v. Hufford, 533 A.2d 1199 (1987)
Sixth Amendment: confrontation
Sixth Amendment: right to counsel

Georgia
State v. Luck, 312 S.E.2d 791 (1984)
Fourth Amendment: warrant requirement
Indigent right to psychiatrist

Hawaii
Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Idaho
Due Process: seizure of driver's license
Illinois
People v. Singleton, 1988 Lexis 27
   Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process

Indiana
   Sixth Amendment: Confrontation Clause

Maryland
   Fifth Amendment: voluntariness; follow Maryland nonconstitutional law

Massachusetts
   Fourth Amendment: inventory search
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Michigan
State v. Chapman, 387 N.W.2d 835 (1986)
   Fourth Amendment: curtilage
   Fifth Amendment: self-incrimination

Minnesota
State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (1985) Dissent
   Sixth Amendment: double jeopardy

Missouri
   Fourth Amendment: exclusionary rule

Montana
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure
   Sixth Amendment: right to counsel

Nebraska
State v. Havlat, 385 N.W.2d 436 (1986) Dissent
   Fourth Amendment: open fields
   Fourth Amendment: exclusionary rule

New Hampshire
State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (1985)
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure
State v. Mercier, 509 A.2d 1246 (1986)
   Fifth Amendment: self-incrimination

New Jersey
   Fifth Amendment: self-incrimination

State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986)
   Jury selection
State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (1987) Dissent
   Eighth Amendment: death penalty
State v. Fritz, 519 A.2d 336 (1987)
   Sixth Amendment: right to counsel
   Fourth Amendment: exclusionary rule

New York
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure
People v. Class, 494 N.E.2d 444 (1986)
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure
   Fourth Amendment: exclusionary rule
   Fourteenth Amendment: due process

North Carolina
State v. Lachat, 343 S.E.2d 872 (1986)
   Fifth Amendment: double jeopardy
Jackson v. Housing Authority of the City of High Point, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988)
   Jury selection

Oklahoma
Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375 (1987)
   Fourth Amendment: exclusionary rule

Oregon
State v. Magee, 744.2d 250 (1987)
   Fifth Amendment: Miranda

Rhode Island
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

South Dakota
   Fifth Amendment: self-incrimination
   Jury trial

Texas
Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575 (1986)
   Fifth Amendment: Miranda
Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542 (1986) Dissent
   Sixth Amendment: assistance of counsel

Utah
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Vermont
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (1985)
   Fourth Amendment: search and seizure
Fourth Amendment: probable cause

Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Washington
Fourth Amendment: probable cause

Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Fourteenth Amendment: due process

West Virginia
Sixth Amendment: right to counsel

Wisconsin
Fourth Amendment: search and seizure

Wyoming
Sixth Amendment: right to counsel
State Courts and Economic Rights

This chapter examines the role of state courts in protecting economic rights. Since the U.S. Supreme Court has decided to expend its constitutional energy on other issues, the protection of property rights from unwarranted state regulation rests essentially with state supreme courts. The correctness and effectiveness of this state court activism are legitimate and important concerns for all those interested in promoting an effective and balanced role for the state judiciaries in our constitutional system. The chapter will examine the arguments for and against state judicial activism in protecting economic rights, and the standards by which such activism can be judged. It will be argued that critics of this area of judicial activism assume too frequently the relevance of the federal experience and generalize their conclusions to the states without fully appreciating the significant difference found in the state constitutional traditions. We conclude by suggesting that it is necessary not only for judges but also for legislators and citizens to work together to strike a proper balance between a judiciary that does too much and one that does too little.

State constitutions are a mine of numerous, unique, and detailed provisions concerned with the protection of property rights. At least 34 state constitutions contain open court or right to access provisions for which there is no national equivalent.1 These open court provisions can be found in the earliest constitutions as well as in ones adopted in the 20th century.2 These provisions were included in constitutions to ensure that state legislatures would not tamper with common law remedies available to citizens and that states would not impose unreasonable financial conditions for access to the courts.3

A number of state constitutions also contain antimonopoly and antiperpetuities clauses for which one finds no national equivalents. These provisions also appeared in the earliest state constitutions and were adopted by other states in the 19th and 20th centuries.4 The earlier antimonopoly provisions were aimed exclusively at public monopolies. These originated in the common law rule against perpetuities and the granting of exclusive franchises or licenses by the state, but they were also aimed at prohibiting excessive regulations on business.5 Provisions adopted after the Civil War were written in such a way as to make them applicable to privately created monopolies as well.6

Finally, the constitutions of half the states contain taking clauses, which unlike the federal taking clause contain the phrase property shall not be taken “or damaged” for public use without just compensation.7 The addition of the “or damaged” phrase was aimed at providing more protection than the federal equivalent, especially against legalized nuisances, which, generally, have not been interpreted as a “taking” by federal courts.8 These exemplify but do not exhaust the variety of property provisions found in state constitutions.

One of the most controversial areas of state court activism in this era of the new judicial federalism is in the use of state due process, equal protection, and right-to-remedy clauses to strike down state and local economic regulations interfering with property interests. The movement to grant greater protection to individual rights on state constitutional grounds than the U.S. Supreme Court has granted under the federal Constitution has met generally with favorable responses.9 However, when it comes to economic rights, the reaction has been less than enthusiastic.10 This tepid response is understandable given the association of protecting economic rights with a period of the U.S. Supreme Court’s history known as the Lochner era, in which, it is claimed, the Court adopted a laissez faire economic philosophy, striking down economic regulation in the name of free enterprise and property rights.11

This is not, however, without its ironies. The "new" judicial federalism is not "new" in the area of economic rights. State supreme courts relied on various provisions of their respective constitutions to protect such rights well before the Supreme Court discovered substantive due process, and they have
continued to do so. These courts are major determinants of the extent to which property rights are given protection in the United States, and with regard to many areas of economic concern, state courts are the only judicial forums in which these issues are given a serious hearing. In part this is the result of the Supreme Court's decision to play little or no role in policing economic regulations, at least as far as due process and equal protection challenges are concerned. As Lawrence Sager puts it:

With extraordinary generality and finality federal courts have ceased to find in the Constitution any basis for intervening in the decisions of governmental entities to tax or regulate economic affairs. Justice William Brennan spoke for the Court of the last half century when he noted the wide latitude granted by the Court "to a valid exercise of the state's police power even if it results in severe violations of property rights." As pointed out in chapter 1, three clauses of the U.S. Constitution have been used by the federal courts to protect property rights: (1) the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment, (2) the contract clause, and (3) the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nearly all state constitutions contain similar provisions. This chapter concentrates primarily on the use of due process, equal protection, and right-to-remedy clauses by state high courts to review regulations that raise questions of property rights. This focus has four rationales: (1) the bulk of state court activity has been and continues to be focused on due process and equal protection as grounds for protecting property rights; (2) most states have incorporated the taking limitation into their due process clauses, thus making it difficult to distinguish the two limitations; (3) when applying the taking or contract clauses, state courts generally have followed the federal precedents, which involve a balancing of private loss against public gain; (4) the U.S. Supreme Court has remained active in applying the taking and contract clauses, deciding at least 18 major cases in the last ten years.

State Courts and Economic Rights in the 19th Century

Substantive due process, the idea that legislation must not be arbitrary (i.e., it must have a real and substantial relationship to a legitimate state interest), arose first among state courts—a fact that was influential in its adoption by the U.S. Supreme Court. Edward S. Corwin, after analyzing state and federal cases prior to the Civil War, credits Wynehamer v. State of New York as the beacon case whose doctrine "less than 20 years from the time of its rendition...was far on the way to being assimilated into the accepted constitutional law of the country." There were numerous other cases, enough to allow the conclusion that the development of substantive due process was as much a function of state judges interpreting state constitutions as it was the creation of federal judges.

The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) did not give immediate impetus to the development of economic due process as far as the Supreme Court was concerned, but state courts were quick to add it to their constitutional arsenals. Exemplary in this respect is the case of In Re Jacobs (1885). The New York legislature had prohibited the manufacturing or preparation of tobacco in tenements in cities of 500,000 or more in population. The New York Court of Appeals voided the law as a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In doing so, the court wrote:

Liberty, in its broad sense as understood in this country, means the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful callings, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation. All laws, therefore, which impair or trammel these rights, which limit one in his choice of a trade or profession, or confine him to work or live in a specified locality, or exclude him from his own house, or restrain his otherwise lawful movements (except as such laws may be passed in the exercise by the legislature of the police power...) are infringements on his fundamental rights of liberty, which are under constitutional protection.

This view is one that survived the 19th century among many state courts and remains an important principle guiding their decisions in this area. New York was not alone. Between 1885 and 1894, ten states adopted the same general approach. Bernard Siegan has suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Allegheny v. Louisiana, in which the liberty of contract was constitutionalized, thus beginning the era of substantive due process, was not unexpected "because the federal judiciary was in fact following trends established in many states." Protection of property and economic rights was not foisted on the country by the judiciary: doctrines of vested rights and economic due process were developed out of a commitment to protecting property and economic liberties that are part of the constitutional and political tradition of the United States.

State Court Activity and Economic Rights, 1897-1987

The heyday of federal substantive due process, roughly 1897 to 1937, has been well studied. The reaction to substantive due process as it was interpreted in Lochner and its progeny was so intense that the U.S. Supreme Court has, for all intents and purposes,
abandoned any serious review of the kind of economic regulation that had been the prime target of the doctrine. Oliver Wendell Holmes' stinging dissent to *Lochner* became the definitive understanding of *Lochner*. Holmes' view, that *Lochner* was no more than an attempt to read into the Constitution a particular economic philosophy derived from Adam Smith and, more immediately, Herbert Spencer, became the dominant view among academic commentators as well as judges. In its place emerged a view that the due process clause, as far as economic regulation is concerned, means what its words suggest, namely, procedural but not substantive protection against government action. While the U.S. Supreme Court has revived the general notion of substantive due process, and has recently indicated that it may become more solicitous of property rights, there has been no attempt to revive substantive due process as a basis for stricter review of economic and social regulation.

What follows is a look at the extent to which state courts adopted a similar doctrine, how rigorously they applied it and in what areas, and the extent to which the state courts followed the U.S. Supreme Court in rejecting substantive due process. To get some idea of state court involvement in protecting economic rights, an examination was made of eight studies that collected cases in this area. Added to the cases noted therein were decisions collected from lists provided by state courts themselves. Finally, to the above were added cases collected since 1980 from the regional reporters. A total of 391 cases were discovered using this method. Although this figure by no means represents all the cases decided by state high courts in this area, it is believed that it is representative of the activity of state courts in the period from 1897 to 1987.

During the period of 1897-1937, state courts definitely emphasized substantive due process, with 70 percent of the cases being decided on this basis. This figure increased to 81 percent during the next period, 1938-1968, but dropped significantly to 18 percent during 1969-1987. The emphasis on equal protection decreased slightly.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local Regulations/Miscellaneous (%)</th>
<th>Judicial Remedy (%)</th>
<th>Anti-Competitive (%)</th>
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<td><strong>1897-1937</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>75.0 15</td>
<td>50.0 1</td>
<td>66.7 10</td>
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<td>50.0 1</td>
<td>13.3 2</td>
<td>16.2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0 0</td>
<td>20.0 3</td>
<td>13.5 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100.0 20</td>
<td>100.0 2</td>
<td>100.0 15</td>
<td>100.0 37</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1938-1968</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive Due Process</td>
<td>71.1 27</td>
<td>0.0 0</td>
<td>85.6 143</td>
<td>81.0 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Protection</td>
<td>18.4 7</td>
<td>60.0 3</td>
<td>7.8 13</td>
<td>11.0 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive Due Process/Equal Protection Combined</td>
<td>7.9 3</td>
<td>20.0 1</td>
<td>4.2 7</td>
<td>5.2 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2.6 1</td>
<td>20.0 1</td>
<td>2.4 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 38</td>
<td>100.0 5</td>
<td>100.0 167</td>
<td>100.0 210</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1969-1987</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Substantive Due Process</td>
<td>25.8 8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Equal Protection</td>
<td>48.4 15</td>
<td>55.1 43</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Substantive Due Process/Equal Protection Combined</td>
<td>9.7 3</td>
<td>5.1 4</td>
<td>24.0 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous*</td>
<td>16.1 5</td>
<td>34.6 27</td>
<td>4.0 1</td>
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<td>100.0 31</td>
<td>100.0 78</td>
<td>100.0 25</td>
<td>100.0 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Cases</strong></td>
<td>23.4 89</td>
<td>22.3 85</td>
<td>54.3 207</td>
<td>100.0 381</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Most of the cases in this category are open court or right-to-remedy provisions of state constitutions.*
from 16 percent during 1897-1937 to 11 percent during 1938-1968, but then increased dramatically to 48 percent during 1969-1987. An increase in state legislative activity involving social and economic regulation may account for part of the shift, but does not seem to be the primary factor. Decisions as far back as the end of the 19th century decided on due process grounds would today almost certainly be decided on equal protection grounds.\(^{31}\) The discrediting of due process as a basis for examining social and economic regulation, as well as the rise of equality as a constitutional value, have combined to make judges and scholars feel more comfortable with equal protection analysis, even though the outcomes are the same.\(^{32}\)

A second significant aspect of the data is the existence of a consistent philosophy governing this judicial activism that persists throughout the periods in question. Fifty-three percent of all the cases examined fell into the anticompetitive category. State court judges struck down measures that either overtly or covertly tended to create monopoly and/or interfere with the operation of the marketplace. In decision after decision, judges concluded that the real as opposed to the ostensible purpose of the legislation in question was anticompetitive. In doing so, the judges were being true to what one scholar has demonstrated was one of the historically valid purposes of the due process clause, namely, protection against monopoly.\(^{33}\)

The most recent period, 1969-1987, reveals a development of some promise in the use of open court or right-to-remedy clauses contained in most state constitutions. These clauses typically take the form of guaranteeing that all courts shall be open, and that all persons shall have a remedy for injuries suffered to their persons, property, or reputation. In conjunction with equal protection clauses, they have been used to strike down guest statutes (which preclude liability for nonpaying passengers in private vehicles), statutes of repose (which preclude liability), caps on malpractice awards, and similar measures. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed any of these issues directly. Assuming that at least some of these statutes are open to legitimate challenge, the only available forums for those challenges have been the state judiciaries. In fact, the single most striking development among state supreme courts in protecting economic rights since 1980 has been the increasing use of these right-to-remedy clauses, frequently in conjunction with equal protection clauses, to strike down a variety of legislative schemes.\(^{34}\)

The protection of economic rights extends beyond the confines of the business world and involves a variety of groups and interests. These range from widows of workmen denied access to courts for claims to compensation\(^{35}\) to suppliers of materials denied a special exemption from liability granted to architects.\(^{36}\) These decisions have protected minors from statutes of limitation which would make suit impossible when those minors reached legal age\(^{37}\) and consumers from attempts by legislatures to arbitrarily limit entry into professions, fix prices, or otherwise lessen competition.\(^{38}\)

**Standards of Review, 1970-1988**

The most recent period of state court activity reveals important shifts in the ground for as well as the standards of review. The 144 cases examined during this period came from 44 states, with the largest numbers concentrated in Ohio (12), Alabama (12), Georgia (8), California (8), New Hampshire (5), and Texas (5). Fifty-six percent of these cases involved some kind of limitation on liability, whether product liability, guest statutes, or limitations on plaintiffs involving the medical profession. In the majority of these cases, the enactments were struck down on right-to-remedy and/or equal protection grounds, suggesting that state court activism is most likely to be triggered when legislatures tamper with traditional common law remedies for injuries without providing alternative relief.

The movement toward stricter liability in torts and the rise of product liability claims coupled with a perceived medical malpractice crisis, galvanized a variety of groups to seek relief before state legislatures. The result was legislation placing limitations on liability in a variety of areas, but especially in the health professions. State courts have not been unanimous in their responses to this legislation. With the exception of the guest statutes where state courts have struck down almost all of those remaining on the books, state courts have sustained a variety of limitations on liability.\(^{39}\) The statutes upheld, in most cases, have been less drastic with respect to remedies left for plaintiffs.\(^{40}\) Prominent examples of state courts that have upheld such legislation are California and Indiana. The California Medical Injury Compensation Act of 1975 was challenged in four different suits, all of which the California Supreme Court sustained by using a rational basis test.\(^{41}\) A similar act adopted in Indiana was also upheld.\(^{42}\)

**Equal Protection.** In applying equal protection clauses, state courts have resorted to a variety of approaches, running from rational relationship to strict scrutiny, and in at least two cases, a standard altogether different from the three-tiered federal analysis.\(^{43}\)

Some of the state courts that claim to be applying the rational relationship test are actually requiring a more demanding standard of review. In *Whitworth v. Bynum*,\(^{44}\) the Texas high court declared that the state's guest statute had no rational relationship to any legitimate state interest. Applying the same test, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld similar legislation.\(^{45}\) In *Ketcham v. Kings County Medical Service*,\(^{46}\) the

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Washington court held an optometrist reimbursement scheme to be void on a rational relationship standard, while the dissenters had no problem coming up with facts to sustain the classification.

Other courts have applied a means-scrutiny or middle-tier standard. The significance of this standard can be seen in the case of Tabler v. Wallace. In the face of some imaginative “reasonable bases” provided by the attorneys for the state, the Kentucky court responded by arguing that the state equal protection clause requires there to be a “substantial and justifiable reason apparent from the legislative history, statute or some other authoritative source,” and that “reasons that could exist without anything of a positive nature to suggest that they did exist do not suffice.”

Another approach used by state judiciaries is to combine equal protection analysis with some other provision of their constitution. The most common combination is with due process and/or right-to-remedy clauses. In the cases combining equal protection and due process, the result looks very much like a substantive due process test. In Benson v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, the North Dakota high court demanded a close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals. In Henderson Clay Products, Inc. v. Edgar Woods and Associates, Inc., the fusion of equal protection and due process is equally clear. The Court held that the statute was an “unreasonable and arbitrary legislative classification. . . .” This fusion of equal protection and due process results in an intermediate level of review under the mantle of the more “respectable” equal protection clause.

Equal protection was combined most frequently with the right-to-remedy clauses of state constitutions. This combination almost always resulted in having the remedy clauses being declared fundamental rights, thus triggering strict scrutiny. Other combinations were also found. In Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, equal protection was combined with the right to pursue a lawful occupation as guaranteed by Article 23 of the state’s Declaration of Rights.

**Due Process.** Under the due process clauses, similar patterns emerged, though with vaguer standards. Although some decisions rested on a rational relationship test, most appear to have involved closer scrutiny than would be undertaken by federal courts. A few clung to an approach that goes back to the 19th century. Georgia continues to rely on substantive due process of the *Lochner* variety. “The right to contract . . . and agree on price is a property right protected by the due process clause of our Constitution, and unless it is a business affected with the public interest, the General Assembly is without any authority to abridge that right.”

Aware of its relative isolation, the Georgia court noted that this was its position “no matter what other states or the Supreme Court of the United States may or may not have decided.”

More typical is *Louis Finocchiaro Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control.* Here the court required a “clear, real and substantial connection between the assumed purpose of the enactment and the actual provisions thereof.” Unlike the federal rational relationship test, these states have required that the rationale be spelled out explicitly; any conceivable rationale that might be adduced will not suffice. These “pure” substantive due process cases are relatively rare in contemporary state constitutional law. Aside from a few scattered cases elsewhere, they are concentrated in the South.

As with the equal protection cases, due process is occasionally linked with other provisions of state constitutions. In *In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park, Inc.* the North Carolina court linked due process analysis with the constitutional prohibitions against monopolies and perpetuities; in *Nelson v. Kruzen,* due process was coupled with the open court provision of the Texas Constitution; and in *Magna, Inc. v. Catrania,* due process was connected with the explicit provisions regarding property rights found in the Alabama Constitution. Such uses of state due process clauses to protect property rights find support in the numerous and explicit references to property found in most state constitutions.

There are some cases that do not rely on equal protection or due process in any way. Most of these cases are based on right-to-remedy or open court provisions, while others resort to contract clauses or guarantees for workers’ compensation for injury or death. Finally, at least two states, Louisiana and New Jersey, have rejected not only the results of various U.S. Supreme Court decisions based on equal protection but also the federal multiple-tier analysis itself. Both states have adopted what appear to them to be more fluid and protective approaches.

State courts have resorted to a variety of combinations of state constitutional provisions and a variety of tests in reviewing legislation. This is not surprising. States and their judiciaries are by law and history independent and diverse entities. Moreover, given the generally discredited history of the protection of economic rights, especially through the use of substantive due process, it is understandable that state judges who believe that their constitution, and their position in the federal system, give them a role to play in protecting economic rights, are groping for a sound basis for this role. The search has involved plotting a
course between the rigidities of Lochnerism and abdication.

Judge Michael Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court provides clear evidence of this search. In sustaining legislation against attacks based on due process or equal protection, he noted the long tradition among state courts toward more careful scrutiny of legislative classifications underlying economic regulations. “We do not purport today to settle definitively the question of the degree of congruence between the standard of review [required by state provisions as opposed to federal equal protection] but our past decisions... demonstrate that in the area of economic regulations, the standard of scrutiny [under the relevant state provisions] will always meet or exceed that mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .”67 This cautious seeking for that delicate balance augurs well for the future of state constitutional protection of property rights.

State Courts and Economic Rights: Constitutional Charge or Reactionary Residue?

State supreme courts continue to rely on their due process, equal protection and, increasingly, their right-to-remedy clauses to grant greater protection to economic rights than would be forthcoming from the federal judiciary. All but three states have refused to follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in its rejection of substantive due process and equal protection in the area of economic regulation.68 There is no doubt about the continued solicitude for economic rights on the part of state supreme courts; however, there are doubts about the justifications for that activism. Seven arguments have been put forth in opposition to judicial activism in this area. Some apply only to the use of substantive due process, but most apply to any attempt by courts to scrutinize economic and social regulations, though there does seem to be less opposition to the use of the equal protection and right-to-remedy clauses to protect economic rights.

Argument 1: The Distorted History Argument

This view is based on a reading of the due process clause as exclusively procedural. The claim is that substantive due process had very little pre-Civil War basis; substantive due process was essentially the invention of the judiciary in its ideologically based determination to protect property interests. This position seemed so obvious to Leonard Levy that he could write, in introducing Walton Hamilton’s famous article on the “Path of Due Process of Law,” that what the U.S. Supreme Court did was a “miraculous transubstantiation of process into substance and human rights into vested rights. . . . The accomplishment was bizarre, haphazard, and unplanned.”68

It has been noted that early in the 19th century state courts had construed their due process clauses so as to provide substantive protection to property rights. Was there any justification for these states to do so? Or putting the question a bit differently: if those who insist that there is no indication whatsoever that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to provide for substantive due process, is that evidence conclusive insofar as the state due process and law-of-the-land clauses are concerned? In the most recent work on the history of the due process and law-of-the-land clauses, Frank Strong shows that articles 39 and 52 of the Magna Carta were meant to provide “a substantive ban on invasion of ancient rights of personal liberty and feudal property.”70 It was Edward Coke who successfully fused the law-of-the-land provision of the Magna Carta with due process of law and, in doing so, provided an historical basis for a substantive content to the due process clause that would be handed down to the colonists in the New World. Strong shows that government-granted monopolies and expropriation by public conversion were regarded as denials of due process. Due process was the ancient enemy of monopoly, a shield against publicly granted monopolies but, at the same time, a sword bolstering state power to deal effectively with private monopolies.71

Strong concludes his analysis of due process by asserting that the inherited content of substantive due process embraces two core meanings: antiepropration of property interest and antimonopoly in economic enterprise.72 He contends, therefore, that the perversions of due process occurred, not with reading into the clause a substantive content, but with Allegheny v. Louisiana and Lochner v. New York.

The substantive due process the Court now unanimously embraces was of an utterly different order from that espoused by Bradley and Field. They had stood for opposition to monopoly, a position with deep historical roots in Due Process increasingly articulated as espousal of freedom of trade. The essence of freedom of trade was the general right of all to engage in the common callings free from constrictions or prohibitions on entry. In severing this right from its tie with antimonopoly the Court in one sentence catapulted into an uncharted domain in which substantive due process could become the obstacle to endless instances of legal, economic and social reform.73

The reading of liberty of contract into the due process clause was not consistent with the historic meaning of substantive due process. The reaction of the U.S. Supreme Court and scholars to this perversion was to read out of the clause any substantive con-
tent, thus throwing the proverbial baby out with the bath water. The notion of due process historically has been not only a shield against arbitrary expropriation and monopolies, but also a sword enabling the state to destroy or regulate private monopolies. Whether or not this revisionist history provides sufficient reason for the U.S. Supreme Court to re-enter the arena, it is certainly relevant to any argument about the appropriateness of state supreme courts so doing.

Argument 2:  
The Superior Importance of Personal Rights

The dichotomization of property versus personal rights, with the attendant elevation of the latter over the former, though well entrenched in the literature and court doctrine, has not gone unchallenged. Judge Learned Hand once said: "Just why property itself was not a personal right nobody took time to explain. . . ."74 The consequence of the premature, not to say immodest, embracing of this dichotomy has been the creation of philosophical and practical difficulties which have come to light after a half-century of experience. Judge James Oakes of the Second Circuit noted one of these difficulties:

If property rights are personal rights as the procedural cases say they are [referring to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)] why should they not have substantive protection like other personal rights?75

Recently, Leonard Levy questioned why the right to a livelihood was not included in the right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness.76 He challenged the dichotomy between personal and property rights as well as the adequacy of protection granted under the rational relationship test.77

Beyond these philosophical objections, a number of practical difficulties arise from this separation. In many of the areas in which state supreme courts have been active, the distinction breaks down. In some cases, privacy and autonomy concerns are inextricably intertwined with property rights. How a family or group wishes to use a dwelling involves the use of property as one sees fit as well as matters of personal autonomy and privacy.78 Cases involving workers' compensation are matters that concern one's livelihood, safety, and future well being. In still other areas, one set of property rights is pitted against another, as in the debate over limits on damages in medical malpractice suits. Why is it considered a property question deserving of more deference from the courts when a legislature singles out one professional group for protection from liability and not others, especially when the basis for the classification appears dubious?

Whatever remains viable in the distinction between personal and property rights, it cannot, without additional arguments, determine that all property rights are less important than all personal rights. We may want to say that some kinds of property rights are less important than others, but it would be difficult to sustain the position that all personal rights are more important than property rights, even supposing we can make the distinction—a supposition which is itself problematic. The intertwining of economic and personal considerations in the cases coming before state high courts is extensive enough to make this distinction of little value for judges deciding cases in this area.

Argument 3:
Lack of Textual Basis

Leonard Levy summarizes the textual basis argument succinctly in responding to the arguments by Robert McCloskey for protecting economic rights.

The problem, rather, is that the Constitution quite explicitly protects religious liberty, but radiates from the vague contours of due process no visible protection to bartenders—nor riverboat pilots, oculists, nor any other occupation.79

To the extent there is force to this argument, it applies to the U.S. Constitution. The same argument cannot be made with regard to state constitutions. In addition to a due process clause found in almost every state constitution, a majority of the state constitutions explicitly protect the "inalienable right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property."80 Some states explicitly grant the judiciary review power any time a taking for public purposes is an issue.81 The clauses in state constitutions concerning the protection of property are more numerous and more explicit than in the U.S. Constitution. For example, Colorado's Constitution, in addition to the due process clause, contains nine other provisions dealing with the protection of property in one form or another.82 By virtue of their quantity and explicitness, property rights under state constitutional law cannot be placed in a subordinate position to personal rights, at least not on textual grounds.

Argument 4:
Conservation of Judicial Resources

This argument is made most forcefully by Robert McCloskey.83 The U.S. Supreme Court, he argues, has all it can do to handle the delicate and intractable problems involved in protecting and promoting political and civil liberties. Since the Court cannot do everything, it best serves our constitutional order by concentrating on the protection of personal rights.

To the extent that this argument has force, that force is attenuated if not completely dissipated in state constitutional history. Indeed, to the extent that
it is accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court so as to eschew any role in policing economic regulations, then to that extent a stronger case can be made for state judiciaries to provide a forum in which redress may be obtained. Levy, while rejecting any role for the U.S. Supreme Court, suggests that “the remedy may properly lie with state courts and state constitutional law.”

Argument 5: Lack of Judicial Competence

This argument, applied to the federal courts by a number of scholars, has also been applied to the state judiciaries. However, this transfer is questionable. State courts may well be in a better position to assess and judge local conditions and problems than is the U.S. Supreme Court. State court decisions do not encompass national issues or problems, and the scope of their decisionmaking is limited to individual states. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania put the argument most effectively when it wrote:

This difference [between federal and state constitutional law] represents a sound development, one which takes into account the fact that state courts may be in a better position to review local economic legislation than the Supreme Court, since their precedents are not of national authority, may better adapt their decisions to local economic conditions and needs. . . . And where an industry is of basic importance to the economy of the state or territory, extraordinary regulations may be necessary and proper.

It may be that the U.S. Supreme Court ought not to spend time on, and lacks the expertise to adjudge, antiscalping ordinances in Indiana, but this cannot be said with the same degree of persuasiveness about state courts. James Kirby, in addressing this issue, wrote: “State courts . . . do not appear to have thrust themselves into unmanageable situations. Review of an economic regulation may well be simpler than an apportionment case, a voting rights case, or a product liability appeal.”

Argument 6: Anti-Democratic Character of Judicial Review

One of the most serious objections to judicial activism is that it conflicts with the basic assumptions of a self-governing polity. This argument applies even more strongly when courts are dealing with protecting economic rights rather than rights that involve the political process itself. Judicial activism involves judges deeply and directly in the political process, and preempts larger and larger areas of policy from decision by the people or their elected representatives. Federal judges are not elected, and they serve for life. This argument must be recast when applied to the constitutional traditions of the states. By constitutional choice, state voters have granted explicit protection to property rights, recognized a right-to-redress, and in many cases specifically empowered the judiciary to exercise judicial review. The tradition is one of limited government rather than majority rule. To argue the character of judicial review is to insist that one tradition be favored over the other or, alternatively, that these constituent choices are wrong ones.

Of course, none of these responses to the arguments against judicial activism are meant to be definitive refutations. What they are meant to suggest is that the arguments against judicial activism apply with less force when the arena is shifted from the federal to the state judiciaries.

Argument 7: Lack of Workable Standards for Review

In spite of the fact that arguments noted above against judicial activism are attenuated at the state level, there remains a final objection, namely, that the contours of the various state constitutional clauses in question are so undefined as to enable, and perhaps require, judges to read a particular economic philosophy into the clauses, one at variance with, but no more legitimate than, the one adopted by the legislature.

A first response to this charge is to note that in state constitutions many of the clauses protecting property rights are as specific as the specific provisions in the national Bill of Rights, and others are no less vague than the most important clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument becomes even more strained in the face of the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of substantive due process to protect personal rights.

A corollary to this argument is that when state judges apply the more general or vague phrases of their constitutions to protect economic rights, they have adopted more conservative social and economic theories, thus placing a stranglehold on attempts by the people to deal with their social and economic problems. However, there is evidence that when state courts resorted to substantive due process during the Progressive era (1890-1910) to strike down economic reform legislation, no consistent philosophy or theory governed the cases decided during that period. Melvin Urofsky’s study of state courts and protective legislation during this era concluded that “with few exceptions, state courts moved consistently towards approval of a wide range of reform legislation. . . . Progressives, although occasionally delayed in court, were not blocked there.” State courts balanced legal doctrines of contract and police power and, in most instances, deferred to legislative judgment in policy matters. A study of more recent decisions in the same area concluded: “On balance, most
of the economic legislation which state courts have invalidated during the past 25 years is arbitrary. . . . \^{96}

Judges should not be allowed to substitute personal prejudice or their own economic philosophies for that of the legislatures: the public ought to have the right to adopt economic and social policies through their elected representatives. Nevertheless, the legislature is not the people, and the policies adopted by legislators cannot be automatically equated with the will of the people. In the American tradition, the existence of a constitution means that courts are expected to protect the people from their legislatures when those legislatures act in arbitrary ways. Some balance must be struck between the competing values involved. With the U.S. Supreme Court unable or unwilling to play any role, state courts need to develop workable standards of review that will enable them to hold the competing interests in a creative balance. There are a number of approaches or criteria that could provide the guidance to enable state supreme courts to steer a course between the Scylla of judicial abdication and the Charybdis of judicial arrogance.\^{97}

Conclusion

Although the problems and policy responses will change—from legislative attempts to hold railroads strictly liable in tort actions involving injury to livestock to attempts to limit court remedies for victims of medical malpractice—the importance of having a judicial forum in which constitutional challenges can be heard is readily apparent. The tests to be used and the extent of judicial activity are legitimate matters for dispute; what is not disputable is the need for some judicial forum in which constitutional challenges can be heard. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision to deny hearings on these questions provides both opportunity and obligation for state courts to play an important role in protecting economic rights and, in doing so, to make a signal contribution to American constitutionalism.

NOTES

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8See, for example, Mosher v. City of Boulder, Colorado 225 F. Supp. (1964): 32, 35 (protection available for damages under state constitutional "or damage" provision which would not be available under federal law).


11This view, generally accepted by commentators, is in need of correction. Mary Cornelia Porter, "That Commerce Shall Be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez Faire Court," in Philip Kurland, ed. The Supreme Court Review 1976 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 135-159, has begun that correction.


14Forty state constitutions contain the equivalent of the federal impairment of contract clause; nearly half contain taking clauses. These taking clauses go beyond their federal counter part in that they require compensation not only when property is taken but also when it is "damaged." Nearly all contain due process clauses or the equivalent. In addition, 37 state constitutions contain right-to-remedy clauses. For a convenient compilation of state bills of rights, see Ronald Collins, "Bills and Declarations of Rights Digests," in The American Bench, 3rd ed. (California: R.B. Roster and Assoc., 1985), 2522-2533.

15For a list of states doing so, see, Note, "Balancing Private Loss against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking without Just Compensation," Wash-
In its initial appearance, substantive due process was associated with protection of property rights against economic regulation. More recently it has been resurrected to protect certain privacy interests and the right to abortion. Edward S. Corwin, "Due Process of Law before the Civil War," as reprinted in A.T. Mason and G. Garvey, eds., American Constitutional History (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964); Benjamin Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire Came to the Supreme Court (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942).

In 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).


See e.g., Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843); In Re Dorsey, 7 Porter 293 (1883).

2298 N.Y. 98 (1885).

Ibid., 106-107.


Ibid., pp. 27-40 provides a history of this commitment.


The view that the due process clause has only a procedural content is put forth in its boldest form by John Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 14-21, and Hans Linde, "Due Process of Lawmaking."

Sce, for example, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987) (property owners must be compensated when use of their land is restricted even temporarily).


Generally, these articles exclude cases regarding public utilities rates, the validity of state taxation, and zoning. I have followed this exclusionary policy to keep the added cases consistent with those found in the studies. One major caveat: most of the research done on state courts and economic regulations has focused on the 1937-1987 period with a few done on the period between 1890-1910. The results presented in the charts probably underrepresent the activity which took place between 1910 and 1937. However, the disproportionate number of cases after 1937 also represents state court reaction to increasing activity on the part of state legislatures, and the fact that the Supreme Court generally refused to review or strike down social and economic legislation passed by the states after 1937.

Bailey v. People, 60 N.E. 98 (Ill. 1901) is typical of a large number of cases. In Bailey, the Illinois Court struck down a statute that limited the number of people a lodging housekeeper may sleep in one room while exempting keepers of inns, hotels, and boarding houses from that limit. The court reasoned on equal protection terms, and the case clearly involves invidious or irrational classification questions, but the court struck the statute down on substantive due process grounds.


38 For example, Batton-Jackson Oil Co. Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1986); Finocchiaro v. Nebraska Liquor Control, 351 N.W.2d 701 (Neb. 1984); San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1957); Vaughn v. State Board of Embalmers etc. 82 S.E.2d 618 (Va. 1954).

39 Of the 33 states adopting guest statutes, 11 repealed them; of the remaining 22, 17 were declared unconstitutional by state high courts. For a list of state court decisions sustaining a variety of enactments aimed at relieving the medical malpractice crisis, see American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 F.2d 670, 677 (Cal. 1984).

40 For an elaborate attempt to distinguish legitimate caps on liability from unconstitutional ones, see former Chief Justice Rose Bird's dissent in American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 F.2d 670, 677 (Cal. 1984).

41 The cases are: Barne v. Wood, 689 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1984); American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984); Fein v. Perminen Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985).

42 Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980). The court in rejecting challenges based on due process, equal protection, open court, and trial by jury provisions claimed to be applying a "fair and substantial relationship" test, yet simultaneously claimed that "considerable deference is to be accorded to the legislature" and that the burden of proof of unconstitutionality is on the "attacker" of the law, 591, 600. It is not clear whether the two are compatible, but the case illustrates the variety of combinations of tests and standards found in state court decisions in this area.

43 Examples of legislation struck down on rational relationship test are: Dunbar v. Hoffman, 466 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1970); Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 322 N.E.2d 880 (Ohio, 1975); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service, 744 P.2d 895 (Mont. 1987). The two cases with different standards are Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 S.2d 1094 (La. 1985); and Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294 (N.J. 1985). Some states, e.g., New York, did not register any significant activity. Two reasons: states like New York have adopted a more deferential standard of review when social and economic regulations are involved; the New York legislature has not been active in limiting liability for special groups such as physicians or with regard to product liability. The case of Colton v. Riccobono, 496 N.E.2d 670 (N.Y. 1986) is illustrative. The Court of Appeals upheld a requirement that a medical malpractice panel hear, evaluate, and recommend on the question of liability. In the teeth of a right-to-remedy provision (Art. I, Sec. 16), the court sustained the statute because the legislation bore a rational relationship to the need to provide quality health care, and the plaintiff did have other remedies.

44 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985)


46 502 P.2d 1197 (Wash. 1972). A New York Appellate Court had no difficulty sustaining similar legislation. United Medical Services, Inc. v. Holz, 4 App. Div. 2d 1017 (N.Y. 1957). In some cases, as in Shibuya v. Architects Hawai'i Ltd., 647 P.2d 276 (Ha. 1982), state courts have used a rational relationship test but required under that test "a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation" (288).

47 Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 11 (N.D. 1979); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985). The U.S. Supreme Court has developed three levels of scrutiny when applying the equal protection clause. Strict scrutiny has been applied to certain suspect categories, such as race and national origin. Minimum scrutiny requires that the legislation further a legitimate state interest and that there be a rational relationship between the classification and its purpose. Means or moderate scrutiny involves "almost suspect" categories such as sex. The level of scrutiny here is not as rigorous as the first tier but more demanding than the third tier. For a clear elaboration of these terms in more depth see Andrea Bonnicksen, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1982), pp. 150-165.

48 704 S.W.2d 179, 186-187.

49 Peter Weston, in "The Empty Idea of Equality . . .", argues in a more theoretical vein that standards of review, whether rational relationship or strict scrutiny, have meaning not by virtue of any equality component but "because the state is obliged to have rational and legitimate reasons for every way in which it treats people. Whatever merit rationality review has must ultimately derive not from notions of equality but from notions of substantive due process," p. 577.

50 283 N.W.2d 96, 99.

51 451 A.2d 174, 175 (N.H. 1982).

52 Other examples of this fusion are: Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho, 1976); Gutierrez v. Glaser Crandall Co., 202 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 1972).

53 Cases applying strict scrutiny include: Kluger v. White, 281 S.2d 1 (Fla. 1973); Dangard v. Baltic Cooperative Supply Association, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984); White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984). Cases not involving strict scrutiny include: Hansen v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1980) wherein the court wrote, "Right to re- approach for personal relationships is an important substantive right . . . triggering an intermediate scrutiny" (325).

54 312 A.2d 216 (Md. 1973).

55 For example, Application of Martin, 504 P.2d 14 (Nev. 1972).

56 Batton-Jackson Oil Co. Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 1986).


60 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).

61 512 S.2d 912 (Ala. 1987).

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Luke's Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986); Hardy v. VerMeulan, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio, 1987).

69 Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).

64 Alvaradi v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 716 P.2d 18 (Ariz. 1986). A fair number of the cases examined are based on more than two constitutional provisions. In Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976), and Health v. Sears Roebeck, Inc., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983) equal protection, due process, and right-to-remedy clauses were involved. In Georgia Franchise Practices Commission v. Masssey Ferguson, Inc., 262 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. 1979), the statute in question was found to contravene four separate provisions of the Georgia Constitution.


66 It should be noted that in a large majority of the cases under examination, state and federal constitutional provisions are cited as the basis for the decision. This means that these cases in all likelihood would not meet the “plain statement” requirement of Michigan v. Long, 473 U.S. 1032 (1983). In that case, the Supreme Court required state courts wishing to base their decisions on state law, thus insulating them from federal review, to make a plain statement to the effect. This failure was due in large part to the lack of any clear-cut standard from the Supreme Court for insulating decisions from review. Although Michigan v. Long provided such a standard, state courts are only gradually developing an awareness of this requirement. The significance of these decisions is not diminished by this failure, as the Supreme Court turns down petitions for review of these cases nearly all of the time.


70 Strong, Substantive Due Process of Law, p. 7.


72 Ibid., p. 72.

73 Ibid., p. 91.


77 Ibid., pp. 171, 184.

78 For example, Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 251 N.W.2d 831 (Mich., 1984) (ordinance preventing communal Christians from living in dwelling because they were not a family voided); Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 390 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. 1979) (right to privacy prevented disclosure of building inspector’s reports to tenant groups concerned with their dwellings); Mountain States etc. v. Department of Public Service Regulations, 634 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981) (right to privacy protects corporate utility from revealing confidential trade records). Cf. The Supreme Court’s uncomfortableness with the dichotomy between privacy and property rights in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). For discussion of these “hybrid” privacy/autonomy property cases, see Susan Fino, “Remnants of the Past: Economic Due Process in the States,” in Stanley Friedelbaum, ed., Human Rights in the States (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988): 145-162.


80 Colorado Constitution II, 3. See also Alabama I, 35; Alaska I, 1; Arkansas II, 22; Idaho I, 1; Illinois I, 1; Iowa I, 1; Louisiana I, 4; Massachusetts I, 1; Missouri I, 2; Montana I, 3; Nebraska I, 1; Nevada I, 1; North Dakota I, 1; New Hampshire Part I, Art. 2; New Jersey I, para. 1; New Mexico II, 4; North Carolina I, 1, 1; Oklahoma II, 2; Pennsylvania I, 1; South Dakota VI, 1; Utah I, 1; Vermont Ch. I, Art. 1; Virginia I, 1; West Virginia III, 1; California I, 1.

81 For example, Arizona II, 17; Mississippi, Art. III, 17. At least half of the states add to their just compensation clauses for property “taken,” the phrase “or damaged,” e.g., Nebraska I, 21; Hawaii I, 20; Missouri I, 26; Texas I, 27; Virginia I, 11. Finally, 34 states have right-to-remedy or open court clauses which generally read like the Idaho constitutional provision: “courts of justice shall be open to every person and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character.” I, 18.

82 Colorado Constitution II, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 27.


84 Levy, American Constitutional Law, p. 157.


86 Kirby, “Expansive Judicial Review,” p. 120.


88 These three combine to weaken any argument against an activist role for the court based on the separation of powers.


90 It has been suggested that judicial review at the state level might play the role of safeguarding the interests of
majorities, i.e., majoritarian review, and that state courts are applying such review in the area of economic regulation without providing this justification. Note, “Developments in the Law...,” pp. 1498-1502. This novel suggestion only underscores the need to examine and evaluate the tradition of state constitutionalism on its own terms.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 91.


State Supreme Courts and Workers’ Compensation: Change and the Diffusion of New Ideas

As preceding chapters demonstrate, the development of an independent state constitutional law, in particular the protection of individual rights and liberties, sometimes depends on the willingness of courts to resuscitate guarantees that have lain dormant for long periods of time. If courts are to look toward fundamental state charters, they must, for the most part, be prodded by counsel. This, of course, depends on counsel’s awareness that state constitutions contain protections that are not in the federal Constitution, and that may serve client interests and/or may help attain desired policy objectives. State guarantees for a quality education, clean air and water, privacy, equality of the sexes, and access to courts are illustrative. Further, as the preceding chapters indicate, when individual state courts explicate and vitalize state constitutions, they often provide precedent, guidance, and encouragement for courts in sister states.

This chapter, focusing on the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy requirement of workers’ compensation statutes, examines the manner in which a particular doctrinal change has been adopted and dispersed, and speculates about the reasons for its initial acceptance. Since the intentional tort exception has been adopted by only a few, but widely varying kinds of state supreme courts, an in-depth look at the characteristics of these courts is possible. The growth of the intentional tort exception demonstrates that judicial creativity and eagerness to respond to what is regarded in some quarters as a major social problem depends on a variety of idiosyncratic factors. Thus, as we look toward state courts to develop state law, we should ask what impels a court toward assuming a leadership role, and what causes other courts to follow, to lag behind, or to be indifferent to change. The development of state constitutional law, however widely heralded, is still in its infancy. State courts bear a large responsibility for its continued growth, and an understanding of what makes these institutions respond to change is essential for those who would persuade courts to take the fundamental charters of their states seriously.

Workers’ Compensation: Problems and Proposals for Change

Almost two decades ago, Congress, pursuant to the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), established a National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws. The commission was mandated to conduct an examination of the workers’ compensation systems of the 50 states and make recommendations for change. It was the view of the Congress that serious questions had been raised concerning the fairness and adequacy of workmen’s compensation laws. Many of the problems could be traced to the growth of the economy, the changing nature of the labor force, increases in medical knowledge, changes in the hazards associated with various types of employment, new technologies creating new risks to health and safety, and increases in the general level of wages and the cost of living.

In 1972, the commission issued a wide-ranging report consisting of 84 recommendations that covered the appropriate scope of the compensation system, and the system’s medical care, rehabilitation, safety, and effective delivery objectives. In all of these areas, the commission concluded that “state workmen’s compensation laws in general are inadequate and inequitable.” Although the commission duly noted the efforts made by some states to improve compensation systems, it had few illusions about the possibilities for change. Legislatures are not only bewildered by the system’s complexities and the array of proposals for change but also are well aware that other issues command more interest and
demand more attention. Interest groups representing employers, unions, and insurance companies have exercised effective vetoes over many proposals for change. Business and industry have raised the specter of large-scale departures from states that, from employer perspectives, provide “excessive” employee benefits and protections. Taken together, “deficiencies in workmen’s compensation in many states result from lack of leadership, understanding, and interest.” Indeed, following a spate of activity engendered by the report, proposals for changes in state compensation systems were relegated to the back burner. In response to the report, no doubt, and to state legislative inertia, a National Workers’ Compensation Act was introduced in Congress. Although not enacted into law, the possibility of federal action, either as supplementary to or in lieu of state law, cannot be dismissed as a possibility.  

Of particular concern, and an objective of the workers’ compensation system, is the protection of workers’ health and safety. However, as the system developed, it was charged that some employers found it more economical to compensate for employee accidents and deaths than to provide safety measures. As Representative Philip Burton noted when OSHA was debated in the U.S. House of Representatives:

> With today’s low level of workmen’s compensation, preventive measures for better health and safety are often the employer’s most expensive and uneconomic choice. Today’s workmen’s compensation laws ... offer an economic incentive to many corporations to forbear from preventive expenditures because they have concluded that the cost of employee death and injury (potentially higher Workmen’s Compensation Health Insurance Premiums, etc. ...) are often less than the costs of accident prevention.

> While federal and state legislation have been designed to protect worker health and safety, thus overcoming this particular shortcoming of the state worker’s compensation systems, enforcement, due to personnel shortages, has been inadequate. An alternative means of reaching the goal has been the institution of suits by injured employees against employers who fail to maintain a safe workplace.

**Workers’ Compensation and the Courts: An Overview**

The nation’s first workers’ compensation statute, enacted in 1910 by the New York legislature, was almost immediately invalidated on constitutional grounds by the state’s highest court. The judicial response was not surprising. With the onset of the Industrial Revolution, American courts, promulgating the “unholy trinity” of employer defenses—assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule—either denied recovery to the vast majority of injured workers who brought suits, or approved awards so small as to be virtually worthless.

While the judiciary, it has been asserted, was motivated by a desire to keep down employer costs, thereby fostering industrial development, some courts provided legislatures with an impetus for reform. Employer defenses, Wisconsin’s chief justice noted, were “archaic and unfitted to modern industrial conditions,” a sentiment that reflected growing national consensus. Furthermore, once employers understood that a scheduled compensation system would not only reduce the financial uncertainties surrounding the common law system but also mitigate labor unrest, resistance to reform ceased.

Workers’ compensation statutes vary from state to state, but all share similar objectives and characteristics. The expenses arising from industrial accidents are borne by insured employers who calculate them into production costs that are then passed on to the consumer. (“The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman.”) The question of the employer’s negligence or lack thereof is irrelevant. Equally irrelevant is the employee’s responsibility for his or her injury. Automatic entitlement to and the assumption of liability for the payment of benefits carry with them the forfeiture of rights—the employees’ to sue at common law and the employer’s to assert common law defenses. It is on this compromise, this quid pro quo, that the workers’ compensation system is based.

Workers’ compensation laws and their administration, while preferable to common law recovery practices, are often regarded by employees as somewhat less than satisfactory. Complaints typically focus on low compensation rates, underestimates of degrees of impairment, delayed payments, and failure to recompense at all. In addition, and most significant, the lowering or removal of many of the traditional barriers to recovery for a wide variety of injuries have highlighted the great difference between jury determined awards and workers’ compensation benefits. For example, about one-half of all product liability suits are based on work-related injuries have highlighted the great difference between jury determined awards and workers’ compensation benefits. For example, about one-half of all product liability suits are based on work-related injuries. As a result, workers are now turning to the common law to circumvent the limitations of statutory/administrative compensation systems.

Among the judicial responses to employee compensation problems have been rulings carving out exceptions to the exclusivity rule that allowed workers to recover more from their employers than the statutorily prescribed benefits. Commonly employed exceptions have been the dual capacity and dual injury doctrines, considered by some commentators as adjuncts to or surrogates for the intentional tort exception. Thus, injured employees have been allowed...
to sue an employer if the employer acts in some capacity that is additional to the employer-employee relationship, and may recover for a second injury that is independent of the original, work-related injury. While the exceptions are understood, they have by no means been accepted in all jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{13}

In creating exceptions to the exclusivity requirements, courts have engaged in statutory interpretation, and have exercised their common law function. To date, exclusivity requirements that have immunized employers from suit have not been challenged on state constitutional grounds. However, in one state, Alabama, other immunity provisions of workers' compensation statutes were invalidated on the basis of a state constitutional guarantee. This suggests a potential use for state constitutions, and, specifically, the Alabama high court has thereby suggested another approach for plaintiffs' lawyers seeking favorable judgments for their clients in workers' compensation disputes.

The Exclusivity Requirement and State Constitutional Law

Constitutional challenges to the exclusivity requirement are rare and are even more rarely sustained.\textsuperscript{14} The basis for these suits has been the right of access to courts provisions contained in most state constitutions, but not in the federal Constitution. Section 13 of the first article of the Alabama Constitution is typical, providing in part, that "Every person, for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have a remedy by due process of law." For many years in Alabama and elsewhere, these right-to-remedy clauses were invoked, but without much success. However, in the past 20 years, as their potential has been recognized, successful challenges to long-standing and arguably outmoded statutes have been mounted, and methodologies for principled constitutional interpretation have been advocated.\textsuperscript{15} The Alabama high court is among those that have devoted considerable time and energy to reconciling the provisions of the constitution's open court provision with the legislature's undoubted right, in keeping with valid public policy objectives, to immunize certain groups and/or individuals from suit.\textsuperscript{16}

When the Alabama legislature amended the state workers' compensation law to immunize co-employees from suit, the plaintiff's bar determined that the time was ripe to make some practical use of Section 13. In\textsuperscript{17} Grantham\textsuperscript{13} v. Denke (1978), the court agreed with the plaintiff's argument that while the employer's immunity was an exchange for his assumption of liability, there was no such voluntary accommodation among co-employees. Put differently, deprivation of a common law right to sue for injury without the provision of an alternative recourse violated the state constitutional guarantee of right to redress. As an Alabama Justice explained:

The amended language [of the statute] denied a job-related injured employee the right to sue his negligent co-employee and for this he gains the right to negligently inflict an on-the-job injury to his fellow employee without risk of suit.\textsuperscript{17}

Two years later, in Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co., the court extended\textsuperscript{18} Grantham to invalidate the legislative grant of immunity to supervisory employees, corporate officers, and workers' compensation carriers. Here, severe and extensive burns sustained by the workers were due to the failure of the employer to provide for proper safety measures, to warn of dangerous working conditions, and to inspect the premises. As summarized by the court:

The workmen testify that they were furnished with materials that they were to use by their superiors and they had to work with those materials and in that dangerous environment or quit work. If they refused to apply the stuff bands and screws in the demonstrated fashion, they could have been fired for insubordination. There was dispute whether or not the federally required sign indicating that employees could refuse to work with anything they felt would endanger them was posted before the fire.\textsuperscript{18}

The employee injuries were, of course, compensable. However, the majority of the court argued that this did not absolve the tortfeasors who failed to carry out their prescribed and/or voluntarily assumed responsibilities.

Only where the employer, except for employer immunity, owes a duty of due care, the breach of which causes injury, and this duty is delegated by the employer to the co-employee defendant, or voluntarily assumed by him and the defendant breaches this duty through personal fault, can liability be imposed. . . . As in any negligence claim, the breach consists in the defendant's duty to discharge the delegated or assumed obligation with the degree of care required of a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{19}

A concurring justice, troubled by the implications of the case as it pertained to precedent, constitutional explication, and legislative/judicial relations, summarized her view of the ultimate role of Section 13 in our system of government.

It does not merely prohibit the legislature from abolishing already accrued rights of action, nor does it immutably enshrine the
common law beyond the reach of legislative attempts to adapt it to our evolving society and economy. It does prohibit governmental action which is arbitrary and capricious, while allowing the legislature much latitude in drafting laws. But most importantly, it sets up a dual system of review which acts as a cautionary brake when change in the common law is contemplated. In effect, Section 13 says that the rights enjoyed by individuals at the common law are of such fundamental importance in our legal systems, that they must be changed, if at all, only after careful consideration by both legislatures and courts.20

In the broadest terms, *Fireman's Fund* establishes the principles that a state constitution may be offended by a workers' compensation system that bars suits for the sort of negligence that, under the common law, constitutes tortious behavior. Further, the case suggests that open court provisions of state constitutions, and by implication due process guarantees, may provide grounds for suits against employers who knowingly harm employees, the quid pro quo of the compensation system notwithstanding. Finally, although the issue was not before the court, Alabama's compensation benefits are “meager not only when compared to civil verdicts, but even when compared to Workmen's Compensation Laws.” Thus the court, albeit indirectly, addressed what is regarded as one of the major problems of the compensation system, and aided, as have other courts, employee attempts “to circumvent the statutory scheme and bring their claims in tort.”21

The Alabama high court's rulings in *Grantham* and *Fireman's Fund* were criticized on the grounds that they constituted piecemeal tinkering with a comprehensive legislative scheme, that they created more problems than they purported to solve, that they violated precedent and precepts of judicial deference to the legislative branches in matters of establishing public policy, and that the majority had engaged in unwarranted judicial activism. Similar charges have been directed to state and federal courts for many years in a variety of contexts. However, it has been only recently that the Alabama Supreme Court has been visible enough to draw fire. Fifteen years earlier, the court would not have been so bold. The court's reputation was one of conservatism in the common law, of extreme deference to the political branches of government, and with a docket badly in arrears.

Beginning in the 1970s, however, the court underwent a dramatic transformation. A hard fought battle for judicial reform culminated in the institution of a modern, and model, state court system, streamlined rules of procedure, and the election of (currently U.S. Senator) Howell Heflin, who led the reform movement, to the chief justiceship. Within only a few years, the court's personnel all but totally changed, the docket became current, and a “new” court consciously assumed an unprecedented role within the state.

The Alabama experience indicates that a variety of factors may explain a court's assumption of an activist stance regarding the state constitution. Similarly, a variety of factors may explain, in a general sense, state high court assertiveness in making public policy and, specifically, state court intervention in workers' compensation systems.

**State Supreme Court Policymaking**

State supreme courts historically have played a significant policymaking role within their respective states. To the extent that their rulings provide precedent for other state courts as well as federal courts, decisions of individual courts have national import. In some respects, state high court policymaking has been in response to major and often controversial problems that the other branches of state government have failed to address, such as inequitable methods of financing public schools, restrictive zoning, and the rights of patients to make decisions about the continuation of life-support systems. In most respects, however, judicial policymaking has been directed toward more routine though equally salient matters, such as the application of automobile guest statutes, fair trade laws, tenant/landlord relations, and criminal and family law.

It is in developing the common law, however, that state supreme courts make particularly important contributions to state and national public policy. Abrogation of the doctrines of sovereign, charitable and spousal immunity, and the development of such doctrines as product liability and comparative negligence that provide greater consumer protection, are indicative of judicial willingness to abandon outmoded precedent and to anticipate legislative initiatives.

Common law doctrines initiated in one state will almost certainly, in time, be adopted by courts in other states. The pace of adoption, however, has been uneven. Depending on particular historical eras, some courts lead, some follow willingly, and others follow with some hesitancy or reluctance. Other state courts will, for periods of time, either ignore or reject changes taking place elsewhere. Some courts may welcome change in particular areas of tort law, but not in others. Some restraintist courts may become activist and vice versa. However, while some courts either resist change or have had few occasions to address the new legal developments, no state has been immune from the “tort law revolution” that
commenced after the Second World War and continues unabated to this day.22

Exactly what factors motivate individual courts to adopt plaintiff-oriented claims, to follow decisional trends established in other jurisdictions, or to hold, in the classically restraintist manner, that change should emanate from legislatures rather than courts, is not clear. However, recent scholarship provides some clues as to why state high courts may look to the rulings of other courts in reaching a decision.

Peter Harris, for example, concluded that state high courts typically look beyond their borders when confronting novel legal problems or when contemplating legal change. However, in attempting to account for the directions in which a state supreme court looks, and why, Harris could discover no major patterns of intercourt citation.23

Providing a complementary perspective, Gregory Caldeira's research reveals that the most frequently cited courts shared various characteristics, such as reputations for professionalism, the size of their caseloads, and the societal diversity of their states. As pertains to the adoption of tort law innovations initiated elsewhere, Caldeira's observation that judges "cited most often in most jurisdictions have a decidedly liberal cast" is useful. Nor is this surprising, because the more liberal courts "demonstrated a willingness to move away from the status quo. Announcing a change in precedent naturally causes more comment and controversy than does a confirmation of past practices."24

Caldeira and other political scientists, Lawrence Baum and Bradley Canon, have, in separate studies, identified courts that enjoy the most prestigious reputations and have categorized courts according to the parts they played in initiating and adopting changes in the law of torts, and have sought to discover overall national patterns for the adoption of plaintiff-oriented innovations.25 The third study revealed that the adoption of tort law innovations followed no consistent patterns. Although some courts were generally more innovative than others, no single court or set of courts either claimed national leadership in all tort law reforms or invariably lagged behind. Canon and Baum concluded that because of the reactive position of the judiciary (as contrasted with the initiatory role of legislatures and administrative agencies), the pattern of change, reflecting litigant demands, has been purely "idiiosyncratic," "embracing," as Caldeira added, "an appreciable amount of serendipity."26 Interestingly, the two Canon and Baum studies indicate that a state high court's overall propensity to tort law activism does not perfectly correspond with its general propensity to innovativeness. Thus, while a state court may be generally activist, it may not always be adventuresome—hesitant perhaps to lead the charge, but unwilling to bring up the rear.

Taken together, the studies paint a picture of the many-faceted and shifting leadership roles of state supreme courts. Other studies and surveys, such as those directed to the development of "the new judicial federalism," are similarly instructive.27 Only a handful of judiciaries, designated as "lighthouse" high courts, have rather consistently relied on state constitutions in order to extend greater protections to civil rights and liberties than those guaranteed by the post-Warren Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. Others have been activist in some areas, but not in others. Most continue to defer to federal precedent on most questions.

In sum, while state supreme courts that have exercised influence and/or have been deemed prestigious have been identified, leadership by particular state high courts is not a constant. It changes according to a variety of factors. Activism in one area, such as the law of torts, does not necessarily translate into activism in another area, such as the development of state civil liberties. Indeed, variations exist within particular areas. The New Jersey high court's concern for privacy rights and its interest in effecting institutional change, for example, is not matched by a concomitant concern for defendants' rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, while willing to reverse its own past tort decisions, has been unwilling to accept several innovative doctrines initiated elsewhere. Finally, activism and/or the assumption of a leadership role in one or more areas of the law does not apparently enhance a court's reputation among courts in other states or coincide with assumptions about the roles and function of different state courts. As Canon and Baum noted in relation to their ranking of innovative tort law courts:

It is not surprising that states such as Minnesota and California rank high, because they have reputations for progressivism and innovativeness... But the rankings of many states do not comport very well with conventional wisdom about innovativeness—either in general or as it relates to judicial doctrines. It is almost shocking to see Texas, Kentucky and Louisiana among the top ten and Massachusetts near the bottom.28

The Intentional Tort Doctrine: The Case Law

The intentional tort exception is based on the premise that the workers' compensation laws do not give employers the right to abuse workers intentionally, and if they do, they may not avoid full tort damages. The problem, of course, is the meaning of "intent," and the extent to which intent may be
separated from negligence that, however heinous, does not provide a cause of action. Almost unanimously, the case law has held that workers’ compensation statutes preclude common law suits when injuries are caused by the employer’s willful, gross, wanton, deliberate, or reckless misconduct, when the alleged misconduct includes knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering the plaintiff to perform an extremely dangerous job, willfully failing to provide a safe workplace, and willfully and unlawfully violating safety laws. As Arthur Larson states in his treatise on workers’ compensation:

The most remarkable feature of the doctrine that “intent means intent” is the way it has survived virtually intact in spite of the most determined onslaughts in dozens of jurisdictions. In the rare instances of its breakdown, the doctrine has usually been restored either legislatively or judicially.

The first “rare instance” of the breakdown of the “intent means intent” dogma occurred in 1978 when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held in Mandolidis v. Elkin Industries that the employer’s “willful, wanton and reckless misconduct” constitutes an intentional tort for which the common law affords a remedy. Three cases were consolidated in Mandolidis. In the first, the employee suffered severe hand injuries while using a power table saw that lacked a safety guard. The failure to provide the safety device was in violation of state and federal law, the employer had been forbidden to use the machinery in question until federal standards had been complied with, and, despite earlier accidents, the employer did not provide the requisite guards, and even threatened to dismiss employees who refused to work at the unsafe machines. The other two actions were brought by representatives of decedent employees. The complaint also raised the matter of the employer’s noncompliance with safety laws.

The West Virginia compensation law provides that employers are liable if injury arises from their “deliberate intent.” The case law, however, drew a line between deliberate intent and gross negligence, holding that employers were immune from suit absent proof of “specific intent” to injure an employee. Absent that proof, the injury would be attributed to negligence, and the employer would retain statutory immunity. Through the years, a number of bills were proposed in the state legislature that would have provided for a more lenient standard, such as a showing of willful, wanton, and reckless employer misconduct. All failed of passage. The high court’s adoption of precisely this standard in Mandolidis thus might be viewed as an end-play around the legislature— a position taken by that body when, after similar successful suits resulted in substantial awards, it directly nullified the court’s unprecedented construction of the statute’s deliberate intent exception.

Two years later, in Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that an employee could bring suit against an employer who had fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff and his doctors that the plaintiff’s illness was related to asbestos exposure. It was charged that as a result of the defendant’s misconduct, the appropriate treatment was not administered to the employee, who continued to work under conditions detrimental to his health. The ruling, while “heralded as providing important rights for the injured worker,” was narrow in scope. The court held that since the initial injuries arising from the concealment of workplace hazards were foreseeable, the employer could be sued only for an aggravation of injury by deceit, which was not foreseeable. In other words, the ruling did not create an exception to the exclusive remedy requirement that would, in effect, penalize employers for exposing employees to toxic substances that employees would not be aware existed in the workplace environment. Subsequently, the California legislature amended the compensation act to encompass the Johns-Manville holding.

Following Johns-Manville, the question of the employer’s liability for failing to provide a safe workplace was addressed directly in a pathbreaking ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court. Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals (1982) involved a suit brought by employees who alleged that they had been exposed, during the course of employment, to various chemicals that made them “sick, poisoned, and chemically intoxicated, causing them pain, discomfort and emotional distress which [would] continue for the indefinite future . . . causing suffering and permanent disability.” It was further alleged that the chemical company knew of and did nothing to rectify the conditions, failed to warn its employees of the exposure to hazardous substances, and failed to report, as required by law, the hazardous working conditions to the appropriate public agencies. Such actions and omissions, according to the complaint, were “intentional, malicious, and in willful and wanton disregard of [the employer’s] duty to protect the health of its employees.” It was argued that employer knowledge of the hazard and awareness that employees were contracting an occupational disease constituted an intentional tort and not an injury incurred within the meaning of the exclusivity provision of the compensation law. The court agreed.

Two questions, immediately raised by commentators, were left open in Blankenship: both were subsequently addressed in Jones v. VIP Development Co. (1984). The first, answered in the affirmative, was whether an action for an intentional tort could be
maintained even after receiving compensation benefits. The second concerned the meaning of intentional tort. The Blankenship plaintiffs did not claim that Milacron had intended to harm them, but had deliberately failed to provide a safe workplace, and had intentionally failed to notify appropriate agencies of the workplace hazards. While the Blankenship court referred to the Mandolidis "willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct" standard, it was unclear if it had been adopted. Jones held that "an intentional tort is committed with an intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such an injury is substantially certain to occur." Thus, running entirely contrary to case law (Mandolidis excepting), Blankenship and Jones established the novel principle that if an employer had reason to believe that injury would result from an unsafe workplace, had failed to warn employees of the dangers to which they were exposed, and had failed to observe safety laws and report dangerous conditions, the employer would be liable at common law.

Blankenship and Jones (in combination with a series of Ohio Supreme Court rulings that expanded the rights of workers) caused a furor. Amid claims that the court was discouraging new industries from entering the state and driving established industries out, the state legislature revised the compensation act.

The most significant questions addressed for purposes here concern the relationship between compensation benefits and common law awards and the intentional tort exception. On the former, the law provides that if injury, occupational disease, or death occurs through the intentionally tortious acts of an employer, then an employee may collect workers' compensation benefits and bring a cause of action against the employer for an excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under law. Intentional tort is defined as "an act committed to injure another or committed with the belief that the injury is certain to occur." Substantial certainty is defined as an act done with "deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer injury, disease or condition of death." As one commentator noted, "the legislature," while "adopting the framework of the intentional tort as established by the Jones court," produced a definition that "stands in marked contrast." For "substantial certainty is a concept which is distinct from actual intent to injure. Thus, the legislature has seemingly made an apple-orange definition of intentional tort by defining substantially certain as deliberate intent."

The almost inevitable outcome will be that in order for an employee to sue his employer for an intentional tort, the employee must show that the injury was the product of the employer's deliberate intent. The term, "deliberate intent," has largely been defined by negative implication. That is to say, courts using this standard define it in terms of what it is not. Thus, it is not sufficient to show that there was mere carelessness, recklessness or negligence, however gross it may be, because deliberate intent implies that the employer must have been determined to injure the employee. Stated positively, a deliberate intent to injure was defined as "an intentional or deliberate act by the employer to bring about the consequences of the act." [This] deliberate intent standard of an intentional tort is more than merely strict in theory. It is fatal in fact. In the absence of a "left jab to the chin," this standard will preclude an injured worker from recovering for the intentional removal of a safety device or for the intentional exposure of an employee to a dangerous condition. This would appear to be especially true in cases of insidious diseases which remain latent for a period of many years before any manifestation appears.

A Michigan Supreme Court ruling provides the most recent example of a successful judicial "assault" on the exclusivity "citadel." In Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. (1986) the plaintiff, a research chemist, sued to recover for disabilities sustained as a result of his exposure to "agent orange" in the workplace. Wrestling with the definition of "intent," and drawing on Blankenship, the court held that an intentional tort had been committed when the employer knew with "substantial certainty" that working conditions were harmful. ("If the injury is substantially certain to occur as a consequence of actions the employer intended, the employer is deemed to have intended the injuries as well.") On the matter of legislative intent, the court had no compunctions about "theorization."

Including intentional torts within the exclusivity provision would mean that the legislature intended to limit substantially an employee's recovery for intentional injury inflicted by an employer. It would mean that the legislature not only intended to limit the employer's liability but also intended to allow an intentional tortfeasor to shift his liability to a fund paid for with premiums collected by innocent employers. Intentional misconduct would seem to be the type of behavior the legislature would want most to deter and punish. Including intentional torts within the exclusivity provision would, in that sense, be counterproductive because the legislature intended to limit and diffuse liability for intentional torts. Accidents are an inevitable part of industrial production, intentional torts are not.
The legislative response to *Beauchamp* struck what has been regarded as a middle ground. The lawmakers thus resembled their California rather than their West Virginia and Ohio counterparts on this issue. While the statute in question requires specific intent to injure, thus modifying the exclusivity requirement, *Beauchamp* was softened (from the employer's perspective), by defining intent as "actual knowledge than an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarding that knowledge."40

**An Assessment**

At first blush, the significance of the intentional tort cases discussed here may appear negligible, especially since in two of the four states concerned, the legislatures enacted limitations that not only overrode judicial holdings but also bolstered the exclusive remedy of the workers' compensation laws.

What must be kept in mind, however, is that these cases are representative of a movement to "reform" the workers' compensation system, not through legislatures but through courts. Legislative responses to the problems of the workers' compensation system, it is rightly or wrongly alleged, have been influenced more by business and less by employee interests. Courts, prodded by the plaintiff's bar, have, in the classical manner, stepped into the breach. The intentional tort/physical injury/death cases, addressing questions of a duty to warn of novel and insidious dangers in the workplace (e.g., the long-term effects of exposure to toxic substances) and the efficacy of state and federal safety laws, provide the most visible and dramatic examples of judicial efforts to "rewrite" workers' compensation laws.41 The Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals (who dissented in *Mandolidis*) put it this way:

There are certain classes of cases on the frontiers of the law... that are political disputes between interest groups. For example, workers who are injured on the job are constantly going to court in efforts to get the courts to erode the statutory immunity from an ordinary lawsuit that an employer who subscribes to a state workmen's compensation fund enjoys. In many industrial states, courts are nibbling away at immunity in serious accident cases where the employer has failed to follow prescribed safety standards or has ordered workers to do things that are abnormally dangerous. The workers knew that under prior court interpretation of the immunity statutes, they could not recover. They went to court to get new interpretations of these old statutes. ... [Such] efforts to change existing laws can be characterized as "disputes," but they are political disputes rather than the factual disputes courts are theoretically in business to resolve.42

*Mandolidis*, *Blankenship*, and *Beauchamp* are such "frontier" cases, similar perhaps to early products liability cases.43

**The California, West Virginia, Ohio, and Michigan Courts**

The high courts of California, West Virginia, Ohio, and Michigan differ in a number of respects. The California court ranks consistently high in innovation and activism. The West Virginia court has generally ranked near the bottom in these regards. The Ohio court ranks relatively high on tort law activism and between the top and middle on innovativeness. The Michigan court is ordinarily rated very high on tort law activism (surpassing California), fairly high on innovativeness, and, with California, is among the state courts best known for developing a state constitutional civil liberties law. Thus, two of the courts showing aggressiveness with regard to the intentional tort exception are among the nation's most active generally. The California high court took a cautious approach to the subject. The Michigan Supreme Court, which generally enjoys leadership status, took its bearings from courts that do not have a similar reputation. Thus, in at least this area of the law, there is an uncertain correlation between how a court is characterized and what a court actually does. Further comparison of the four courts is illuminating.

Members of the California high court are selected by a variant of the merit selection system. Justices are nominated by the governor, must be approved by at least two members of a judicial nominating commission, and face voters in two retention elections. If successful after the second election, justices serve a 12-year term and are eligible for any number of terms thereafter. While there is disagreement about which judicial selection method produces the most qualified justices, there is no gainsaying that the California Supreme Court has produced more than its share of both luminaries and outspoken policy advocates. The court has long been regarded as a leader, not only among state courts, but vis-a-vis federal courts as well. Since the dual capacity exception to the exclusivity requirement was initiated in and has been nurtured in California, *Johns-Manville* should not be considered surprising; what may be surprising is the court's reluctance to permit a common law action for the initial injury, as contrasted to the aggravation of the injury. On the other hand, the court might well have believed that the California legislature would take the concerns raised in the compensation cases seriously. The *Johns-Manville* doctrine, as noted earlier, was incorporated by statute. Although the legislature eliminated the dual capacity doctrine, it
did permit worker suits under circumstances that had previously invoked the dual capacity doctrine.\textsuperscript{44}  

West Virginia justices are selected in moderately competitive judicial elections, and are, for the most part, Democrats. Interim appointees of Republican governors are almost invariably defeated when they must run for election. Furthermore, “West Virginia voters have split their tickets when necessary to express short-term policy preferences at the gubernatorial level while relying on their more permanent allegiances at the judicial level.”\textsuperscript{45}  

Beginning in 1976, following the election of three new justices to the five-member court, the court commenced to take an activist stand more generally and in workers’ compensation cases specifically, showing “little reluctance to substitute the majority’s assessment of the evidence for the factual findings of the workmen’s compensation appeal board.” More precisely, between January 1977 and September 1978, the court held in favor of the employee in 49 out of 50 cases. In most, if not all of these cases, the court “redefined well-settled statutory interpretations,” and “entered areas not ordinarily considered within the scope of appellate review.” A court, long Democratic, began to respond to new claims, and to assume a sympathetic posture toward working people.\textsuperscript{46}  Indeed, as the dissenting Justice Richard Neely pointedly commented, “the court was ready, willing and eager to effectuate change.” A fair reading of the majority opinion implies to me that this court has been waiting for years to remove the yoke of oppression from the workers of this state by providing a vehicle for recovery of common law jury awards for negligently inflicted, work-related injuries in addition to the admittedly parsimonious awards of workmen’s compensation.\textsuperscript{47}  

Ohio justices are selected in nonpartisan elections that are preceded by partisan primaries, a system unique to the state. From the end of the Second World War to the late 1970s, the appellate judiciary, despite the state’s strong two-party tradition, was overwhelmingly Republican. State supreme court decisions tended to reflect the values of small town and rural interests. Traditional electoral and jurisprudential patterns were abruptly shattered in the late 1970s and the early 1980s when the Democrats obtained first a 4-3 and subsequently a 6-1 majority on the court. The partisan shift was due to concerted efforts of the labor unions to “win” the court, believing that labor’s goals would be more quickly and surely obtained through judicial rulings than through the slow and often unpredictable legislative process. Under the leadership of its controversial chief justice, Frank Celebrezze, the court, as its chief proclaimed, became a “people’s court,” concerned with the “little guy or gal.” The Ohio court reversed a long line of precedents pertaining to restrictions on suits against state and local governments, the rights of tenants and consumers, and workers injured during the course of employment. The court, in a complete turnaround, became prolabor and highly urban in orientation, responsive to its new constituency. Blankenship, Jones, and other labor cases represented only a part, but a highly significant one, of what was described as a “quiet revolution.” The Ohio Supreme Court’s adoption of the intentional tort exception may be attributed to a number of factors. First, the court changed hands, going from one party to another. Second, the labor unions had been instrumental in changing the partisan composition of the court. Third, Chief Justice Celebrezze not only had a judicial agenda, but perhaps hoped to parlay it into political advantage when pursuing his gubernatorial ambition. Finally, a majority of the justices had no difficulty with the concept of an activist judiciary—or at least activist in some areas—and saw no reason why the court should continue to operate in its traditional deferential and self-effacing manner. (In this sense, the court is similar to at least one other state court, that of Alabama, described earlier, which precipitously and completely changed character).\textsuperscript{48}  

Michigan Supreme Court justices, like their Ohio counterparts, are selected in nonpartisan elections. As in Ohio, the partisan primary provides the clue. In Michigan, nomination by political party convention for a place on the ballot, as well as media coverage, performs a similar function. The ascendancy of the Democratic party in the state, coupled with interim gubernatorial appointments, resulted, in the 1950s, in Democratic control of the court. The shift, as in Ohio, prompted substantial changes in the court’s rulings. A court, closely divided on labor management issues, became decidedly prolabor. As Sidney Ulmer observed in his study of the Michigan high court, “it is clear that in workmen’s compensation and unemployment compensation cases, Democratic justice is more sensitive to the claims of the unemployed and the injured than Republican justice.”\textsuperscript{49}  The justices’ party affiliations have been influential in other areas as well, such as criminal appeals and reapportionment. Here, as in the labor cases, dissent rates have not been high, but disagreements on the court have been vociferous. In short, the Michigan high court, like Ohio’s, has reflected the state’s competitive political climate.\textsuperscript{50}  

While the Beauchamp court was Republican-controlled, the ruling, it might be argued, reflects the court’s long-standing approach to workers’ compensation cases. Further, since the legislature was due to
enact a new definition of disability, the time may have appeared ripe to “suggest” further revisions in the workers’ compensation system. The Michigan court, as the opinion and as history indicate, has few compunctions about prodding or even defying the legislature.51

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how one tort law innovation was adopted and dispersed. It also supports the thesis that the patterns of adoption and diffusion of tort law doctrines are idiosyncratic. Further, it supports the thesis that caution should be employed when making assumptions about the characteristics of state supreme courts. Whatever their reputations and traditions—distinguished, ordinary, activist, restrained, bold, timid, leaders, followers, negotiators—state high courts do not always take positions that run true to form. Finally, as Canon and Baum have indicated, and as the Ohio, Alabama, and Michigan supreme courts have demonstrated, a court can, in a relatively short period of time, undergo a radical transformation.

This chapter is not intended to be read as an advocacy for the intentional tort exception, nor as a criticism of the existing workers’ compensation system. Nor is it intended as an argument for a particular system’s many, and often surprising, sources of policy initiatives.

NOTES

2 Ibid., p. 119.
3 Ibid., pp. 123-124.
8 Ives v. South Buffalo Railway, 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
12 A large literature is devoted to the shortcomings of workers’ compensation acts and their administration. For a summary of the problems and useful references, see “Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers’ Compensation Statutes.” For the perspective of a plaintiff’s lawyer, see Allen Wilkinson, “Alternative Theories to Workers’ Compensation: Serving the Injured Worker Better,” Trial (October 1983): 90-97, Amchan, “Callous Disregard.”
13 “Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements,” p. 1648. Friedman and Landinsky expressed concern over the ramifications of accidents, determined by courts to be compensable, that had “nothing to do with the impact of a machine on a man in an industrial setting.” They warned that “if all the tendencies of the case law were followed to their logical limit, then workmen’s compensation would end up covering all illnesses, injuries and disabilities which might somehow be linked to the job either casually, or because they happened during working hours,” “Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents,” pp. 80-82. To a degree, their forebodings have been realized. “Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements”; Wilkinson, “Alternative Theories to Workers’ Compensation”; William Bohyer, Montana Law Review 47 (1986): 157-180; “Exclusivity Provisions of Workers’ Compensation Statutes: Will the Dual Injury Principle Crack the Wall of Employer Immunity?” University of Cincinnati Law Review 55 (1986): 550-571. Many dual injury cases involve alleged employer deceit. See, for example, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980), and discussion, note 33 and accompanying text.
15 For discussion, see chapter 7 of this volume and literature cited, note 25 therein.
16 Discussion of the Alabama high court and cases is based on G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), chapter 3.
Fireman’s Fund at 339-340.
19Cit. at 347, Justices Jones concurring.
20Cit. at 354, Justices Shores concurring.
22Much of the material for this section was drawn from Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation, pp. 30-40.
28“New Jersey: The Legacy of Reform” chapter 5, in Tart and Porter, eds., State Supreme Courts in State and Nation: Canon and Baum, “Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations,” p. 977. Since 1975, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has begun to take a newly activist position in support of changes in the tort law. As a result, no longer can this court be regarded as a bulwark of opposition to tort law activism.” Baum and Canon, “State Supreme Courts as Activists,” p. 101.
30The phraseology derives from a few federal cases and from rulings of high courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, and Oklahoma—all of which have strictly construed the immunity provisions of workers’ compensation statutes. Successful intentional tort suits for physical injury have for the most part, involved physical assault by the employer, an early seminal case being Boek v. Wong Hung, 221 N.W. 233 (Minn. 1930).
33Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 612 P. 2d 948 (Cal. 1980). For an unenthusiastic view of Johns-Manville, see Wilkinson, “Alternative Theories to Workers’ Compensation,” pp. 91-92. The New Jersey Supreme Court has seen fit to punish particularly egregious employer behavior under the dual injury doctrine. Million v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 501 A. 2d 505 (N.J. 1985). In some instances the dual injury doctrine has been held to include nonphysical injuries such as defamation, emotional distress, and employment discrimination and harassment. Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A. 2d 286 (Del. Super. 1982); Seals v. Henry Ford Hospital, 333 N.W. 2d 272 (Mich., 1983); Belanoff v. Grayson, 434 N.E. 2d 717 (N.Y. 1982). The revised California labor code (West’s Supplement 1988) states that “an employee may bring an action at law for damages against the employer... where the employee’s injury is aggravated by the employer’s fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the employer’s liability shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by the aggravation. The proof of respecting apportionment of damages between the injury and any subsequent aggravation thereof is on the employer.”
35Jones v. VIP Development Co., 472 N.E. 2d 1046 (Ohio, 1984). (Emphasis added.) Ohio commentary on the case was mixed, some approving, some disapproving, all somewhat uncertain as to the rule promulgated. “Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemical Co.: Workers’ Compensation and the New Intentional...


38. For an account of the ultimately successful efforts to persuade courts to adopt an important consumer protection doctrine, see William L. Prosser, “The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),” *Yale Law Journal* 69 (1960): 1099-1148 and “The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Products Liability to the Consumer),” *Minnesota Law Review* 50 (1966): 791-848.


40. “Intentional Torts and Workers’ Compensation: Beauchamp v. Dow Chemicals,” *Cooley Law Review* 4 (1987): 707-723, 719, 723. Commentary concluded that “despite [legislative] attacks on judicial activism, the Beauchamp decision had at least one undeniable effect: it prompted action from a legislature which had failed to correct the situation. There was no statutory intentional tort exception before the Beauchamp decision, but since then, Michigan has joined the majority of states in refusing to allow an employer to hide behind the exclusivity of worker’s compensation.” The problem here, of course, is that “intent” has been difficult to define. What one court may regard as “intent,” another may dismiss as an “negligence.”

41. The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, while conceding that lawsuits often presented appealing alternatives to the compensation system, nonetheless cautioned that successful suits required substantial financing, and have “concentrated on [only] a narrow range of issues which encompass a compelling need.” Report, p. 123.


43. See note 38.

44. Much has been written about the California Supreme Court. For an overview, see Mary Cornelia Porter, *State Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren Court: Some Old Inquiries for a New Situation,* in Porter and Tarr, eds., *State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the Federal System,* chapter 1. For the court’s contribution to the development of tort law, see G. Edward White, *The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), chapter 13. The California Supreme Court consistently supported the dual capacity doctrine, e.g. *Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc.*, 637 P2d 206 (Cal., 1981), until the legislature abolished the doctrine. “Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirement of Workers’ Compensation Statutes,” p. 1653, n. 76. In the 1986 judicial election the California high court lost its Democratic, liberal majority. As a result, fewer rulings favoring workers, consumers, tenants, and “underdogs” generally might be anticipated.


48. Discussion drawn from “Ohio: Partisan Justice,” chapter 4, in *Tarr and Porter, eds., State Supreme Courts in State and Nation.* (In 1986, the court, by a narrow majority, was recaptured by the Republicans. Chief Justice Celebrezee did not win reelection.)


The Legislature shall provide for the support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. . . .

*New Jersey Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 14, para. 1.*

Unlike the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of New Jersey, like those of almost all the states, mandates that the state legislature provide for a system of public education. Until recently, however, the meaning of this obligation has remained something of a mystery. Whatever its meaning, historically the states have delegated most of the responsibility for the implementation of this obligation to local school districts. Local school districts carried the principal responsibility for defining the content of education, for its management and supervision, and for its financial support.

This process of delegation raised interesting questions under state constitutions: (1) Was the legislature shirking its constitutional obligations by delegating so much of the responsibility to local districts? (2) Did the unequal distribution of resources among local districts to support education violate the equality or uniformity provisions of state constitutions, or even the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

In 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the last argument, that the school finance law of Texas violated the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. State courts, however, have continued to struggle with state constitutional issues: what is a state's obligation to provide a "thorough and efficient" system of education, and what kind of equality must be guaranteed by a state?

As state courts—and state legislatures—grappled with these difficult constitutional issues, the court opinions and legislative debates raised the broadest questions about the meaning of "equality of educational opportunity," and state legislatures began to enact a wide range of educational reforms as they responded, in part, to court opinions. The consequence has been a reinvigoration of state educational policy, which has spread rapidly throughout the United States.

This chapter will examine the dynamics of that constitutional-political process. This should not be taken to suggest that this particular process is somehow typical of state constitutional-political processes generally, for very little is "typical" in the United States. However, it will demonstrate the continuing importance of state constitutions and constitutional law as the basis of state policy.

*The States and Education: An Historical Perspective*

Of the first 14 American states (including Vermont, which joined the Union in 1791), seven provided for some form of education in their first constitutions. The precise nature of these provisions varied. On the one hand, Section 44 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 seemed to mandate the establishment of schools:

> A school or schools shall be established in each county by the legislature for the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters paid by the public, as may enable them to instruct youth at low prices. . . .

On the other hand, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was ambiguous about the state's obligation:

> Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country and among the different orders.
of the people, it shall be the duty of Legislatures and Magistrates, in all future periods of this Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns. . . .

The Massachusetts Constitution went on to provide that it was the duty of the legislature

... to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and general sentiments among the people.

During the last decade of the 18th century and the first two of decades the 19th, the states began to implement these constitutional provisions. Generally, they enacted two types of legislation: (1) laws encouraging and sometimes even requiring local communities to provide schools, and (2) laws setting up small state schools funds to assist local communities in these efforts. Two great issues emerged out of these experiments in education: (1) Should schools be provided for all children, or only for those from families too poor to afford the tuition at private academies? (2) Should the schools be under public or private control?

By the middle of the 19th century, the proponents of the common school won both of these political struggles. Led by reformers, such as Horace Mann of Massachusetts and Henry Barnard of Connecticut, they succeeded in establishing the dominance of public schools, first in the cities and then in spreading the common school to the countryside. By the 1840s and 1850s, as states rewrote their constitutions, they usually included a provision that the state establish “public” or “common” or “free” schools and that the system be “efficient” or “thorough” or “uniform” or “general” and “open to all.”

In addition, more of the states began to establish permanent school funds for distribution to local school districts, usually on a per capita basis, and created state administrative structures to supervise the growth and operations of the common schools. Naturally, the nature and extent of state involvement varied from state to state, depending on its own tradition and circumstance. However, to the extent that one can generalize at all, it is safe to say that the states’ role was that of encouraging local communities to meet the constitutional obligation for common schools.

By the end of the century, public schools, including some high schools, were in place throughout the nation, and the states’ concern began to shift from the number of schools to their quality.

Beginning with the studies of E.P. Cubberley in New York in the early years of the 20th century, educational researchers found that even with the system of flat, per capita grants, many districts were unable to provide an adequate education. The problem was especially acute in rural areas with low property tax rates. They simply could not generate enough revenue to support adequate schools, especially as the provision of education became more complex and expensive. Therefore, Cubberley and his followers recommended that the states guarantee each district a certain basic, or “foundation” level of education funding, regardless of their local property values. Thus, property-poor districts would receive more state aid than would wealthy ones. The concept spread gradually throughout the states, so that, even today, most states use some form of foundation support.

Although these foundation plans were equalizing, they did not equalize spending among the districts. Indeed, it was never claimed that a foundation plan would lead to equal per pupil expenditures. In fact, Paul Mort argued that every state needed some “lighthouse” districts that could afford the “risk capital” to experiment. Successful experiments, Mort claimed, would gradually be adopted in other, less affluent districts. Even beyond this, the foundation plans were never as equalizing as the reformers hoped they would be. The continuing disparity in school district spending was a consequence of two political necessities. First, the politics of state foundation plans required that all school districts receive some money, so that foundation aid was usually distributed over and above the system of flat grants. Second, the plans provided only for a foundation level of education, and local districts were free to spend beyond that level. Either because of their lack of property wealth or their unwillingness to tax themselves at higher rates, some districts spent only the minimum, or barely above it.

While the states worked to improve their foundation plans, usually by raising the foundation level and by weighing school district needs according to demographic factors and the nature of the student population, dissatisfaction continued to grow, so that by the 1960s a variety of forces coalesced to wage a full-scale legal and political battle against state school finance systems.

Two forces especially seemed to spur this attack. First, the civil rights movement was in full sway, and there was widespread concern for “equality.” Second, property taxes, the mainstay of school finance, had risen rapidly, and there was a growing sense that they were inefficient and fundamentally unfair.
federal courts, it is not surprising that many of the initial attacks on school finance systems were waged in federal courthouses.22

The Federal Courts and State School Finance Laws

One of the first challenges to a state school finance law emerged out of a desegregation controversy in Louisiana. There, a U.S. District Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the state's detailed constitutional provisions for the distribution of state aid violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 In unequivocal language, the court said:

There is simply no right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States in any way being denied by these respondents when they allocate and disburse funds pursuant to the provisions . . . of the Louisiana Constitution.24

Three years later, a U.S. District Court in Illinois was equally abrupt when it rejected an attack on the state's school finance law.25 Here, the plaintiffs claimed that the only constitutionally permissible method for the distribution of state school funds would be "educational need." In rejecting the claim, the court quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' comment that "the Fourteenth Amendment is not a pedagogical requirement of the impractical."26

Similarly, another district court rejected a challenge to Virginia's school finance law,27 commenting that:

... the courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the State.28

The first victory—although a small and temporary one—for the challenges of state school finance laws was in Florida.29 There, the federal court overturned a specific provision of the state's school finance law which had, in effect, placed a limit on local tax rates so that property-poor districts were prohibited from taxing themselves at higher rates so as to provide the same level of school expenditure as more wealthy districts. The court held that this absolute limitation was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment.30

In 1971, there were two more far-reaching decisions. In both Minnesota31 and Texas,32 federal courts struck down state school finance laws as violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reasoning that education is a "fundamental interest," the courts found that there was no "compelling state interest" which could justify the differentials among the school districts' capacities to support education.

However, these victories were short-lived, because, in 1973 in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the federal Court of Appeals in Texas,33 holding that education is not a "fundamental interest," that the relationship between property-poor districts and poor people was too tenuous to justify a "suspect category," and that the state's method of financing education served a legitimate state interest, local control of education.

Much has been written on the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, and there is no need to review that literature here. Clearly, however, one of the Court's major concerns was that of an appropriate remedy. According to one commentator, "[T]he Court majority saw the danger of a Court-dictated financing scheme along . . . simplified lines—one child, one budget, or one school district, one tax base; to the Court, a fearful symmetry."34 Any solution along those lines would raise extraordinarily difficult questions. For example: What is the relationship between equal spending and equal educational opportunity? How could a state deal with the special problems of school districts with high-cost students, or with the unusual costs associated with very densely or very sparsely populated districts? Would the states be forced to "level up" all districts to the level of the highest spending district? Could districts tax themselves at higher rates to provide enhanced educational programs, and thus perpetuate spending inequalities? Or would the states be forced to place some sort of tax or spending cap on the high spending districts? Finally, what would be the effect of a Court-imposed remedy on the tradition of local control? With the rejection of Rodriguez's claim, federal courts were not forced to confront these issues. But as the battleground shifted from federal courts and the U.S. Constitution to state courts and state constitutions, these difficult questions were addressed in many states.

State Courts, State Constitutions, and State School Finance Laws

While the annals of American state constitutional history are filled with taxpayer suits challenging state tax and spending programs, including state and local taxation and spending for public schools,35 the modern period begins with the 1971 decision of the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest.36 In Serrano, the California Supreme Court became the first state supreme court to invalidate a state school finance system on equal protection grounds. Beginning with a determination that education is a "fundamental interest," the court found that the
state’s concern for local control was not compelling enough to meet its “strict scrutiny” test. With regard to local control, the court said:

. . . so long as the assessed valuation within a district’s boundaries is a major determinant of how much it can spend for its schools, only a district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide how much it really cares about education. The poor district cannot freely choose to tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present financing system actually deprives the less wealthy districts of that option.37

Although the court’s opinion implies a financing scheme that will provide equal per pupil spending, the court did not specify a remedy; rather, it merely remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.38

The following year, in Robinson v. Cahill, the New Jersey school finance law was invalidated by the state’s high court, but on an entirely different ground.39 The New Jersey court found that the decentralized method of local school finance violated that provision of the New Jersey Constitution requiring the legislature to provide for a “thorough and efficient system of free public schools.”40 The Court did not define the specific contours of such a “thorough and efficient” system, but did note that:

The constitution’s guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in a contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market.41

Because education is a “fundamental interest,” the Court said, the state must meet its “strict scrutiny” in defining and providing a “thorough and efficient” education.

California and New Jersey were not the only states to consider the constitutionality of their school finance systems. In fact, between 1971 and 1983, the constitutionality of state school finance statutes was considered by 21 different state supreme courts.42 Some were “equal protection” cases, as in Serrano; some were “thorough and efficient” cases, as in Robinson v. Cahill; others raised different state constitutional issues altogether. Whatever the particular allegation, the state supreme courts were fairly evenly divided in their responses: 12 courts upheld the state school finance statutes,43 while 9 held that they violated either the “thorough and efficient” or “equal protection” provision of the state constitution.44

The courts articulated three reasons for rejecting challenges under the “thorough and efficient” clauses: that the clause did not suggest uniformity, that the clause implied only a “basic” education; or that the definition of the clause was best left in the hands of the legislature. For example, the Maryland Supreme Court45 said that the constitutional provision requiring “the Legislature . . . [to] establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient system of free public schools” did not “mandate uniformity in per pupil funding and expenditures among the State’s school districts.”46 In Colorado, the Supreme Court held47 that its nearly identical constitutional provision did not bar such disparities “because that clause should not be interpreted to prevent local districts from supplementing beyond this minimum standard.”48 In almost all of these cases, the courts showed great deference to legislative judgments. For example, in New York,49 where the plaintiffs had argued that the school finance system should consider “municipal and education overburden” in the distribution of school funds, the Court said:

Because decisions as to how public funds will be allocated among the several services for which by constitutional imperative the Legislature is required to make provision are matters peculiarly appropriate for formulation by the legislative body (reflective of and responsive as it is to the public will), we would be reluctant to override those decisions by mandating an even higher priority for education in the absence, possibly, of gross and glaring inadequacy.50

Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court51 rejected a challenge to that state’s school finance system because:

. . . to do otherwise would be an unwise and unwarranted entry into the controversial area of public school financing, whereby this court would convene as a “super-legislature,” legislating in a turbulent field of social, economic, and political policy.52

In decisions based principally on state protection clauses, the courts usually held that education was not a “fundamental interest” and, therefore, that the disparities in school funding and expenditure caused by state finance systems needed to be justified only by a “rational purpose” test. For example, after determining that education was not a “fundamental interest,” the Oregon Supreme Court53 balanced “the interest impinged upon—educational opportunity . . . against the state objective in maintaining the present system of school financing—local control.”54 In Ohio,55 after rejecting the “fundamental interest” contention, the court held that the disparity in funding “is the product of a system that is [not] so irrational as to be a violation of the equal protection and benefit clause.”56 Courts reached similar conclusions in Arizona,57 Illinois,58 Montana,59 and Michigan,60
On the other hand, nine state supreme courts struck down school finance statutes under either state constitutional "thorough and efficient" provisions or "equal protection" requirements. The Constitution of the State of Washington, for example, after requiring that the legislature "provide for a general and uniform system of public schools," goes on to state that "it is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for all children residing within its borders."61 The Washington Supreme Court,62 in striking down the state's school finance law, made an explicit connection between these two provisions, maintaining that:

Flowing from this constitutionally imposed "duty" is its jural correlative, a correspondent "right". . . . Therefore all children residing within the borders of the State possess a "right" arising from the constitutionally imposed "duty."63

The legislature, by delegating so much of the financial responsibility for education to local communities, was shirking its constitutional "duty" and violating the "rights" of state residents. Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court64 had difficulty with the delegation of responsibility to local school districts. In finding the state's school finance law to be unconstitutional, the court commented that "the duty to educate is that of the state; delegating that duty does not discharge it."65 In finding Arkansas' school finance law unconstitutional,66 the Court commented that where local school districts could not provide the "general, suitable, and efficient" education required by the Constitution,67 then the state must.

In the five cases in which state school finance laws were found to violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution, the courts tended to rely on the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in its Serrano decision, finding that education is a "fundamental interest" and that the state's concern with "local control" is insufficiently "compelling" to justify the disparities in funding and expenditure.

Regardless of the basis of the decision, and almost independent of whether the state supreme court upheld or struck down the finance law, the court decisions started a virtual revolution in school finance as state legislatures across the nation were called on to struggle with defining the states' role in education and with creating funding mechanisms that could assure a "thorough and efficient" education.

State Legislatures, State Constitutions, and State School Finance Laws

According to a 1979 study by the Education Commission of the States, "Within the past decade, more that half of the states have passed laws significantly changing the way by which state aid is distributed to school districts."68 In some cases—California, Connecticut, Kansas, New Jersey, and Washington, for example—the legislatures were reacting to state supreme court decisions that had held the old systems to be unconstitutional. In other states—Idaho and Massachusetts—there was the need to address funding problems brought about by citizen-initiated property tax limitations. In most states, however, school finance reform was put on the agenda by a variety of factors, including not only court decisions and tax limitations, but also the need for property tax reform, the research and networking activities of such groups as the Education Commission of the States and the National Conference of State Legislatures, federally funded studies of state school finance systems, and the need to address the special educational requirements of high-cost segments of the pupil population, such as handicapped and bilingual students.69

Thus, school finance reform was not designed merely to equalize per pupil expenditures, although certainly the reform measures were equalizing in this sense.70 The school finance reform measures enacted by the states during the 1970s also addressed taxpayer equity, the high costs of bilingual, compensatory, and handicapped educational programs, and educational improvement generally. It was possible to pursue all of these goals simultaneously because state governments were willing to put substantial new revenues into education. The magnitude of this effort can be gauged by the fact that state spending for education tripled between 1969 and 1979, increasing from under $14 billion to approximately $42 billion. While local spending also increased during this period (from about $18 billion to $38 billion), the state share of the state-local cost of education went from about 43 percent to 52 percent.71 This increase in state support had several consequences for school finance reform.

First, the states were able to "level up" low spending districts toward the levels of the higher spending districts. Many states simply increased their foundation levels and adjusted their formulas so that almost all of the new funding went to the poorer districts. A few states, Utah and Montana, for example, found it necessary to include "recapture" provisions, so that a portion of the "excess" funds generated by wealthy school districts through property taxation went to the state for redistribution to the poorer districts.72 Other states made it difficult for high spending districts to increase expenditures, either by requiring local voter approval or by putting a "cap" on the rate of increase.

Second, the new state money for school finance was often used for property tax relief. Property-poor districts had been forced previously to tax themselves at high rates to meet the rising costs of education. Many states—Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kan-
Third, many states recognized the special high-cost needs of certain school districts and pupil populations. Michigan, for example, recognized the problem of “municipal overburden” by providing additional school aid to all districts in which the noneducational tax rate exceeded the state average by more than 25 percent. Florida pursued the same goal by building a cost-of-living factor into its school aid formula. Other states—Utah, New Mexico, Kansas, Colorado, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, and Texas, for example—adjusted their formulas so as to recognize the special problems of districts with small numbers of students, sparse populations, or rural isolation. States also recognized the high costs of special-needs pupils, either by improving the weighing system in their general aid formulas or by developing targeted categorical programs.

All of these changes took place within the context of continuing school finance litigation. The situation that developed in California is an especially interesting example for the interaction of state courts, state legislatures, and political and fiscal developments generally. After the supreme court’s original Serrano decision in 1971, holding the state’s school finance law unconstitutional, the legislature enacted a palliative measure greatly increasing state funding for education and placing a cap on local school spending. In 1976, the supreme court held that this was insufficient and that the amended law still violated the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. In response, the legislature adopted an entirely new school finance law based on a district power equalizing formula. The new law also contained provisions for a massive program of educational improvement. But nine months later, the voters approved Proposition 13, which effectively eliminated 60 percent of local tax revenues and destroyed the fiscal assumptions underlying the school finance bill. The state legislature promptly passed a series of “bail-out” measures which, in effect, provided more state funding for those districts most affected by Proposition 13. The California Supreme Court upheld the new school finance law, noting that “significant parity” had been achieved because over 90 percent of the per pupil expenditures within the state were within a range of $100.

Nevertheless, the supreme court’s approval of the school finance law did not end the legislature’s redefinition of the state’s role in education. In 1983, Governor George Deukmejian announced that he was willing to support $800 million in new state education aid, but only if there were “structural reforms” in education. The resulting bill combined further school finance reform with fundamental changes affecting both students and teachers. The law, in the words of one commentator, “went beyond the technical periphery of education into the core of the instructional process to set standards on what should be taught, how it should be taught, and who should teach it.” Thus, starting with the fairly straightforward, although complicated issue of “fiscal neutrality,” California began to address the most fundamental questions about the role of the state in education.

Developments in other states, while not as dramatic or well-documented, followed a similar path. In Arkansas, Connecticut, and New Jersey, what began as school finance reform moved quickly to broader questions of school improvement and educational reform. Even in those states where the state high court had upheld the state school finance law, state legislatures felt compelled to deal with matters of school finance and educational improvement. For example, in New York, where the state court had upheld the school finance law, the legislature nevertheless provided $630 million in new state aid for education, the largest single-year increase in state history. In addition, the legislature adjusted the school aid formula to provide greater aid to low-wealth districts. In Texas, where the Rodriguez case originated, the legislature provided $2.8 billion over three years for both equalization and school improvement purposes. Under the state’s new foundation program, “the 71 poorest districts . . . received an additional $220.1 million or an average increase of 46.3 percent; the 176 wealthiest districts . . . lost $21.6 million, a 20.5 percent decrease in per pupil revenue.”

The new state money was directed more at educational improvement than at equalization.

In the words of H. Ross Perot, the chairman of Texas’ Select Committee on Public Education, “A million dollars for reform but not a penny for the status quo.”

In other states where state supreme courts had upheld school finance laws, legislatures nevertheless took second looks at education policies and often made significant financial and programmatic changes. State court decisions and opinions, and sometimes even the threat of court action, were among the many factors that led the states to reconsider school finance and the role of the state in education generally.

Conclusion

According to some observers, “School finance through the local property tax is one of those established institutions that can profit from forced reexamination.” In some ways, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Rodriguez case was regrett-
ble. Perhaps it might have been better if the court had overturned Texas' school finance law and re-
manded it back to the state for a "forced reexami-
nation." Yet, such a ruling would have been prob-
lematic, because it would have subjected the states to
continued supervision by the federal judiciary. Such
a forced reexamination has occurred without federal
court mandates. Referring to the decision of the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Serrano, Judith Areen and
Leonard Ross claim that it "was a bold and, so far as
can be told, singularly successful undertaking, if suc-
cess is defined in the precise sense of forcing a reex-
amination and encouraging a transition to a less ran-
don system ... both in California and elsewhere."

In a complex area like school finance, there may
be important differences between decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court on the basis of the United States
Constitution and decisions made by state supreme
courts on the basis of state constitutions. If the U.S.
Supreme Court had decided Rodriguez differently, it
would have needed to articulate a single, uniform,
national standard—probably either fiscal neutrality
or equal per pupil expenditure. Neither standard
seems flexible enough to accommodate the various
purposes that a well-designed school finance system
must serve, including both tax reform and school im-
provement. However, state supreme courts, whether
overruling or upholding state school finance statutes,
have encouraged a reexamination of the state role in
school finance and in education generally—a reex-
amination that has led to significant changes.

NOTES

1. The constitutions of 40 states clearly mandate that the legis-
    lature "establish," "maintain," "support," or "pro-
    vide for" some sort of system of public schools. There is
    some ambiguity about the constitutions of Iowa, Louisi-
    ana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hamp-
    shire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Ver-
    mont. For example, Article IX, Section 6 of the Iowa
    Constitution provides that "The Legislature shall en-
    courage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intel-
    lectual, scientific, moral and agricultural improve-
    ment" (emphasis added). However, Section 12 of the same Arti-
    cle goes on to require that "The Board of Education shall
    provide for the education of all the youths of the State,
    through a system of Common Schools."

2. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,

3. See Lorraine McDonnell and Susan Fuhrman, "The Polit-
    ical Context of Reform," in Van D. Mueller and Mary
    P. McKeown, eds., The Fiscal, Legal and Political Aspects
    of State Reform of Elementary and Secondary Education
    (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Com-
    pany, 1986), pp. 43-64.

4. The seven were Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, New
    Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Ver-
    mont.

5. It is interesting to note that this mandatory provision was
    not included when Pennsylvania wrote a new constitu-
    tion in 1970; rather, it was replaced with permissive lan-
    guage. See Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution
    in Pennsylvania 1776-1790 (Harrisburg: The Pennsyl-
    vania Historical and Museum Commission, 1971).

6. Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter V, Section II.

7. Ibid.

8. See R. Freeman Butts, Public Education in the United
    States: From Revolution to Reform (New York: Holt,

9. For example, Connecticut established a small school fund in
    1796, funded largely from the sale of public land. New
    York also established a small fund in 1795, but re-
    pealed it in 1800. Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and
    South Carolina established similar small funds between
    1811 and 1817. For more details, see Butts, Public Educa-
    tion in the United States.

10. For an excellent discussion of the role of the private
    academies, see Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy and

11. On the struggle over who should control the schools, see
    Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars: New York City,

12. See Butts, Public Education in the United States.

13. Today, the most popular language is "general and uni-
    form," used by seven states, and "thorough and effi-
    cient," also used by seven states. Other phrases in use in-
    clude "general, suitable and efficient," "thorough and
    uniform," "general and efficient," "uniform," "general,
    uniform, and thorough," "complete and uniform," and
    simply "efficient."

14. In addition to Michael Katz's Class, Bureaucracy and
    Schools, see also his detailed study of developments in
    Massachusetts, The Irony of Early School Reform (Bos-

15. The character of a state's involvement in education ap-
    pears to be a function of its political culture, its pattern
    and time of settlement, and its geography. For a study of
    the continuing impact of these factors on state education
    policy, see Frederick Wirt, "School Policy, Culture and
    State Decentralization," in Jay D. Scribener, ed., The
    Politics of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago

16. E. P. Cumberley, School Funds and Their Apportionment
    (New York: Columbia University Teachers College,
    1923). See also the later work of Cumberley's students, G.
    D. Strayer and R. M. Haig, The Financing of Education
    in the State of New York (New York: The Macmillan
    Company, 1923).

17. John Augenblick, "Taking Stock on School Finance Re-
    form: A State-Level Update," School Finance in the
    1980s (Washington, DC: League of Women Voters Edu-

18. See Paul R. Mort, State Support for Public Education
    (Washington, DC: The American Council on Educa-
    tion, 1933). Mort was also Cumberley's student at COLUM-

19. For a good, brief explanation of foundation plans, see El-
    chanan Cohen, Economics of State Aid to Education
    (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company,

20. The relationship between school district wealth and per
    pupil expenditure continues to evoke controversy. While
    there is a positive correlation between the two, local
    wealth is not the only determinant of spending. For a
    fuller discussion, see Patricia R. Brown and Richard F.
    Elmore, "Analyzing the Impact of School Finance Re-

According to a study by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, citizens rate the property tax as the "least fair." See Changing Public Attitudes on Governments and Taxes 1987 (Washington, DC: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1987), p. 5. In March 1972, the first date for which the data are available, 45 percent of Americans rated the property tax as the least fair.

For a good discussion see, Frederick W. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, Schools in Conflict (Berkeley, California: McCutchen Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 253-276.


Ibid., 260.


Ibid., quoting Mr. Justice Holmes in Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265 (1923), property tax as the least fair. (1965).


Ibid., 572.


See, for example, Sawyer v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169, 83 Atl. 673 (1912); Miller v. Korns 107 Ohio St 287, 104 N.E. 773 (1923), and; Ehret v. School District, 333 Pa. 518, S.A.2d 188 (1939).


Ibid., 1252.

In Serrano v. Priest, 135 Cal.Rptr. 435 (1976), the trial court also found the by then revised state school finance law unconstitutional.


New Jersey Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, para. 1.

Ibid., 295.


Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education.

Ibid., 777.

Lujan v. State Board of Education.

Ibid., 1025.

Board of Education v. Nyquist.

Ibid., 369.

Thompson v. Engleking.

Ibid., 640-41.

Olsen v. Oregon.

Ibid., 155.

Board of Education v. Walter.

Ibid., 821.

Shofstall v. Hollins.


Woodahl v. Straub.

Milliken v. Green.

Constitution of Washington, Article IX, Sections 1 and 2.

Seattle School District No. 1 v. State.

Ibid., 91.

Horton v. Meskill.

Ibid., 816.


Constitution of Arkansas, Article XIV, Section 1.


For an analysis of the forces behind the school finance reform movement, see Susan Fuhrman, State Education Politics: The Case of School Finance Reform (Denver: Education Commission of the States, 1979), esp. pp. 15-20.

There continues to be considerable debate about the "equalizing" impact of school finance reform. For an interesting analysis of the various meanings of equality, see the yearly reports published by the Education Commission of the States under the title, School Finance Reform in the States. See also, John E. Coons, "Recent Trends in Science Fiction: Serrano among the People of Number," in Roy C. Rist and Ronald J. Anson, eds., Education, Social Science and the Judicial Process (New York: Teachers College Press, 1977), pp. 50-71, and Brown and Elmore, "Analyzing the Impact of School Finance Reform."

Computed from data in Allan Odden and John Augenblick, School Finance Reform in the States: 1980, p. 25.

In Buse v. Smith, the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck such a "reapture" provision of the school finance law because it violated the state constitutional requirement for "uniform taxation." On the other hand, the Montana
Supreme Court upheld such a provision in Woodahl v. Strabu.

73 For a description of the politics of school finance reform in California, see Fuhrman, *State Education Politics: The Case of School Finance Reform*, pp. 50-60 and 72-78.


75 Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1986).


77 Ibid., p. 135.


83 Ibid., p. 300.

84 Ibid., pp. 298-304.

85 Ibid., 284.


87 Ibid., p. 55.
Chapter 10

State Constitutional Law: The Ongoing Search for Unity and Diversity in the American Federal System

The invention of American federalism in 1787 represented an attempt to provide for both unity and diversity: unity to meet the foreign and domestic challenges that confronted the new nation, and diversity to accommodate the expanse of the nation and to maintain state and local political arenas in which citizens could make meaningful decisions. In the words of Daniel J. Elazar:

Federalism involved the linking of individuals, groups, and polities in lasting but limited union in such a way as to provide for the energetic pursuit of common ends while maintaining the respective integrities of all parties.¹

The pursuit of both unity and diversity is quite compatible. Unity and diversity are not opposites: the opposite of unity is disunity, while the opposite of diversity is uniformity.

This does not deny the need for some uniformity, although it is clearly secondary to the need for unity. There are ways in which it is desirable to treat individuals uniformly, and certainly there are occasions when the requirements of a national economy mandate uniform rules. For at least three reasons, however, federalism also places high value on diversity. First, diversity in public policies reflects the pluralism of the nation itself, in terms of its complex history, culture, geography, and people. Second, diversity fosters experimentation, allowing states and localities to try out a variety of solutions to increasingly complicated problems. Third, by allowing communities to make important policy choices, we encourage participation and foster democratic citizenship.

However, recognizing the need for both uniformity and diversity does not tell us when to opt for one rather than the other. While common sense and logic are sometimes helpful in sorting out the competing needs for uniformity and diversity, there is no clear, rational formula to make the choice for us. Instead, the choice is left to the political process—to courts, legislatures, and executive agencies.

The Supreme Court and the Search for Balance

The Supreme Court of the United States has played, and continues to play, an important role in balancing the needs for uniformity and diversity. Chapter 2 of this study explored contemporary federalism doctrines of the U.S. Supreme Court and suggests that the Court’s solicitude toward “Our Federalism” may create new opportunities for state economic policies. Although the situation is complex and still evolving, carefully drawn state statutes can pass constitutional muster under the Court’s current doctrines of preemption, the dormant power of the commerce clause, and the takings, due process, and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Similarly, as suggested in chapters 4 and 6, the U.S. Supreme Court seems willing to show greater deference to diversity in crucial areas of state civil rights and liberties policy. The most promising development for federalism in this area is the doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds, under which the U.S. Supreme Court will not review state court decisions if they are based clearly and unambiguously on state, rather than federal constitutional grounds. The obvious implication of this doctrine is that if state policies are to be insulated from federal review, state court judges must base their decisions on their state constitutions.

It needs to be stressed that these Supreme Court doctrines, both in the economic and civil liberties fields, are evolving. One cannot predict how these doctrines will be used in the future. Chapter 2 of this study concluded with Napoleon’s observation that, “The tools belong to the man who can use them.” The U.S. Supreme Court appears to have provided the
states with new opportunities to forge their own constitutional polices. The future of these opportunities depends, in large part, on how the states use them.

State Constitutional Traditions

Not only do state constitutions differ in function and style from the Constitution of the United States, they also differ among themselves. According to Daniel J. Elazar, American state constitutions follow six distinct patterns.2

1. The Commonwealth Pattern. Typical in the New England states, these constitutions “are basically philosophic documents designed first and foremost to set a direction for civil society and to express and institutionalize a theory of republican government. . . . These constitutions, as brief or briefer than the federal document, concentrate on setting forth the philosophic basis for popular government, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the individual and delineating the elements of the state’s government in a few broad strokes.”

2. The Commercial Republic Pattern. This pattern prevails in the Middle Atlantic states and the states to their immediate west. According to Elazar, “These states have built their constitutions upon a series of compromises required by the conflict of ethnic and commercial interests and ideals created by the flow of various streams of migrants into their territories, and the early development of commercial cities. . . . These constitutions tend to be longer than those written in the commonwealth mold, primarily because the compromises written into them have had to be made explicit and presented in detail to soften potential conflicts between rival elements that have sharply divergent views of what is politically right and proper.”

3. The Southern Contractual Pattern. Elazar notes that except for North Carolina and Tennessee none of the southern states has had fewer than five constitutions, and he then goes on to suggest that, “Southern state constitutions are designed to diffuse the formal allocation of authority among many offices in order to accommodate the swings between oligarchy and factionalism characteristic of Southern state politics. Perhaps because of the fluctuating balance of factions in many of the Southern states, their citizens have been more tempted to write into their constitutions materials normally included in ordinary legislation.”

4. The Civil Code Pattern. Reflecting its unique history, Louisiana’s constitutions “have been more like the basic civil codes of European countries—long [and] detailed.”

5. The Frame of Government Pattern. Found among the less populated states of the Far West, these constitutions “are frames of government first and foremost. They reflect explicitly the republican and democratic principles dominant in the nation in the late 19th century when their first constitutions were written, and then go on to specify the structure of state government and the distribution of powers within it in the style of the times. Their constitutions tend to be business-like documents of moderate length and reflect the relative homogeneity of the states themselves.”

6. The Managerial Pattern. Written during the 1950s, the constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii emphasize “conciseness, broad grants of powers to the state executive branch, and relatively few structural restrictions on the legislature. Their constitutions also feature articles dealing with local government, natural resource conservation, and social legislation.”

This typology of state constitutional patterns is useful in many ways, particularly in reminding us that constitutions are not simple technologies that can be transferred from one setting to another. State constitutions, in Elazar’s terms, connect “political ideas, political culture and institutional development.” One finds both uniformity and diversity among state constitutions. Within each state constitutional pattern, one finds identical language and similarities in the application of such political ideas as the separation of powers. On the other hand, across patterns, one discovers considerable diversity in terms of the various purposes of government and the ways in which political authority is distributed, both among the branches of government and between the state and its communities. Furthermore, even identical state constitutional provisions can have different meanings in different contexts. Thus, the phrase “a thorough and efficient system of public education” can take on different meanings within the contexts of different state constitutional traditions.

It is unlikely that this diversity among state constitutions threatens national unity or that a uniformity of state constitutions is either necessary or desirable. The diversity of state constitutions is an expression both of the diversity of the nation itself and of the commitment of American federalism to allow that diversity to be articulated in the most fundamental ways.

State Constitutional Law and Individual Liberties

Whatever the merits of diversity among state constitutions, it is sometimes argued that we cannot accept diversity in matters of individual liberty. Americans, no matter where they live, are citizens of the United States, and must enjoy equally the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. The unstated premise underlying this argument is often the belief that a national definition of rights will expand the scope of individual liberty. The states, quite simply, are not to be trusted in this area.

Chapter 4 of this study explored this argument in some detail. It suggests, first of all, that the definition of rights is not always a matter of more or fewer
rights. Often, it is a matter of resolving a conflict between rights, as in the right of reporters to refuse to reveal their news sources versus the right to a fair trial, and the conflict between free speech and the protection of private property. Different states have resolved these conflicts differently. Most important, where state courts have recognized the legitimacy of the rights claimed on both sides of a conflict, they have struck different balances between them, seeking to accommodate both claims in keeping with its own state constitutional tradition.

Furthermore, the argument that the states are incapable of protecting rights adequately seems to have little merit in the context of the 1980s. Chapter 4 points out that, today, the states often take the lead in defining and expanding individual liberty. Chapter 6, which focuses on criminal procedure, documents the extent to which the states have shown sensitivity to the rights of criminal defendants.

Today, a total dependence on the national government for a uniform definition of rights would, in all likelihood, diminish the scope of individual liberty in the United States. The development of an independent state constitutional law of civil liberties, on the other hand, would not only be likely to expand individual rights but would also encourage experimentation in developing appropriate balances when rights are in conflict.

State Constitutions and Equality

The principal equality provision of the U.S. Constitution is the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." State constitutions, on the other hand, contain a variety of equality provisions, often designed to serve quite different purposes. Chapter 5 of this study demonstrates how state courts have interpreted these state constitutional equality provisions to reach decisions quite different from those reached by the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution. For example, an Illinois court held that the state's no-fault automobile insurance plan, which required the owners of private automobiles to purchase the no-fault insurance but imposed limitations on tort recoveries of persons injured by any type of motor vehicle, violated the Illinois Constitution's prohibition against "special laws," and a New Jersey Court held that the state's prohibition against the use of state money to pay for abortions violated the state constitution, despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had held that such prohibitions do not violate the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution.

Furthermore, while the U.S. Supreme Court has all but abandoned the federal equal protection clause as a defense of property rights, state supreme courts continue to make substantial use of their state constitutional equality provisions to limit state regulation of property. Chapter 7 of this study reports almost 100 cases in the last 20 years in which state courts have struck down state economic regulations as violating state constitutional equality provisions.

However, many people are concerned about the protection of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities—as well as about sex discrimination—under state constitutions. The preceding chapters suggest that the record of the states in this regard has been mixed. On the one hand, chapter 4 points out that 19 states had enacted equal pay laws before the Congress of the United States passed its equal pay law in 1963; that 17 states had fair housing laws prior to the passage of a national fair housing law in 1968; and that 19 states have constitutional prohibitions against sex discrimination despite the failure to add a federal equal rights amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the 1970s. On the other hand, while chapter 5 reports on some major state supreme court decisions under their state ERAs, state supreme courts, by and large, continue to look to the U.S. Supreme Court for leadership in this field. Clearly, the richness of state constitutional equality provisions provides opportunity (and perhaps even a mandate) for state courts, as well as state legislatures and executives, to address these concerns.

State Constitutional Law and the Regulation of Property

Since 1937, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed the states a relatively free hand in the regulation of property. State courts, as chapter 7 reports, continue to play an important role in the forging of state regulatory policy. Employing state due process, equal protection, or right-to-remedy clauses, state supreme courts have struck down more than 350 state statutes since the U.S. Supreme Court all but abandoned the field in 1937. One should not conclude from this, however, that state supreme courts are the captives of powerful, vested economic interests.

First, as chapter 3 of this study reminds us, state constitutions are designed primarily to limit legislative authority. Because the states are the repositories of all power not delegated to the federal government, state constitutions are filled with limitations on the exercise of state power, and go into considerably more detail about the protection of personal and property rights than does the U.S. Constitution.

Second, because state constitutions are much easier to change than is the U.S. Constitution, judicial activism by state judges does not pose the same counter-majoritarian problem as would similar activism by the federal judiciary. State constitutions are amended regularly as the public mood shifts.

These and other arguments about the proper role of the state judiciaries in the protection of property rights are detailed in chapter 7 of this study. However one resolves this difficult issue, it may be that the participation of state judges in the development of state public policies is quite different from the participation of the federal judiciary in state
policymaking. Clearly, the federal judiciary has certain national interests to protect; it must, for example, assure that the economic policies of one state do not discriminate against the economic interests of the other states. On the other hand, state constitutions, written and ratified by state citizens, define the scope of state policy and the role of state courts in adjudicating disputes. Some state constitutions provide very detailed protections of property rights and clearly assign to the judiciary the role of enforcing them. Often, these constitutions are fairly easy to amend, and unpopular state supreme court decisions can be reversed through the amendment process. In a very immediate sense, decisions about the legitimacy of public policy and the role of the courts remain with the state and its citizens.

State Constitutional Law and Public Policy

Not only do state constitutions limit state legislative authority, they also sometimes mandate legislative action. In the two areas of public policy examined in this study—workers’ compensation in chapter 8 and educational reform in chapter 9—both state constitutional limitations and mandates served as the framework for the development of state policy. With regard to workers’ compensation, a few state supreme courts looked to state constitutional right-to-remedy clauses to create exceptions to the exclusivity requirement of their workers’ compensation statutes. In other words, they used a constitutional right as a limit on state constitutional authority. On the other hand, several state supreme courts turned to the constitutional mandate that the legislature provide for “a thorough and efficient system of public education” to strike down what they perceived to be inadequate financing and supervision of public education.

In neither case did the courts act alone; rather, they entered into what might be termed a dialogue with the political branches of government to bring about what many considered to be much needed change. Put somewhat differently, the state supreme courts did not, by themselves, make public policy; instead, by interpreting their own state constitutional limitations and mandates, they placed important policy questions on the political agendas of their states and continued to participate in the policymaking process within the framework of their own state constitutional requirements.

It is also worth noting that these are two important policy areas that remain outside of the purview of the federal Constitution and the federal judiciary. Indeed, in the 1970s, the Congress of the United States deliberately decided not to enact a national workers’ compensation statute, and the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1973, held that the alleged inequities of state school finance schemes did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Thus, the reform of both workers’ compensation plans and school finance systems was left to the states. In both cases, state constitutional provisions and state political processes appear adequate to the task of bringing about significant change.

This lack of federal involvement also raises the issue of what has been termed “horizontal federalism”—the diffusion of innovations among the states without significant participation by the federal government. Judicial doctrines concerning school finance diffused rapidly among the states, while court rulings on workers’ compensation have spread more slowly. In both instances, the states, in adopting these innovations, have adapted them to their own needs and constitutional traditions.

Unity, Uniformity, and Diversity

Every coin of the United States carries the Latin inscription, “E Pluribus Unum”—translated as “one out of many.” This commitment to both unity (the “one”) and diversity (the “many”) captures the value underlying American federalism. The American states function within the overarching framework of the U.S. Constitution and the values it embodies. At the same time, the American states are polities, empowered by the U.S. Constitution to make policy choices in keeping with their own needs, cultures, and traditions. In keeping with this commitment to diversity, the states adopt their own constitutions according to their particular circumstances and govern themselves in conformity with their constitutional choices. As this study has demonstrated, there is considerable diversity in how the states structure their governmental processes and in how state courts interpret these basic charters.

Critics sometimes argue that either the federal Constitution has become so comprehensive that there is little room left for meaningful constitutional choices by the states, or that to the extent that there continue to be gaps in the federal Constitution, they ought to be filled quickly because the states are sure to misuse their power. We hope that this study has answered both of these criticisms and demonstrated that the states have considerable constitutional space, and, by and large, that they use it responsibly.

NOTES

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